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‘The time has come,’ the Walrus said,
‘To talk of many things:
Of shoes – and ships – and sealing-wax –
Of cabbages – and kings –
And why the sea is boiling hot –
And whether pigs have wings.’
— Lewis Carroll,TheWalrus and the Carpenter
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Prashant Parikh has, over the years, accumulated a substantial and impressive
body of work on the nature of language, deploying the resources of game theory.
Communication and content is a vastly ambitious culmination of this lifelong pur-
suit. It covers a tremendously wide range of themes and critically discusses an
enormous range of writing on those themes from diverse intellectual traditions,
as it systematically develops a game-theoretic account of content in the commu-
nicative contexts in which human linguistic capacities are employed, eschewing
standard distinctions between semantics and pragmatics, and offering instead a
highly integrated elaboration of the slogan “meaning is use”. It is a work that is
at once creative yet conscientious, bold yet rigorously technical, systematic yet
sensitive to contingency and context. It will abundantly reward close study.
— Akeel Bilgrami, Sidney Morgenbesser Professor of Philosophy, Columbia Uni-
versity
Prashant Parikh has made fundamental contributions to the game-theoretic anal-
ysis of linguistic meaning. Communication and content summarizes and extends
this important work, offering a truly novel approach to the strategic foundations
of meaning. This approach finds a way out of the prison of methodological solip-
sism and opens up the study of linguistic meaning to scientific study.
— Robin Clark, Linguistics, University of Pennsylvania
Praise for Communication and content
A pioneering attempt to work out things like literal meaning, modulation, en-
richment, implicature, etc. in mathematical detail within a game-theoretic frame-
work.
— François Recanati, Chair, Philosophy of Language and Mind, Collège de France
Communication and content is the crowning achievement of a long line of re-
search pioneered by Prashant Parikh. In this groundbreaking work Parikh in-
troduces a fresh perspective on natural language pragmatics, by making a cre-
ative tie with game theory. Clearly written, Communication and content weaves
together semantics, game theory, and situation theory to create a thought-pro-
voking picture of natural language pragmatics. Every modern AI researcher in-
terested in the foundations of natural language pragmatics owes it to him- or
herself to become familiar with this picture.
— Yoav Shoham, Computer Science Department, Stanford University
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Part I
Introduction

1 Why communication is central to
meaning
There aremany kinds of things in the world.There are individuals such as planets
and stars, ants and humans, tables and chairs, and books and civilizations. Each
of these individuals has an infinite number of properties such as having a size
and shape or being more or less complex. And these individuals also stand in
relations such as a planet circling a star, an ant being smaller than a human, a
chair being beside a table, or a book belonging to modern times. Complexes of
these, individuals having properties or standing in relations, form infons, and
collections of infons form situations, parts of the world we occupy as agents
and move about in. A situation may contain the earth circling around the sun,
a person on earth sitting at a desk writing a book, and a scurrying ant. Such an
inventory, consisting of individuals, properties, relations, infons, situations, and
some other kinds of entities, makes up reality.
All agents, whether ants or humans, carve up reality and create an informa-
tional space or ontology to navigate the world.That is, while the entities in such a
space are part of reality, they need to be individuated as distinct entities for them
to become part of an agent’s informational space. An ant does not individuate a
mountain just as a person may not discriminate between two shades of blue.
In carving up reality, one of the key things agents do is discover or create con-
nections or constraints between two or more items of information such as, say,
smoke and fire or an utterance and its content. When such a connection occurs
with a certain regularity, we call it a meaning. Indeed, we say that smoke means
fire and, likewise, that an utterance of “There is a fire” in suitable circumstances
means there is a fire in some situation. Reality is full of such constraints or mean-
ings. Science, broadly construed, is just the attempt to comprehend them and, in
this sense, it can be said to be the search for meaning.
1.1 Semantics
This vast domain of constraints in reality can be roughly divided into natural and
artificial, that is, those that are independent of humans and those that depend on
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them. Smoke meaning fire is a natural constraint and an utterance of “There is a
fire” meaning there is a fire in some situation is an artificial constraint.
Some artificial constraints like the one above involve symbol systems that en-
able a person to represent one object by another and convey this to another per-
son. A traffic light tells one to stop or to go. Representation does not just exist in
the world; it requires agency. It appears that a symbolic consciousness emerged a
few hundred thousand years ago with the Neanderthals, or possibly much earlier
with Homo erectus, although this has yet to be confirmed.
Semantics is or ought to be the study of symbol systems. In some traditions,
this discipline is called semiotics or semiology. My use of “semantics” is consid-
erably broader than simply the representing of utterance content as in formal
semantics.1 One of the most complex symbol systems is (verbal) language and
so semantics has often come to be more narrowly identified with the study of
linguistic meaning. A study of four traditions – Sanskrit, Greek, Hebrew, and
Arabic – reveals that semantics emerged as an independent discipline roughly
three thousand years ago from the exegesis of mostly religious texts and con-
cerned the relationship between language, reality, and knowledge.2 Its original
context was communicative, initially between people and divine powers when
the world itself was largely read as signs from above. Today, semantics belongs
primarily to philosophy, linguistics, psychology, and artificial intelligence, and
derivatively to other fields, each studying it from different points of view and
with different ends. The reason for its wide scope is that symbolic meaning is
central to life itself.
Arguably, its main problem is to understand how language acquires mean-
ing. How is it that an utterance, whether spoken or written, carries one or more
meanings from a speaker to an addressee? Because language has so many varied
devices to convey meaning, this turns out to be a very large question made up of
very many subquestions. To follow some parts of this problem, consider a simple
puzzle concerning names.
1.2 A classic example
Consider the following sentence:
(1) Hesperus is Phosphorus. (𝜓 )
1I say more about this in Section 5.4.
2See van Bekkum et al. (1997: 286). See also Deutsch & Bontekoe (2007) for other traditions.
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1.2 A classic example
Many readers will recognize 𝜓 as a variant of a sentence considered by Gott-
lob Frege (1892/1980), perhaps the founding figure of modern semantics. A first
attempt at apprehending its content might be to say that a name refers directly
to the object it names. For 𝜓 this would imply that both the words hesperus
and phosphorus refer to the planet Venus. Because is can be taken to stand for
equality, we can infer that 𝜓 asserts the same thing as “Hesperus is Hesperus.”
But this is a problem because the latter utterance is a trivial identity whereas 𝜓
involves an empirical discovery. This is Frege’s puzzle of informative identities:
how can we explain the new information conveyed by 𝜓?
Frege’s solution was to posit an intermediate layer of meaning called the sense
of each name and the object Venus they both stand for would be the reference.
His idea was that every name expresses a sense which in some cases leads to a
reference. Though the referents of the two names in 𝜓 are identical, their senses
are different, the first being the evening star and the second being the morning
star, and it is these different senses that capture the cognitive significance of 𝜓
unlike the trivial identity “Hesperus is Hesperus” where even the senses are the
same.This solution runs into insuperable problemswithmore complex sentences
although his two-tier account of meaning was on the right track. For now, I want
to point out a pivotal thing he left implicit.
He did not sufficiently articulate the distinction between a sentence and an ut-
terance. A sentence – like a word – is an abstract object whereas an utterance of
a sentence is an action performed in some situation. Everyone knows the differ-
ence between the two but Frege mentioned it mainly when he discussed force.3
But it is vital even for his theory of sense and reference because a sentence by
itself does not have a content: it is only when it is used appropriately in an ut-
terance situation that it acquires a content. It appears to us that 𝜓 has a content
only because we implicitly evaluate it as an utterance in some unspecified but
familiar situation. But a little thought would reveal that in a different situation
a speaker may be referring to the figure in Greek mythology who was a person-
ification of the evening star and not to the evening star itself. In other words,
hesperus is ambiguous and the addressee needs to know which meaning is in-
tended. Differently put, Frege abstracted from its use and assumed the meaning
of interest to him. A more complete theory would have to start by showing first
how the utterance is disambiguated.
Frege and the logicist tradition he inaugurated correctly identified reference
as a key property of language. In so doing, the ideal language philosophers suc-
ceeded in stating one of the two main subproblems of semantics: how does lan-
guage relate to reality, how does it connect with the world? The other main
3By “force” Frege meant assertion or other such acts performed as part of uttering a sentence.
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subproblem, bequeathed from ancient times, concerns the possible knowledge it
brings about. But by sticking to sentences and ignoring utterances they left out
the key means to their solution: the use of language – or communication. Just as
Frege did, many who followed him chose to abstract from communication and
focus on particular linguistic devices and their problems, as we have just seen
with the puzzle of informative identities. They did this generally by employing
truth as a way to get at meaning because Frege had pointed to a truth value as
the reference of a sentence. It was the later Wittgenstein (1953/1968) followed by
Austin (1961; 1975) and Grice (1989c) and other ordinary language philosophers
who realized the importance of seeing language as a situated activity but did not
quite succeed in unraveling this elusive concept.4
It would seem there are two ways to approach the connection between lan-
guage and world. One is to break down language into various constructions such
as noun and verb phrases, select some specific devices, and create a framework
to see how they work via their truth conditions. Some adherents still stick to
sentences as the bearers of truth values but many have shifted to utterances be-
cause the situated nature of language makes the former increasingly difficult as
the field advances and more details come into view.
The other is to recognize that unless one first fathoms simple cases of commu-
nication in their full complexity across a number of devices, one cannot create a
general framework that will be able to address the many problems they raise in a
uniform way. And doing so allows us to largely avoid the tricky notion of truth
because meaning would be derived from its use in communication.
The first approach is bottom-up and the second top-down. There is a grave
danger that the first will lead to a proliferation of incompatible theories presup-
posing different views of meaning at a more foundational level. My view is that
once communication and content are understood thoroughly with simple con-
structions in a general way, it will be much easier to tackle more complex con-
structions with an elaboration of the same tools so that the many subquestions
of semantics all cohere into an integrated solution to its main problem.
4See the fascinating account by Sen (2003) of how the economist Piero Sraffa (and indirectly
the political theorist Antonio Gramsci) may have influenced Wittgenstein in making his cele-
brated move from his early logicist ideas to his later use-based ideas. As Sen puts it, “Wittgen-
stein told a friend (Rush Rhees, another Cambridge philosopher) that the most important thing
that Sraffa taught him was an “anthropological way” of seeing philosophical problems. In his
insightful analysis of the influence of Sraffa and Freud, Brian McGuinness (1982: 36–39) dis-
cusses the impact on Wittgenstein of “the ethnological or anthropological way of looking at
things that came to him from the economist Sraffa.” While the Tractatus tries to see language
in isolation from the social circumstances in which it is used, the Philosophical Investigations
emphasizes the conventions and rules that give the utterances particular meaning. The con-
nection of this perspective with what came to be known as ‘ordinary language philosophy’ is
easy to see.”
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From a related but different vantage point, Dummett (1996: Chapter 3) offers
the following insights.
In fact, it is by grasping what would render [a sentence] true that we appre-
hend what it means. There can therefore be no illuminating account of the
concept of truth which presupposes meaning as already given: we cannot
be in the position of grasping meaning but as yet unaware of the condi-
tion for the truth of propositions. Truth and meaning can only be explained
together, as part of a single theory. (page 15)
⋮
Or, at least, they have to be explained together so long as Frege’s insight
continues to be respected, namely that the concept of truth plays a central
role in the explanation of sense. On this Fregean view, the concept of truth
occupies the mid-point on the line of connection between sense and use. On
the one side, the truth-condition of the sentence determines the thought it
expresses, in accordance with the theory developed by Frege and adapted
by Davidson; on the other, it governs the use to be made of the sentence
in converse with other speakers, in accordance with the principles left tacit
by both of them.That leaves open the possibility of describing the use directly,
and regarding it as determining meaning, relegating the concept of truth to
a minor, non-functional role. [my italics] This was the course adopted by
Wittgenstein in his later work. The concept of truth, no longer required to
play a part in a theory explaining what it is for sentences to mean what they
do, now really can be characterized on the assumption that their meanings
are already given. (page 19)
⋮
Rather than characterizing meaning in terms of truth-conditions, and then
explaining how the use of a sentence depends upon its meaning as so char-
acterized, this approach requires us to give a direct description of its use:
this will then constitute its meaning.
The disadvantage of this approach lies in its unsystematic nature. This, for
Wittgenstein, was a merit: he stressed the diversity of linguistic acts and of
the contributions made to sentences by words of different kinds. System-
atization is not, however, motivated solely by a passion for order: like the
axiomatic presentation of a mathematical theory, it serves to isolate initial
assumptions. A description of the use of a particular expression or type of
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sentence is likely to presuppose an understanding of a considerable part of
the rest of the language: only a systematic theory can reveal how far linguis-
tic meaning can be explained without a prior supply of semantic notions.
The ideal would be to explain without taking any such notions as given:
for it would otherwise be hard to account for our coming by such notions,
or to state in any non-circular manner what it is to possess them. It is un-
clear from Frege’s work whether this ideal is attainable. The indefinability
of truth does not, of itself, imply the inexplicability of truth, although Frege
himself offered no satisfactory account of elucidations that fall short of be-
ing definitions. Perhaps the concept of truth can be adequately explained
if a substantive analysis of the concepts of assertion and of judgement is
feasible: but Frege leaves us in the dark about this. Wittgenstein, equally,
leaves us in the dark about whether his programme can be executed: it is
another disadvantage for the repudiation of system that it leaves us with no
way of judging, in advance of the attainment of complete success, whether
a strategy is likely to be successful. (pages 20–21)
Dummett provides a further reason to pursue meaning via communication:
to sidestep the interdependence of truth and meaning. My approach squarely
pursues the possibility of describing use directly and deriving meaning from use.
However, contraWittgenstein’s “repudiation of system” I will attempt a complete
and systematic account of communication and meaning.
There is a third advantage to reducing meaning to communication. It allows us
to see meaning as a natural phenomenon as opposed to something otherworldly.
With the truth-conditional strategy, this possibility remains murky at best. Grice
(1989c) may have been the first person to outline a concrete program for such a
reduction even though its details are different from my approach. I discuss his
framework in Chapter 5.
Lastly, ever since the later Wittgenstein mentioned it, various writers have
been trying to pin down the normativity of language and meaning. I will try to
show that even this intangible property emerges more clearly once communica-
tion is grasped in a precise way.
1.3 A snapshot of semantics
Communication has at least six dimensions: its contextual or situated nature, its
involving actions or utterances and interpretations, its encompassing epistemic,
practical, and social interactions between speaker and addressee, and its being
computationally tractable. For the moment, they can be understood intuitively.
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Table 1.1 displays how some prominent approaches to communication fare
against these dimensions.
Table 1.1: Summary of theories of communication
Logicism Wittgenstein Austin Grice Lewis
context marginal implicit implicit implicit implicit
action partial yes yes yes yes
epistemic interaction no no implicit yes yes
practical interaction no implicit no no partial
social interaction no no no no no
computable no no no partial partial
The table identifies how different frameworks deal with the how of communica-
tion, not the what. It deals with its process rather than its content. Two distinct
“yesses” in the same row do not imply that both accounts do equal justice to the
dimension. As will become clear, my framework – called Equilibrium Semantics
– scores a “yes” in all rows except the one pertaining to social interaction, where
it scores a “partial” rating.
1.4 Equilibrium Semantics
Building on my booksThe Use of Language (2001) and Language and Equilibrium
(2010), I present a new framework in this book that can serve as a core part of
a science of communication usable primarily by philosophy, linguistics, and ar-
tificial intelligence, and also perhaps by cognitive and social science, especially
economics, and related disciplines. I will try to show that themodels I develop are
not only philosophically sound and mathematically solid but also computation-
ally tractable and empirically adequate, and I will connect them to the subjects
above in multiple ways. The nature of communication is such that I will also
have to draw upon insights from these diverse areas, especially philosophy, lin-
guistics, psychology, and economics. This poses a challenge for both the writer
and reader, as I have to strive to make all of it accessible and you may have to
take an interest in occasionally unfamiliar ideas, concerns, and methods. But I
believe the journey will be well worth the effort as I offer a substantial advance
on the state of the art with results that are both more general and more precise.
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In my view, the mathematics best suited for modeling communication com-
prises certain innovations in game theory and situation theory that I have de-
scribed earlier and that I add to here.
Informal game-theoretic thinking is quite old, going back to classical times
in multiple cultures. Possibly its modern roots can be traced to Machiavelli and
Hobbes. Its first formal results were obtained by Zermelo (1913) in connection
with the game of chess. As Myerson (1991: 1) says, interactive decision theory
might have been a more descriptively accurate name for the theory as it allows
one to consider practical and epistemic interactions between people in a compu-
tationally tractable way.
Lewis (1969) was the first to introduce game theory into semantics but he used
rather simple games from Schelling (1960) and viewed them as dispensable scaf-
folding. At this early moment, game theory was not seen as offering a framework
that could partly replace logic. The Austin-inspired idea of use conditions as an
alternative to truth conditions was often entertained but such conditions were
also seen as a part of logic.
As I have shown in my dissertation Language and Strategic Inference (1987b)
and since, game theory allows one to discard such logically stated use condi-
tions and offer precise mathematical derivations of content instead. This work,
together with some aspects of Lewis’s way of modeling games, has led to a small
but growing field in recent times with many papers and also books such as Benz
et al. (2006), Pietarinen (2007), Clark (2011), and Benz et al. (2011). Shoham &
Leyton-Brown (2009: Chapter 8) describe some of my ideas in the context of
distributed systems. The key difference between some of the game-theoretic lin-
guistic approaches that have emerged and my framework is that the former are
largely orthodox Gricean and the latter is not, as will become especially clear
in this book. This has meant that the former have focused mainly on deriving
Gricean implicatures whereas I have tried to derive literal meaning as well.
The theory of situations was originally developed by Barwise & Perry (1983)
and Barwise (1989d) and drew upon ideas from Shannon & Weaver (1949) and
Austin (1961/1979a). It is essentially a qualitative account of information and I
have already described some of its key ideas informally, especially the idea of a
situation which forms the context for an utterance. Later we will see how it also
allows us to capture the content of an utterance in a very general way.
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I will confine myself to language although the primary means by which we
convey meanings5 to one another include words, images, and gestures. Indeed,
gestures preceded words and images in our evolution. My account can be ex-
tended straightforwardly to images and gestures as well as to other symbol sys-
tems and so will also be of interest to the corresponding fields.
One of my aims in this book is to show how little needs to be assumed to
construct a science of communication, mainly facts about ontology, the partial
rationality of agents, and a language and its grammar and phonetic system. I
want to do this in an informally foundational way so I will introduce various
concepts when they are required, in a more or less linear fashion. I will therefore
start with information as the most basic “building block” instead of plunging
directly into communication.
A science of communication rests on a science of information for two reasons.
The first is that the world is information as such and we are embedded in it.
Communication therefore occurs within an informational space and cannot be
understood without it. The second is that communication involves conveying in-
formation in one form or another even when we ask questions, issue commands,
or express feelings. It relays content and has an effect and both are informational,
although the former affects us cognitively and the latter may involve the whole
person. So I begin with a brief tour of this pervasive landscape.
5I will use “meaning” and “content” interchangeably in many contexts although I will also use
“content” more widely to include the grammatical and phonetic structure of the sentence ut-
tered. There will be times when I will explicitly distinguish conventional meanings from refer-
ential meanings, the latter being the same as semantic contents.
11

2 Information and agents
2.1 Information
I started the first chapter with a quick description of an informational space. I
elaborate on it here.
2.1.1 Philosophical background
Reality is all the stuff that makes up the world, not only the tables and chairs in
it but also a table’s being white and a chair’s being black. Perhaps Wittgenstein
(1921/1961: 5) put this insight most grandly: “The world is the totality of facts, not
of things.” I include both facts and things as well as other entities.
Reality is sliced up differently by different living things, partly because they
possess different kinds of bodies and partly because they have different concerns.
That is, ants, dogs, and humans individuate and discriminate reality in different
ways,1 both at a basic categorial level that is constant across a species and at
a more fine-grained level that varies with each agent. Individuation involves an
analog-to-digital conversion, possibly along with an application of symbols to re-
ality.2 Discrimination involves just an analog representation without any digital
conversion.
So ants may see one facet of reality, dogs another, and humans a third, each
based on a distinct perceptual and cognitive apparatus. And two persons may
further individuate their shared ontologies in contrastingways, as happenswhen
one sees the proverbial glass as half full and the other as half empty. Ontologies
depend on reality and so cannot be arbitrary and must also be compatible with
1See Devlin (1991: Chapter 2). For some evidence of this, see Carruthers (2004).
2When some information is in analog form, there is always more specific information about
the object also present. Digital information is the most specific information about an object
in a representation. If someone says a cup has coffee in it, this information is in digital form;
when a picture of the cup is shown instead, the same information is in analog form because it
conveys many more specific facts, such as the extent to which the cup is filled, what kind of
cup it is, and so on. See Dretske (1981: 177). The analog/digital distinction is related to but not
the same as the continuous/discrete distinction. The former could perhaps be thought of as a
generalization of the latter.
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one another. That is, if a real glass is in fact half filled with water, one cannot
without error see it as only a third full, but one can see it as either half full or
half empty. An informational space can be viewed as a coordinate system an
agent uses to orient itself in reality.
People find themselves in a “world” or environment from the start, as the phe-
nomenological tradition3 has emphasized. This is not the entire world or all of
reality but a small part of it. This observation seems obvious but the analytic
tradition of Frege and Russell missed it and missed its profound consequences.
First, in all social matters and especially in the domain of communication, this
environment or context or background is indispensable. Even today, a century
later, its presence in the study of meaning is stubbornly resisted by many. Less
obvious is the fact that our informational space, a subspace of our environment,
results from society’s interaction with reality partly via communication.4 Third,
this context of communication often has indeterminate boundaries and this re-
sults in many other uncertainties. Once individuated, each informational item
is linked with others that form its context, although in formal domains such as
mathematics and physics this context is more determinate. For example, a cer-
tain fact may be true of equilateral triangles and then this condition forms the
context for the fact. In everyday life, the context is less determinate.5
There is a premature rush among analytically minded researchers to secure the
respectability of science and it is not realized that their abstractions often miss
the essence of the problem. A glaring example of this is the fundamental differ-
ence between a sentence and an utterance, something Wittgenstein (1953/1968),
Austin (1961), and Strawson (1956; 1964) were the first to emphasize. When ap-
proaching the social sciences, one has to straddle both their abstract and concrete
sides, and recognize that a complete science may not be possible because of the
indeterminate and partly unstructured nature of context. And yet, as I will show,
a remarkable degree of scientific success is possible if the task is approached
in the right way. Surprisingly, philosophers especially, despite their desire to
emulate the sciences, have often kept away from relatively new mathematical
tools such as game theory and have continued to rely on commonsense insights.
This is seldom the way of science. Earlier philosophers invented and used the
then-most powerful methods of logic but most contemporary philosophers have
largely avoided the more modern techniques of game theory.
3See Spiegelberg (1981). Also Husserl (1913/1967: 68–71) andHeidegger (1927/1962: Division One).
Husserl’s situatedness is more cognitive whereas Heidegger’s encompasses the whole person.
4This interaction among persons, language, and world was described in what I called equilib-
rium metaphysics in Section 7.6 of Language and Equilibrium.
5Taylor (2013: 85–86) discusses this Heideggerian holism in the context of the evolution of mod-
ern epistemology.
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As we move about, we encounter parts of this environment that we carve out
as situations. From situations, we extract states of affairs or infons, informational
complexes consisting of individuals having properties and standing in relations
to other individuals. That is, situations are just more or less indeterminate col-
lections of infons and there are often multiple situations within an agent’s en-
vironment. There are further uniformities such as types and parameters that we
abstract.6 Perceptual information is transformed into cognitive information in
our ongoing experience that keeps identifying and classifying new situations as
we act in the world. Our sensory/perceptual awareness of situations tends to be
analogical and our partial classification of them by infons digital.7 In practice,
we extract a fair bit of digital information from our surroundings but a great
deal is omitted.8 These entities – situations, infons, properties and relations, in-
dividuals, types, parameters, propositions, constraints – form our partly shared
informational space.9 Such information enters the science of communication in
two ways, via the context of communication and via the content of communica-
tion.
6This book will not be dealing with such entities much, if at all, as I plan to use situation theory
relatively informally here. They are described more fully in my previous book, Language and
Equilibrium.
7Most classical Indian philosophies held that “perceptionmust be of two kinds, each correspond-
ing to a stage of its unfolding: at first a nonconceptual, nonlinguistic taking-in of whatever is
presented to the senses, and then a conceptual, linguistic, predicative cognition in which the
entities presented to the senses are knit together as qualifier and qualified.” See Mohanty (2007:
31).
8During this conversion, there is always a loss of information because not all that is taken in
is digitized, and language can handle only the digitized part. When we want to describe seem-
ingly ineffable aspects of our thoughts – like the glimmer of an idea – we have to digitize some
of our analog information. That is why articulating our ideas and experiences is seldom easy.
Such a gap between word and world, possibly responsible for some of our sense of alienation,
becomes most evident in the arts. Dance is relatively analog and literature is relatively digital,
so when we try to capture our experience of dance in words, we sense correctly that we are
losing a lot of information. That is why we say a picture is worth a thousand words.
9As Quine (1960; 1969a,b) has noted, the possible ontologies social groups can individuate are
not unique. For example,Quine (1969b: 4–5) says: “English general and singular terms, identity,
quantification, and the whole bag of ontological tricks may be correlated with elements of
the native language in any of various mutually incompatible ways, each compatible with all
possible linguistic data, and none preferable to another save as favored by a rationalization
of the native language that is simple and natural to us.” However, as I say in Parikh (2010:
Section 7.6), it is not necessary to accept Quine’s conclusions about radical indeterminacy
because while many ontologies may be possible, only very few are optimal, as equilibrium
processes eliminate all the suboptimal ones. The ontologies that remain are therefore likely to
be identifiable and inter-translatable, and radical indeterminacy can be avoided. Similarly, the
classical Buddhist doctrine of dependent originationmaintains that reality is conventional, that
is, socially constructed and nonunique, and becoming aware of this conventionality is the key
to attaining wisdom. See Garfield (1995: 87–94) and also Mohanty (2000).
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I generally use the word information for the entire ontological space, includ-
ing both true and false propositions and also entities that are neither true nor
false. Dretske (1981; 2003; 2009) and Israel & Perry (1989) use it just for proposi-
tions that are true. Computer scientists, linguists, psychologists, and others use
it for both true and false propositions. There is some warrant for both of these
senses in ordinary usage, and my more inclusive meaning is a little nonstandard,
but it is useful when accounting for titles of books such asThe Problems of Philoso-
phy or Anna Karenina, or unfinished utterances, or pictures of objects such as an
apple or a ball, or similar uses of symbols that are “nonpropositional.” My notion
is coextensive with “content” but this word usually involves some representation
whereas “information” need not.
2.1.2 Situation theory
The version of Barwise & Perry’s (1983) situation theory I offer here is my own,
its main innovation being partial infons. I use it relatively informally in this book
so I give just an outline here.10
Consider an utterance of bill smith ran in some utterance situation 𝑢. To
analyze it, we would need to represent the content of bill smith, the content of
ran, the content of the whole sentence, and possibly other things. It is partial
infons and full infons that enable us to do this.
Situation theory allows us to model partial information in a very fine-grained
way. There are individuals 𝑎𝑖 and 𝑛-ary relations 𝑅𝑖 . Basic infons are (𝑛 + 4)-
tuples ⟨⟨𝑅; 𝑎1; … ; 𝑎𝑛; 𝑙; 𝑡; 1 ⟩⟩ made up of individuals standing in relations at
certain locations 𝑙 and times 𝑡 with the last item, the number 1, being its polarity,
indicating the relation holds.11 Partial infons such as ⟨⟨𝑅; 𝑎1; 𝑎3 ⟩⟩ or even ⟨⟨ 𝑎1 ⟩⟩
are legitimate infons. Any arguments from the full infon ⟨⟨𝑅; 𝑎1; … ; 𝑎𝑛; 𝑙; 𝑡; 1 ⟩⟩
can be omitted. For example, the content Bill Smith ran can be expressed partially
as ⟨⟨ ran; Bill Smith ⟩⟩ or more formally as ⟨⟨𝑅ran; 𝑏 ⟩⟩ where 𝑅ran is a relation,
𝑏 is an individual, and the location and time and polarity have been dropped.⟨⟨Bill Smith ⟩⟩ or ⟨⟨ 𝑏 ⟩⟩ is also a partial rendition of this content and is just the
10The curious reader who wants to know more can refer to Parikh (2010). It is interesting to
compare situation theory with semantic nets and studies by Sanskrit grammarians dating back
to the first millennium BCE and up to the 18th century CE. As discussed by Briggs (1985), the
latter two have a number of parallels. Situation theory is similar. For example, in an utterance of
“John cooked the food and burned his mouth,” Sanskrit schemata and semantic nets represent
the missing information (that cooking involves heating food and heated food when eaten can
burn a mouth) explicitly in the analysis of the utterance. Situation theory handles it in the
same way.
11The polarity can also be 0 indicating the relation does not hold.
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individual Bill Smith. This is the same as the identity between 7 and (7) in arith-
metic. The angled brackets serve to gather the arguments.
Partial infons are not existentially quantified over the “missing” arguments
because they are separate entities in their own right that can be merged with
other appropriate partial infons in the right circumstances. In this sense, there
are no missing arguments as such. More complex infons are formed from these
basic infons via the operation of merging and they are all collected in the setI . As I will not be much concerned with the internal structure of infons in this
book, I will assume the operation ofmerging or unification parametrized by some
situation 𝑠 on I is given.This operation ⊙𝑠 , abbreviated to ⊙, is neither associative
nor commutative and has the identity 1which stands for no information and zero
0 which stands for contradictory information. The product 𝜎 ⊙ 𝜏 is often written
𝜎𝜏 .12
The relation between a situation 𝑠 and an infon 𝜎 that holds in it is written
𝑠 ⊨ 𝜎 or 𝜎 ∈ 𝑠, and is described by saying 𝑠 supports 𝜎 or 𝜎 holds in 𝑠. The infor-
mation expressed by ⊨ is special and 𝑠 ⊨ 𝜎 is called an (Austinian) proposition.
Only propositions can be true or false or indeterminate, the last in borderline
cases involving vague terms as discussed in Chapter 11 or when the relevant
infon is partial; infons by themselves do not admit of truth values. Utterances
typically convey multiple propositions although these are usually multiple in-
fons relative to a common described situation. I will show in Chapter 15 how
propositions actually have a more general form because the infons in them may
occur probabilistically.
Recall that a partial order over I , the space of infons, is a binary relation⇒ℓ
over I which is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive; that is, for all 𝜎 , 𝜏 , and
𝜐 (i.e. the Greek letter upsilon) in I , we have:
Reflexivity: 𝜎 ⇒ℓ 𝜎
Antisymmetry: If 𝜎 ⇒ℓ 𝜏 and 𝜏 ⇒ℓ 𝜎 then 𝜎 = 𝜏
Transitivity: If 𝜎 ⇒ℓ 𝜏 and 𝜏 ⇒ℓ 𝜐 then 𝜎 ⇒ℓ 𝜐
A partial order⇒ℓ on I that captures the relation “is at least as informative as”
or “is at least as strong as” is assumed. Certain infons are naturally more informa-
tive or stronger than others. For example, ⟨⟨𝑃 crimson; 𝑎 ⟩⟩⇒ℓ ⟨⟨𝑃 red; 𝑎 ⟩⟩where 𝑎
is some physical object because anything crimson is also always red. So the first
infon is stronger than the second. Likewise, ⟨⟨𝑃 spinster; 𝑎 ⟩⟩ ⇒ℓ ⟨⟨𝑃 female; 𝑎 ⟩⟩
12The interested reader is referred to my previous book, Parikh (2010: Chapter 2), for more details
about ⊙.
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where 𝑎 now stands for a person. It is also true that ⟨⟨𝑅; 𝑎; 𝑏 ⟩⟩ ⇒ℓ ⟨⟨𝑅; 𝑎 ⟩⟩.
If 𝑅 is the relation of eating, then if 𝑎 is eating 𝑏, 𝑎 must be eating. Likewise,⟨⟨𝑅; 𝑎; 0 ⟩⟩⇒ℓ ⟨⟨𝑅; 𝑎; 𝑏; 0 ⟩⟩ because if 𝑎 is not eating, then 𝑎 is not eating 𝑏. In
each case, the infon on the left is more informative than the infon on the right.
Intuitively, it is clear that if we have two items of information, say, that 𝑎 is red
and 𝑏 is blue, then it is possible to combine these states of affairs in two obvious
ways, by conjoining or disjoining them. With this in mind, the partially ordered
set (I ,⇒ℓ) is further assumed to be a lattice, which is a partially ordered set in
which every pair of elements has a unique supremum (called their join)13 and a
unique infimum (called their meet).14 Let ∨ and ∧ be the induced join and meet
operations. If 𝜏 = sup{𝜎, 𝜎 ′}, then 𝜏 = 𝜎 ∨𝜎 ′, and if 𝜏 = inf{𝜎, 𝜎 ′}, then 𝜏 = 𝜎 ∧𝜎 ′.
A lattice is complete if all of its subsets, finite or infinite, have both a join
and a meet. There is no reason to restrict ∨ and ∧ to finite subsets so we assume(I ,⇒ℓ) is complete. The supremum of (I ,⇒ℓ) is denoted by 1 and the infimum
by 0. Intuitively, 1will hold in any situation because every situation supports “no
information” vacuously, and 0 will not hold in any situation because no (coher-
ent) situation can support contradictory information. 1 and 0 are just the identity
and zero elements for ⊙.
Since I now has the two binary operations ∨ and ∧, we assume each distributes
over the other. That is, it is assumed that 𝜎 ∧ (𝜏 ∨ 𝜏 ′) = (𝜎 ∧ 𝜏) ∨ (𝜎 ∧ 𝜏 ′) and
𝜎 ∨ (𝜏 ∧ 𝜏 ′) = (𝜎 ∨ 𝜏) ∧ (𝜎 ∨ 𝜏 ′).
A valuation on I is a real-valued function 𝑣 ∶ I →ℝ such that 𝑣(𝜎) + 𝑣(𝜏) =
𝑣(𝜎 ∨𝜏)+𝑣(𝜎 ∧𝜏). A positive valuation is one where 𝜎 ⇒ℓ 𝜏 implies 𝑣(𝜎) < 𝑣(𝜏).
Ametric lattice is a lattice with a positive valuation and the correspondingmetric
is given by:
𝛿(𝜎, 𝜏) = 𝑣(𝜎 ∨ 𝜏) − 𝑣(𝜎 ∧ 𝜏)
Valuations and therefore metrics always exist on distributive lattices and so one
can define a metric 𝛿 on I . Our interest will be in situated metrics that depend
on some situation 𝑠. In other words, the valuation 𝑣 the metric would correspond
to would be a situated valuation. I will use this kind of metric in Chapter 21.
I will use the following concept in Chapter 19. A nonempty subset F of I is
called a filter if
1. 𝜎, 𝜏 ∈ F implies 𝜎 ∧ 𝜏 ∈ F ,
2. 𝜎 ∈ F , 𝜏 ∈ I and 𝜎 ⇒ℓ 𝜏 imply 𝜏 ∈ F .
13The supremum or least upper bound of a pair of elements, if it exists, is the least element of I
that is greater than or equal to each element of the pair.
14The infimum or greatest lower bound of a pair of elements, if it exists, is the greatest element
of I that is less than or equal to each element of the pair.
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For all situations 𝑠 and all infons 𝜎 and 𝜏 , the following facts hold:
1. 𝑠 ⊭ 0 and 𝑠 ⊨ 1.
2. If 𝑠 ⊨ 𝜎 and 𝜎 ⇒ℓ 𝜏 then 𝑠 ⊨ 𝜏 .
3. 𝑠 ⊨ 𝜎 ∧ 𝜏 if and only if 𝑠 ⊨ 𝜎 and 𝑠 ⊨ 𝜏 .
4. 𝑠 ⊨ 𝜎 ∨ 𝜏 if and only if 𝑠 ⊨ 𝜎 or 𝑠 ⊨ 𝜏 .
Extensions are just the sets corresponding to properties or relations relative to
some situation. Perhaps the most common type of extension is {𝑥 ∣ 𝑠 ⊨ ⟨⟨𝑃; 𝑥 ⟩⟩},
which is the set of objects satisfying the property 𝑃 in situation 𝑠. We can define
𝑒(𝑃, 𝑠) to be the individual 𝑎 when the condition 𝑠 ⊨ ⟨⟨𝑃; 𝑥 ⟩⟩ yields one object 𝑎
and the set {𝑥 ∣ 𝑠 ⊨ ⟨⟨𝑃; 𝑥 ⟩⟩} otherwise. This entity 𝑒(𝑃, 𝑠) occurs frequently in
the study of noun phrases.15 When no object has 𝑃 in 𝑠, 𝑒(𝑃, 𝑠)will be the empty
set. More formally:
(2) 𝑒(𝑃, 𝑠) = {𝑎 if there is exactly one object 𝑎 having 𝑃 in 𝑠{𝑥 ∣ 𝑠 ⊨ ⟨⟨𝑃; 𝑥 ⟩⟩} otherwise
When one situation 𝑠 (or situation type s) involves another 𝑠′ (or s′), there
is a constraint between them, written 𝑠 ⟹ 𝑠′ (or s ⟹ s′). Constraints can
be nomic, conventional, or of other types. They provide the mechanism through
which agents perceive, infer, and act in the world and were introduced in Chap-
ter 1 to account for meaning. Equilibrium Semantics can be compactly expressed
as a system of constraints.
2.2 Agents
Our situated agents are finite in their capacities, have a range of concerns, and
constantly face choices their environments make available. When concerns are
articulated digitally as infons, they become goals. All agents have a complex and
shifting hierarchy of concerns and goals, from survival at the top that is gener-
ally always present to very particular ones at the bottom such as a desire16 for ice
cream in some situation. An agent’s goals can be equivalently expressed as pref-
erences between situations, for example one in which he is eating ice cream and
another in which he is not. It is convenient to use both goals and preferences
15See Chapter 26 and also Parikh (2010: Chapter 6).
16I use goal, desire, wish, purpose, and other synonyms interchangeably to relieve the tedium of
repetition.
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when discussing communication, remembering that we can translate between
them.
When the choices afforded by a situation become articulate and explicit, they
form, together with the agent’s beliefs and preferences, a situated choice problem
for the agent. When it involves just the agent by himself, it is a situated decision
problem, and when it involves other agents, it is a situated game.
A situated game is a structure involving a set of situations along with a set
of players, a set of interlinked choices of action for each player in alternative
situations, and each player’s preferences (or payoffs) for every combination of
choices the players may select. That is, a situated game is a multi-person interac-
tive situated decision problem. Being (partly) rational, agents try to do the best
they can given how the other players may choose, and such a jointly optimal
choice for each player is called an equilibrium.17
2.2.1 A simple example
Suppose two agents or playersA and B are trying to meet in Manhattan without
being able to communicate with each other first. Assume they could meet either
at Grand Central Station which is closer to both of them or at Penn Station which
is further away. If they go to different stations, neither benefits. Such a situation
can be captured by the matrix in Figure 2.1.18
(2,2) (0,0)
(0,0) (1,1)
Grand Central Penn Station
Penn Station
Grand Central
Figure 2.1: A coordination game 𝐺 in normal form
In the game 𝐺, A has the two choices indicated in the two rows, either to go
to Grand Central or to Penn Station, and B has the same two choices indicated in
the two columns. Their respective payoffs are mentioned in the four cells of the
17The words “best” and “optimal” are meant to be synonymous with “equilibrium.” It is common
to distinguish between an optimal choice and an equilibrium choice in game theory because
an optimal choice, if evaluated in the absence of what other players may do, can diverge from
the equilibrium. I just mean the best a player can do given the other players’ (best) choices.
18Almost this very game was first considered by Schelling (1960). Throughout, I have used “he”
forA and “she” for B as two-person game theory naturally lends itself to two pronouns, mak-
ing it easier to differentiate between the agents.
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matrix, the first number being A’s payoff and the second being B’s in each cell.
If both agents go to Grand Central they get a payoff of 2 units, if they both go to
Penn Station they get 1 unit, and if they end up at different stations they get 0.
Both A and B are rational and prefer more payoff units to less but each of them
can only select their own action even though the outcome depends on what they
both do. As we will see later, this is exactly the situation with communication
where the outcome depends on both the speaker and the addressee.
Thus, both players have to choose a course of action based on what the other
player will choose. This sort of interactive choice structure represented as a pay-
off matrix is called a game in normal or strategic form. This particular game is
also called a coordination game because both agents have compatible payoffs and
there is no conflict, that is, they do not value the same outcome differently. By
varying the payoffs it is possible to generate a range of games even in this simple
two-player, two-choice setting. In general, there can be more than two players
and more than two choices of action for each player. In some sense, 𝐺 is one
of the simplest nontrivial games where some interesting interactive phenomena
occur.
Once a game like 𝐺 is set up the next step is to see how rational agents want-
ing to choose the best action would act given that the other agents want to do
the same. The resulting optimal strategies are called the solution to the game.
Studying the solution process formally involves a number of definitions of terms
like strategy, equilibrium, and the like as well as somewhat subtle analyses.
The key idea behind one prominent kind of solution is that optimal actions
should be such that no agent will want to deviate from them unilaterally. If A
were to choose Grand Central then it is optimal forB to choose the same and vice
versa. IfAwere to choose Penn Station then it is optimal forB to choose the same
and vice versa. In other words, both (Grand Central,Grand Central) = (GC,GC)
and (Penn Station,Penn Station) = (PS,PS) are pairs of actions that neither
agent will want to deviate from unilaterally. They possess a kind of stability. On
the other hand, both (GC,PS) and (PS,GC) are, in this sense, precarious pairs of
choices because both agents will want to shift their strategy. Each can do better
by a unilateral change to a different action. For example, with (GC,PS)A would
benefit by shifting to Penn Station because A would then receive 1 instead of 0
and, likewise,Bwould benefit by shifting to Grand Central becauseBwould then
receive 2 instead of 0, assuming the two agents do not both shift simultaneously.
If any single agent can do better by a unilateral change to a different strategy then
that pair would not be selected as optimal. A pair of strategies that is immune to
any such unilateral deviation by any agent is called a Nash equilibrium.19
19See Nash (1951), Myerson (1991: Chapter 3), Watson (2002: Chapter 9) or Parikh (2010: 78).
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(GC,GC) and (PS,PS) are Nash equilibria and such solutions always exist in a
large class of games but they are often not unique.This requires ways to eliminate
certain equilibria that are counterintuitive from a commonsense viewpoint. In
𝐺, both agents would be better off by selecting (GC,GC) rather than (PS,PS)
because they would both receive higher payoffs, (2, 2) rather than (1, 1). Such
Nash equilibria that make at least one player better off without making any other
player worse off are called Pareto-Nash equilibria.20
I will use both these equilibria extensively in the games I construct to model
communication. The optimal utterances and interpretations of speakers and ad-
dressees form Pareto-Nash equilibria although the details are more complex as
the games required to understand communication are subtler than 𝐺.
A different way to express 𝐺 is via the so-called extensive form where each
agent’s actions are laid out sequentially in an interactive decision tree as shown
in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Extensive form for 𝐺
The nodes labeled 𝑠, 𝑡 , and 𝑡′ are situations and the idea is that an initial situa-
tion consisting of various infons results in some action by A and leads to a new
situation which is followed by a further action by B leading to a third situation
where payoffs are distributed to the two agents. So, for example, 𝑠 may result
in A going to Grand Central leading to a new situation 𝑡 and then B may also
go to Grand Central leading to a third unlabeled situation where both agents re-
ceive a payoff of 2. And similarly for the other three paths through the game tree.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 capture the same choices and payoffs.
The new element in Figure 2.2 is the oval enclosing the situations 𝑡 and 𝑡′. This
oval is called an information set and represents the epistemic state of B after
20See Parikh (1987b; 2001; 2010).
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A has chosen his action, Grand Central or Penn Station. Because we assumed
the two agents cannot communicate their choices, B does not know what A
chose to do. She cannot distinguish between 𝑡 and 𝑡′. This translates into two
requirements: there must be the same choices available to B at both 𝑡 and 𝑡′
because otherwise she could tell the two situations apart, and she must make
the same choice in 𝑡 and 𝑡′ because she is in the dark about where she is in
the information set.21 Every situation where a choice has to be made by either
agent belongs to an information set. The oval represents B’s information set.A’s
information set is trivial because he has just one choice situation 𝑠 and it alone
belongs to an information set which we do not bother to identify.
Consider Figure 2.3 where a slightly different game 𝐺′ is shown with the same
choices and payoffs as 𝐺 but with different epistemic properties.
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Figure 2.3: Extensive form for 𝐺′
In 𝐺′ there is no oval which meansA’s choice of action is communicated to B
and so she can distinguish between 𝑡 and 𝑡′ and make different choices in each
of the two situations. Differently put, B now has two information sets, one con-
taining 𝑡 and the other containing 𝑡′. If A chooses Grand Central, B would find
herself in 𝑡 and knows this, and so can choose Grand Central, and if A chooses
Penn Station, B would find herself in 𝑡′ and again knows this, and so can choose
Penn Station. It is an easier game for both agents to solve as they don’t need
to anticipate each other’s choices. This is one of the ubiquitous reasons commu-
nication is so useful because society consists of a large number of games and
communication makes them easier to solve. But communication itself involves
21There is a third requirement involving one situation in an information set not preceding an-
other but I will ignore it as this possibility does not arise in the two-stage games we will be
considering.
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solving various games and so must be addressed first. 𝐺 and 𝐺′ are constructed
from situations and so are situated games, structured sets of situations as I said
above.22
2.2.2 Common knowledge
We have seen how the extensive form makes certain internal epistemic con-
straints on the agents explicit via information sets. Once knowledge and belief
enter the scene, it becomes evident that both agents need to at least know the
whole game 𝐺 itself. In fact, they need to have shared knowledge of the choices
and payoffs and of the interactive structure. The particular kind of shared knowl-
edge required is called common knowledge.23 It is interesting that this notion
first arose outside of game theory in the context of communication itself, show-
ing indirectly that there is some intimate link between games and communica-
tion.
There are two approaches to characterizing common knowledge.The orthodox
idea, originating in Schiffer (1972) and standardly used in game theory following
Aumann (1976), is that common knowledge of a fact 𝜎 is iterated knowledge of
𝜎 :A knows 𝜎 , B knows 𝜎 ,A knows B knows 𝜎 , B knowsA knows 𝜎 ,A knowsB knows A knows 𝜎 , and so on. This remains the mainstream approach. The
shared situation approach, originating in Lewis (1969: Chapter II, Section 1) and
made serviceable by Barwise (1988; 1989a), is as follows: A and B have common
knowledge of 𝜎 just in case there is a situation 𝑠 such that (a) 𝑠 ⊨ 𝜎 , (b) 𝑠 ⊨A knows 𝑠, and (c) 𝑠 ⊨ B knows 𝑠. Keep in mind that “⊨” can be read simply
as supports or contains and “A knows 𝑠” as A knows all the facts in 𝑠. When a
situation is relatively limited, it is quite common for an agent in that situation to
know all the facts in it and thereby to know the situation itself.
Gintis (2000: 14) and others have argued against the possibility of common
knowledge of the infinitely iterated kind for finite agents because it involves an
infinite mental representation. I agree with them but when two ordinary human
interlocutors are copresent, their copresence is surely common knowledge be-
tween them, and so this can only be explained by the shared situation approach,
which involves only finite structures. IfA knows 𝑠, then A knows each fact in 𝑠,
and soA knows 𝜎 andA knows B knows 𝑠. This means therefore thatA knowsB knows 𝜎 . If this is continued indefinitely, it follows that the situational concept
22Watson (2002) is an introductory text on game theory. Also see the Appendix for more on
situated games.
23The interested reader can see Parikh (2001: Section 5.3) where I discuss the motivation for
common knowledge in detail.
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implies the infinite chains of knowledge in the orthodox concept and so satisfies
the intuitive requirement for common knowledge without its explicit mental rep-
resentation. As Lewis (1969: 53) has said, “Note that this is a chain of implications,
not of steps in anyone’s actual reasoning. Therefore there is nothing improper
about its infinite length.” So common knowledge can be made plausible for finite
agents.24
Common knowledge can be either conscious, nonconscious, or semiconscious.
It typically arises from perceptual and other situations we share with others and
then is maintained by our ongoing actions and communication. When A com-
municates something to B on the basis of some initial common knowledge, then
the content communicated and related facts also become common knowledge
and the process continues with an expanded base. Part of such growing common
knowledge is retained and becomes their shared background information which
is no longer directly perceptual. As members of society, agents can count on such
shared information as part of their common knowledge.25
When common knowledge is used later, 𝜎 will be substituted by, say, 𝑔 for
the situated game under consideration. The agents will be said to have common
knowledge of 𝑔 as a situated game is a structured set of situations and situations
are collections of infons which makes a situated game a structured collection of
infons. This structure can itself be expressed via infons because infons involve
entities standing in relations. Thus, a situated game is just a large collection of
infons and so agents having common knowledge of situated games is the same
as agents having common knowledge of all the infons comprising them.
24There is a mild cost to the shared situation approach. It requires the assumption of circular or
non-well-founded situations where a situation may contain itself as a constituent. See Barwise
& Etchemendy (1986). See also Fagin et al. (2003: Section 11.5) for a fixed-point approach to
common knowledge. And see Clark & Marshall (1981) for the iterated approach.
25This has been a basic leitmotif of all my work. See, for example, Parikh (2001: Section 6.4). It
has also been a fundamental idea in dynamic semantics as represented in, for example, Kamp
(1981), Heim (1982), and Gronendijk & Stokhof (1991). However, as I pointed out in Parikh (2010:
5), “most of these developments remain squarely within the tradition ofMontague-inspired for-
mal semantics where the focus is on finding appropriate meaning representations rather than
on deriving intended and optimal meanings through use. Discourse representation theory, file
change semantics, and dynamic logic are concerned more with the results of the communica-
tive process than with communication itself, with the what rather than with the how. They
address what Austin (1961/1979b) called the perlocutionary act and effects of communication,
not the locutionary and illocutionary acts and the securing of uptake and understanding. As
such, they do not appear to question the syntax-semantics-pragmatics trichotomy and pipeline
view of meaning bequeathed by Morris (1938) and Grice (1989c) despite their undoubted tech-
nical accomplishments.” Also, the notion these accounts use is that of common ground which
is a little different from common knowledge. See Stalnaker (2002).
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I have defined common knowledge in terms of knowledge so a quick word
about knowledge is in order. It is best explained as informationally caused belief,
and belief as information carried in “completely” digitized form, as argued in
Dretske (1981: 86, Chapters 7 and 8).26
2.2.3 Context
Our being situated agents implies that there is always a context when we com-
municate. A core aspect of this context, called an utterance situation, plays a
profound role in communication, both in particular instances and in the large-
scale evolution of language. It is seldom precisely specified or specifiable as the
boundaries of situations are generally indeterminate. It contains all the ambient
information that agents can draw upon in deciding what to say and inferring
what has been communicated. There are other situations that are also part of
the context such as a described situation, multiple resource situations, and a dis-
course situation made up of a sequence of utterance situations, but I will not
need them much here. I will also often use “utterance situation” and “context”
interchangeably. A central part of an utterance situation is a certain set of games
that will be introduced in the next chapter.
I have given a brief description of our informational space and situation theory
and, based on this, of agents and games and common knowledge and utterance
situations. With these preliminaries, we are now ready to take a synoptic look at
communication.
26In this sentence, the first use of “information” pertaining to knowledge stands for factual in-
formation and the second use of “information” pertaining to belief stands for propositional
information that may be false.
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Communication in the small and in the large is a roughly circular process in a
manner reminiscent of Dilthey’s famous hermeneutic circle. In the small, I have
shown in Language and Equilibrium how the interdependence of speaker and ad-
dressee as well as the mechanism of conveying and interpreting meaning make
communication circular. In this book, I develop this theme further. In the large,
this circularity is amplified because communication in society is ongoing and
because such societal communication consists of smaller, interlocking conversa-
tions. That is, the conversations are linked with one another via the shared con-
ventional meanings of words which emerge, in turn, from these conversations.
The smaller model focuses on dialogues between two (or more) participants and
describes what I callmicro-semantics; the larger model focuses on several such in-
terconnected micro-semantic models and describes what I call macro-semantics.
3.1 Micro-semantics
I start by showing a snapshot of the intricate process that occurs in micro-seman-
tics in an utterance situation:
Utterance Situation
Setting Game
→ A’s wish to elicit some response from B
→ Content Selection Game
→ A’s equilibrium content
→ Generation Game
→ A’s equilibrium utterance
→ Interpretation Game
→ B’s equilibrium content
→ Content Selection Game
3 A picture of communication
→ B’s equilibrium response
→ Back to the Setting Game
I now proceed to explain these terms in more detail.
3.1.1 The Setting Game
A widely prevalent picture of communication starts with something the speaker
wishes to convey. This is only partly correct. A more accurate starting point is
that the speaker and addressee are involved in some interaction and this utter-
ance situation or setting induces the speaker to affect the addressee either by
conveying information to her and triggering a corresponding belief or by elic-
iting information from her or, more generally, by getting her to act or react in
some way. It may happen that the speaker does not care about the addressee’s re-
sponse but even here the conveying and reception of information is still desired.
This setting will generally be a game or decision problem of some kind. For
example, A and B may be discussing where to eat and A may wish to influenceB’s choice. Such a situation, involving multiple options and involving possibly
differing preferences for them, may take many forms, one of which may be the
agonistically dubbed game Battle of the Sexes.1 Its normal form typically looks as
shown in Figure 3.1.
(3,2) (0,0)
(0,0) (2,3)
Restaurant one Restaurant two
Restaurant one
Restaurant two
Figure 3.1: A Battle of the Sexes game in normal form
The payoffs in such a Setting Game reflect the explicit or implicit goals and
subgoals of the agents. Someonemay have said something earlier like “Why don’t
we eat out tonight?” which makes their joint goal explicit. Or the goal may have
evolved implicitly. These goals are similar to what Roberts (1996) calls “domain
goals.” They may be either cooperative or conflictual.
The Setting Game is crucial for a theory of communication because it contains
information, especially about the agents’ goals, some of it shared, that constrains
1Practically every textbook on game theory considers this game, which is almost as widely
known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
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the future actions of both participants and helps in explaining them. There is of-
ten a hierarchy of goals in the utterance situation. For example, their joint goal
may be to eat out but this leads to A’s subgoal to influence B’s choice of restau-
rant based on the payoffs in the Setting Game which reflect their preferences for
different restaurants.
The Setting Game takes place in the utterance situation and results inA’s wish
to elicit some response fromB as indicated in the snapshot above.This desiremay
lead A to select some content to convey to B.
3.1.2 The Content Selection Game
Based on how A wishes to affect B,2 he considers the suitability of various con-
tents—not utterances yet. As human beings are only partly rational, a speaker
may not deliberate on all the relevant choices, only a few or possibly just one.A’s pondering possible contents and the responses each would elicit from B re-
sults in a kind of game that seems superficially like what is called a signaling
game.3 But it will soon become clear why Content Selection Games are in fact
very different from signaling games. For the moment, notice that in the latter the
first player, the so-called sender, has to choose among a set of possible signals
he can send. Signals are just utterances but in the Content Selection Game the
sender has to decide among a set of contents, so while our game may look similar
to a signaling game, it is different in substance.
2Other “external” factors such as the presence of eavesdroppers may also constrainA’s choices.
3A signaling game is a particular kind of game among many different types of games studied in
game theory. It starts with a randommove by “Nature,” that is, a kind of abstract device like the
flip of a coin, which results in the first player, the Sender, acquiring some private information
that the other player, the Receiver, does not know. The task of the Sender is to convey this
private information to the Receiver by choosing one of a set of signals or utterances. The task
of the Receiver is to take some action that affects both players based on the signal received.
The first signaling games were invented by Lewis (1969). They were later studied by Spence
(1973), Crawford & Sobel (1982), and Kreps (1986).
Some in the game-theoretic linguistics community combine features of signaling games
with my former partial information games. For example, David Lewis was interested in the
emergence of meaning and so he used initially meaningless utterances. Those writing since
2003, such as Robert van Rooij, Gerhard Jäger, and Anton Benz, were analyzing implicature
and so could not assume initially meaningless utterances. So they adopted the idea from my
games that the speaker’s intentions constrain the range of sentences available, and related
assumptions. I have compared signaling games and my games in several places and so I dis-
cuss such issues briefly in this book. The important point is not how different my games are
from signaling games but whether the substantive structures employed are useful to compare
directly or not. Besides, these theorists employ an orthodox Gricean framework, something I
criticize in detail in Chapter 5. I hope readers from this community will find it useful to relate
the substantive structures and ideas I offer to their frameworks.
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I will call this structure the Content Selection Game because in it the primary
task for the speaker is to select the best content from his choices and the primary
task for the addressee is to select her best response from her choices. Concretely,
ifAwants to influenceB’s choice of a restaurant, hemay have to choose between
a content like should we go to Bar Boulud? or like should we go to Bar Boulud? we
haven’t been there in a while. The latter are contents, not sentences, and italics
will be used to refer to particular contents throughout.4 Once B learns what A
wishes to convey, she would have a variety of choices, ranging from a simple yes
or no to other possibilities such as how about Bouley instead? Just as the addressee
cannot fully anticipate what the speaker might convey, the speaker cannot fully
anticipate how the addressee might respond. So this game is typically one with
unaware players without common knowledge of the game.5 Despite this, I will
assume common knowledge for such games as it is simpler to do so.A then solves the Content Selection Game and identifies its equilibrium con-
tent. This search for his optimal action can be a tricky affair because this game
can be conflictual. The interests of the two parties may not be perfectly aligned.
The way the addressee’s choice influences the choice of content (and vice
versa) has seldom been considered explicitly in semantics. Theories always start
with a sentence the speaker has uttered as given. It is by attending to this game
in the context of the whole communicative process that it becomes doubtful if
the Gricean (1975) maxims work as they are meant to. A key reason is the pres-
ence of conflict; another is that in addition to conveying information, a speaker
typically wishes to affect his relationship with the addressee in some way, either
maintaining or altering it via the effect the utterance has on her.6
Relating the foregoing to the snapshot of communication above, the Content
Selection Game arises fromA’s desire to evoke a response from B and results in
the selection of an equilibrium content to convey to B.
3.1.3 The Generation Game and the Interpretation Game
If telepathy were possible, A would directly transmit this choice to B and that
would be the end of his effort. Unfortunately, he now has to find the right words
to convey his chosen content. This involves considering different combinations
of words based on their conventional meanings. For example, two options he
may contemplate are should we go to bar boulud? and should we go to bar
4One can also use the infons of situation theory to represent such contents.
5See Parikh (2001: Sections 5.3 and 6.5) and, for a formal account, Halpern & Rego (2006; 2007).
6Asher & Lascarides (2013) address somewhat similar issues.
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boulud? we haven’t been in a while. Throughout, small capitals or quotation
marks will be used for expressions.
Stepping back momentarily, A and B will generally have a language L they
share. Sharing a language is a complex matter. For now, assume it is the linguistic
community’s nonconscious common knowledge of the conventional meanings
of the words of the language as well as of its grammar and phonetic system. SoA will look for a sentence or two in L that will express the content he has iden-
tified given the utterance situation he is in. If L is a very simple (artificially con-
structed) language that has neither ambiguous nor structured expressions, his
task will be much simpler in one sense although an overly simple language may
not be sufficiently rich for all that he wants to convey. When L is a full-blown
natural language like English or Gujarati, things get a bit complicated because
there are three dimensions at play simultaneously. One is the conventional mean-
ings of the words, a second is the internal structure of the sentence, that is, their
syntax, and the third is their phonetic properties. Assuming A is speaking and
not writing, the content of a possible utterance will be determined by all three
dimensions.
Since languages can be simple or complex, it should be evident that syntax and
phonology are merely a wrinkle, a complicating factor – like friction in Newto-
nian mechanics – in the primary process of communication. The presence of
syntax is highly interesting but contingent. It is the meaning (and effect) of ut-
terances that are central, not their structure or phonetic patterns. Yet, linguists
have focused primarily on these latter aspects and this is perhaps one reason
why the science of communication has languished, including an account of how
the optimal parse or set of words in an utterance is conveyed.
At a simplified level, A thinks about uttering a sentence such as should we
go to bar boulud? we haven’t been in a while by mentally trying out howB would interpret it if it were uttered. This interpretation process is part of his
decision-making and is a game of partial information.7 In other words, A, so to
speak, lines up alternative utterances, and then imagines the games of partial in-
formation each of them leads to, and, based on how B would interpret each utter-
ance, he selects the utterance that will best convey the content he has identified
in the Content Selection Game. This complex structure is called the Generation
Game because in it A generates his best choice of utterance.
This is a simplified description of generation because I have made A consider
whole sentences: I have conveniently omitted how the speaker assembles the
7These are games that were first developed in my doctoral dissertation Language and Strategic
Inference (1987b) at Stanford University in the context of modeling communication and mean-
ing. They have been elaborated a great deal since then.
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parts of possible sentences to create whole utterances and also how the speaker
decides how to pronounce the sounds corresponding to thewords. I will saymore
about this later but it is a part of the model of communication that remains to be
worked out fully.
We can now see fully why the Content Selection Game is not really a signaling
game at all. Since telepathy is not possible, A cannot convey his chosen content
to B without playing the Generation Game. So the Content Selection Game is
linked to the Generation Game. And we will see below that the Generation Game
is itself linked to another game because it isn’t complete either. These linkages,
together with the fact that there are no signals in it, make the Content Selection
Game very different from a standard signaling game.
The games of partial information that are embedded in the Generation Game
are called speaker games because they are the speaker’s model of the linguistic
interaction between A and B. The speaker considers one set of speaker games
for every utterance in the Generation Game but once he has selected his optimal
utterance, he utters it, and this induces a corresponding set of partial information
games onB’s side, called addressee games.These areB’s model of their linguistic
interaction.A has multiple sets of speaker games to solve whereasB has just one
set becauseA utters just the one best sentence from his choices. She has no idea
about the other locutions A turns over in his mind. B’s single set of addressee
games is best referred to as the Interpretation Game. These games, too, have the
three dimensions of meaning, structure, and sound.
As the Generation Game and Interpretation Game are A’s and B’s subjective
models of their interaction, there is also a structure that is their actual objective
interaction and this is also a game. In other words, onceA utters a sentence pub-
licly, the objective game comes into being along with B’s model of it. For those
who might find this third objective structure odd, think first of a single agent and
their subjective representation of some part of the world in which they have to
act. In this simpler scenario, there is the single agent’s mental representation and
an objective situation. An agent may look at the dark clouds in the sky and decide
to carry an umbrella. When explaining their behavior and its outcome, a theorist
needs access to both the actual state of the sky and the agent’s mental representa-
tion of it. When communication is considered, there are two agents so there are
two subjective representations along with the objective situation. In theorizing
about communication, we need access to all three structures to understand the
most general cases.
The Generation Game and Interpretation Game as well as the third objective
game involve sets of games because there are games corresponding to each word,
each phrase, and the whole sentence on both sides for each sentence considered.
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So, in the example sentence should we go to bar boulud? there would be
as many as five lexical games just for the semantic aspect of the interpretation.
There would also be syntactic games and phonetic games. All of this will be dealt
with in detail in Part III.
When the ideal conditions for communication are met, the speaker games in
the Generation Game are identical to the addressee games in the Interpretation
Game and both are also identical to the relevant objective games and the in-
terlocutors have common knowledge of all these games. This will also become
clearer in Part III. After A has completed his utterance and the Interpretation
Game and objective game have emerged, it is B’s turn to act. She solves the
game to find the best interpretation of the utterance. If all goes well, she is now
in possession of the content A wanted to communicate to her and she then has
to choose her best response to this content in the Content Selection Game.
To sumup, onceA has selected the optimal content hewants to convey toB, he
considers theGenerationGamewhich enables him to convert this content into an
equilibrium utterance for him to produce in the utterance situation. Reciprocally,
onceA utters his optimal sentence,B plays the InterpretationGame and attempts
to infer the equilibrium content that A is conveying. Based on this inference,
she now selects her best response in the Content Selection Game. And then both
players resume the Setting Game.
3.1.4 The Communication Game
I once again display the process of communication schematically to help fix the
sequence:
Utterance Situation
Setting Game
→ A’s wish to elicit some response from B
→ Content Selection Game
→ A’s equilibrium content
→ Generation Game
→ A’s equilibrium utterance
→ Interpretation Game
→ B’s equilibrium content
→ Content Selection Game
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→ B’s equilibrium response
→ Back to the Setting Game
Everything starting and ending with the Setting Game occurs inside the utter-
ance situation. It is unfortunate that there are so many different games and so
much terminology, but the reader will immediately see that communication does
in fact involve all of these steps and will also see the interdependence among
these games. Very simply, the interlocutors are trying to decide where to eat
and so A chooses to make a suggestion to B to which B chooses a response af-
ter which they return to their decision-making. This simple set of acts has the
rather complex structure sketched above. In reality, perhaps the whole process
happens in a more seamless way, but it is helpful to separate its parts analytically
to understand the process better.
Further, even this quite complex picture is a simplification because the clean
distinction betweenA’s content and utterance selection embodied in the Content
Selection Game and the Generation Game is often an idealization. A poet may
care more about a word and its sound than its meaning and want the former to
affect the addressee more than the latter and so may not first identify a meaning
and then a word but in the reverse order or even together. Or they may struggle
to articulate an inchoate thought and realize what their meaning is only through
their words. So, in the most general picture, the model would merge some of
these parts, especially the Content Selection Game and the Generation Game,
possibly by considering ordered pairs of contents and sentences. We will keep
them separate, however, for clarity and to simplify the model.
As we have seen, there are four large interlocking games:
1. Setting Game
2. Content Selection Game
3. Generation Game
4. Interpretation Game
I have built upon an innovation in my previous book involving separate but
interdependent games. In that book, the linked games considered were just the
games of partial information on the speaker’s and addressee’s sides. Here, the
idea has been extended to the whole communicative process. I call the entire
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structure comprising these four games the Communication Game because it re-
ally is a single structure with interdependent parts. The Setting Game was de-
scribed in some detail in Language and Equilibrium (2010: Chapter 3) so I will
treat it summarily here. The other three games will be discussed in Parts III and
IV.
Ever since the founding of modern semantics by Frege in the late nineteenth
century, communication has been understood in a one-sided way, focused pri-
marily on the perspective of the speaker. Arguably, the role of communication
in semiosis was left implicit at best. It was the ordinary language philosophers
such as the later Wittgenstein (1953/1968), Austin (1961; 1975), and Grice (1989c)
who brought it to the fore but, though they grasped some of the complexities
of the two-sided nature of the interaction, they appear to have missed the full
structure articulated above. Their followers have seldom grappled with this am-
pler vision of communication and have confined themselves to elaborations and
revisions of the original proposals.
In particular, all of Grice’s ideas – communication as a form of rational activity,
the conversational maxims, the analyses of speaker meaning and word meaning,
and the distinction between a largely conventional semantics and an inferential
pragmatics – fall short. Part of his goal was to naturalize “intentionality” or the
aboutness of language by reducing linguistic meaning to speaker meaning and
the latter to speaker intentions. Intentions can then presumably themselves be
reduced to a digital notion of information as Dretske (1981) has suggested or to
an agent’s actions as Stalnaker (1984) favors. This led Grice to analyze speaker
meaning but he missed other key concepts in the process of communication and
the concomitant emergence of meaning. I look closely at some of the limitations
of Gricean ideas in Chapter 5.
This completes my picture of micro-semantics. It is not difficult to extend it
from a single utterance to discourse and dialogue but I will not pursue these
natural extensions here.8
A key assumption of micro-semantics is that the conventional meanings of
words9 are fixed and given and are exploited by speakers and addressees in com-
8See Clark & Parikh (2007) for a preliminary account of discourse anaphora.
9In my framework, only words have conventional meanings. Longer expressions such as
phrases and whole sentences do not, although conventional meanings can certainly be as-
signed to them if required for other reasons. The contents conveyed by utterances of longer
expressions can be computed by using just the conventional meanings of words. Of course,
idiomatic expressions (e.g. kicked the bucket) and such multi-word expressions that are not
compositional would be treated differently but I do not consider such cases in this book. There
are also sentences like can you pass the salt? that involve conventional interpretations. I
treat such situations as instances of modulation – see Chapter 17.
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municating referential meanings, much as Fregean senses are used to convey ref-
erences,10 the former being generalized and refined versions of the latter.11 This
makes it possible to give a fairly complete account of communication and mean-
ing in the small. Nothing else needs to be assumed besides the partial rationality
of agents,12 a language and its grammar, and an ontology. But this leaves unfin-
ished the explanation of how semiosis gets off the ground, how language acquires
meaning in the first place, the main problem of semantics. Conventional mean-
ing itself must emerge through communication because there is nothing else, no
other possible source. To explain this origination, it becomes necessary to shift
from a single utterance to society-wide conversations, from micro-semantics to
macro-semantics.
3.2 Macro-semantics
Inmacro-semantics, the assumption that conventional meaning is fixed and exter-
nally given is relaxed and other cross-conversational constraints are identified. In
other words, it isn’t possible to account for semiosis by looking at just one utter-
ance.Multiple exchanges are required, either between the same two interlocutors
over time or within a whole community. One can abstract from time and assume
each member of a population is engaged in multiple conversations with other
members synchronically. Each such utterance is described by a Communication
Game. But now, instead of using a fixed set of conventional meanings for each
word, all we ask is that whatever the conventional meanings may turn out to be,
they are consistent across users.The same agent will not use a wordwith different
conventional meanings every time they speak or interpret. In other words, the
constraint of consistency entails that both parties to a conversation use the same
conventional meanings not only in the exchange at hand but in all their commu-
nications. This severely limits the range of conventional meanings a word can
acquire and makes it possible to derive not just referential contents via the Com-
10See Frege (1892/1980) and Section 1.2.
11While this will become fully clear in Part III, it might help readers who think of conventional
meanings differently to see the following schema: word⟶ conventional meaning⟶𝑢 refer-
ential meaning. Only the referential meanings of words enter into the content of the whole
sentence uttered in the utterance situation 𝑢. Conventional meanings are a steppingstone to
referential meanings and are more or less shared by the interlocutors.
12I discuss informally what I mean by “partial rationality” in Chapter 5. No clear definition of
this notion has yet emerged and so I use it to indicate various sets of assumptions that fall short
of full rationality. Other similar terms are “bounded rationality,” “resource-limited rationality,”
and “behavioral rationality.”
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munication Game but also conventional meanings for each of the words. I will as-
sume a toy language of one-word sentences as that sidesteps syntax, and assume
there is no ambiguity, that is, there is one conventional meaning per word. Such a
model is enough to demonstrate the basic idea behindmacro-semantics.Working
out the mathematical details of such a meaningful equilibrium for language pre-
supposes a solution to the micro-semantic problem. An outline of such a model
exists in Parikh (1987a) and I introduce a more complete version in Part V. The
society-wide collection of interlocking Communication Games, linked via the
Consistency Condition on conventional meanings, is called a Language Game, a
highly suggestive but vague metaphorical idea of Wittgenstein’s (1953/1968) that
is given a precise definition here. There can be many different kinds of Language
Games based on the kinds of networks that are possible in society. This suggests
that Lewis’s (1969) account of convention captures conditions that are sufficient
but not necessary. That is, my network model broadens Lewis’s more restrictive
notion of convention as shown in Chapter 23.
Many generalizations of this picture are possible, not least introducing syntax
and allowing ambiguity. These steps are difficult since ambiguity involves not
just multiple conventional meanings per word but other complexities such as
what is called modulation.13 Another generalization is to note that people seldom
share exactly the same conventional meanings so the notion of consistency has
to be weakened. This also means the description of what it is to share a language
in Section 3.1 has to be relaxed. Common knowledge of conventional meanings is
too stringent. We can make the meaningful equilibrium dynamic by making ut-
terances sequential rather than simultaneous to study meaning change. Another
direction is to derive syntax and phonology from communication. These are all
theoretical ideas and could be hard to work out, especially in computationally
effective ways that enable empirically testable hypotheses to be developed.
The conventional meanings of a single word such as “dog” result from count-
less conversations and countless conversations are affected by these conven-
tional meanings in a diachronic way. Indeed, it isn’t clear how stable conven-
tional meanings really are because it is through these very encounters that they
also change, as becomes evident if one traces the word’s evolution from the Old
andMiddle English “dogge” to its modern form and meanings. I address meaning
change in Chapter 24.
Suchmacro-semanticmodels allow us to answer a question that is rarely posed
in semantics. It is often said that language is a social institution but what this
13See Cohen (1985; 1986). An example of modulation is the use of a phrase like “the stone lion”
where the content of “lion” has to be modulated to be made compatible with “stone.” I treat
this phenomenon in detail in Chapter 17.
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consists in is seldom made explicit. One dimension of its being an institution is
the conventional meanings of words as they are shared by the community and
make communication possible. This is such a truism that it is seldom asked what
purpose this conventionality serves.14 Recanati (2004: Sections 9.6–9.7), based
on his interpretation of Wittgenstein (1953/1968) and Austin (1961/1979c), enter-
tains the possibility of eliminating conventional meanings altogether while still
retaining an intermediate mechanism of abstraction from past uses of words to
derive the referential meanings of present uses. One answer to this “Meaning
Eliminativism” is that relatively stable, quasi-public conventional meanings facil-
itate communication by simplifying the choices agents have to make, not to men-
tion the reduction in the burden on memory that results. Likewise, the purpose
grammar serves is to reduce effort because there would be many more choices
to consider otherwise. Syntax slots words in ways that automatically preclude
many possibilities. These are two key elements that make language a social in-
stitution. Indeed, the standardization of the various devices themselves, whether
words, images, or gestures, also eases communication immeasurably by reducing
the possible alternatives. Whether the existence of such factors results from our
rationality remains an open question but at least it can be so derived mathemat-
ically.
As I have said before, my inspiration for this network model of macro-seman-
tics is a large analogy between the social institution of linguistic communication
and a market economy, which is similarly ongoing and circular both with re-
spect to the equation of supply and demand within a single market as well as
within the wider interactions among different markets. Comparing the idea of
meaningful equilibrium above with the idea of general economic equilibrium,15
utterance situations are like markets, words are like commodities, conventional
meanings are like the prices of commodities, and referential meanings are like
the quantities of commodities bought or sold. Just as prices and quantities emerge
from a general economic equilibrium so conventional meanings and referential
meanings emerge from a meaningful equilibrium. Language change is roughly
similar to the way in which the prices of goods in a market economy change.
14Direct reference theories deriving fromKripke (1980) err when they cut out conventional mean-
ings, viewed as intermediate between words and referential meanings, for certain classes of
words. A name N, for example, can be said to have a conventional meaning, the property of
being named ‘N’, as Kneale (1962) and Burge (1973) have suggested, with the added proviso that
this property together with a resource situation involving a causal chain of the kind Kripke has
proposed determine the referent. My account retains an intermediate conventional meaning,
thus avoiding direct reference, and also avoids Kripke’s criticisms, including his noncircularity
condition. See Kripke (1980: 20–21, 68–70) and also Section 26.2.
15See Arrow & Debreu (1954).
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And just as a price system spares us the trouble of bargaining every time we buy
or sell goods, so conventional meanings and grammar and standardization of the
communicative devices we use ease our effort.16
A network model of this sort can be deployed at two levels. The first is a more
abstract level where the empirical inputs are just assumed as given in order to
show that conventional and referential meanings pop out of the model as ex-
pected. At this level, one does not attempt to derive the fact that the conven-
tional meaning of desk is, in fact, the property of being something made for writ-
ing, just that desk acquires some conventional meaning. This is the level I will
look at in Part V as it is the appropriate task for an initial theoretical study. But
once such models have been developed in sufficient generality and detail, they
can be examined empirically with historical linguists supplying the concrete ini-
tial inputs. This is exactly how the work in building models of general economic
equilibrium has proceeded, with the early models establishing the theoretical ex-
istence of equilibrium prices and quantities and later models applying these early
results to particular empirical economies. My purpose in this book is to start off
the theoretical task with a relatively simple but revealing model. Later, it can be
developed more fully and applied to specific languages. Such work will depend
on what empirical data is available and how far back into the mists of time and
into the origins of particular languages the data goes.
This completes my sketch of macro-semantics. I believe it goes significantly
beyond the explanation envisaged by Grice (1968) and even Lewis (1969; 1972;
1975). Together, micro-semantics and macro-semantics make up my framework
for the study of language that I call Equilibrium Semantics or Equilibrium Lin-
guistics because equilibrium plays such a central role in it, not only as an idea
and image but also as a practical computational tool. Equilibrium is a deep and
widely used notion in the physical and social sciences, and is a part of the fabric
of language and communication as well, not a deus ex machina imposed from the
outside.
To summarize, communication occurs in the small and in the large. In the
small, it is an interaction between two agents where an utterance situation, ow-
ing to the concerns and goals of the agents in it, induces one agent, the speaker,
to elicit a response from another agent, the addressee, by conveying a content.
Based on how the addressee might react, the speaker identifies the content and
converts it into an utterance involving a sentence with a sound pattern, struc-
ture, and meaning. Upon receiving the utterance, the addressee has to interpret
16See Rubinstein (2000) for other interesting but quite different connections between economics
and language.
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it based on her model of the speaker, using the information the sentence pro-
vides as well as information from the utterance situation. Once she interprets it,
and identifies the content, she can respond accordingly. In the large, there are
multiple conversations in society that are linked to one another by an intricate
structure. Both conventional and referential meanings arise through communica-
tion. As I have emphasized, communication in the small and in the large, what I
call micro-semantics and macro-semantics, consists of circular processes at mul-
tiple levels, not in a “vicious” way, but in a way that makes modeling them quite
difficult. It appears to require the special resources of game theory and is not
amenable to the kinds of tools philosophers and linguists ordinarily use – logic
and semi-technical English.
Those familiar with the literature in economics on communication and cheap
talk, especially Crawford & Sobel (1982) and Farrell (1987; 1993), may now appre-
ciate the key difference in my approach from theirs. First, both sets of authors
consider just the micro-semantic level. Second, Crawford and Sobel assume there
is no exogenously given meaning and Farrell assumes that literal meaning is en-
tirely exogenous. These are two extremes and the truth lies somewhere in be-
tween. I discuss the former in Section 8.4 but suffice it to say here that for them
meaning is entirely unconstrained and determined endogenously at the level of a
single utterance. For Farrell, on the other hand, meaning is fully constrained be-
cause it is externally given.The latter begs the question because the problem is to
show howmeaning is determined. For me, at the level of micro-semantics, mean-
ing is partly exogenous (i.e. conventional meanings are held fixed) and partly
endogenous (i.e. literal and implied meanings are determined internally). At the
level of macro-semantics, nothing is fixed, everything is endogenous, but an in-
terplay among multiple utterance situations in society is required. Crawford and
Sobel collapse these two levels. And Farrell just assumes the answer. There are
other important differences too, mainly in the assumption of costless talk, which
I discuss in Part III.
There are a number of moving parts in my framework. Different readers will
undoubtedly find some of these more acceptable than others, given their own
theoretical commitments and interests. I urge them to pick and choose, retaining
what suits their tastes or reformulating some of the ideas in new ways. I have
tried to identify and address a large swath of the problem of communication
and meaning. Once the elements of the framework are grasped, it will be easy
to tinker with it, replacing or improving one or other part, or even adapting a
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substantive idea to a different framework. I invite the reader to be a co-creator
in just this way.
From the foregoing account, it should be evident that communication is a com-
plex and many-splendored thing. Viewed broadly, it is what enables symbols and
language to emerge and, through them, human civilization itself. And yet, as late
as the twenty-first century, we do not have a firm grasp of the science of com-
munication.17 Some have even felt such a theory of performance is an impossibil-
ity. Perhaps this is because understanding communication turns out to require a
number of novel ideas.
17Shannon & Weaver’s (1949) celebrated theory of communication is really a theory of infor-
mation transmission. Transmitting information, say from one hard disk to another through a
channel, is very different from communication, although the former occurs within the latter.
Incidentally, transmitting information and conveying information are one and the same thing.
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In Chapter 2, I described informational spaces as well as agents and their interac-
tions. Among other things, I introduced the infon space (I , ⊙)which will supply
the semantic contents of utterances in Equilibrium Semantics. Assessing utter-
ances requires certain operations on words and parse trees analogous to the op-
eration ⊙ on infons and so I now define two systems similar to (I , ⊙). One serves
as the language to be analyzed and the other provides the syntactic contents.
4.1 Language
Assume a finite set of words W . For example, W might include {bill,ran}. A
string onW of length 𝑛 is a function from {0, 1, 2,… , 𝑛} toW . We usually write
just a list of words such as bill, bill ran, or ran bill.The unique string of length
0, the empty string, is denoted by 𝑒. The unique zero string 0 can be thought of as
an illegitimate string. Both 𝑒 and 0 are always members ofW . The concatenation
⋅ of two nonzero strings is defined in the usual way1 and 𝑤 ⋅ 𝑤′ is written 𝑤𝑤′.
For example, bill ⋅ bill = bill bill and ran ⋅ bill = ran bill. The concatenation
of any string with 0 is 0.W ∗ is the set of all strings onW and is called the free
monoid onW . It is an infinite set and has an identity 𝑒 and a zero 0.
Assume 𝐺 is a context-free grammar (CFG).2 Here is a simple example:
S→ NP VP; NP→ N; VP→ V; N→ Bill; V→ ran
Here, “S” stands for sentence, “NP” for noun phrase, “VP” for verb phrase, “N”
for noun, and “V” for verb. The only sentence generated by this CFG is bill ran.
I will use “parse” and “parse tree” to refer also to the subtrees of phrases with
the root node being any relevant nonterminal symbol. A tree such as [NP[N Bill]]
would count as a parse or parse tree of the noun phrase bill.
1See Wall (1972: 164–166) for example.
2A context-free grammar is a grammar whose rules all have the form A → 𝑤 . That is, there is
no (linguistic) context surrounding A and 𝑤 so that the rule can be freely applied. See Wall
(1972: Chapter 9).
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I now use concatenation to define an operation that yields exactly the sub-
sentential expressions and sentences of the language L by forming an appro-
priate proper subset ofW ∗. Define the following modification of concatenation:
𝑤 ○𝐺 𝑤′ = 𝑤 ⋅ 𝑤′ = 𝑤𝑤′ when 𝑤𝑤′ is a substring of some string in W ∗ that
has at least one parse by 𝐺 and 𝑤 ○𝐺 𝑤′ = 0 otherwise. The set formed by freely
generating all strings fromW by this special concatenation operation is the lan-
guage L. In our little example, L = {𝑒, 0,bill,ran,bill ran}. For instance, the
string ran bill has been dropped fromW ∗ because it is not a substring of any
string parseable by 𝐺.3 This operation is called grammatical concatenation and
is abbreviated to ○. It is associative but not commutative and has 𝑒 as its iden-
tity and the zero element 0. In other words, (L, ○) is a monoid with a zero. A
sentence 𝜑 of L is made up of individual words 𝜑1 ○ 𝜑2 ○… ○ 𝜑𝑛 = 𝜑1𝜑2…𝜑𝑛 for
some natural number 𝑛. For the sentence 𝜑 = bill ran, 𝜑1 = bill, 𝜑2 = ran, and
𝜑 = 𝜑1 ○ 𝜑2 = 𝜑1𝜑2.
4.2 Algebraic system of trees
So far, I have defined two algebraic systems (I , ⊙) and (L, ○) that capture the
structure of infons and linguistic expressions. One describes the world and the
other language. The third system involves a new way to describe the grammar
𝐺 as a system of trees with a product operation.
Each of the five rules of the CFG above can be re-described as a tree. For ex-
ample, the tree corresponding to the first rule is [S[NP ][VP ]] and the tree corre-
sponding to the fourth rule is [N Bill]. Thus, 𝐺 can be expressed either as a set
of rules or as a set of trees. However, we cannot define the desired operation on
these trees directly and a little work is required to get them into the appropriate
form.
The product operation is defined in two stages. First, an intuitive substitution
or merging operation on parse trees is specified as follows. A tree such as 𝑡′ =[X…] can be substituted into 𝑡 = [Z[X ]…] to form 𝑡″ = [Z[X…]…] where the
… from 𝑡′ have been entered into 𝑡 because the outer category X of 𝑡′ matched
an inner category X of 𝑡 . If there is more than one X in 𝑡 that matches the X in
𝑡′, then the leftmost one is substituted into. This operation is denoted ⊲ and we
write 𝑡 ⊲ 𝑡′ = 𝑡″. It is neither associative nor commutative and is identical to the
substitution operation defined in Joshi (1985) and Joshi & Schabes (1997).
3Consider the sentence i handed you the salt. Then the string you the is a member of the
correspondingL even though it is not a legitimate phrase because it is a substring of the whole
sentence whichwould be parseable by the corresponding𝐺. I owe this example to TomWasow.
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Consider now the following merging of the second and fourth tree above:[NP[N ]] ⊲ [N Bill] = [NP[N Bill]]. This can be informally described by saying that
we have merged the simple tree [N Bill] as far as it could go up the parse tree
of the whole sentence without encountering another branch. It cannot go any
further because the tree encountered is [S[NP ][VP ]] which has another branch
involving the verb phrase. I call this procedure chaining, so we say that simple
lexical trees are chained as far up as possible. It is possible to chain the third and
fifth trees in the same way to get [VP[V ran]]. Thus, we are left with just two
maximally chained trees from the original five trees and we also have the first
tree – [S[NP ][VP ]]. These are:
[S[NP ][VP ]]; [NP[N Bill]; [VP[V ran]]
The chained trees, also called elementary trees, are collected and given names as
follows:
𝑡1 = [NP[N Bill]]
𝑡2 = [VP[V ran]]
The subscripts of 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 are determined by the sentence being considered,
namely, bill ran, so that the tree involving the first word bill is indexed by
1 and the tree involving the second word ran is indexed by 2. In more complex
sentences, there will be more than nine elementary trees and then the indexes
will be written (10), (11), (12), and so on. Keeping track of the indexes in this
way makes it easier to describe the operation below. The unchained trees – just[S[NP ][VP ]] in our case – are left in 𝐺.
Now, I describe a more complex product operation ⋆𝐺,𝑢 on these trees. It is
parametrized by 𝐺 as ○𝐺 was and by 𝑢 as ⊙𝑢 was. The utterance situation is
needed because the sentence being parsed enters via 𝑢 and it is on the basis of
the sentence that the trees can be properly indexed as explained above.
Because the chosen CFG is so simple, there is just one nontrivial product:
𝑡1 ⋆𝐺,𝑢 𝑡2 = [NP[N Bill]] ⋆𝐺,𝑢 [VP[V ran]]= ([S[NP ][VP ]] ⊲ [NP[N Bill]]) ⊲ [VP[V ran]]= [S[NP Bill][VP ]] ⊲ [VP[V ran]]= [S[NP Bill][VP ran]]= 𝑡12
In other words, the tree product draws upon relevant trees in𝐺 such as [S[NP ][VP ]] to enable them to be merged or substituted. In this product, only one such
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tree in 𝐺 was introduced but in general there could be more, both to the left of
𝑡1 or 𝑡2. This is why the operation is parametrized by 𝐺.
We now add two special trees. The first is the empty tree, 𝑡𝑒 , and the second
is a tree 𝑡0. The former serves as the identity of the set of trees obtained via this
product and the latter as the zero of the set. That is, 𝑡 ⋆𝐺,𝑢 𝑡𝑒 = 𝑡𝑒⋆𝐺,𝑢 𝑡 = 𝑡 for all 𝑡
and 𝑡 ⋆𝐺,𝑢 𝑡0 = 𝑡0⋆𝐺,𝑢 𝑡 = 𝑡0 for all 𝑡 , the latter being true by definition. When two
incompatible trees are multiplied, for example 𝑡1 ⋆𝐺,𝑢 𝑡12, the result is stipulated
to be 𝑡0.
Note the special vector index “12” of the product 𝑡12. First, this index should not
be confused with an elementary tree index such as (12) which would be expressed
as 𝑡(12). In the case of 𝑡12, the vector index has two components; in the case of
𝑡(12) the vector index has just one component. Second, it may seem at first sight
that we could have obtained the product 𝑡2 ⋆𝐺,𝑢 𝑡1 = 𝑡12 in the same way, by
first substituting the verb and then the noun. But instead the product 𝑡2 ⋆𝐺,𝑢 𝑡1 =
𝑡0 by stipulation. The basic rule is that the subscript of the first multiplicand
must be strictly lower than the subscript of the secondmultiplicand to potentially
yield a nonzero tree. When higher-level trees are multiplied in a more complex
setting, the rule is that the first component of the first vector index must be
strictly less than the first component of the second vector index. For example,
a tree labeled 𝑡34 would have a lower vector index than one labeled 𝑡5 because
3 < 5. So 𝑡34⋆𝐺,𝑢 𝑡5 could potentially be nonzero. In the reverse order, the product
is always 𝑡0.
There are thus five trees in the operation table for this sentence with respect to
this CFG, the three above and 𝑡𝑒 and 𝑡0. All combinations of these five trees yield
one of these five trees. This gives us closure for the operation. The multiplication
table for ⋆𝐺,𝑢 is shown in Figure 4.1. Observe that 𝑡1 ⋆𝐺,𝑢 𝑡2 = 𝑡12 ≠ 𝑡2 ⋆𝐺,𝑢 𝑡1.
⋆𝐺,𝑢 𝑡𝑒 𝑡1 𝑡2 𝑡12 𝑡0
𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑒 𝑡1 𝑡2 𝑡12 𝑡0
𝑡1 𝑡1 𝑡0 𝑡12 𝑡0 𝑡0
𝑡2 𝑡2 𝑡0 𝑡0 𝑡0 𝑡0
𝑡12 𝑡12 𝑡0 𝑡0 𝑡0 𝑡0
𝑡0 𝑡0 𝑡0 𝑡0 𝑡0 𝑡0
Figure 4.1: The operation table for ⋆𝐺,𝑢
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The basic rules for forming the product of trees are as follows:
1. Merge or substitute via ⊲ if possible.
2. Otherwise, successively introduce trees from 𝐺 to the left of either or both
multiplicands until one or more substitutions via ⊲ are possible. For exam-
ple, if two trees 𝑡′ and 𝑡″ have to be introduced in that order to the left of
𝑡𝑖 in a product 𝑡𝑖 ⋆𝐺,𝑢 𝑡𝑗 , it would be as follows: (𝑡″ ⊲ (𝑡′ ⊲ 𝑡𝑖)) ⊲ 𝑡𝑗 .
3. If the above fails, the result is 𝑡0.
This procedure always gives a unique result as only trees such as Z→X Y from
𝐺 can left multiply a product like 𝑡𝑖 ⋆𝐺,𝑢 𝑡𝑗 where 𝑡𝑖 = [X…] and 𝑡𝑗 = [Y…] and
we stipulate that there cannot be another rule Z′ → X Y with Z′ ≠ Z in the CFG.
Like ⊲, the operation ⋆𝐺,𝑢 is neither associative nor commutative.
Full parsing may be done in either of two ways: by successive application of
compatible rules in the CFG to yield S or by successive application of the ⋆𝐺,𝑢
operation to yield a tree like 𝑡12. All other combinations will ultimately result in
𝑡0. In more complex CFGs, there will be multiple trees like 𝑡12 that may be the
end result of combining subtrees, which corresponds to multiple parses for the
sentence. The word order of the sentence is automatically taken into account by
the product operation owing to the indexing procedure so the yield of successive
applications of ⋆𝐺,𝑢 is guaranteed to match it.
Consider the algebraic system (T , ⋆𝐺,𝑢) where T is the set of five trees. This
captures the relevant subset of the CFG for this sentence and so is an equiva-
lent way to express a context-free grammar sentence by sentence. Each sentence
corresponds to a separate algebraic system, all of which can in principle be com-
bined into a larger system but this is unnecessary in practice. If we start with the
elementary trees 𝑡𝑒 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2, and 𝑡0, we can freely generate the whole set T .
I will assume the grammar 𝐺 for L can be rewritten as a system of trees(T , ⋆𝐺,𝑢) for each sentence in the manner described above. For convenience, I
will drop the parameters from the notation and write just ⋆ henceforth and also
frequently write 𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑗 instead of 𝑡𝑖 ⋆ 𝑡𝑗 .
4.3 Summary of assumptions
Three algebraic systems have been constructed: (I , ⊙𝑢), (L, ○𝐺), (T , ⋆𝐺,𝑢) or,
more simply, (I , ⊙), (L, ○), (T , ⋆). The second system is a monoid with a zero
but the first and third have just an identity and a zero. As the parameter 𝑢 is
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fixed at the outset, each sentence in it is identifiable, and so the corresponding
subsystem (T , ⋆) is also identifiable.
In Chapter 3, I sketched what communication looks like in the small and in
the large and briefly mentioned the games of partial information that arise. The
interaction between speaker and addressee can be partly described by these par-
tial information games and they lead to two more monoidal systems (G, ⊗) and(G′, ⊗′), the first involving semantic games and the second involving syntactic
games. These are introduced in the context of the sentence 𝜑 = bill ran that we
will consider in detail in Chapter 7.
A peculiarity of all these systems is that every element of each system that is
not an identity element is what is called a zero divisor, that is, a nonzero element
for which another nonzero element exists such that their product is zero. Also,
there is just an operation of multiplication and the zeros are stipulated rather
than arising as identities of a second operation of addition as happens in rings.
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Part II
Foundational perspectives

5 Grice and conversation
While the laterWittgenstein was the first to bring communication into semantics
by tying meaning to use and while Austin produced some profound insights into
meaning and use, it was Grice1 who pioneered a systematic approach to deriving
meaning from use. Unsurprisingly, therefore, his work has been enormously in-
fluential not only among those who make communication the basis of meaning
but even among more traditional researchers still attached to logicism for whom
communication remains something of an afterthought.2 Indeed, he managed to
straddle the two traditions of ideal language and ordinary language philosophy
by dividing the subject into two parts, one largely conventional and consonant
with logic and the other largely inferential and based on rationality, even though
communication ultimately underlay both for him.
There are four elements in Grice’s (1989c) synthesis of communication and
meaning: the idea that rational agency applies to communication as it does to
other actions, a theory of conversation based on this idea, a reduction of various
semantic notions such as speaker meaning and word meaning that are involved
in communication to the intentions of speakers, and a division of the study of
meaning into a largely conventional semantic component and a largely inferen-
tial pragmatic component, the former preceding the latter in interpretation with
both preceded by syntax in turn.
What was once an extremely fresh set of insights has now been shown to
have serious defects, many of which have been pointed out by Grice’s followers
who may be divided broadly into orthodox Griceans, neo-Griceans, and post-
Griceans. In my dissertation, Language and Strategic Inference (1987b), and in
my first book,The Use of Language (2001), I myself sought to set some aspects of
Grice’s thought on firmer ground by using game theory and situation theory. But
the inner dynamics of this process undermined these very ideas and an entirely
new framework has emerged, leading to quite different construals of the four
elements listed above. Not least among these is a mathematical rendering of the
underlying phenomena.
1An overview of Grice’s (1989c) writings can be found in Neale (1992).
2I discuss the shortcomings of logicism in some detail in Language and Equilibrium (2010: Chap-
ter 1). Key figures include Frege, Russell, and, more recently, Montague. See the references in
Chapter 1 of my book.
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5.1 Communication as rational activity
Grice’s (1989b) explanations were couched in a philosophical psychology that
had two shortcomings.
First, his adherence to a belief-desire model based on rationality was at such
a high level of generality that it appears that he only accounted for the opti-
mality of single actions – essentially against a background of no action rather
than within the full-fledged context of choice (i.e. a whole set of explicitly iden-
tified alternative actions) as studied in game theory. In a nutshell, he did not
translate desires into preferences over situations and, indirectly, over alternative
actions. In addition, this fledgling belief-desire model was one-sided rather than
two-sided and did not account for both speaker and addressee.
This is that for any particular object X and for any feature F and for any
activity or type of behavior A, if the creature C believes that the object X
both has the feature F and is nearby, or within reach, and that things of type
F are suitable for activity A, then the creature wants to Awith respect to the
object X. In other words, the law harnesses the object to the type of activity.
(Grice 1989b: 285)
In this passage, only one behavior A is identified. The problem here and else-
where in Grice’s writings is that he never explicitly discusses a choice between
two or more actions, say A and B, whether these actions are utterances or inter-
pretations. If he had done so, it would have compelled him to consider a more
choice-theoretic perspective. He goes on to say:
The laws I have mentioned are vulgar laws. The kind of theory in which I
think of them as appearing would not be a specialist or formalized psycho-
logical theory, if indeed there are such things; I am perhaps not very com-
fortable with the word “theory” being applied to it. It would be the rough
kind of system with which we all work, and the laws in it are to be thought
of as corrigible, modifiable, and ceteris paribus in character. (Grice 1989b:
285)
This quote indicates, first, that hewas probably not aware of decision and game
theory in 1976 and 1980 when this late paper of his first appeared and so could not
envisage the possibility that there might be a formalized theory for “the rough
kind of systemwith which we all work.”The second is his use of ceteris paribus in
describing such laws which shows that he did have an implicit notion of choice
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that he never fully realized explicitly. Later in the same essay, he even uses the
word “optimal” for the first time in his writings but the discussion veers off into
other territory and does not address the choice of utterance or interpretation
and how such choices might be optimal. Since this paper represents his mature
thinking on the topic, we must take it as final. It seems that he was very much on
the threshold of choice-theoretic thinking but as choice theory itself burgeoned
only in the 1970s, the two passed each other like strangers in the night.3
Second, Grice introduced the all-important idea of interaction between speaker
and addressee in a slightly more structured way than Wittgenstein (1953/1968)
or Austin (1961) by seeing it through the lens of strategic reasoning. But this
interaction and reasoning remained epistemic – he knows that she knows that
he knows and so on – rather than practical – given what he knows, if he does
this, she could do that, and so he should do something else instead. Here is a
typical statement of Grice’s that purports to account for implicature:
He said that P; he could not have done this unless he thought that Q; he
knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I will realise that it is
necessary to suppose that Q; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that
Q; so he intends me to think, or is at least willing for me to think, that Q.
(Grice 1989a: 30–31)
All his statements are similarly phrasedwhere the reference to alternative actions
and their desirability – what the speaker could have said but did not – remains
implicit: “he has done nothing to stop me thinking that Q” where the main con-
clusion Q has already been arrived atwithout any explicit consideration of choice
– “he could not have done this unless he thought that Q.”
Thus, the two dimensions of rationality Grice enlisted – a one-sided belief-
desire model of action and two-sided epistemic strategic reasoning – were not
connected to each other and failed to explicitly compare the two-sided desirabil-
ity of alternative actions. Moreover, he applied this limited sense of rationality
only to the derivation of implicature and left it open how literal meaning was
to be determined given its many sources of ambiguity: lexical and structural am-
biguity, reference resolution and saturation, modulation, free enrichment, and
other such phenomena that he mentioned only in passing if at all.
3I had started work on my dissertation at Stanford University in 1985 and had tried to contact
him at U.C. Berkeley where he was based, but he was already unwell by then and was racing
to complete his volume so he demurred. Sadly, I lost the opportunity to meet him and also to
tell him about the possibility of using game theory to study language and meaning.
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Although he never used the term, perhaps his account was abductive, that is,
it involved an inference to the best explanation, but choice is present even in
abduction, and in all the examples he considered, a choice among alternative ex-
planations based on the agent’s preferences never arose.4 In other words, despite
superficial similarities, his framework was never intended to be choice-theoretic
and his sense of strategic rationality was always epistemic rather than based on
a two-sided belief-desire model as in game theory.
Indeed, perhaps because it was logicians who took up the study of meaning
and not social scientists, the almost exclusive emphasis in the entire field has
been on the epistemic dimension of agency. Even when the ordinary language
philosophers introduced a way of seeing utterances as actions, it was this epis-
temic level that persisted. Knowledge and belief were simply brought into prac-
tical reasoning but without all the accompaniments of practical action such as
choices and preferences and utilities even in the domain of pragmatics. This is
possibly why game theory has been such a latecomer to the field.5
As I stressed in my dissertation,6 ambiguity applies not just to the lexical and
structural aspects of a sentence butmuchmore broadly to the presence of alterna-
tive interpretive possibilities as such, and then a framework for choosing among
4See C. S. Peirce (1867–1913/1955: 151) for the first use of the term “abduction.” It is possible
William Whewell (1840) originated the idea. Here is a quote from Hobbs (2004: 727–728): “In
deduction, from 𝑃 and 𝑃 ⇒ 𝑄, we conclude 𝑄. In induction, from 𝑃 and 𝑄, or more likely
a number of instances of 𝑃 and 𝑄 together with other considerations, we conclude 𝑃 ⇒ 𝑄.
Abduction is the third possibility. From an observable 𝑄 and a general principle 𝑃 ⇒ 𝑄, we
conclude that 𝑃 must be the underlying reason that 𝑄 is true. We assume 𝑃 because it explains
𝑄.
Of course, there may be many such possible 𝑃 ’s, some contradictory with others, and there-
fore any method of abduction must include a method for evaluating and choosing among al-
ternatives.” Indeed, as I will show in Section 12.2, the choice-based approach of Equilibrium
Semantics is just a species of abduction in which the choice structure is far more sophisticated
and detailed than that provided by Hobbs.
5Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason concern these two dimensions of
agency. The trouble arises when one tries to use the epistemic notion to do work that can only
be done by the practical notion.The first is generally regarded as falling under metaphysics and
epistemology and the second as falling under ethics and political philosophy. Philosophy of
language in modern times was pursued primarily by logicians and so has long been practiced
as if it were more like the first domain than the second. But it is arguable that evenmetaphysics
and epistemology, let alone philosophy of language, have an inescapable practical dimension.
See Parikh (2010: Section 7.6) and Section 2.1 of this bookwhere I argue thatQuine’s (1960) view
of radical indeterminacy fails to take the optimal actions of individuating agents into account.
To its credit, choice theory – including both decision theory and game theory – unifies these
two aspects of human agency. See Myerson (1991).
6See Language and Strategic Inference (1987b).
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such alternative interpretations arising from various sources becomes indispens-
able. It is only through certain innovations in game theory that we are able to
show how the meaning of an utterance may be computed from first principles
assuming only the partial rationality of agents. To the best of my knowledge, no
other contemporary approach, whether based on Grice or not, comes even close
to doing this, and this is because they all lack the constraints on practical reason-
ing that the situated game-theoretic framework provides. If one wishes to un-
derstand linguistic communication and meaning, the appropriate philosophical
psychology to adopt is the variant of game theory I call Equilibrium Semantics.
Going further, if one reflects on how human beings act, it becomes clear that
in addition to the epistemic and practical levels of agency, there is a third level
that might be called social agency. While people are, of course, separate enti-
ties enclosed in their bodies, there are ways of acting that may involve a direct
connection between the minds and bodies of two or more agents through per-
ception rather than inference. Many neuroscientists believe so-calledmirror neu-
rons7 may play an important role in imitation, empathy, and understanding oth-
ers. This close connection operates in conjunction with the more individualistic
modes of acting involved in practical agency and practical reasoning. Partly, as
Hegel argued, individual persons aremolded through social interactions in ways
we do not as yet fully understand, and partly they operate as separate individu-
als. Game theory grew out of single-person decision theory and so largely shares
its methodological individualism making it difficult to study social agency. Like-
wise, cognitive science is also largely individualistic in its approach. But there
are more holistic traditions in the social sciences, especially in sociology and an-
thropology, and some of their insights could be incorporated into the more finely
articulated and more rigorous forms of choice theory. To a certain degree, I ar-
gued for something like thiswhen I said that the preferences of agents in games of
partial information are endogenous and shared, unlike those in traditional game
theory where they are exogenously given and individualistic.8 Further, this en-
dogenous development is in response to the speaker’s possible intentions. This
implies that the individual preferences of two or more agents are shaped by com-
mon social factors as indicated by social agency.
Notions like shared situation are holistic in ways that partly elude us. As we
saw in Section 2.2, common knowledge involves introducing non-well-founded
situations where a situation may contain itself as a constituent. It is exactly this
sort of change that allows us to bring less individualistic social action into com-
7See Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia (2008).
8SeeThe Use of Language (2001: 28).
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munication. Endogenous shared preferences can also be developed along similar
non-well-founded lines.
There are thus three dimensions of agency: epistemic and practical – which
are individualistic – and social, and this last level has barely been mentioned
in studies of communication, although it could play a central role. I reproduce
Table 1.1 from Section 1.3 as Table 5.1 as it is worth contemplating it in light of
this discussion.
Table 5.1: Summary of Theories of Communication
Logicism Wittgenstein Austin Grice Lewis
context marginal implicit implicit implicit implicit
action partial yes yes yes yes
epistemic interaction no no implicit yes yes
practical interaction no implicit no no partial
social interaction no no no no no
computable no no no partial partial
The key missing idea in all of this literature is that a rational decision-maker
should make decisions that maximize his expected utility,9 a view that goes
back to Bernoulli (1738/1954) and to the early days of probability theory, though
its modern justification is due to the classic work of von Neumann & Morgen-
stern (1944/1947). In the context of game theory, which is two-sided, this modus
operandi becomes substantially more complex to describe and requires ideas of
equilibrium as we have seen.
Such a procedure can be used prescriptively or descriptively.The seminal work
of Allais (1953), Simon (1955; 1956), and Kahneman & Tversky (1979); Kahneman
et al. (1982) has demonstrated the descriptive inadequacy of rational decision-
making (understood as the maximization of expected utility) in many situations
9For an introduction to utility theory, see Myerson (1991: Chapter 1). The utility scale is like the
temperature scale: the numbers are not unique (think of Fahrenheit and Celsius) and can be
scaled by a positive number 𝑘 and translated by any number 𝑘′, that is, 𝑣′ = 𝑘𝑣+𝑘′ where 𝑘 > 0,
while still representing the same underlying preferences. If action 𝑎 is preferred to 𝑎′ we write
𝑎 ⪰ 𝑎′. If 𝑣 is the corresponding utility function then, given the assumptions of rationality,
𝑣(𝑎) ≥ 𝑣(𝑎′) is equivalent to 𝑎 ⪰ 𝑎′. Making choices involves actions that are more preferred
and this is equivalent to choosing actions with higher utilities. This allows us to deal with
numerical utility functions instead of qualitative preferences, a great convenience that allows
expected values of utilities to be computed. Incidentally, the payoffs I have shown in earlier
chapters are utilities.
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by establishing that people are just partially rational. The consequences of this
behavioral revolution for theories of single-person and interactive decision the-
ory have yet to crystallize10 despite much experimental research (e.g. Camerer
2003; Vlaev et al. 2011) and many popular books (e.g. Ariely 2008) on the subject.
Such behavioral considerations will be a leitmotif throughout. The Interpreta-
tion Game has the kind of structure that does not lead people to deviate from
utility theory. The only place where partial rationality may enter is the Content
Selection Game. And this is where alternative theories of choice may play a role.
There is also a subtler way inwhich I have already built partial rationality into the
structure of communication. By separating it into different and independent lev-
els – the four components of the Communication Game described in Section 3.1
– rather than trying to build a single large encompassing game, I have implic-
itly assumed that people are finite agents and cannot process everything at once.
At the level of the brain, however, it is likely that there is one seamless parallel
processing structure.
5.2 The theory of conversation
As is well-known, Grice’s framework consists of a general principle called the
Cooperative Principle and four lower-level sets of conversational maxims that
enable addressees to infer meanings beyond the literal content of an utterance.
These are as follows (Grice 1989a: 26–27):
The Cooperative Principle: Make your conversational contribution such as is re-
quired, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of
the talk exchange in which you are engaged.
• The maxim ofQuality:
1. Ceteris paribus, do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Ceteris paribus, do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
• The maxim ofQuantity:
1. Ceteris paribus, make your contribution as informative as required for
the current purposes of the exchange.
2. Ceteris paribus, do not make your contribution more informative than
is required.
10Rubinstein (1998) is one attempt to formalize bounded rationality.
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• The maxim of Relation:
– Ceteris paribus, make your contributions relevant.
• The maxim of Manner:
– Ceteris paribus, be perspicuous.
a. Ceteris paribus, avoid obscurity.
b. Ceteris paribus, avoid ambiguity.
c. Ceteris paribus, be brief.
d. Ceteris paribus, be orderly.
Grice’s basic idea was that the speaker generally observes the Cooperative
Principle and the four maxims when they are communicating. The addressee
knows this and so, when she detects an infringement of one of the maxims, she
supplies a further meaning, an implicature, to preserve the assumption that the
higher-level Cooperative Principle has not been violated. This is an extremely
powerful mechanism to explain how implied meanings can be derived rationally.
When a speaker does not follow the maxims, he may mislead, opt out of coop-
erating, be faced with a clash of two or more maxims, or flout or blatantly fail
to fulfill a maxim. Grice then divides implicatures into three groups: where no
maxim is violated, where there is a clash of maxims and so amaxim is not obeyed,
and where a maxim is flouted.
For our discussion, it is convenient to consider just situations where a maxim
is violated, either literally or by what might be meant. Otherwise, presumably,
the maxims play no role in the calculation and it isn’t clear how the framework
provides a way to obtain such implicatures. The actual example Grice gives to
illustrate the casewhere nomaxim is violated is where a strandedmotorist beside
an immobilized car is told by a passerby that there is a garage around the corner.
Grice’s own gloss here is that the speaker would be infringing the maxim of
relevance unless he thinks the garage might be open. This potential violation of
the maxim of relevance is not effected by the literal content but by what might
be meant by the utterance. This potential violation serves to rule out the possible
meaning that the garage may be closed and enables the addressee to opt for the
related implicature that the garage may be open. Perhaps one can say that some
maxim is violated in all implicatures, either literally or by what might be meant,
that is, either actually or potentially, and in certain cases what is meant includes
the literal meaning of the utterance and in other cases what is meant excludes
the literal meaning.
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Consider one of Grice’s examples of the flouting of the maxim ofQuality:
Irony: X, with whom A has been on close terms until now, has betrayed a
secret of A’s to a business rival. A and his audience both know this. A says
X is a fine friend. (Gloss: It is perfectly obvious to A and his audience that
what A has said or has made as if to say is something he does not believe,
and the audience knows that A knows that this is obvious to the audience.
So, unless A’s utterance is entirely pointless, A must be trying to get across
some other proposition than the one he purports to be putting forward.)
(Grice 1989a: 34)
This example makes clear that certain implicatures arise not because people are
generally truthful as required by the maxim ofQuality but rather because certain
falsehoods are obvious to the audience. It is the manifest nature of the falsehood
that generates the implicature, not its mere presence. That is, its falseness is com-
mon knowledge. Why should an overt lie matter in this way? Not because people
obey the maxim ofQuality which enjoins sticking to the truth but because when
they knowingly utter a falsehood they generally try to conceal this fact. In the
example, one would expect some stress on the word “fine” or an accompanying
gesture or facial expression to make the falsehood more obvious. This additional
information reveals to the audience that the falsehood is meant to be detected
and is therefore not to be taken literally. A and his audience seem to be engaged
in a cooperative conversation. If, instead, their own exchange were adversarial
and the rest of the setting were identical (and there was no stress or gesture), the
audience might merely think A was trying to mislead or had forgiven X; in any
case, there would be no implicature and no irony.
Going back to the immobilized car, the lack of relevance of a possibly closed
garage is common knowledge between the speaker and addressee and that is
why the implicature follows. The speaker does not have to do anything special
like stressing a word as in the case of irony above; the implicature flows from
background knowledge every adult member of contemporary society has. But it
is again common knowledge of the lack of relevance of what might be meant –
and not lack of relevance per se – that leads to an implicature.
The same analysis applies to the other two maxims, the maxim of Quantity
and the maxim of Manner. A person may not convey all that he needs to if the
speaker and addressee are negotiating or may convey too much if he is trying to
be helpful. In either case, he would violate the maxim ofQuantity. It is only when
such a violation is common knowledge that an implicature may be generated. As
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mentioned in Section 3.1, if A wants to influence B’s choice of a restaurant, he
may have to choose between conveying a content like should we go to Bar Boulud?
or should we go to Bar Boulud? we haven’t been there in a while. A may pick the
latter as it would give a reason to B to accept his suggestion but it may also
be unduly prolix and not the least-cost utterance and so violate the maxim of
Manner. In such cases, too, it is only when it becomes common knowledge that
an utterance is not perspicuous that it triggers an implicature.
Thus, the Gricean maxims will not do. People simply do not speak the way the
maxims dictate because they lie or withhold information or do somewhat irrele-
vant things or fail to be perspicuous more often than not, all without setting off
implicatures. A key reason the maxims don’t work is the presence of conflict.11 In
addition, utterances affect addressees in positive or negative ways and the desire
to produce such effects constrains speakers in ways that lead to routine viola-
tions of the maxims that also do not result in implicatures. These observations
become especially clear when we consider the Content Selection Game, which
is generally partly cooperative and partly conflictual.
Once one admits the influencing of relationships in order to maintain or al-
ter them as part of the story of communication and, equally importantly, also
includes the basics of human psychology and motivation, many large-scale phe-
nomena like indirect speech, politeness, and just plain but ubiquitous framing –
something politicians and used car salesmen know a great deal about – become
possible to explain via the Communication Game. Indeed, all communication in-
volves framing. A may choose to give B a reason why they should go to Bar
Boulud because he knows enough human psychology to know that only some
content of that kind would be effective.12 And so he might choose a costlier ut-
terance than the cheapest possibility.
The Content Selection Game and the Generation Game are precisely the sites
where a speaker chooses the best way to frame his utterance given the situation
he is in.This explains a curious paradox. As a rule, we do not choose the cheapest
utterances overall, as I also observed in my first book.13 But once away to realize
11As discussed in Section 2.2, all that is required for an interaction to be conflictual is that the in-
terlocutors value the same situations differently. In game-theoretic terms, their payoffs would
be misaligned. A and B may both want to eat out but may have somewhat dissimilar prefer-
ences about restaurants as shown in Figure 3.1. This is such a common occurrence that conflict
in this sense is more or less ubiquitous. On the other hand, pure conflict is rare and some co-
operation is also typically present because the payoffs are seldom completely misaligned. This
is why most games are mixed-motive games rather than coordination games involving pure
cooperation or zero-sum games involving pure conflict, the two extremes of a continuum.
12See Cialdini (2006), for example.
13SeeThe Use of Language (2001: Section 8.3).
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the speaker’s goal has been identified, that is, once a framing has been identified,
then the speaker does try to choose the cheapest utterance that corresponds to
the framing. That is, the contents we select are not usually the cheapest but once
they have been identified, we do normally choose the cheapest way to convey
them. Of course, cost includes not just the effort of producing a sentence but
also includes the kinds of things Pinker et al. (2008) mention (e.g. the avoidance
of awkwardness in a relationship) based on the Politeness Theory of Brown &
Levinson (1987).
If one followed Grice literally, it would seem that speakers always choose the
cheapest sentence (unless they want to implicate something via the maxim of
Manner). But the foregoing shows why we often do not utter the cheapest sen-
tences as such; we do so only relative to the contents we have chosen to con-
vey.This is why language in ordinary human interactions and in literature is far
more complex and colorful than we would expect based on straightforward cost-
minimizing of the kind Grice envisaged. It is the Communication Game and its
multi-level structure that can give a clear account of such large-scale phenomena,
as we will see. It makes possible a kind of thick description14 of communication.
In fact, the Cooperative Principle itself appears ambiguous. One way to inter-
pret it is to say that people generally cooperate when they communicate. But
this would render it completely implausible owing to the pervasive existence of
conflict. In clarifying it, Grice (1989a: 29) says the following:
The participants have some common immediate aim, like getting a car
mended; their ultimate aims may, of course, be independent and even in
conflict – each may want to get the car mended in order to drive off, leav-
ing the other stranded. In characteristic talk exchanges, there is a common
aim even if, as in an over-the-wall chat, it is a second-order one, namely,
that each party should, for the time being, identify himself with the transi-
tory conversational interests of the other.
There are as many as three levels at which the Cooperative Principle may be
interpreted. As Grice makes clear above, there are so-called ultimate aims that
could be cooperative or conflictual. This level is not germane for the Cooperative
Principle. But there are also immediate aims like getting a car mended. As Grice
lacked the model of a Communication Gamewith its distinction between various
games, he could not say that the immediate aims or “conversational interests” are
the goals the agents have in the Setting Game.
14See Gilbert Ryle’s 1971 university lectures and especially Clifford Geertz (1973).
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As mentioned in Section 3.1, in the interaction betweenA and B involving the
choice of a restaurant, there is a shared goal of eating out together in the Setting
Game. This is the same as the conversational goal. Its subgoals, whether to eat
at this or that restaurant, may not be shared. Both the goal and its subgoals are
reflected in the payoffs of the Setting Game (e.g. possibly a Battle of the Sexes).
If the Setting Game induces a Content Selection Game, then the latter’s payoffs
reflect the former’s payoffs. It is the Content Selection Game through which co-
operation and conflict primarily enter the process of communication, as shown
later.
Some conflict also occurs in the choice of utterance the speaker faces in the
Generation Game, especially in what to make explicit and what to leave implicit.
Such conflict can occur because of the requirements of politeness or appropriate-
ness or to avoid error. The speaker may prefer to be more direct or less explicit
whereas the addressee may prefer greater deference or greater explicitness to
prevent error. But such conflict is related more to the maxims just discussed and
less to the Cooperative Principle. I discuss this in Section 8.4.
But once a speaker utters something and the addressee tries to interpret it,
the Interpretation Game involved is usually one of cooperation because the in-
terlocutors identify with their mutual interests in communicating even if one is
insulting the other. This identification is partly what makes their preferences en-
dogenous reactions to the speaker’s possible intentions, as I said earlier. But even
here, as will be seen in Sections 8.1 and 12.2, conflict can occur because certain
interpretations may be more or less preferred by the addressee. This is the third
level at which the Cooperative Principle could be interpreted.
The correct level at which the Cooperative Principle applies is the intermedi-
ate level of “conversational interests” or “immediate aims.” It does not apply at
the level of ultimate aims and it does not apply at the level of the Generation
and Interpretation Games. At this intermediate level of the Setting and Content
Selection Games, however, there can be cooperation or conflict or both. So the
Cooperative Principle does not apply universally to all conversations. However,
Grice was right in assuming that it nevertheless plays a crucial role in determin-
ing illocutionary meanings such as implicature. This is a subtle point that has
been missed by many and so I repeat it: even when there is no common immedi-
ate aim or shared conversational goal, the Cooperative Principle still influences
implicature. Grice’s error lay, as I will show in Chapter 16, in identifying precisely
what implicatures are generated when the Cooperative Principle does not hold.15
15I believe my analysis is different from but related to the proposal by Asher & Lascarides (2003),
who distinguish Strong Cooperativity (underlying goals coordinated) from Rhetorical Cooper-
ativity (conversational goals coordinated).
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Thus, the Gricean maxims might be rephrased into a single maxim of Commu-
nication as follows:
The maxim of Communication: If you wish to imply something beyond or in place
of what you are literally conveying, ensure that it is common knowledge between
you and the addressee that you are either actually or potentially conveying a
falsehood or not providing the appropriate amount of information or not being
relevant or not being perspicuous and ensure that it is common knowledge that
you are not opting out of cooperating at a conversational level.
Implicatures that themselves do not need to become common knowledge can be
secured by weaker forms of shared knowledge than common knowledge, as in
cases of hinting or suggesting. If a speaker acts in accordance with such a maxim
or a weaker variant, then the desired implicature will be calculable from this
maxim together with the Cooperative Principle: the addressee will notice that
the speaker has uttered a falsehood or is not providing the expected amount of
information or is being irrelevant or is not being perspicuous, either actually or
potentially, and that this is common knowledge (or something weaker) between
them and, given the Cooperative Principle, will be able to infer the implicature.
The requirement of common knowledge is different from Grice’s notion of
flouting. Flouting is just one way in which common knowledge is realized but
common knowledge can also occur in other ways, as indicated by the garage ex-
ample discussed above.The key thing that makes implicature possible is common
knowledge.
The maxim of Communication is still open to the charge often expressed with
regard to the Gricean maxims – that they are approximate and vague and may
also be vulnerable to other counterexamples.16 Thomason (1990: footnote 32)
says, in fact:
I have the impression that Gricewas tentative in theWilliam James Lectures
about his account of conversational implicatures, and may not have been
entirely satisfied with its ability to generate detailed explanations of a wide
range of cases. On the whole, I believe that linguists and computer scientists
have taken the details of Grice’s theory more seriously than they perhaps
should have. It is important to remember that Grice’s William James Lec-
tures were never prepared for publication.
16See Horn (1972; 1984) and Levinson (1983; 2000) for example.
63
5 Grice and conversation
This is why the informal expression of maxims, whether Grice’s or mine, is it-
self an inadequate approach to the problem. In Part IV, I will show how all such
informal principles may be replaced by formal notions and how these formal
notions play a role not only in the derivation of implicatures but also in com-
puting other aspects of what I call illocutionary meaning, such as modulation,
free enrichment, and figures of speech, which belong to the literal meaning of
an utterance. In other words, the Gricean maxims are completely superfluous.17
As we will see, however, the Cooperative Principle is required.
Grice’s theory of conversation also assumed the pipeline theory of meaning
where the syntax of the sentence uttered is determined first, then its semantics
(i.e. its literal meaning), and finally its pragmatics (i.e. its implicatures). The im-
plicatures were derived from the literal meaning and other facts of the utterance.
As I have shown earlier,18 literal meaning and implicature can in fact be interde-
pendent as all meanings tend to be. This two-way influence will be discussed in
detail in Part IV. I will show, in fact, that not only are the various meanings of
an utterance interdependent but so are these meanings and the optimal parse of
the utterance. In other words, the implicature can depend in part on the optimal
parse and vice versa.
To conclude this section, I point out that the Gricean theory of conversation is
really a theory of interpretation and not communication. While it is two-sided, it
has little to say about the speaker’s calculations. It also offers nothing about how
literal meaning is to be derived and one is forced to surmise that Grice probably
meant this to be addressed by convention. While conventional meaning does
play an important role in the determination of literal meaning, the process is
ineluctably contextual as I have shown before and will show in even greater
detail in this book.
5.3 Speaker meaning and word meaning
As I said toward the end of Section 3.1, Grice wanted to reduce the intentionality
of language, its aboutness or acquisition of meaning, to the intentions and beliefs
of speakers, with the idea that these mental states could be further reduced to
physical facts. This would explain how meaning could be part of the natural
order. In his view, the key notion to effect such a reduction was that of speaker
meaning.19 If that notion could be defined in terms of the speaker’s intentions,
17This was also argued inThe Use of Language (2001: Chapter 7).
18See Language and Equilibrium (2010: Section 4.6).
19He used the term “utterer’s meaning” as he had in mind the wider scope of what he called
nonnatural meaning of which linguistic meaning was one important part.
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then word meaning20 (and, presumably, literal meaning and implicature) could
be reduced to what speakers mean.
Grice (1957; 1969; 1989c) gave many definitions of speaker meaning, each suc-
cessively designed to meet various counterexamples and counter-definitions pro-
posed mainly by Strawson and Schiffer. Consider the following restatement of
an early version by Strawson (1964: 446):
𝑆 meant something by (or in) uttering 𝑥 iff 𝑆 uttered 𝑥 intending
1. that this utterance of 𝑥 produce a certain response 𝑟 in a certain audi-
ence 𝐴;
2. that 𝐴 recognize 𝑆’s intention (1);
3. that 𝐴’s recognition of 𝑆’s intention (1) shall function as at least part
of 𝐴’s reason for 𝐴’s response 𝑟 .
To summarize the complex intention involved in meaning, the term “M-inten-
tion” was introduced. Schiffer (1972: 63) argued against both the sufficiency and
necessity of these conditions and gave his own more adequate definition:
𝑆 meant that 𝑝 by uttering 𝑥 iff 𝑆 uttered 𝑥 intending thereby to realize a
certain state of affairs 𝐸 which is such that 𝐸’s obtaining is sufficient for
𝑆 and a certain audience 𝐴 mutually knowing that 𝐸 obtains and that 𝐸 is
conclusive evidence that 𝑆 uttered 𝑥 with the primary intention
1. that there be some 𝜌 such that 𝑆’s utterance of 𝑥 causes in 𝐴 the acti-
vated belief that 𝑝/𝜌(𝑡);21
and intending
2. satisfaction of (1) to be achieved, at least in part, by virtue of 𝐴’s belief
that 𝑥 is related in a certain way 𝑅 to the belief that 𝑝;
3. to realize 𝐸.
While Schiffer’s definition may be sufficient, it is not necessary for three rea-
sons. First, his kind of M-intention is too complex for people to entertain in or-
dinary speech. In fact, even Grice’s M-intention is too complex. An argument
20In Equilibrium Semantics, there is no need for the notion of sentence meaning so I omit it from
the discussion here but Grice did want to reduce both word meaning and sentence meaning
to speaker meaning.
21The symbol “𝑝/𝜌(𝑡)” is to be read as the belief 𝑝 for which 𝑆 intends 𝐴 to have the truth-
supporting reasons 𝜌(𝑡).
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against both is the inability to form such intricate intentions when we rattle off
multiple sentences in quick succession. And yet speakers certainly mean things
so suchM-intentions cannot be required. Second, there are many utterances such
as “It is raining” or “Smith weighs 150 pounds” involving free enrichments of the
content where a location is meant but not always explicitly intended so again
the conditions are not necessary. By “explicitly” I just mean there is no corre-
sponding mental representation. This objection can be fixed by stipulating that
the speaker implicitly intends contents that he would assent to if asked. Third,
when a language exists with conventionally meaningful words there is no need
for M-intentions. Both Grice and Schiffer miss the circularity of language where
communication explains the emergence of conventional meanings and conven-
tional meanings (partly) explain communication.
In Parikh (2000; 2001; 2010), I give game-theoretic definitions of speaker mean-
ing and other related concepts, especially communication and information flow.
The main idea is that the kind of state of affairs 𝐸 that Schiffer envisaged is re-
placed by an appropriate game and this game is shown to occur naturally so it
does not need to be intended. Moreover, because utterances are ambiguous in
many ways as I have remarked above, these ambiguities need to be resolved in
some way in order for a speaker to mean the right thing. As a result, the key to
speaker meaning is the solution of a certain game.
Definition 5.1. Ameans 𝑝 by uttering 𝜑 in 𝑢 if and only if there is an addresseeB
such thatA intends to convey 𝑝 to B in 𝑢 (a proper part of which intention may
be implicit) and the solution to the game 𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) between A and B that A con-
siders in uttering 𝜑 in 𝑢 and (nonconsciously) believes to be common knowledge
between them is 𝑝.22
𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) is A’s mental model of part of the interaction with B and belongs to
the Generation Game. It was introduced in Section 3.1 and will be described in
Part III so the definition’s evaluation has to be deferred. There is only a simple
intention to convey 𝑝, part of which may be implicit. No complex intentions
22The word “convey” in the definition merely signifies a transfer of information as from one
computer disk to another. We could replace “convey” with “bring about a transfer of.”
One approach to the definition would include other attitudes to 𝑝 than the having of infor-
mation by B. For example,Amight intend to cause an activated belief that 𝑝 in B. Or he might
intend to get B to do something. If we adopt this approach, we can think of this definition as
focusing on the case of pure information transfer. Other possibilities are then easy to define.
Alternatively, transferring information is a prerequisite for having other attitudes to 𝑝, or
doing something, so that one can circumvent having to specify the other possibilities by simply
using “convey.” This seems like a better approach because the response is left open.
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are required. It should also be noted that 𝜑 can be a linguistic or nonlinguistic
action.23
Notice that an infinite amount of “work” is being done in both Schiffer’s and
my definition above.This infinity cannot be avoided. Early attempts by Grice and
Strawson led to an unending series of explicit intentions. Schiffer introduced it-
erated common knowledge which substituted an unending epistemic chain for
the unending chain of intentions. Both may be sufficient but are unnecessary as
I have argued above. Definition 5.1 renders this explicit infinity harmless by re-
quiring a single simple intention and a shared situation orientation to common
knowledge.The explicit infinity becomes implicit – mere entailments rather than
mental representations – because of the circular nature of this account of com-
mon knowledge.
Just as there are two ways of approaching the iterated type of definition – ei-
ther via infinitely iterated intentions or iterated common knowledge – so there
are also two ways of approaching the circular type of definition, not just via com-
mon knowledge but also via circular intentions. Indeed, Grice’s (1957) very first
attempt was precisely along these lines: “A meant𝑛𝑛 something by 𝑥” is (roughly)
equivalent to “A intended the utterance of 𝑥 to produce some effect in an audi-
ence by means of the recognition of this intention.” Here, the speaker’s intention
contains a reference to itself and so is circular.
Bach & Harnish (1979) and Bach (1987a; 2012a,b) but also Searle (1969) and Har-
man (1974; 1986) have championed such circular intentions, filling out Grice’s
somewhat incomplete stab at the definition. In my view, none of their formula-
tions satisfy entirely because they lack a clear language to express the circularity.
Barwise (1989c: 194–195) points out that such circular intentions involve circular
(or non-well-founded) situations but does not spell out a definition. My account
is as follows.
Definition 5.2. A means 𝑝 by uttering 𝜑 in 𝑢 if and only if there is an addresseeB and a situation 𝑠 ⊂ 𝑢 such that (a) 𝑠 ⊨ A utters 𝜑 and (b) 𝑠 ⊨ A intends to
convey 𝑝 to B by B’s recognition of 𝑠.
Definition 5.2 shows plainly that the relevant intention is circular and entails
an infinite chain of intentions just as happened with common knowledge in Sec-
tion 2.2. “Recognition of 𝑠” is just recognition of all the facts in 𝑠. One of these is
precisely the fact in item (b) in the definition and so we getA intends to convey 𝑝
to B by B’s recognition that “A intends to convey 𝑝 to B by B’s recognition of 𝑠”
23As I will not be dealing with nonlinguistic cases here, see Chapter 6 ofThe Use of Language for
further discussion.
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and so on ad infinitum. This kind of clear formulation is better because it identi-
fies precisely what is involved in adopting a self-referential intention, something
that remains obscure in Grice’s original formulation and in subsequent ones by
Bach and others as well. Just as with the situational account of common knowl-
edge, such an infinite chain of entailments is harmless because it does not involve
an agent actually representing these nested intentions mentally. So while Reca-
nati (1986) was right to say that an infinite number of sub-intentions are implied
by a reflexive intention, he was wrong to say this poses a problem.
Despite the infinity of entailed intentions being innocuous, such circular in-
tentions are also too complex, certainly compared with the simple intention in
Definition 5.1. This is especially true when successive rapid utterances are con-
sidered. So while the conditions in Definition 5.2 may be sufficient, they are also
not necessary. However, they are simpler than Strawson’s and Schiffer’s defini-
tions. In other words, both types of iterated approach are worse than the circular
intention approach and the latter is worse than the situated common knowledge
approach. Indeed, my claim is that Definition 5.1 also gets things right.
Some authors (e.g. Devitt 2013a) argue that such definitions, presumably in-
cluding Grice’s and Schiffer’s, confuse the causes of a speaker’s meaning 𝑝 with
what constitutes a speaker’s meaning 𝑝. For Devitt, speaker meaning is consti-
tuted by the speaker’s “thought content” 𝑝. In light of the above, this thought
content is just a necessary condition that is not sufficient. After all, a speaker
will have many thought contents and only those satisfying either Definition 5.1
or some such definition will count as what the speaker meant.
A related issue in Devitt (2013a) is the use of the term “metaphysics of mean-
ing” to describe speaker meaning and distinguish it from the “epistemology of
meaning” to describe the addressee’s (inferred) meaning. Speaker meaning and
addressee meaning are certainly kept distinct in my framework. While Contex-
tualists such as Recanati (2004) confuse them by discussing the addressee’s in-
terpretation in place of the speaker’s production, the terms themselves are mis-
leading and best avoided because the speaker has to take account of how the
addressee will interpret his utterance and so the metaphysics and epistemology
are intertwined and not separable. This interpenetration of the two will become
completely obvious in Part III.
Speaker meaning is supposed to help with three things: defining word mean-
ing, literal meaning, and implicature. But, in my view, it is too one-sided a notion
as it is A’s mental representation of part of the interaction with B. This makes
it possible for A to mean things even when they are not communicated to B.
The right notion to use, as suggested by Section 3.2 on macro-semantics, is com-
munication which is genuinely two-sided as the interaction with the addressee
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is not just a representation in A’s mind. The cross-conversational constraint of
consistency on conventional (i.e. word) meanings introduced there applies to all
users, whether speakers or addressees. That is, conventional meanings arise be-
cause both speakers and addressees participate in creating them, not just speak-
ers as Grice supposed. Speakers exploit conventional meanings in speaking and
addressees exploit them in interpreting this speech.
Just as there is A’s subjective game 𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑), it was mentioned in Section 3.1
that there is B’s subjective game 𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) and there is also the actual objective
game 𝐺𝑢(𝜑), the latter two of which emerge after the public utterance of 𝜑 in 𝑢.
Incidentally, it is these distinct games that keep speakermeaning distinct from ad-
dressee meaning. Since all these games will be described later, the reader should
just think of them for the moment as the agents’ subjective representations of
their interaction and their actual interaction.
Definition 5.3. A communicates 𝑝 toB by uttering 𝜑 in 𝑢 if and only ifA intends
(possibly partly implicitly) to convey 𝑝 to B in 𝑢, B intends (possibly partly im-
plicitly) to interpretA’s utterance of 𝜑 in 𝑢, and the games𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑),𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑),𝐺𝑢(𝜑)
induced thereby are equal and common knowledge and their solution is 𝑝.
Communication involves an actual transfer of 𝑝 from A to B rather than just
an intended transfer by A as with speaker meaning. It is such actual transfers
that result in conventional and referential meanings emerging from the inter-
locking Communication Games in society that make up a Language Game. So
speaker meaning is not the right concept to be chasing after despite all the ink
that has been spilled on it; it is communication that is foundational. Grice’s (1968)
attempts at defining word meaning from speaker meaning were in any case ex-
tremely informal and vague. He also failed to realize that the two notions – con-
ventional and referential meaning (i.e. literal meaning and implicature) – have
to be defined together, as we will see in Part V.
Despite the fact that communication underlay meaning for Grice, he never
made explicit the connection between his theory of conversation and speaker
meaning as indicated in Definition 5.3 and as explained in Part III. As a result,
the speaker and addressee in his account remain solipsistic, locked within their
mental states, and their interaction never gets addressed. It is because of this lack
of integration of the two sides of communication that orthodox Griceans focus
on speaker meaning and revisionist Griceans focus on addressee interpretation
and the heart of the problem – communication – eludes the grasp of both.
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5.4 Semantics and pragmatics
WhenMorris (1938) introduced his trichotomy of syntax, semantics, and pragmat-
ics within semiotics, the general science of signs, content, the subject matter of
semantics, was thought of as predominantly conventional. For example, Austin
(1961/1979c) assumed that demonstrative conventions correlated statements with
historic situations. Because content and convention were believed to coincide, it
is arguable that the use of “semantics” to describe this aboutness of utterances
was ambiguous between the two. Later, when Grice (1975) realized they diverged,
he chose to identify semantics with the mostly conventional aspect of content,
with what is said, rather than with content per se. This latter possibility dropped
out of view.
This also meant that implicature, the part of content left over after what is said
is assigned to semantics, was relegated to pragmatics. This created a parallel am-
biguity in “pragmatics” as applying to communication (as Morris had originally
envisaged) and as applying to implicature, an ambiguity Devitt (2013b: Section 4)
mentions, although without tracing it back to Morris and Grice. There were thus
two shifts: semantics was narrowed from all content to literal meaning and prag-
matics was altered from communication to implicature.
Although Grice was aware that literal meaning required the disambiguation
of lexical and structural ambiguities and the fixing of pronoun references, he
seemed to ignore the uncomfortable fact that the context would have to play a
role in the determination of literal meaning and not just implicature. As a result,
because Grice held literal meaning to be primarily conventional, there was an
implicit third shift: semantics was tied to what comes from the linguistic rep-
resentation alone and pragmatics was tied to what comes from the utterance
situation.
There were thus two distinct scopes for Gricean semantics: one was literal
meaning, the other was conventional meaning, and the two were thought to co-
incide – except for the somewhat unusual category of conventional implicature.
Just as Morris had implicitly identified the full content with convention so Grice
implicitly identified literal meaning with convention. And just as the presence
of implicature meant that the full content could not be entirely conventional, so
Searle (1978), Cohen (1985; 1986), and others made it equally clear that the pres-
ence of contextual aspects of literal meaning, such as saturation, modulation, and
free enrichment, meant that literal meaning could not be entirely conventional.
This was in addition to the already known contextual aspects of literal meaning
– lexical and structural disambiguation and fixing the references of pronouns –
that Grice had chosen to disregard.
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This divergence between literal and conventional meaning has led to deep
schisms in the understanding of semantics and pragmatics. Contemporary writ-
ers such as Bach (1987b; 2001), Levinson (2000), Recanati (2004), Bianchi (2004),
Cappelen & Lepore (2005a), Szabó (2005), Carston (2008), Devitt (2013b), and oth-
ers have tried to redraw the line between semantics and pragmatics in a variety
of ways based on different motivations to include either no context in seman-
tics (e.g. Carston – linguistically encoded or conventional meaning, and possibly
Levinson – generalized versus particularized conversational implicatures) or re-
stricted bits of context (e.g. Bach – “narrow” and “wide” context, Cappelen and
Lepore – shared minimal semantic content, Devitt – a narrow notion of what is
said) or all of context (e.g. Recanati – truth-conditional content or a wide notion
of what is said or full literal meaning). However, the Gricean distinction between
a largely conventional semantics and a contextual/inferential pragmatics surpris-
ingly continues to underpin all these efforts.
Carston (2004; 2008) does an able job of showing the inadequacy of several
competing views (Levinson, Bach, Cappelen and Lepore) so I will not discuss
their details here. However, her own context-independent linguistically encoded
meanings of sentences expressed as “incomplete, gappy meaning structures (se-
mantic schemata or templates, propositional radicals or matrices)” have their
own problems. First, it isn’t clear that sentences have conventional meanings
because only words do. At least, such sentential conventional meanings are not
required for generating and interpreting utterances, the real problem of commu-
nication, though it is possible that the kinds of gappy structures she posits might
be definable with some difficulty. In any case, Carston and the Relevance The-
orists lack a precise theory of communication as I will show in Chapter 13, so
such posits remain otiose. This is a problem for all the writers mentioned above
because none of them have a worked-out theory of communication that enables
one to derive the meanings of utterances from first principles so the vigorous
redrawing of lines between semantics and pragmatics becomes a little scholastic
and reminiscent of pre-Copernican astronomy.
Second, these lexical conventional meanings are intermediate steps toward ref-
erential meanings, the former being generalizations of Fregean senses and the
latter of Fregean references, as I said in Section 3.1. So conventional meanings
are not contents that utterances are about; they are rather exploited by speakers
to convey referential meanings. That is why conventional meanings belong to
word types; it is only when words are uttered in some situation that they acquire
referential meanings based on their conventional meanings.
Third, as I argued in Section 3.2, the context-independence of conventional
meaning, that is, of linguistically encoded meaning, is just a convenient assump-
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tion in what I call micro-semantics; the real theater of conversation is macro-
semantic and, in this society-wide setting, conventional meanings themselves
keep changing and getting reset. While speakers and addressees do generally
have access to some initial lexical conventional meanings during communica-
tion, the final conventional meaning at the end of the process either remains
what it was or gets altered, as will be shown in Part V.
On account of the above, especially the first and second points, it is far from
clear what purpose is served by calling this complex but relatively small area of
lexical conventional meaning within the much larger field of content and com-
munication semantics. Carston (2008: Section 4) herself hints at this by saying
that semantics could be omitted entirely, leaving just syntax and pragmatics.
Communication involves fundamental indeterminacies of many different
kinds.24 To take just one pertinent example, the basic distinction between literal
meaning and implicature is itself indeterminate. In the situation of the stranded
motorist referred to earlier where the speaker tells the addressee that there is a
garage around the corner, there is no simple way to decide whether there is an
implicature that the speaker thinks the garage might be open or there is just a
modulated literal meaning that there is a possibly open garage around the cor-
ner. Some speakers and addressees might see it one way and others might see it
differently. There may not even be a fact of the matter because the speaker may
not have had an explicit intention regarding it. Such indeterminacies are perva-
sive so using, say, the distinction between literal meaning and implicature as the
basis for the distinction between semantics and pragmatics seems unwarranted.
The important issue is that this additional information, whether obtained via
implicature or via modulation, involves what I call illocutionary computations.
However, implicature will turn out to be purely illocutionary whereas modula-
tion will have both locutionary and illocutionary dimensions. In general, there
are meanings obtained via lexical and structural disambiguation as well as by the
fixing of pronoun reference or saturation that involve exclusively locutionary
techniques. On the other side, there are meanings such as free enrichment and
implicature and direct and indirect illocutionary force that involve exclusively
illocutionary techniques. Modulations, the most complex of all, straddle the two.
The distinction between locutionary and illocutionary meaning describes how
the meanings are derived. It crosscuts the other classes of content such as literal
meaning which includes everything except for implicature and force. That is, the
latter classes are based on the nature of the content, on the what, not on how it
is computed. These two crosscutting classifications of content will become very
24See Language and Equilibrium (2010: Chapter 5).
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clear in Chapter 20 by which point I will have shown how all types of content
are obtained by the speaker and addressee.
Interestingly, even though it is useful to distinguish between locutionary and
illocutionary meaning derivations, these processes are more similar than differ-
ent. Both involve partial information games and there is an underlying unifor-
mity in communication that Equilibrium Semantics brings out clearly. This com-
mon feature is that all content computation requires context. Thus, contrary to
Grice’s distinction between a largely conventional semantics and an inferential
pragmatics that undergirds all the more recent approaches, it is better to identify
semantics with the problem of inferring the entire content, regardless of what
contributes to this content, the linguistic representation or the context. As one
reading ofMorris’s trichotomy suggests, the concern of semantics should bewith
content per se, a view that has disappeared from sight.
There are three basic reasons why such an identification of semantics with
deriving content is desirable: it allows a uniform view of all representations
whether they are linguistic or visual or gestural or mental; it makes the flow of
information rather than representation primary; and, as Austin (1961/1979b; 1975)
argued, truth conditions parallel felicity conditions, which makes a construal of
the semantics-pragmatics distinction that connects the former with semantics
and the latter with pragmatics untenable.
The reason why it is more appropriate to call everything semantics rather than
pragmatics as Carston (2008: Section 4) suggests is that semantics refers to the
content itself and pragmatics is ambiguous between communicative processes
and content. There is, therefore, just phonetics, syntax, and semantics and all
three mutually determine optimal phonetic, syntactic, and semantic values in
communication in a circular way, as I will show. Such an expanded semantics
that swallows all of pragmatics, if articulated mathematically as Equilibrium Se-
mantics does, can then be seen as a generalized and contextual model-theoretic
account of meaning within some wider notion of a situated logic. It also rein-
forces the broad notion of semantics as the discipline founded by Frege, Russell,
Wittgenstein, and Austin that I started with in Section 1.1.
This completes my discussion of Grice and why I believe it is time that his
synthesis of communication and meaning is superseded by a fully mathematical
framework such as Equilibrium Linguistics that offers a much more comprehen-
sive and correct account of the subject. The full proof of this can only be realized
through the rest of the book.
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6 Incorporating elements of the
Romantic tradition
In my previous book, I tried to combine the strengths of two twentieth-century
analytic traditions, so-called ideal language philosophy and ordinary language phi-
losophy. I identified reference as the key notion contributed by the former and
use as the key notion contributed by the latter. To these two notions, I added the
new ideas of indeterminacy and equilibrium. Thus, Equilibrium Semantics rests
on the four fundamental ideas of reference, use, indeterminacy, and equilibrium.
Both the analytic traditions are rooted in the rationalist and empiricist doctrines
of Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, and others issuing from the seventeenth-century
revolution in science and later Enlightenment ideas. They leave out ideas devel-
oped in the Romantic reaction to these doctrines embodied by Herder, Humboldt,
Hegel, and especially Heidegger.The two sets of ideas, one identified largely with
Anglo-American philosophy and the other largely with Continental thought, al-
though these geographic markers no longer hold, have tended to be opposed to
each other and consequently neglected by each other. One reason why analytic
and science-based approaches have generally ignored the latter is that their ex-
pression is often mired in obscure (and sometimes obscurantist) language and
another is that their articulation is sometimes genuinely difficult. A third im-
portant factor is that most such accounts tend to be nonnaturalistic and hence
opposed to science.
Nevertheless, there are some central insights in this Romantic tradition that
are worth assimilating. One way to attempt this is by expanding certain aspects
of the notion of use that ordinary language philosophy developed in a partial way.
My own notion of use was partly based on game theorywhich, though far ampler
in its understanding of action and choice than ordinary language philosophy and
much contemporary semantics, is still somewhat narrowly circumscribed. This
broadening is obviously a large undertaking and to accommodate it within a
single chapter of this book, I restrict myself to the papers of Taylor (1985/1999),
who is unusually clear in his formulations of these Romantic elements.
In Language and Equilibrium (2010: Section 1.4.2), I identified the following
interconnected aspects of use:
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• Belief, desire, intention, and agency
• Sentence and utterance
• The situatedness of language
• The efficiency of language
• Ambiguity
• Communication and information flow
Of these six, only the first one, the concept of action, needs some direct alter-
ation; the rest change as a result. I divide my comments on Taylor’s papers into
two parts.
6.1 Human agency
Compressing greatly, it is possible to pinpoint the following key aspects of action
Taylor identifies:
1. Human agents are self-interpreting animals and their feelings in particu-
lar (e.g. pride, shame, sense of worth, love, etc.) essentially involve inter-
pretations or articulations in language that may be more or less adequate
to their objects. Further, these articulations partly constitute their objects.
That is, these formulations may simultaneously be right or wrong and also
partly constitutive. So they are representations but not of extra-linguistic
and independent objects. (Taylor 1977/1999a; 1981/1999)
2. Some actions involve evaluations (e.g. emotional, moral, political, aesthetic,
etc.) that cannot be reduced to a calculus of preferences as required by
decision and game theory. (Taylor 1977/1999b)
3. Action is not to be explained in terms of the mental (i.e. beliefs, desires,
intentions) but the mental is to be explained in terms of action. Under-
standing does not precede action but is achieved by performing the action
and this understanding also transforms the action. (Taylor 1983/1999)
4. Collective action is not reducible to individual actions. (Taylor 1983/1999)
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6.1.1 Persons as self-interpreting animals
Taylor contrasts two interpretations of persons, one the broadly Enlightenment
view and the other the broadly Romantic view, both updated to our current times.
Both start with the ordinary concept of persons as beings with certain capacities:
“a person is an agent who has a sense of self, of his/her own life, who can evaluate
it, and make choices about it.” (Taylor 1981/1999: 103)
The first view treats all agents as entities that act on the basis of beliefs and
desires. There is no essential difference between animals and complex machines.
The ends of agents are taken as unproblematic. What is unusual about persons,
therefore, is their ability to conceive andmakemore complex choices: their strate-
gic power.The capacities listed above are seen in the context of this ability to plan.
The power to represent with clarity plays a crucial role in executing this strate-
gic power. Computation is the key and the difference between persons and other
animals and machines is the relative complexity of the calculations involved.
This is the dominant view in current scientific writing about people. However,
all modern semantics, including Grice, operates with a much thinner version of
even this partial picture. It is only game theory that allows us to address the full
range of this strategic power underlying communication and language.
The second view conceives persons as beings for whom things matter in cer-
tain special ways, as subjects of significance. Things matter for all agents but per-
sons have qualitatively different concerns that are sui generis. In other words, the
peculiar ends of persons come into focus. Thus, the difference between humans
and other animals is not just their greater strategic abilities but also their unusual
goals. This means consciousness consists not just in the power to represent but
also in the power to constitute our concerns.
What makes human ends qualitatively different is that they involve a sensi-
tivity to certain kinds of situated standards. To understand what is meant by
“standard,” first consider a situation where two persons are preparing food and
one says to the other, “The oven is hot.” Here, the statement is made relative to
some situated standard involving temperature and heat issuing from a situated
goal, say that of baking pizza.1
1I discussed this example from Travis (1996) in Parikh (2010: Section 5.6): the key idea is that the
standard or goal relative to which the statement is made arises from the utterance situation
and is located in the described situation 𝑐 of the (Austinian) proposition 𝑐 ⊨ 𝜎 conveyed by
the utterance. More broadly, Austin’s (1961/1979b) felicity conditions are likewise standards
that belong to the described situation part of the proposition conveyed by an utterance. Sadly,
mainstream semantics has largely ignored Austin and so has largely ignored the facts about
standards as dealt with by Travis and in my previous book. See Barwise (1989b) for a discussion
of Austinian propositions.
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But standards involving heat and temperature are immediately physical and
other animals andmachines could also be sensitive to such standards (and similar
ones like experiencing pain or fear). The kind of standard Taylor (1977/1999a:
54) has in mind is subject-referring. For example, the emotion of shame involves
(failing with respect to) standards which are experience-dependent properties
related to our desires and to our emotional life and in particular to a sense of
dignity, of worth, of how we are seen by others, all things connected with the
life of a subject of experience. Such standards are part of the situation in which
shame is experienced and are bound up with a whole gamut of other emotions,
goals, and experiences. So shame and its accompanying standards refer us back
to the subject or agent and so are subject-referring.
Further, such situated standards are partly constituted by accompanying ar-
ticulations or interpretations and so, consequently, are the corresponding emo-
tions.There cannot be an experience of shamewithout some awareness of certain
distinctions because shame is felt with respect to falling short of standards like
worth and this is related to levels of high and low. These distinctions or articu-
lations, while partly constitutive of shame, are not arbitrary: they can be right
or wrong in delineating the feeling. As I said above, they can be more or less
adequate to their objects which means that such feelings are, to a certain degree,
independent of their articulations even though they are partly constituted by
them.
Being a subject of significance is then being an agent that experiences subject-
referring standards and emotions (such as shame, pride, remorse, moral good-
ness, admiration, contempt, aspiration, dignity, worth, love, certain joys and
anxieties, and countless others) that necessarily involve ongoing articulations
or interpretations. And being a subject of significance is what makes us self-
interpreting animals. We are partly constituted by such self-interpretations. This
self-interpreting nature is the distinctive mark of our humanity, not our strategic
capabilities, which we share to a greater or lesser degree with other animals and
machines.
For these self-interpretations to partly constitute our emotional life and, there-
fore, partly constitute us, a symbolic medium is required, that is, language in the
widest sense, which includes words, images, and gestures among other things. In
this wide sense, language articulates feelings and makes them clearer and more
defined and hence transforms them. So language partly constitutes us and, as a
result, the pre-symbolic hominins must have been much impoverished in their
mental lives compared with us.
This second view, in highly condensed form, captures Heidegger’s concept of
a person according to Taylor. Taylor (and Heidegger) claim that persons and,
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in particular, their subject-referring emotions that are articulated in and partly
constituted by language are irreducible, that is, they cannot be naturalized or
reduced to physical things. Further, it is this nonnaturalizability of persons that
makes them essentially distinct from other animals and machines.
This is a delicate argument and we can leave this question of nonnaturalizabil-
ity open, although I believe persons are not sharply different from other animals
and machines and are naturalizable. One has to concede, however, that any re-
duction of the interconnected web of subject-referring emotions and goals and
their partly constitutive articulations would have to be quite complex and seems
beyond our reach today.2 Analytic philosophy has generally not faced up to the
difficulties raised by such Romantic intuitions about the nature of persons. It con-
tinues to focus on strategic man (and, in the case of mainstream semantics, on
an extremely thin version of strategic man) and has, relatively speaking, ignored
these subtler dimensions of symbolic man.
If the argument is right about the partial constitution of subject-referring emo-
tions by language, then the insight of real import for our discussion is that the
linguistic formulations of feelings are representations but not of wholly inde-
pendent objects. It has been a basic assumption of referential semantics since
Frege (in fact, even earlier – Bolzano, for example) that the referents of words
are wholly independent of them. This is true of objects like tables and chairs but
not of subject-referring emotions. In other words, depending on what they are
about, utterances can partly constitute the propositions they convey. Despite
this partial constitution, propositions remain abstract entities; that is, they are
not linguistic.
But this realization does not affect the fundamental fact that language is nev-
ertheless representational, as Taylor (1981/1999: 101) himself concedes. That is,
the key concept of reference still applies to all words, as I have argued in Parikh
(2010). In some cases, the infons represented will be independent of the uttered
words, and in others, they will be partly constituted by them. This is a relatively
small adjustment in the framework though it should be acknowledged that it
alters the basic nature of a large number of referents.
6.1.2 Irreducible evaluations of choices
Taylor (1977/1999b) argues that some choices involve strong evaluations (e.g. emo-
tional, moral, political, aesthetic, etc.) that cannot be reduced to a calculus of
2Think, for example, ofOthello and of the evil Iago’s sharp awareness of themoral and emotional
standards that prevail in his community that he exploits so adroitly.
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preferences as required by game theory. This is because the evaluations con-
cern considerations of worth that require contrastive articulations like good/bad,
high/low and so entail potential conflicts among different self-interpretations.
For example, someone may forgo cake because it would adversely affect their
cholesterol. This is an instance of weak evaluation and involves utilitarian rea-
soning. But they might also forgo it because they do not wish to be the kind of
person who responds abjectly to bodily appetites: this implies contrasting self-
interpretations such as preserving one’s dignity versus succumbing to degrada-
tion. In otherwords, desires do not only count in virtue of the positive consumma-
tions that result but also in virtue of the kind of life and kind of person considered
worthwhile. Taylor maintains that such strong evaluations cannot be reduced to
a calculus of preferences and to what he calls instrumental action.
In my view, there is no problemwith accepting that, contrary to Taylor, strong
evaluations can be so reduced because the preference relations of game theory
abstract from the motivations that underlie them, whether they happen to be
strong or weak. The contents of the two kinds of evaluation mentioned in for-
going a cake are suppressed in registering that forgo cake ≻ eat cake because
preference is a relation among situations or actions. At this abstract level, the dis-
tinction between the two kinds of evaluation – avoiding cholesterol or avoiding
degradation – can be ignored. And these preferences over situations or actions
are all that is needed for the calculation of the best course of action. Grice (1989b),
for example, does not draw a distinction between these two kinds of evaluation
but he does use the words “value” and “optimal” and, here, I agree with Grice. It
is often not realized by critics of choice theory how thin its demands are with
respect to the assumptions it needs to make to draw very powerful conclusions.
But this reduction to preferences and calculation does not thereby imply a
reduction to instrumental action if the latter means nonmoral and non-self-in-
terpreting action. This is because the choice-theoretic description does not fully
exhaust our understanding of action, it only provides a means to predict and
partially explain it. If we also want to understand its underlying motivations,
then it will be necessary to return to the contents that we abstracted from in
arriving at their preferences. This is true even if we wish to know whether it was
cholesterol or fat that drove them to avoid cake, not just higher-level motivations.
All kinds of evaluation occur in communication, especially in the Content Se-
lection Game described in Section 3.1 and later. The game-theoretic framework
abstracts from the content of the reasons why A wishes to communicate some-
thing to B and focuses on explaining why certain choices are made in light of
certain abstracted preferences. In carrying this out, it becomes necessary to ex-
plain informally how these preferences follow from the relevant motivations but
80
6.1 Human agency
this informal step does not raise any special difficulties. If required, it can be
formalized through the notion of higher-order preferences though this would be
unduly pedantic.
6.1.3 The expressive dimension of action
Supported by Hegel’s philosophy of mind and action, Taylor (1983/1999) con-
trasts two views of action, the causal view and the qualitative view.3 The first
view, rooted in the rationalist/empiricist paradigm, takes the performance of an
action to be an event (typically involving some physical movement) caused by
an agent’s beliefs, desires, and intentions that are further reducible to physical
things. This can be recognized as the informal underpinning of the notion of
action in game theory as well.
The second view, originating especially in Vico but also in Kant and Hegel,
takes the performance of an action to be a primitive thing inseparably connected
with some direction or purpose that is either semiconscious or fully conscious
and that requires articulation to be better understood. This understanding via
articulation is an achievement and it transforms the action itself just as it did
subject-referring emotions.
This coming to fuller understanding through articulation in a symbolic me-
dium is the expressive dimension of action as developed in Romanticism which,
according to Taylor, is missing from the first view as the latter takes actions as
fully determined by their causes. Understanding is itself an activity that does not
take beliefs, desires, and intentions as immediately and transparently given but
as objects that have to be clarified and partly constituted in their expression. For
example, our desires that issued in some prior action may crystallize as we re-
flect on them. And becoming clear about an action in this way changes the action
itself.
Thus, action is not to be explained in terms of the mental as the causal view
does, rather themental is to be explained in terms of action as the qualitative view
recommends. The mental is not a primitive given but something to be achieved
via the primitive capacity for action and its subsequent clarification. Further, be-
cause utterances are themselves actions, this reversal applies to utterances as
well.
There appear to be two irreconcilable views of action here. In one, actions are
caused by beliefs, desires, and intentions, and, if we come to appreciate these
3In the paper, Taylor’s goal is to explicate Hegel’s philosophy in light of the qualitative view,
not to infer the latter from the former.
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causes better upon reflection, the action itself is not transformed, only our un-
derstanding of it. In the other, these causes are at best partial, and they are, as
it were, completed when we express and clarify them, and that changes the ac-
tion itself. For example, someone who voted a certain way may have done so on
the basis of inchoate intuitions. The first view would say the action remains un-
changed even if the voter subsequently thinks about it and clarifies their initially
unformed intuitions. The second view would say the action is transformed by
this clearer insight.
It seems the first view is right because in everyday life and also in the law
we hold people responsible for their actions based on their initial beliefs, desires,
and intentions, however inarticulate, and not on their later cogitations. In the
case of subject-referring emotions, it is possible for the emotions themselves to
change from their rudimentary forms to more fully developed forms, but not in
the case of actions. This is because emotions are ongoing and evolving, actions
are not. As Omar Khayyam’s memorable verse says, “The Moving Finger writes;
and, having writ, Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit Shall lure it back to cancel
half a Line, Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it.”
Besides, Taylor overstates his case in contrasting what he takes to be mutu-
ally exclusive views of action. Sometimes (e.g. when we turn on the lights in a
room), we understand our beliefs, desires, and intentions perfectly well prior to
our actions and no further clarification is required. At other times, an agent such
as a voter may not understand their action until they mull over it. And there is a
whole continuum of cases in between. For the entire spectrum, the action itself
is what it is independent of its symbolic expression.
So the reversal mentioned above, explaining the mental in terms of the action,
is to be understood in a qualified way. It is certainly true that we sometimes
come to more fully understand what we did upon further thought. But this un-
derstanding is not involved in causing the action in any way. The action has its
own determinants, however embryonic.
It needs to be noted that the beliefs, desires, and intentions assumed in explain-
ing action are seldom fully developed. They are likely to be partial and partially
understood in a variety of ways.4 This affects game theory as much as it does
any other causal theory. But the effect is quite limited because a partial intention
must nevertheless be sufficiently formed to bring about an action or utterance.
4Incidentally, for Hegel complete understanding is possible whereas for Heidegger, who shares
the qualitative view of action, understanding is always partial. An implicit part always persists.
This latter view of partial understanding is similar to the partiality of situations described in
Section 2.1. They can seldom be exhaustively described; there is often something left over.
82
6.2 Language
6.1.4 Collective action
According to Taylor (1983/1999), it follows from the qualitative view that collec-
tive action cannot be reduced to individual actions because action is primary
and the mental is secondary. This part of his argument is not clear because if
there are irreducible collective actions, there also has to be irreducible collective
understanding that partly constitutes them. But unless one is willing to accept
collective minds, this is not possible.
Collective actions are ubiquitous: for example, newspapers daily report the col-
lective actions of various composite associations. Indeed, communication itself
can be seen as a joint action of speaker and addressee like two persons together
pushing a cart uphill. And language in the large, the subject of macro-semantics,
might also be viewed as being a fully public object potentially irreducible to in-
dividual actions.
I think it is true that communication and language involve joint or collective
action, something that is seldom acknowledged by mainstream semantics as it
is rather remote from taking models of actions and agents as seriously as game
theory requires one to do. But there is no reason to think that such action can-
not be reduced to individual actions. The model of communication and language
developed in this book shows concretely how such a reduction might be carried
out in these special cases.
For other types of collective action, all that is required is a suitable generaliza-
tion of Definition 5.3.5 This involves shared situations and common knowledge
and their non-well-foundedness, which are less individualistic ways of conceiv-
ing holistic facts than a directly individualistic account but, in the end, it nev-
ertheless remains a reduction of such facts to the actions and physical states of
individuals.
6.2 Language
A good bit of the groundwork has already been laid by the discussion of human
agency. We have already encountered some key roles of language adumbrated
by Herder, Humboldt, and Heidegger. Part of Taylor’s (1978/1999; 1980/1999) goal
is to trace the genesis of two contrasting modern approaches to meaning. I will
set aside this interesting historical aspect. I also pay less attention to elements
where both perspectives are more or less in agreement (e.g. the importance of
use as a key idea for any theory of meaning).
5See Parikh (2001: 58–59).
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For Taylor, language has two dimensions, the representational and the expres-
sive, the latter being more fundamental. Expression is realized through the ac-
tivity of speech, through use, so communication and the speech community are
central to language. Language shapes the community as much as the community
shapes language.
Expression has four aspects: the articulation of inchoate and dimly grasped
contents; the making public among interlocutors of such contents; the partial
constitution of subject-referring emotions and concerns; and the partial consti-
tution of relationships among interlocutors and among members of the wider
community.
The first of these –making something implicit explicit – is in essence similar to
what happens with emotions and actions but this process of giving shape covers
all of language. There are times when speakers know exactly what they want
to convey and just have to convert their mental contents into words; at other
times, they may struggle and only partially succeed in expressing their thoughts.
This wider scope of what happens in speech is a fact of life and so the simple
separation of Content Selection Games from Generation Games must be seen as
an idealization, as I said in Section 3.1. The full picture must involve a range of
cases allowing contents andwords to be identified in any order and even together.
For now, we can stick with this idealization as it is useful to first clarify how an
easier instance works.
Making public is just the securing of common knowledge between speaker
and addressee of the content conveyed. Here, Taylor has something irreducibly
holistic in mind and implicitly criticizes the Gricean tradition’s iterated approach
to common knowledge. As shown in Sections 2.2 and 5.1, the shared situation ap-
proach to common knowledge does have a holistic side but it is fully reducible.
Parikh (2001: Section 6.4) and Parikh (2010: 225) discuss the publicity of com-
munication and its content in some detail and it is also mentioned in passing in
Section 2.2.
The partial constitution of subject-referring emotions and concerns has al-
ready been addressed. The key here is that language remains representational
but the entities represented are not always entirely language-independent. Some
contents expressed will be partly formed by the words uttered by the speaker.
The partial constitution of relationships (e.g. equality between the interlocu-
tors or in a wider political sense) has two senses, one immediate as happens via
a Communication Game, and another mediate as happens in society via a Lan-
guage Game. The first was discussed in Section 5.2 under framing and will be
addressed further through an example in Section 18.2. The second is discussed in
Part V.
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With regard to both emotions and social relationships, special mention must
be made of the significance of vagueness in language, a new point that is missing
from the Romantic tradition aswell. It is because almost all words in a natural lan-
guage are vague to some degree that a language can constitute both human emo-
tions and concerns and large-scale relationships in society like political equality.
If our words were perfectly precise, it might be impossible to have the kinds of
conversations we do in fact have that allow language to play a constitutive role.
Vagueness is essential to language because without it we could not be fully hu-
man. This shows how remote such a conception of language is from that of ideal
language philosophy. I will say a great deal more about vagueness in Chapter 11.
Taylor (1980/1999: 273–292) argues successfully, I believe, against truth-con-
ditional theories of meaning. A key point seems to be that once an expressive
dimension in its four aspects is admitted, understandingmust precede truth condi-
tions, contrary to truth-conditional meaning theories where understanding con-
sists in grasping truth conditions. A further difficulty with these theories is that
they posit a neutral observer who has to apply the theory in order to understand
an utterance.6 I repeat the middle paragraph from Dummett (1996) quoted in
Section 3.2:
Or, at least, they have to be explained together so long as Frege’s insight
continues to be respected, namely that the concept of truth plays a central
role in the explanation of sense. On this Fregean view, the concept of truth
occupies the mid-point on the line of connection between sense and use. On
the one side, the truth-condition of the sentence determines the thought it
expresses, in accordance with the theory developed by Frege and adapted
by Davidson; on the other, it governs the use to be made of the sentence
in converse with other speakers, in accordance with the principles left tacit
by both of them.That leaves open the possibility of describing the use directly,
and regarding it as determining meaning, relegating the concept of truth to
a minor, non-functional role. [my italics] This was the course adopted by
6A third point has to do with the primacy of literal meaning in these theories. Here, I believe
Taylor is mistaken because all that analytic theories require is that there be some primary
meaning from which secondary, indirect meanings such as implicature can be derived. This
primary meaning is what is usually called literal meaning. If what Taylor calls “invocative”
meanings are primary in other cultures – though I very much doubt this can ever be the case
because the demands of everyday life undergird everything including special invocative oc-
casions – then they have to make possible the derivation of other secondary meanings (e.g.
literal meanings); otherwise, the very things that language makes possible will be rendered
impossible. But doing justice to this part of Taylor’s argument and rebutting it would take us
too far afield.
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Wittgenstein in his later work. The concept of truth, no longer required to
play a part in a theory explaining what it is for sentences to mean what they
do, now really can be characterized on the assumption that their meanings
are already given. (page 19)
As I wrote in Section 3.2, Equilibrium Semantics squarely pursues the possi-
bility of describing use directly and deriving meaning from use. So my approach
agrees with Taylor (and Dummett) that use is central and comes first. Moreover,
as I have said in Parikh (2010: 208), there is no question of a neutral observer: the
ethnographer or theorist may know only part of the Communication Game.
I hope I have made a case for taking the insights of the Romantic tradition
seriously. They call for expanding the notion of use that prevails in ordinary lan-
guage philosophy and incorporating certain elements into Equilibrium Seman-
tics. The adjustment is slight in material terms but the arguments sensitize us to
the expressive dimension of language that has been missed by the analytic tradi-
tion. It does not conflict with the representational dimension and the four ideas
that underlie Equilibrium Semantics – reference, use, indeterminacy, and equilib-
rium – continue with straightforward alterations. Indeterminacy, especially as it
occurs via vagueness, becomes central rather than something to be shunned. A
key lack in Romantic theories, including those of Heidegger, is that they remain
inadequately theorized from a scientific standpoint. Part of this has to do with
their accepting context fully but, as I said in Section 2.1, this does not prevent us
from going quite far down the scientific road contrary to what many Continental
theorists believe. They have also typically adopted an anti-scientific stance and
this explains why such attempts have not been forthcoming. For our purposes
here, the two traditions have been amalgamated as far as that is possible.
In closing this chapter, I remind the reader of what I set out to do in Section 1.4
and reiterate that it is desirable and possible to develop a framework that not only
brings together arguments in philosophy, linguistics, and artificial intelligence,
but also incorporates a few relevant elements of psycholinguistics, sociolinguis-
tics, and historical linguistics in order to build a unified science of language and
meaning based on communication. Secondly, it has become evident since the be-
ginning of the last century that language and meaning occupy a central place in
the human sciences, and to realize this essential role it is necessary to build a
solid theory of communication as their foundation.
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Part III
Communication Games

7 Defining Communication Games
I start by illustrating the four parts of a Communication Gamewith a very simple
example.
7.1 The Setting Game
Consider the following situation or setting 𝑢. Bill Smith, a politician, and Bill
Jones, a runner, are acquaintances ofA andB, who are discussing a local election.
This is their implicit, more or less shared goal that both agents are able to extract
from the exchange. In such an open-ended conversation, there is a very loosely
specified Setting Game, a dialogue with alternating discourses by A and B.
7.2 The Content Selection Game
The implicit goal and the Setting Game induceA to simply continue the conversa-
tion without affecting B in any very specific way or eliciting any very particular
response from her. The only reaction he wishes to draw is that she tacitly accept
the information he conveys and continue talking. Since there is nothing conflict-
ual here, let us say that she considers just one response 𝑎, which is to accept the
information he conveys and respond to it with her own contribution. More com-
plicated scenarios are not uncommon. B may reject what A says and respond
accordingly. But my goal is first to explain the basics of the model.
In such a loosely constrained dialogue game, all that is required is that A andB stick broadly to the topic though even this is not really true as topics in such
free-floating conversations are likely to change unpredictably. Given this happy
situation, A may want to convey to B that Bill Smith ran in the election. Call
this content 𝜎 . He may not bother to think about alternative contents, especially
as 𝜎 would be a perfectly fine thing to convey in 𝑢. This single pair of actions,
conveying 𝜎 and 𝑎, make the Content Selection Game shown in Figure 7.1 trivial.
The game has a situation 𝑠 at the start that is represented by a large black node.
This situation is a part of 𝑢 and containsA’s intention to evoke the response 𝑎 by
conveying 𝜎 . Sometimes the whole content conveyed is not explicitly intended
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𝑠 𝜎 𝑎 𝑣A, 𝑣B
Figure 7.1: Content Selection Game for conversation about local politics
as when someone says “My weight is 150 lbs.” and conveys that their weight
is 150 lbs. on earth. The weight being relative to earth may not have crossed
the speaker’s mind even in the relevant Content Selection Game let alone in
the Generation Game. It is simplest to stipulate that the intention is situated or
implicit in such cases. It is important to be aware of such intentions because
contrary to what Grice thought and what most of his followers think, all that is
conveyed is not always explicitly intended, as was pointed out in Section 5.3.
The other label for the initial node is 𝜌 and this is just the (prior) probability
of that node. It is the probability of A’s intention to convey 𝜎 and evoke 𝑎 and,
derivatively, the probability of 𝑠. Given its nature, it is generally a shared subjec-
tive probability. Since there is just one initial situation 𝑠, 𝜌 = 1, but when there
are more initial situations, as happens in more complex settings, there will be
multiple prior probabilities between 0 and 1 that sum to 1.
Next, there is an arrow issuing from 𝑠 that represents A’s single choice of ac-
tion, conveying 𝜎 . This leads to an unnamed intermediate situation from which
issues another arrow representing B’s single choice of response, the action 𝑎. Fi-
nally, in the unnamed terminal situation,A receives the payoff 𝑣A andB receives
the payoff 𝑣B . These payoffs are algebraically represented numbers standing for
utilities, which are themselves representations of the agents’ preferences over
the outcomes that are delivered through the terminal situation. Preferences and
payoffs are determined in a variety of ways and are based partly on the ben-
efits received, the costs incurred, and possibly other factors such as the other
agent’s payoffs. The benefits and costs are themselves fixed in many ways, some
exogenous depending on the payoffs in the Setting Game and some endogenous
depending on the other agent’s intention.
As indicated above, it is possible to accommodate B’s rejecting rather than
accepting the information A conveys. Rejection may be called 𝑎′. Now there
would be two arrows issuing from the intermediate node of Figure 7.1, one labeled
𝑎 and the other 𝑎′, and there would be corresponding payoffs 𝑣′A, 𝑣′B awaiting
the players in the new terminal situation. This suggests two possible scenarios.
One is that 𝑣A = 𝑣′A, which makes A indifferent to what B chooses. Another
is that, based on what 𝑣B and 𝑣′B are, A might contemplate some alternative
content 𝜎 ′ if he feels that 𝜎 may not achieve his desired result based on 𝑣A and
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𝑣′A. This leads to a new initial situation 𝑠′ where A’s intention is to convey 𝜎 ′.
This makes the overall tree structure of the game more complex. I will consider
such elaborations later. I note in passing that it is the psychology and sociology
of the interaction that result in such complexities in the Content Selection Game
and, correspondingly, in different choices of content and utterance and, therefore,
in altered communication.
The entire game has been described as a succession of situations, first 𝑠, then
the intermediate situation, and then the final situation. This idea can be devel-
oped formally and I have done so in my two earlier books. It enables games to be
represented as structured sets of situations and thereby in terms of our informa-
tional universe as I observed in Section 2.2. This reduction suggests a new way
to understand games that I call situated game theory and allows us to prove that
such interactive choice situations are games. In otherwords, the construction pro-
vides an argument for using games and demonstrates the fit between the model
and the facts assuming more basic and self-evident starting points like situations
and possibilities for action.
Recall from Section 2.2 that the agents need to share information about this
and other games in order to be able to play them fully. At this stage, however,
only A is aware of this game as it is all in his mind and nothing has been com-
municated yet. He considers the game, identifies his optimal action, and then
converts this content into a sentence via the Generation Game that I have yet
to describe. It is only after he utters the corresponding sentence and only afterB interprets the utterance by playing the Interpretation Game that she becomes
aware of the Content Selection Game. Thus, there is a time lag betweenA’s hav-
ing information about the Content Selection Game and B’s having information
about it, a factor that matters for the psycholinguistics of communication. Also,A may ponder alternatives that B may never imagine – and vice versa – so that
their shared information is generally partial. Despite these important qualifica-
tions, I will assume the Content Selection Game is common knowledge betweenA and B, as also mentioned in Section 3.1. This common knowledge is part of
the definition of the game when it is handled formally. In other words, it is not
just the theorist who thinks about the game but also the agents, though in our
situation the latter do it nonconsciously or semiconsciously.A now has to identify the optimal content for him to convey. As we saw in
Section 2.2, this is called solving the game. The key idea is that each agent has
to take account of what the other agent might do because it is their joint actions
that affect their payoffs. In other words, when rational decision-makers interact,
their individual decision problems have to be solved together, like a system of
equations. In addition to making explicit the details of their interaction in a clear
91
7 Defining Communication Games
model, this circular process where each agent puts himself or herself in the other
agent’s shoes and tries to guess what the other agent will do and then chooses
his or her best action lies at the heart of game theory.
In our very simple game, the agents do not have any real choices; they just
convey the one content 𝜎 and respond with the one action 𝑎. So, the solution is
trivial andA perforce picks 𝜎 as his equilibrium action. (The action is conveying
𝜎 , not 𝜎 , but we can slur over this nicety.) More generally, the agents would have
to take account of the payoffs and prior probabilities and compute solutions by
evaluating the expected utility of different strategies, as explained in Section 2.2.
As I said in Section 3.1, the Content Selection Game is very different from a
standard signaling game because it does not contain any physical action for A
to perform and because of its linkages with the other parts of the whole Commu-
nication Game. All that it can do is enable A to identify what to convey to B in
order to elicit action 𝑎 from her. This game induces a corresponding Generation
Game as a way to achieve this goal. The two games are interdependent because
the former relies on the latter for its realization and the latter depends on the
former for its existence.
7.3 The Generation Game
AssumingA wants to convey 𝜎 , he searches for sentences that will do the job in
𝑢. He may find bill smith ran in the election by a kind of direct conversion
of 𝜎 but he may also be cleverer and wonder about bill ran. The latter involves
less physical effort, though it may require a little more mental effort because he
has to check if B will be able to fill in the rest by using the context 𝑢. There are
also intermediate possibilities such as bill ran in the election.
In practice, he has to construct a sentence from individual words that get iden-
tified from bits of partial content. Psycholinguistically speaking, the communi-
cation process does not happen with the whole content and the whole utterance
being identified in that order, but happens with partial contents and partial ut-
terances and partial interpretations in an ongoing sequential and partly circular
process on both sides. This is why the sentences we utter are seldom optimally
constructed – their optimization is dynamic and sequential and occurs in chunks.
Even when we write, we frequently have to revise our sentences to make them
smoother and more graceful. Constructing good sentences is an art and most of
us do not ever manage to solve this complex optimization problem fully. This
is a consequence of our limited resources and finite rationality, though subjec-
tive factors of taste and style also play a role. However imperfect the final result,
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considerations of efficiency, social norms, and aesthetics guide us in our choices,
whether spoken or written.
I’m not sure as yet how the details of this process – the conversion of bits of
content to parts of sentences – might be modeled, so I will assume the whole
content 𝜎 is identified first through the Content Selection Game and candidate
sentences are magically available to A to evaluate in the Generation Game. I
will consider bill ran first – call it 𝜑. In order to evaluate 𝜑, A has to imagine
uttering it and examine how B might interpret it givenA’s information about 𝑢.B’s hypothetical interpretation involves four constraints:
• Phonetic Constraint
• Syntactic Constraint
• Semantic Constraint
• Flow Constraint
All of these operate simultaneously and in a “circular” way. A key fact of natu-
ral language is pervasive ambiguity in all aspects of content – phonetics, syntax,
and semantics. The basic idea is that, owing to this ambiguity, the Phonetic Con-
straint generates all the possible words associated with the speech wave corre-
sponding to 𝜑 in 𝑢, the Syntactic Constraint generates all the possible parse trees
of 𝜑 in 𝑢, and the Semantic Constraint generates all the possible meanings asso-
ciated with 𝜑 in 𝑢. The Flow Constraint then disambiguates all these ambiguities
simultaneously and identifies the optimal or intended content, that is, the words
uttered, their parse, and their meaning. In practice, there are shortcuts which
considerably simplify this process.
I will abstract from the first constraint and assume the actual words in the
speech wave are immediately available to B. In principle, an algebraic system
corresponding to the phonetic properties of utterances can be constructed just
as we built up (I , ⊙) and (T , ⋆) for semantics and syntax. Showing how seman-
tics and syntax work together to determine content is enough to suggest that
a phonetic system can also be added to the mix to deliver its part of the con-
tent of an utterance because the principles used in this process can be seen to be
quite general. The common idea is to generate all the possibilities and then dis-
ambiguate them in an interdependent way. It does not matter what the particular
possibilities are, whether words associated with the speech wave from the Pho-
netic Constraint, parses from the Syntactic Constraint, or referential meanings
from the Semantic Constraint. It does not even matter how they are generated,
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which will naturally be different for each of the three Constraints. That is why
they are all contents of the utterance. Indeed, the method can be extended even to
different but related problems such as detecting spam or sentiments in a message,
as will be shown in Section 12.2. All of these are classification problems, sorting
inputs (i.e. utterances) into separate bins, each set of bins being a different kind of
content. Identifying an utterance as spam or its sentiment as positive is just clas-
sifying it in terms of more abstract contents. And the interdependence among
the three types of contents, phonetic, syntactic, and semantic, also occurs in a
uniform way, just through conditioning variables in conditional probabilities, as
will be seen presently.
For example, consider an utterance situation with a potentially ambiguous
speech wave whose words could be either i want to get up late or i want to
get a plate.The Phonetic Constraint would be tasked with generating these two
possibilities. Once they are available, they can be added to the Flow Constraint
via phonetic games of partial information that interact with similar syntactic and
semantic games of partial information in the manner described below. The Flow
Constraint disambiguates phonetic, syntactic, and semantic contents in exactly
the same way. Once the interdependence between syntactic and semantic games
is understood, it will be more or less obvious how phonetic games can be added
to the system.
The traditional way to interpret an utterance is to first obtain its words, then
its parse, then its literal meaning, and finally its implied meaning. This pipeline
view can be abbreviated as phonetics→ syntax→ semantics→ pragmatics. In
Equilibrium Linguistics, semantics and pragmatics are unified into just one pro-
cess called semantics, and phonetics, syntax, and semantics codetermine each
other. I describe the framework below for syntax and semantics. I first consider
just the locutionary part of semantics which corresponds to that part of themean-
ing that derives directly from the words in an utterance. Illocutionary meaning –
modulation, free enrichment, implicature, and force – is addressed in Part IV. All
that is assumed by Equilibrium Linguistics in addition to the (partial) rationality
of agents is an ontology, a language, and a grammar for the language, expressed
via the three systems (I , ⊙), (L, ○), and (T , ⋆).
We are now ready to consider how A imagines B interpreting 𝜑 in 𝑢 in light
of his desire to convey 𝜎 in 𝑢. Recall from Section 7.1 that in 𝑢 there are two
Bills, Bill Smith the politician and Bill Jones the runner, either of whom could
be the potential referents of 𝜑1 = bill in 𝑢 since it is ambiguous. It is quite pos-
sible that A and B know yet other Bills, so there may be further possibilities
but I will ignore these. Likewise, 𝜑2 = ran in 𝑢 is also ambiguous since it could
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mean stood for election or competed in a race,1 two quite different kinds of run-
ning. In fact, my dictionary gives over twenty different meanings for the verb
run of which the ones corresponding to an election are be a candidate for, stand
for, be a contender for and the ones corresponding to a race are compete, take part,
participate. The word run can also be a noun and has over ten different dictio-
nary meanings. At the start, it cannot be known that the word is being used as
a verb so all meanings would have to be entertained and the inappropriate ones
eliminated via the Flow Constraint. In practice, the full range of theoretical pos-
sibilities is not included because agents seldom know all the different meanings
a dictionary (i.e. the language) can offer. However, at a nonconscious level, it ap-
pears that several different meanings do get activated even though we are almost
never aware of this.2 I will consider just the two meanings related to elections
and races. Such facts about semantic ambiguity are captured formally by the Se-
mantic Constraint. Only words have conventional meanings so this is all that is
mentioned here. In a similar way, as we saw in Section 4.2, 𝜑1 = bill has just one
parse 𝑡1 = [NP[N Bill]], 𝜑2 = ran also has just one parse 𝑡2 = [VP[V ran]], and so
does 𝜑 = bill ran whose parse is 𝑡12 = [S[NP Bill][VP ran]]. These syntactic facts
are captured formally by the Syntactic Constraint.
7.3.1 The Syntactic Constraint
We have already done the work of parsing the words and the sentence in Sec-
tion 4.2 so all that is required here is to write down the results.
𝜑1 = bill⟶ [NP[N Bill]] = 𝑡1
𝜑2 = ran⟶ [VP[V ran]] = 𝑡2
𝜑 = bill ran⟶ [S[NP Bill][VP ran]] = 𝑡12
The Syntactic Constraint uses the elementary trees in (T , ⋆) to derive the
possible parses of each word, phrase, and the whole sentence. In this example,
there is no syntactic ambiguity so there is just one syntactic content per word and
for the whole sentence. I look at situations with syntactic ambiguity in Chapter 9.
7.3.2 The Semantic Constraint
The Semantic Constraint consists of two subconstraints, the Conventional Con-
straint and the Referential Constraint. The first maps words into their conven-
1Throughout, I will mean a certain kind of sporting event when I use “race.”
2See, for example, Onifer & Swinney (1981) and Kawamoto (1993). I will be saying more about
this later.
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tional meanings and the second maps each of these conventional meanings into
their potential referents relative to 𝑢.
(3) bill:
• Referential Use: 𝜑1 ⟶𝑃𝜑1 𝑢⟶𝜎1
• Referential Use: 𝜑1 ⟶𝑃𝜑1 𝑢⟶𝜎 ′1
As mentioned in Section 2.1, properties or relations corresponding to words
are written formally as 𝑅𝜔 where 𝜔 is the relevant word. Since 𝑃𝜑1 = 𝑃bill is a
property, I have used 𝑃 instead of 𝑅. It is the conventional meaning of the word
bill and, as I said in footnote 14 in Section 3.2, it is the property named ‘Bill’.
This part of the Semantic Constraint is the Conventional Constraint because it
provides the map from a word to its conventional meanings.
The Referential Constraint then maps each conventional meaning into poten-
tial referents. The situation 𝑢 gives rise to two distinct resource situations 𝑟𝑢 and
𝑟 ′𝑢 , the first containing a causal chain originating from Bill Smith and the second
from Bill Jones. There are only these two possibilities given the Setting Game.
This mapping is a bit complicated and I discuss it in Section 26.2 in the context
of Frege’s puzzle. For now, to keep things simple, just note that these two Bills are
obtained via 𝑒(𝑃𝜑1 , 𝑟𝑢) = Bill Smith and 𝑒(𝑃𝜑1 , 𝑟 ′𝑢) = Bill Jones based on the defini-
tion of 𝑒(𝑃, 𝑠) on page 19 in Section 2.1. The first possibility is 𝜎1 = 𝑏 = Bill Smith
as mentioned on page 16 and the second possibility is 𝜎 ′1 = 𝑏′ = Bill Jones. I will
assume the two individuals 𝜎1 = 𝑏 and 𝜎 ′1 = 𝑏′ are given to us directly and return
to how names work in more detail in the very last chapter where I discuss the
hesperus is phosphorus example from Section 1.2.
The symbol 𝑢 on top of the second arrow above is required to constrain the
possibilities by the information in 𝑢. It is because of 𝑢 that bill gets mapped into
Bill Smith or Bill Jones and not any of the other countless Bills that doubtless
abound. On the other hand, the first arrow in each case does not have a 𝑢 on top
of it because words acquire conventional meanings through communication as
discussed in Section 3.2 and then, until a change in meaning occurs, they remain
attached to the words independent of context.
Both uses of bill are of the same kind and are called referential. There are
other ways of using names, most commonly attributively but also generically
and predicatively, just as with descriptions.3
3See Parikh (2010: Chapter 6) for more details. For example, the name january in an appropriate
use of the sentence january has 31 days may be used generically.
96
7.3 The Generation Game
(4) ran:
• Predicative Use: 𝜑2 ⟶𝑃𝜑21
𝑢⟶ ⟨⟨𝑃𝜑21 ⟩⟩ = 𝜎2
• Predicative Use: 𝜑2 ⟶𝑃𝜑22
𝑢⟶ ⟨⟨𝑃𝜑22 ⟩⟩ = 𝜎 ′2
These predicative uses of ran involve two distinct conventional meanings as
noted above and each is mapped into itself by the Referential Constraint. Specifi-
cally, ⟨⟨𝑃𝜑21 ⟩⟩ = 𝜎2 is the meaning stood for election and ⟨⟨𝑃𝜑22 ⟩⟩ = 𝜎 ′2 is the mean-
ing competed in a race. Despite the Referential Map’s being an identity map, we
write 𝑃𝜑21 ⟶𝑢 ⟨⟨𝑃𝜑21 ⟩⟩ instead of writing 𝑃𝜑21 ⟶𝑢 𝑃𝜑21 as the angled brackets serve
to emphasize that a potential referent of ran is an infon, which in this case is
just the property 𝑃𝜑21 written as ⟨⟨𝑃𝜑21 ⟩⟩. I also use the term “referent” much more
broadly: in Equilibrium Semantics, every word more or less refers to its content
via the Conventional and Referential Maps and so do speakers.
Notice that the word ran actually contains two bits of information: the possi-
ble referents of the verb to run and the time of running, some time prior to the
time of utterance. In other words, strictly speaking, ran should generate the two
possibilities 𝜎2 and 𝜎 ′2 as well as temporal infons 𝜎3 and 𝜎 ′3 (or continuous ranges
of temporal infons). Indeed, if it is known to the interlocutors when the election
under discussion took place, then this time can be more precisely fixed than sim-
ply being some interval in the past. I will ignore these complexities, both how a
single word might generate two distinct sets of possibilities and how temporal
possibilities might be narrowed by taking contextual information into account.
They do not pose insuperable obstacles but do complicate the framework and my
purpose is to delineate just the basic ideas. For that reason, I will drop 𝜎3 and 𝜎 ′3
and work just with the infons identified above.4
Thus, the Semantic Constraint, based on its two component constraints, pro-
vides the possible referents of each word in the utterance. Larger units, such as
phrases and the whole sentence, do not have conventional meanings. Their pos-
sible referents are derived by multiplication of the partial infons 𝜎1, 𝜎 ′1 and 𝜎2,
𝜎 ′2 via the unification operation ⊙ as will become clear shortly.
Equilibrium Linguistics treats all values, whether syntactic, semantic, or pho-
netic, as contents and treats them uniformly.The outcome of the three constraints
is to produce the possible corresponding contents for each relevant part of the
utterance.
4The details involve conditioned infons dealt with in Parikh (2010). Essentially, 𝜎3 and 𝜎 ′3 con-
dition 𝜎2 and 𝜎 ′2 respectively.
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7.3.3 The Flow Constraint
It is helpful to keep the coordination game in Figure 2.1 in mind for this section.
The Flow Constraint disambiguates among the possible contents thrown up by
the Phonetic, Syntactic, and Semantic Constraints.There are four lexical games of
which two are syntactic and two are semantic, corresponding to the two words
in 𝜑. (If we had included the Phonetic Constraint, there would also have been
phonetic games except that, in this case, it is the lexical items that have to be
determined from the speech wave.) It is convenient to start with the semantic
games as these are more likely to be familiar. Recall that in the Generation GameA is trying to imagine how B might interpret an utterance of 𝜑 in 𝑢. Figure 7.2
shows the first semantic game of partial information he constructs in order to do
this.
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Figure 7.2: Semantic lexical game 𝑔1
This game should not be confused with the Content Selection Game in Fig-
ure 7.1, although there are superficial similarities because both structures involve
communication. In the latter game, A’s choice concerns the content 𝜎 and B’s
choice concerns her response 𝑎. In the present game, based on the Content Se-
lection Game, A’s choice involves a hypothetical utterance of 𝜑1, the first word
of the whole utterance 𝜑, and B’s move involves her possible interpretations of
this word uttered in 𝑢. In terms of complexity, 𝑔1 is slightly more complex than
the game in Figure 7.1 as there are now two initial situations 𝑠1 and 𝑠1′ instead
of just one. (Note that the prime is on the 1 and not on the 𝑠. The reason for this
will become clear presently.) Each initial situation is part of the utterance situa-
tion and includes an appropriate intention to convey some content. Recall from
Section 7.2 that this intention may be implicit.
In 𝑠1 in Figure 7.2, the speaker is assumed to be conveying 𝜎1, Bill Smith, al-
though because his action of uttering 𝜑1 = bill is semantically ambiguous be-
tween 𝜎1 and 𝜎 ′1 , the addressee could potentially interpret the word as referring
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to 𝜎 ′1 , Bill Jones, as well. This choice is represented by two branches labeled 𝜎1
and 𝜎 ′1 emanating from the upper intermediate situation inside the elongated
oval. That is, if A utters 𝜑1 in 𝑠1, the resulting situation, the upper intermediate
node inside the oval, offers B two choices of interpretation 𝜎1 and 𝜎 ′1 . In the ter-
minal situations that result from each choice, the payoffs for the two agents are
𝑎A and 𝑎B for making the right choice 𝜎1 as this is what A is conveying in 𝑠1,
and they are 𝑐A and 𝑐B for making the wrong choice 𝜎 ′1 as this is not what A
is conveying in 𝑠1. The 𝑎 payoffs are therefore greater than the corresponding 𝑐
payoffs as they represent the correct interpretation by B.
In 𝑠1′ in the lower half of 𝑔1, a similar choice presents itself to the addressee but
this time the payoffs are reversed, because in this situationAwould be conveying
the other possible meaning 𝜎 ′1 . Again, the primed 𝑎 payoffs are greater than the
corresponding primed 𝑐 payoffs.
As we saw in Section 2.2, the oval enclosing the two intermediate nodes is an
information set. It represents B’s inability to distinguish between them as she has
seen the same utterance 𝜑1 in both cases and cannot know if the originating situ-
ation was 𝑠1 or 𝑠1′ (since whatA is conveying is not antecedently available to B).
So she is constrained to make the same choice in both situations: either she must
choose 𝜎1 in both or 𝜎 ′1 in both. If the oval were not there, she could make differ-
ent choices in the top half and the bottom half of the game tree. This constrains
the possible solutions of the game. Depending on the other features present, such
games are called games of imperfect, incomplete, or partial information. In this
case, this is a game of partial information for reasons given below.
The symbol 𝜌1 represents the prior conditional probability thatA is conveying
𝜎1 given that he is conveying the other meanings and parse trees of the rest of
the sentence in the utterance situation 𝑢.5 In other words, 𝜌1 = 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣ 𝑥2, 𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑢)
where the 𝑥2 is a variable ranging across the possible corresponding meanings
𝜎2, 𝜎 ′2 , and the 𝑦1, 𝑦2 are variables standing for the possible corresponding parse
5In retrospect, this idea could be seen as a generalization of the concept of selection restrictions,
which are the semantic restrictions a word imposes on the environment in which it occurs. See
Chomsky (1965). For example, a verb like “eat” generally requires that its subject refers to an
animate entity and its object to something concrete. A violation of the selectional restrictions
of a word results in an anomaly: in “the mountain eats sincerity” both restrictions are violated,
rendering the sentence anomalous. Such restrictions are often not absolute as there are uses
of “eat” such as “the meeting ate up a lot of time,” an example I owe to Tom Wasow. The
question whether selectional restrictions should be treated in syntax or semantics, or even
outside grammar, as a matter of knowledge of the world, has been a point of debate. My idea
for the prior probabilities was developed independently of this notion and it occurs entirely
outside grammar.
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trees 𝑡1, 𝑡2, respectively.6 I have omitted writing other conditioning variables in-
volving phrasal and sentential meanings and parse trees such as 𝑥12 = 𝑥1⊙𝑥2 and
𝑦12 = 𝑦1⋆𝑦2 as their influence occurs through the corresponding component lexi-
cal items anyway.The situation 𝑢 is not a random variable but a parameter that is
held fixed. This notation is a slight abbreviation for the actual probability which
is a conditional probability of a speaker’s conveying a content rather than just the
conditional probability of a content per se. This is a very important difference
because a speaker could be likely conveying a rare content and it is the former
likelihood that matters. Note that 𝜌1 is actually a function of the conditioning
variables and parameter 𝑢 and not a constant.
Likewise, the other prior probability 𝜌1′ = 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣ 𝑥2, 𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑢) and we must
have 𝜌1 + 𝜌1′ = 1 as there are only two possible meanings the speaker could be
conveying. Since 𝜌1′ is also a function of the conditioning variables and parame-
ter 𝑢, there are different versions of essentially the same game 𝑔1 when 𝑥2, 𝑦1, or
𝑦2 take on different values. These versions differ only in the numerical values of
the prior conditioned probabilities; in all other respects, they are identical. Thus,
for example, when 𝑥2 = 𝜎2 the values of 𝜌1 and 𝜌1′ may be 5/6 and 1/6 and when
𝑥2 = 𝜎 ′2 the values of 𝜌1 and 𝜌1′ may be 1/4 and 3/4. 𝑔1 has just two versions.
One reason why it is a game of partial information and not a game of incomplete
information (or a signaling game, one kind of game of incomplete information)
is that the prior probabilities are not fixed in advance.
If I had worked out how the Phonetic Constraint generates its possible con-
tents, that is, the possible words in the speech wave, then these possibilities
would just have been added to the conditioning variables just as the syntactic
possibilities are. That is all the interdependence among phonetic, syntactic, and
semantic contents consists in. So, in principle, it is easy to add phonetic contents
into the mix once the details of the Phonetic Constraint are spelled out. I have
done this for both the Syntactic and Semantic Constraints so augmenting the sys-
tem with phonetic contents is a natural extension. There is a slight complication
because in semantic and syntactic games one is interpreting words via meanings
and parses and in phonetic games one is interpreting a speech wave via words,
but this does not pose any insuperable technical problems.
Returning to Figure 7.2, A knows what his intention is and so he knows the
real situation is 𝑠1 and not 𝑠1′ . But because B does not know A’s actual inten-
tion in advance – as represented by the information set – A realizes that B
6There is no syntactic ambiguity in this example and so 𝑦1 just stands for 𝑡1 and 𝑦2 for 𝑡2. If there
had been other alternative parses, for example, some tree 𝑡′1 as a possible parse of 𝜑1, then 𝑦1
would have ranged over both 𝑡1 and 𝑡′1 just as 𝑥2 ranges over 𝜎2 and 𝜎 ′2 . Likewise with 𝑦2. I will
consider such an example in Chapter 9.
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might think the real situation was 𝑠1′ . So A has to consider this counterfactual
situation 𝑠1′ as well. He has to portray the interaction as B would see it and,
therefore, as both should see it. The prior probabilities indicateA’s view of what
chances B would assign to the two situations. But these chances depend on var-
ious conditioning variables which gives rise to different versions of the game.
Which version to play is a further decision each agent has to make. That is, the
speaker has to choose not just what to utter but also the probability distribution(𝜌1, 𝜌1′) by specifying the values of the conditioning variables – in this case, just
whether 𝑥2 = 𝜎2 or 𝑥2 = 𝜎 ′2 since the variables 𝑦𝑖 can take on just one value each.
Likewise, the addressee also has to choose not just an interpretation but also
the probability distribution. Expressed concretely, both agents have to choose
between the pair 𝜌1 = 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝜌1′ = 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) and the pair
𝜌1 = 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝜌1′ = 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢). (I use the same symbols 𝜌1, 𝜌1′
for both pairs only to avoid having to specify the arguments of the functions
these symbols really represent.)
Now, 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) > 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) because 𝜎2 is compatible with 𝜎1
as Bill Smith, the politician, is more likely to be running in an election than Bill
Jones, the runner. This is also reinforced by 𝑢 as the topic of conversation is
the local election as mentioned in Section 7.1. In other words, the agents’ com-
mon goal is to discuss the local election. On the other hand, 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) <
𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) because now 𝜎 ′2 and 𝜎1 are incompatible as one involves run-
ning in a race and the other involves Bill Smith whereas 𝜎 ′2 and 𝜎 ′1 are compatible
because Bill Jones is a runner. This is so despite the presence of 𝑢 which might
bolster the former probability because incompatible meanings are much worse
than an irrelevant remark. The parse trees 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 do not play any role as they
are unique. Taking the earlier numerical values, both players have to choose
between (𝜌1, 𝜌1′) = (5/6, 1/6) and (𝜌1, 𝜌1′) = (1/4, 3/4). These numbers are de-
termined by a variety of objective and subjective factors that are exogenous but
the choice between them is endogenous.
This semantic lexical game 𝑔1 is obtained by applying the semantic game map
𝑔𝑢 to the word 𝜑1. That is, 𝑔𝑢(𝜑1) = 𝑔1. It is possible to construct 𝑔1 entirely from
the assumption thatA is trying to imagine how Bmight interpret his uttering 𝜑1
as part of 𝜑 in 𝑢, from the Semantic Constraint which provides its possible inter-
pretations, from his intention to convey one or the other meaning which sets the
payoffs to higher or lower values based onwhetherB’s interpretation gets it right
or not, and from internally determined inequalities among the partly objective
and partly subjective probabilities such as 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) > 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢).
The map 𝑔𝑢 is available to A without any additional assumptions and all he has
to do is apply it to 𝜑1.
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I reiterate that 𝑔1 has been entertained only inA’s head so far. B has as yet no
idea what is brewing inA’s mind. Later, whenA identifies an optimal utterance
and utters it,Bwill construct a very similar game by applying a similar map 𝑔𝑢 to
the utterance she hears. These games constructed by the two interlocutors may
or may not be identical and when they are identical they may or may not have
common knowledge of it. To mark the possibility that these games may diverge, I
label them 𝑔A𝑢 (𝜑1) = 𝑔A1 and 𝑔B𝑢 (𝜑1) = 𝑔B1 , the first called a speaker game and the
second called an addressee game as mentioned in Section 3.1. I should clarify that
the prior probabilities in 𝑔A1 represent A’s view of B’s assignments whereas in
𝑔B1 they represent B’s own assignments. To avoid unnecessary encumbrances, I
will just drop the superscripts and leave the disambiguation to the context.When
I need to discuss them both together, I will reintroduce the labels.
As an aside, I mention that a reader may wonder how a speaker’s private in-
tention which is part of 𝑠1 or 𝑠1′ can ever become common knowledge. This can
happen because both share the word that has been uttered and they share the two
possible interpretations of the word because they share the Semantic Constraint.
This leads them to share the same game tree with 𝑠1 and 𝑠1′ as its initial situations
as just explained. And the addressee would know that in 𝑠1 the speaker must be
intending to convey the first interpretation and in 𝑠1′ the second. That is, she is
confronted with two possibilities and she can infer that in the first there must
be a certain intention and in the second there must be a different corresponding
intention. The same question could arise with seemingly private preferences. As
explained above, both agents would come to have the common knowledge that
the 𝑎 payoffs are greater than the 𝑐 payoffs because the former represent the
correct interpretation and the latter the incorrect interpretation.
Clearly, then, 𝑔1 presents a choice situation for both agents to consider, as yet
only inA’s thought. While he does not have any choice of utterance – he has to
utter 𝜑1 – he does have a choice of probability distribution. This choice depends
on the optimal interpretation determined for 𝜑2, 𝜎2 or 𝜎 ′2 , because A will want
his choice to be compatible with this interpretation. Otherwise, he may choose
one value and therefore one version of the game and B may choose another
and, besides, the interpretations chosen for the parts of the whole utterance may
not hang together. As the reader may anticipate, there will be a corresponding
semantic lexical game 𝑔𝑢(𝜑2) = 𝑔2 that involves precisely a choice for B between
𝜎2 and 𝜎 ′2 . So, the right solution for 𝑔1 depends on the solution to 𝑔2. But, as will
be seen presently, the right solution for 𝑔2 depends on the solution to 𝑔1. In the
same way, there will also be corresponding syntactic games 𝑔′𝑢(𝜑1) = 𝑔′1 and
𝑔′𝑢(𝜑2) = 𝑔′2 which involve just a trivial choice of trees 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 as these are the
only possible parses of 𝜑1 and 𝜑2. In general, their solution will also influence the
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solution to 𝑔1 and vice versa. Just as A’s only real choice is between two prior
probability distributions, so B has a choice of interpretation between 𝜎1 and 𝜎 ′1
and also a choice between the same two probability distributions. She will also
want to make her choice of distribution compatible with A’s and with her own
choice of interpretation in 𝑔2 as just observed.
u r- r-
𝜌′1
𝑠′1 𝜑1 𝑡1 𝑎A, 𝑎B
Figure 7.3: Syntactic lexical game 𝑔′1
The syntactic lexical game 𝑔′1 is shown in Figure 7.3. In it, the only initial sit-
uation is 𝑠′1. This corresponds to the initial situations 𝑠1 and 𝑠1′ in Figure 7.2. If
there had been an ambiguity in the parse of 𝜑1, say another tree 𝑡′1, there would
have been a second initial situation 𝑠′1′ in Figure 7.3. Notice where the primes are
placed, whether on the symbol 𝑠 itself or on the subscript 1 or both. The prime
on the symbol corresponds to the syntactic game and the prime on the subscript
determines whether it is an alternative initial situation in the relevant game, se-
mantic or syntactic.
In this game, there is no intention to convey the parse 𝑡1 in 𝑠′1 as there was in
the previous game 𝑔1. In semantic games, there is an intention whether explicit
or implicit. In syntactic games, neither the speaker nor the addressee are likely to
be aware of the parse of the corresponding word or expression. All that happens
is the initial situation is a part of the utterance situation 𝑢 which includes a fact
that the relevant parse tree is being transmitted or conveyed, just like a transfer
of information from one hard disk to another.
The rest of the diagram should be straightforward to read. A has just the one
choice of utterance 𝜑1 andB has just one choice of syntactic interpretation 𝑡1.The
payoffs received are the same as before because the interpretation is obviously
correct with respect to what is being transmitted in 𝑠′1.
The prior probability 𝜌′1 = 𝑃(𝑡1 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑦2; 𝑢) where the 𝑥1 is either 𝜎1 or 𝜎 ′1 ,
𝑥2 is either 𝜎2 or 𝜎 ′2 as before, and 𝑦2 is just 𝑡2 as there is no other parse tree
corresponding to 𝜑2. It is also influenced by the parameter 𝑢. Since there is just
one alternative 𝑡1 in this game, 𝜌′1 = 𝑃(𝑡1 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑦2; 𝑢) = 1 independent of what
values the conditioning variables adopt.
This syntactic lexical game 𝑔′1 is obtained by applying the syntactic game map
𝑔′𝑢 to theword 𝜑1.That is, 𝑔′𝑢(𝜑1) = 𝑔′1. Unlike the case of the semantic game 𝑔1, 𝑔′1
is constructed entirely nonconsciously or subpersonally by A. This is also often
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true for semantic games but in those instances there may be a kind of semicon-
sciousness present. The syntactic game 𝑔′1 uses the parsing alternatives provided
by the Syntactic Constraint and other information analogous to the information
used in constructing 𝑔1. That is, the map 𝑔′𝑢 is available to A just as 𝑔𝑢 was and
all that is required is for A to apply it to 𝜑1.
This game also presents a choice situation for both agents, as yet only in A’s
head. All the choices on both sides – the utterance and the prior probability on the
speaker’s side and the interpretation and the prior probability on the addressee’s
side – are trivial. So, the solution to this game is also trivial but it still does depend
in an otiose way on the values of the conditioning variables 𝑥1, 𝑥2, and 𝑦2 and so
on the solutions to those games just as the solutions to those games depend on
the solution to 𝑔′1.
Now, we move to the next set of lexical games for the second word 𝜑2 = ran
shown in Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5. These diagrams should be relatively straight-
forward to understand.
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Figure 7.4: Semantic lexical game 𝑔2
u r- r-
𝜌′2
𝑠′2 𝜑2 𝑡2 𝑎A, 𝑎B
Figure 7.5: Syntactic lexical game 𝑔′2
In 𝑠2 in Figure 7.4, the speaker is conveying 𝜎2, although because 𝜑2 is semanti-
cally ambiguous, the addressee could potentially interpret the word as conveying
𝜎 ′2 as well. This choice is represented by two branches labeled 𝜎2 and 𝜎 ′2 emanat-
ing from the upper intermediate situation in the oval. The payoffs follow the
same pattern as in 𝑔1. In 𝑠2′ in the lower half of the same game, a similar choice
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presents itself to the addressee but this time the payoffs are reversed because in
this hypothetical situationA is conveying the other possible meaning 𝜎 ′2 . Again,
the primed 𝑎 payoffs are greater than the corresponding primed 𝑐 payoffs.
The prior probabilities for 𝑔2 are 𝜌2 = 𝑃(𝜎2 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑢) and 𝜌2′ = 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑥1,
𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑢) and these must sum to 1 as there are only two possible meanings the
speaker could be conveying. Since these probabilities are also functions of the
conditioning variables and parameter 𝑢, there are different versions of essentially
the same game 𝑔2 when 𝑥1 takes on different values as 𝑦1 and 𝑦2 are just 𝑡1 and
𝑡2 and 𝑢 is held fixed.
As I said abovewith 𝑔1, 𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) > 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) because the pres-
ence of 𝜎1 is compatible with 𝜎2 as Bill Smith is more likely to be running in
an election than running in a race. This is also reinforced by 𝑢 as the topic or
goal of conversation is the local election. On the other hand, 𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) <
𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) because now 𝜎2 and 𝜎 ′1 are incompatible as one involves run-
ning in an election and the other involves Bill Jones whereas 𝜎 ′2 and 𝜎 ′1 are com-
patible because Bill Jones is, in fact, a runner. This is so despite the presence of 𝑢
which might bolster the former probability because incompatible meanings are
much worse than an irrelevant statement. Once again, the parse trees do not play
any role except to confirm all the probabilities as they are unique. If we assume
the same numerical values as before, both players could be choosing between(𝜌2, 𝜌2′) = (5/6, 1/6), one version of 𝑔2, and (𝜌2, 𝜌2′) = (1/4, 3/4), another ver-
sion of 𝑔2. Again, the actual numbers themselves are determined by a variety of
objective and subjective factors that are exogenous but the choice between them
is endogenous.
The same kinds of choices and payoffs occur in Figure 7.5 except that this time
a trivial syntactic ambiguity has to be “resolved” as in 𝑔′1. This time the only prior
conditional probability is 𝜌′2 = 𝑃(𝑡2 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑦1; 𝑢) = 1 as before.
The games 𝑔2 and 𝑔′2 are obtained by applying the same semantic and syntactic
maps 𝑔𝑢 and 𝑔′𝑢 to 𝜑2. That is, 𝑔𝑢(𝜑2) = 𝑔2 and 𝑔′𝑢(𝜑2) = 𝑔′2. Again, as argued
above, bothmaps are available toA and so the relevant games can be constructed
without any further assumptions.
This completes the discussion of semantic and syntactic lexical games as con-
structed nonconsciously by A. There are two semantic games and two syntactic
games, each corresponding to the utterance of 𝜑1 or 𝜑2 in 𝑢. Moreover, as I have
shown in detail, the games are interdependent because the solution to each of
them depends on the solutions to the others via the prior probabilities which
are conditioned by these solutions. In this example, the syntactic games were
trivial and solvable immediately and so their dependence on other games was
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redundant. Later in Chapter 9, I will look at a more complex example with syn-
tactic ambiguities as well. Because in general one cannot know which version
of a semantic or syntactic game is going to be optimal without solving all the
other lexical games, they have to be solved together. In this sense, these inter-
locking games are circular not only because each individual game involves an
interdependence between speaker and addressee but also because no game can
be solved without solving all the games simultaneously.
The next step is to consider the products of these lexical games to form phrasal
and sentential games. In the very simple two-word sentence at hand, there are no
phrasal games because we get the sentential games at once. I show the semantic
sentential game 𝑔12 = 𝑔1 ⊗ 𝑔2 in Figure 7.6.
There are several new things in this game product. First, the tree diagram is a
“product” of the trees of 𝑔1 and 𝑔2.7 Next, there are four initial situations 𝑠12 =
𝑠1 ∪ 𝑠2, 𝑠12′ = 𝑠1 ∪ 𝑠2′ , 𝑠1′2 = 𝑠1′ ∪ 𝑠2, and 𝑠1′2′ = 𝑠1′ ∪ 𝑠2′ . The latter situations 𝑠1, 𝑠1′ ,
and 𝑠2, 𝑠2′ are the initial situations of the two semantic games 𝑔1 and 𝑔2 that are
being multiplied. That is, the initial situations of the product are derived from
the initial situations of the multiplicands as they should be and 2 x 2 = 4 such
combinations are possible from the two initial situations of 𝑔1 and the two initial
situations of 𝑔2.
I have abbreviated the sentence 𝜑 = 𝜑1 ○ 𝜑2 as 𝜑1𝜑2 and the products 𝜎1 ⊙ 𝜎2,
𝜎1 ⊙ 𝜎 ′2 , 𝜎 ′1 ⊙ 𝜎2, and 𝜎 ′1 ⊙ 𝜎 ′2 as 𝜎1𝜎2, 𝜎1𝜎 ′2 , 𝜎 ′1𝜎2, and 𝜎 ′1𝜎 ′2 , respectively. The
speaker’s single choice of utterance 𝜑1𝜑2 is a concatenation of the individual
utterances 𝜑1 and 𝜑2 from 𝑔1 and 𝑔2. And the addressee’s possible interpretations
are 𝜎1𝜎2, 𝜎1𝜎 ′2 , 𝜎 ′1𝜎2, and 𝜎 ′1𝜎 ′2 , where again the components are obtained from
the respective games. The payoffs corresponding to the relevant branches in the
multiplicands are added to give the payoffs in the relevant branch of the product.
For example, the payoff for A in the topmost branch corresponding to the path
𝑠12, 𝜑1𝜑2, 𝜎1𝜎2 is 𝑎A + 𝑎A, which is the sum of the 𝑎A in 𝑔1 corresponding to the
path 𝑠1, 𝜑1, 𝜎1 and the 𝑎A in 𝑔2 corresponding to the path 𝑠2, 𝜑2, 𝜎2.
Finally, the four priors are 𝜌12 = 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑢), 𝜌12′ = 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2 ∣𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑢),
𝜌1′2 = 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2 ∣𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑢), and 𝜌1′2′ = 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑢) which must sum to 1 as
they represent all the alternatives. Again, it should be easy to see how these prob-
abilities are generated from the corresponding probabilities in the multiplicands
𝑔1 and 𝑔2 where the priors are 𝜌1 = 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣ 𝑥2, 𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑢), 𝜌1′ = 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣ 𝑥2, 𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑢)
and 𝜌2 = 𝑃(𝜎2 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑢), 𝜌2′ = 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑢). It is clear that 𝜌12 > 𝜌1′2′
because both are conditioned by 𝑡1, 𝑡2, and 𝑢 and because 𝑢 is about the local
7This game tree product is, of course, different from the parse tree product described in Sec-
tion 4.2.
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𝑠1′2′
𝑠1′2
𝑠12′
𝑠12
𝜌1′2′
𝜌1′2
𝜌12′
𝜌12
𝜑1𝜑2
𝜑1𝜑2
𝜑1𝜑2
𝜑1𝜑2
𝜎1𝜎2
𝜎1𝜎2
𝜎1𝜎2
𝜎1𝜎2
𝜎1𝜎 ′2
𝜎1𝜎 ′2
𝜎1𝜎 ′2
𝜎1𝜎 ′2
𝜎 ′1𝜎2
𝜎 ′1𝜎2
𝜎 ′1𝜎2
𝜎 ′1𝜎2
𝜎 ′1𝜎 ′2
𝜎 ′1𝜎 ′2
𝜎 ′1𝜎 ′2
𝜎 ′1𝜎 ′2
𝑎′A + 𝑎′A, 𝑎′B + 𝑎′B
𝑎′A + 𝑐′A, 𝑎′B + 𝑐′B
𝑐′A + 𝑎′A, 𝑐′B + 𝑎′B
𝑐′A + 𝑐′A, 𝑐′B + 𝑐′B
𝑎′A + 𝑐A, 𝑎′B + 𝑐B
𝑎′A + 𝑎A, 𝑎′B + 𝑎B
𝑐′A + 𝑐A, 𝑐′B + 𝑐B
𝑐′A + 𝑎A, 𝑐′B + 𝑎B
𝑐A + 𝑎′A, 𝑐B + 𝑎′B
𝑐A + 𝑐′A, 𝑐B + 𝑐′B
𝑎A + 𝑎′A, 𝑎B + 𝑎′B
𝑎A + 𝑐′A, 𝑎B + 𝑐′B
𝑐A + 𝑐A, 𝑐B + 𝑐B
𝑐A + 𝑎A, 𝑐B + 𝑎B
𝑎A + 𝑐A, 𝑎B + 𝑐B
𝑎A + 𝑎A, 𝑎B + 𝑎B
Figure 7.6: Semantic sentential game 𝑔12 = 𝑔1 ⊗ 𝑔2
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election it pushes up the former and pushes down the latter. The parse trees 𝑡1
and 𝑡2 are both unique and play no role.The “cross” probabilities 𝜌12′ and 𝜌1′2 are
both very much lower than the other two because they represent incompatible
interpretations, either Bill Smith the politician running in a race or Bill Jones the
runner running in an election. So 𝜌12 is the highest among these four prior proba-
bilities. A possible set of values could be (𝜌12, 𝜌12′ , 𝜌1′2, 𝜌1′2′) = (0.5, 0.1, 0.1, 0.3).
I will presently be showing how all these games are to be solved but I point out
here that the prior probabilities play a key role.
The product game 𝑔12 = 𝑔1 ⊗ 𝑔2 can also be obtained directly by applying the
semantic map 𝑔𝑢 to the sentence 𝜑1 ○ 𝜑2. When this is done, it becomes evident
that 𝑔12 ≡ 𝑔𝑢(𝜑1 ○ 𝜑2) = 𝑔𝑢(𝜑1) ⊗ 𝑔𝑢(𝜑2) ≡ 𝑔1 ⊗ 𝑔2.
The syntactic sentential game 𝑔′12 = 𝑔′1 ⊗ 𝑔′2 is shown in Figure 7.7.
u r- r-
𝜌′12
𝑠′12 𝜑1𝜑2 𝑡1𝑡2 𝑎A + 𝑎A, 𝑎B + 𝑎B
Figure 7.7: Syntactic sentential game 𝑔′12 = 𝑔′1 ⊗ 𝑔′2
Each multiplicand has just one initial situation 𝑠′1 or 𝑠′2 and so there is just 1 =
1×1 initial situation 𝑠′12 = 𝑠′1 ∪ 𝑠′2 in the product. The interpretation 𝑡1𝑡2 = 𝑡1 ⋆𝑡2 =
𝑡12 as shown earlier. The payoffs are the sum of the corresponding payoffs in the
component games as before. The prior probability 𝜌′12 = 𝑃(𝑡1, 𝑡2 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥2; 𝑢) = 1 as
the reader should now be able to work out.This is a trivial game and even though
the prior probability is conditioned by other variables that take on different val-
ues depending on the optimal solution to the semantic games 𝑔1, 𝑔2, and 𝑔12, it is
always just 1 so the game is solvable immediately. Aswith the semantic sentential
game, this syntactic product can be obtained directly by applying the syntactic
map 𝑔′𝑢 to 𝜑1 ○𝜑2 and so we have 𝑔′12 ≡ 𝑔′𝑢(𝜑1 ○𝜑2) = 𝑔′𝑢(𝜑1)⊗′ 𝑔′𝑢(𝜑2) ≡ 𝑔′1 ⊗′ 𝑔′2.
This is the Flow Constraint from the speaker’s viewpoint. Recall that all the
interlocking games constructed so far – 𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑔12 on the semantic side and 𝑔′1, 𝑔′2,
𝑔′12 on the syntactic side – actually carry a superscriptA to mark this viewpoint.
These are the games generated by the speaker when he considers the sentence
𝜑 = 𝜑1𝜑2 = bill ran as a possible thing to utter in order to convey 𝜎1𝜎2 =
Bill Smith stood (for election) to B and thereby get across the whole content 𝜎 =
Bill Smith ran in the local election in order to evoke the response 𝑎, acceptance,
by B. This content 𝜎1𝜎2, if indeed it is the content of an utterance of 𝜑 in 𝑢,
something I have yet to show, would be called the locutionary meaning of the
utterance because it comes directly from the words uttered in the situation 𝑢. As
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I have said before, the sentence 𝜑 has no meaning without a context and does
not have a conventional meaning at all. As the Semantic Constraint makes clear,
only words have conventional meanings and they, together with the situation 𝑢,
yield the locutionary meaning and, indeed, also the illocutionary meaning of the
utterance which is the meaning that comes largely from the context 𝑢 and only
indirectly from the words uttered.This latter meaning, which includes things like
free enrichment, modulation, figures of speech, implicature, and illocutionary
force, will be addressed in Part IV.
I will postpone showing how these six locutionary games are solved because
I first want to develop the complete model of locutionary communication. For
the moment, just assume that their joint solution is in fact 𝜎1𝜎2 rather than 𝜎1𝜎 ′2 ,
𝜎 ′1𝜎2, or 𝜎 ′1𝜎 ′2 , the other possibilities shown in Figure 7.6. I will label this locu-
tionary meaning 𝜎 ℓ = 𝜎1𝜎2 = Bill Smith stood (for election). The full illocutionary
meaning will be labeled 𝜎 𝜄 so that the complete meaning of the utterance will be
𝜎 = 𝜎 ℓ ⊙ 𝜎 𝜄 = Bill Smith ran in the local election.
On the other hand, it is obvious that the equilibrium or optimal parse of the
utterance is just 𝑡 = 𝑡12 = 𝑡1𝑡2 as indicated in Figure 7.7 as it is the only possibility.
In more complex cases where syntactic ambiguities are present, the solution will
be correspondingly more complex and syntax will also play a more active role
in the overall determination of both locutionary and illocutionary contents and
vice versa. Indeed, the syntactic and semantic (and phonetic) games all have to be
solved together because they generally cannot be solved “locally” except when
they are trivial. While the solution process involves a slightly elaborate descrip-
tion, it involves rather easy probabilistic computations that are straightforward
to implement in our nonconscious (and semiconscious) neural processes.
The six interdependent local games that have been constructed so far can also
be collected into a locutionary global game 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) = {𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑔12, 𝑔′1, 𝑔′2, 𝑔′12} and
we can say that whenA considers howBmight interpret an utterance of 𝜑 in 𝑢 in
his head he will construct 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑). This interdependence of the games of partial
information is another reason why they are not games of incomplete informa-
tion (or signaling games). If 𝑓𝑢 is a solution function that maps games into their
solutions, we can also write, based on our assumption that the joint solution to
the semantic locutionary games is 𝜎1𝜎2 and to the syntactic locutionary games is
𝑡1𝑡2, that 𝑓𝑢[𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑)] = {𝑓𝑢(𝑔1), 𝑓𝑢(𝑔2), 𝑓𝑢(𝑔12), 𝑓𝑢(𝑔′1), 𝑓𝑢(𝑔′2), 𝑓𝑢(𝑔′12)} = {𝜎1,
𝜎2, 𝜎1𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡1𝑡2}. In other words, the solution to each local game, whether
semantic or syntactic, is compatible with the solutions to all the other games
because they must agree not only in the contents they deliver but also in the
values of the conditioning variables that get set in the prior probability func-
tions. For example, in the first lexical game 𝑔1, the prior probability function
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𝜌1 = 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣ 𝑥2, 𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) in equilibrium, which shows that
the conditioning variables are 𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2 which all agree with the solutions to the
other five games. Further, the equilibrium paths that will actually be followed in
these six games will all begin with the actual situations, 𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠12 in the three
semantic games and 𝑠′1, 𝑠′2, 𝑠′12 in the syntactic games, because all the other initial
situations are just counterfactual possibilities. And these paths will follow the
branches that are consonant with the solutions listed above. If these paths are
traced in all the trees then the payoffs actually delivered to the speaker would be
𝑎A, 𝑎A, 𝑎A + 𝑎A in the three semantic games and 𝑎A, 𝑎A, 𝑎A + 𝑎A in the three
syntactic games. We can just take the maximum value 𝑎A + 𝑎A of all these six
numbers as the payoff that would be actually delivered to the speaker if he were
to utter 𝜑 in 𝑢. Precisely what we do is somewhat arbitrary: the payoffs could
also be added up to yield 8𝑎A or just the lexical payoffs could be added to yield
4𝑎A. This is because of the affine nature of utilities mentioned in footnote 9 in
Section 5.1.
There is one important matter that remains to be specified with respect to the
products of games. I considered the products of two semantic games and of two
syntactic games but why can’t one multiply a semantic game with a syntactic
game? After all, both yield contents and I have been saying that semantic and
syntactic contents are to be treated uniformly. The answer is one can – by form-
ing ordered pairs of possible semantic and syntactic contents. For example, the
“pure” semantic game 𝑔1 in Figure 7.2 would have (𝜎1, 𝑡𝑒) in place of just 𝜎1 and(𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡𝑒) in place of just 𝜎 ′1 where 𝑡𝑒 is just the empty tree. Likewise, the “pure”
syntactic game 𝑔′1 in Figure 7.3 would have (1, 𝑡1) in place of just 𝑡1 where 1 is just
empty or no information. Then we can perform the product 𝑔1 ⊗ 𝑔′1 = 𝑔11′ which
would have (𝜎1, 𝑡1) and (𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1) as the interpretive choices for B. This shows that
the locutionary global game actually contains many more local games. Indeed, it
is not enough to consider just ordered pairs of contents but we need 2𝑛-tuples
where 𝑛 is the number of words in the sentence.This is because we can also form
products like 𝑔1 ⊗ 𝑔′2 = 𝑔12′ as well as 𝑔12 ⊗ 𝑔′12 = 𝑔121′2′ , the full mixed sentential
product.
I will not bother to list all of them as there are too many permutations of the
indices. In fact, the upper bound for the number of these games is 22𝑛 − 1 =
15 when 𝑛 = 2.8 So one can see that the number of games grows quite rapidly
8It is instructive to work out this formula to check one’s understanding of these games. In
general, there will be 2𝑛 indices, 1, 2, 3, …, 𝑛 for semantic lexical games and and 1′, 2′, 3′, …, 𝑛′
for syntactic lexical games. These indices form a set of 2𝑛 elements which has 22𝑛 subsets. And
as there is no null subset involved, we subtract 1, giving us the formula 22𝑛 −1. The reason it is
an upper bound is that there will be many zero products and the corresponding games would
be discarded.
110
7.3 The Generation Game
with 𝑛, the length of the sentence. I will show in the next chapter that the only
product of semantic and syntactic games that matters is the full mixed sentential
product so I will ignore the other mixed products. Remarkably, the only games
needed to understand an utterance turn out to be the pure lexical games, a vast
computational simplification resulting from our rationality.
7.3.4 Back to the Generation Game
Thus, our conclusion so far is that, based on the Content Selection Game induced
by the Setting Game in 𝑢, A resolves to convey 𝜎 in 𝑢 in order to evoke the re-
sponse 𝑎 from B, and then, in the Generation Game that is induced by the Con-
tent Selection Game, casts about for a sentence that would do the job, finds 𝜑 as
one such sentence by some assumed conversion process from 𝜎 to 𝜑, constructs
𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) in his head as described by the Phonetic, Syntactic, Semantic, and Flow
Constraints, solves it with themap 𝑓𝑢 , checks that the equilibrium content is com-
patible with 𝜎 , and receives a value 𝑣A𝑢 [𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑)] = 𝑎A + 𝑎A. We say the value
of 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) to A is 𝑎A + 𝑎A. This entire computation, or some approximate ver-
sion of it, presumably takes only milliseconds to perform in a speaker’s head and
happens nonconsciously. In actual fact, it is not just 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) that is constructed
but also 𝐼𝐺𝑢(𝜑), the global set of local illocutionary games corresponding to the
illocutionary meanings of the utterance, whose description I have postponed to
Part IV. In other words, it is the global game 𝐺𝑢(𝜑) = 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) ∪ 𝐼𝐺(𝜑) that the
speaker identifies when he contemplates uttering 𝜑 and it is the global game’s
value 𝑣A𝑢 [𝐺𝑢(𝜑)] that he computes. I realize this is a lot of terminology but once
we have set it up, the discussion will flow very smoothly.
There is one other factor that enters intoA’s consideration of 𝜑.That is the cost
of uttering 𝜑, 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑), which is based on a variety of factors, mostly objective ones
such as the length and complexity of the sentence and the effort required to men-
tally process it and to physically produce it but also subjective ones especially
related to the consequences of making certain information explicit and leaving
certain information implicit. These subjective costs have to do partly with aes-
thetic things like conversational style but also with how making certain things
explicit may affect the relationship with the addressee in positive or negative
ways depending on whether these explicit things are polite or impolite and how
leaving certain things implicit may result in costly errors. The mental process-
ing involves playing the global game and determining its value. The net valueA would receive from uttering 𝜑 is then 𝑣A𝑢 (𝜑) = 𝑣A𝑢 [𝐺𝑢(𝜑)] − 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑).9 This
9Here, I have used the same symbol 𝑣A𝑢 for a function of 𝜑 and for a function of 𝐺𝑢(𝜑) to avoid
multiplying symbols needlessly. Also, note that this symbol is different from 𝑣A, the payoff toA shown in the Content Selection Game in Figure 7.1.
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finally completes my description of what happens when A imagines uttering 𝜑
in 𝑢. Essentially, he computes its net value 𝑣A𝑢 (𝜑) based on the value 𝑣A𝑢 [𝐺𝑢(𝜑)]
of the global game determined by the four Constraints and its cost 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑). I will
consider the details of costs in Section 8.4.
In the same way, A may compute the net values of other sentences he could
utter in 𝑢 to convey 𝜎 , possibly 𝜑′ = bill smith ran and 𝜑″ = bill ran in the
election. These net values would be determined by the global games 𝐺𝑢(𝜑′),
𝐺𝑢(𝜑″) and the associated costs 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑′), 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑″) of the two sentences. Each of
these global games would involve the corresponding lexical, phrasal, and senten-
tial semantic and syntactic speaker games (as well as the relevant illocutionary
games) and their global solutions.
On the other hand, the limits of rationality mentioned earlier may make him
abandon his search for more sentences if he feels sufficiently satisfied with the
best net value he has computed so far.This is a trial and error process as becomes
especially clear when one is writing rather than speaking as then there is ample
scope to try out different sentences to express roughly the same content. Indeed,
when writing is considered, it becomes obvious that there is an interdependence
between the Content Selection Game and the Generation Game because a new
sentence with a slightly improved content may suggest itself in the Generation
Game and then the new content would have to be evaluated in an altered Content
Selection Game.
In any case, he considers one or more sentences and this leads to the choice
he faces in the Generation Game 𝐺𝐺𝑢(𝜎) as shown in Figure 7.8.
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𝑣A𝑢 (𝜑′)
𝑣A𝑢 (𝜑″)
Figure 7.8: Partial Generation Game 𝐺𝐺𝑢(𝜎)
This may appear superficially like a one-person decision problem but keep
in mind that the net values are based on the values of the corresponding global
gameswhich involve bothA andB.𝐺𝐺𝑢(𝜎) is so far just inA’s head. His solving
it involves choosing the sentence with the highest net value and, finally, publicly
uttering it in 𝑢.
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I will assume 𝜑 is in fact the best sentence to utter in 𝑢 because it conveys the
same content 𝜎 as the other sentences with a lower cost. Its cost is lower because
it is shorter and simpler than the other sentences and the physical and mental
effort involved is therefore lower (even though there may not be any illocution-
ary games required for the other sentences because all the information has been
made explicit in them). Also, if the ongoing conversation is about the local elec-
tion, then aesthetic considerations might imply that repeating the information
about the election explicitly is inelegant. For example, if B has just referred to
the election explicitly in her prior utterance to A, then the election is already
very prominent in the context. These sorts of things lead to the use of pronouns,
for instance. There may be no very weighty relationship-related dimensions in-
volved and no politeness considerations in this kind of purely informational and
casual exchange. I will consider such psychosocial factors in Sections 8.6 and 18.2
and Chapter 11 as the first task is to lay out the model in its simplest form.
I end this section by reiterating the point made in Section 3.1 that sharply sep-
arating the Content Selection Game from the Generation Game is just a useful
idealization. The two games are interdependent because identifying the optimal
content to convey leads to the search for the optimal sentence to utter and vice
versa. For example, in considering 𝐺𝐺𝑢(𝜎), A may opt for something more ten-
tative and less assertive such as 𝜂 = i think bill ran based on his own and his
addressee’s psychology as well as on their interaction so far. This would take
him back to an altered Content Selection Game with a slightly different content
corresponding to 𝜂 and so on. And, indeed, bits of content and bits of language
rather than entire sentences may go back and forth between the two games with
alterations in both games as new possibilities arise. Speaking and writing are ul-
timately creative acts so there can be no complete closure to this process. That is
part of the reason why I do not as yet have a model of how sentences are gener-
ated from contents: the map is partly open-ended as it depends on many factors
including the speaker’s mastery of the language.
To the best of my knowledge, most models in semantics, includingmy own ear-
lier work, do not make the distinction between content selection and generation.
Even computational studies of generation (e.g. Jurafsky & Martin 2009: Chap-
ter 24) seem to omit the content selection problem and simply start with a given
content. Thus, while the sharp separation referred to above is an idealization, the
key point is to recognize that two choices, not one, are involved, the choice of
content and the choice of appropriate sentence to convey the content, whatever
the particular manner in which the two are effected, whether separately as I have
shown or together via an ordered pair in a single more complex game.
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7.4 The Interpretation Game
Once A has publicly uttered 𝜑, B presumably hears (or reads) it. Based on her
using the same four Constraints – Phonetic, Syntactic, Semantic, and Flow – that
the speaker has used, this leads to the public emergence of a game between A
and B. There are, in fact, three games: one is the actual game 𝐺𝑢(𝜑) that comes
into existence and the other two 𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑), 𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) areA’s and B’s models of their
interaction. That is, the local games contained in the global games have three
aspects and each of them derives from the game maps 𝑔𝑢 , 𝑔A𝑢 , and 𝑔B𝑢 . The “ob-
jective” map 𝑔𝑢 is not in either agent’s private information but can be said to
exist on account of the utterance. The construction of 𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) is very similar to
the construction of 𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) above. Just as A’s locutionary global game
𝐿𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) = {𝑔A1 , 𝑔A2 , 𝑔A12, 𝑔′A1 , 𝑔′A2 , 𝑔′A12 }
so B’s locutionary global game is
𝐿𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) = {𝑔B1 , 𝑔B2 , 𝑔B12, 𝑔′B1 , 𝑔′B2 , 𝑔′B12 }
and the objective locutionary global game is
𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) = {𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑔12, 𝑔′1, 𝑔′2, 𝑔′12}.B receives just this one sentence 𝜑 and does not need to consider other alterna-
tives such as 𝜑′ or 𝜑″ as A did in 𝐺𝐺𝑢(𝜎). So the Interpretation Game is just
𝑈𝐺𝑢(𝜑) = 𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑).10 Thus, there is an asymmetry between A’s and B’s effort
in communication: the speaker generally has to work harder. Incidentally, this
slight time lag between 𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) being played in A’s head and 𝐺𝑢(𝜑) appearing
publicly and 𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) emerging in B’s head after the utterance and the possibility
of there not being common knowledge is a third reason why these games of par-
tial information are not games of incomplete information (or signaling games).
The objective game 𝐺𝑢(𝜑) is made up of those parts ofA’s and B’s subjective
games 𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) and 𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) that are known to each of them. For example, in each
game in 𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) there will be a part that involvesA’s own possible actions which
would clearly be known to him. And there will be a part where he models B’s
possible actions whichmay or may not be accurately known to him. On the other
hand, in each game in 𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) there will be a part that involves B’s own possible
actions which would clearly be known to her. And there will be a part where she
10I use the letter 𝑈 as a mnemonic for “understanding” as the letter 𝐼 has already been used for
the illocutionary global game 𝐼𝐺(𝜑).
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models A’s possible actions which may or may not be accurately known to her.
𝐺𝑢(𝜑) will then consist of the parts of each interlocutor’s subjective games that
are known to them,A’s own possible actions from 𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) and B’s own possible
actions from 𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑). This kind of setup for interpretation is more general than
Grice’s understanding, for example, as it makes possible a formal modeling of
miscommunication and weaker flows of information in a natural way.
If all goes well, 𝐺𝑢(𝜑) = 𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) = 𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) and, indeed, they all become (non-
conscious) common knowledge betweenA andB. So far, I have described just the
locutionary global game 𝐿𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) in the previous section and said that the illocu-
tionary global game 𝐼𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑)will be developed in Part IV. But it is the global game
𝐺𝑢(𝜑) = 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) ∪ 𝐼𝐺𝑢(𝜑) that unfolds publicly and 𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) = 𝐿𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) ∪ 𝐼𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑)
that is induced privately in B. I will generally assume that the objective and sub-
jective games are all identical and common knowledge as this is what happens
when the communication succeeds. But there are situations where there is mis-
communication or a weaker flow of information and this is then explained by
the divergence among these three games or by the lack of common knowledge.
Prior to the utterance, A merely believed (nonconsciously) that the emergent
game𝐺𝑢(𝜑)would be common knowledge.When this belief turns out to be infor-
mationally caused,11 that is, when it is knowledge, then 𝐺𝑢(𝜑) will be common
knowledge between A and B. This would mean that B’s corresponding (non-
conscious) belief that 𝐺𝑢(𝜑) is common knowledge would also be information-
ally caused. In this sense, common knowledge of the global game is not some-
thing that is exogenously assumed as is usually the case in applications of game
theory but it is something that issues from the utterance of 𝜑 in the ambient utter-
ance situation 𝑢 when communication succeeds, and fails to obtain when there
is miscommunication or when there is a flow of information that is weaker than
full communication. There could be a variety of factors responsible for miscom-
munication, either differences in the prior probability estimates each agent uses
in each local game belonging to the global game or differences in the Phonetic,
Syntactic, or Semantic Constraint outputs (e.g. the addressee might consider an
additional word or parse or meaning or might fail to consider some possibility
owing to differences in the agents’ knowledge of the language) or other differ-
ences in their subjective games. Whatever the factor, common knowledge of the
game will then not obtain. I have considered miscommunication in some detail
earlier so I will not deal with it in this book.12 In the case of weaker information
flows, the content does get through but it does not become common knowledge.
11Here “information” is used in Dretske’s sense of being a true proposition. See Section 2.1.
12See Parikh (2001: Chapter 9) and Parikh (2010: Section 5.3).
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This happens when, for example,A suggests or hints something. I have also con-
sidered such weaker flows earlier though I will address them again briefly in
Chapter 20.13 Generally, I will just assume throughout that common knowledge
does materialize.
Incidentally, common knowledge of 𝐺𝑢(𝜑) = 𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) = 𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) is not so hard
to come by because the utterance itself is generally public and therefore common
knowledge, the language is sufficiently shared so that the Syntactic and Semantic
Constraints are (nonconscious) common knowledge, and therefore the possible
contents considered in the various local games are common knowledge, and the
payoffs are determined endogenously from A’s possible intentions which are
given by the possible contents, which leaves just the prior probabilities. These
are specified by a host of subjective and objective factors and need to be just
roughly shared. However, they are the one item that can go awry and so when
there is miscommunication it is more often than not because the probabilities
were differently assessed by the interlocutors. As I said in Section 2.2, there are
sufficient grounds for saying that often enough there will be a situation 𝑠 ⊂ 𝑢
such that (a) 𝑠 ⊨ 𝐺𝑢(𝜑), (b) 𝑠 ⊨ A knows 𝑠, and (c) 𝑠 ⊨ B knows 𝑠, which means
that often enough A and B will have common knowledge of 𝐺𝑢(𝜑), especially
its locutionary part 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑), and, consequently, (partial) communication will suc-
ceed.
As before, I will postpone discussing the solution process to the Interpretation
Game. Indeed, the solution process is a joint one betweenA and B and is carried
out against the background of 𝐺𝑢(𝜑), the objective global game. Given the as-
sumed identity of the three global games, we can say for the moment that their
joint solution is 𝜎 ℓ = 𝜎1𝜎2 = Bill Smith stood (for election) and 𝑡 = 𝑡12 = 𝑡1𝑡2 =[S[NP Bill][VP ran]] and the full meaning 𝜎 = 𝜎 ℓ ⊙ 𝜎 𝜄 = Bill Smith ran in the local
election. In other words, both A and B derive the same semantic and syntactic
content from the utterance.
After solving 𝑈𝐺𝑢(𝜑), B has understood the utterance. In a narrow sense of
communication, this is all that is involved. But in a wider sense, she still has to
respond to the content. When I defined communication in Section 5.3, it was the
narrow sense that mattered as communication is not concerned with how the
addressee responds to the utterance even though her possible responses in the
interactive structure we have called the Content Selection Game influence the
content and therefore the sentence A chooses to convey.
As I said in Parikh (1987b: 46), the interpretive act by B in the Interpretation
Game is not observable by A. As a result, given just this much, A cannot tell if
13See Parikh (2001: Section 6.5) and Parikh (2010: Section 5.10).
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the communication was successful. It is only B’s response in the Content Selec-
tion Game, if it is an observable act, that allows A to infer how B might have
interpreted his utterance. Otherwise, he would need to wait for some public ac-
tion such as an utterance by B in an ongoing conversation of the kind we are
modeling or some other kind of perceptible action to infer how she might have
understood him. Even with such observations, there will generally remain some
uncertainty about B’s precise interpretation just as B will remain unsure about
precisely what A was conveying because there are often fundamental indeter-
minacies in communication as discussed in detail in Parikh (2010: Chapter 5).
Such indeterminacies arise from a variety of sources as I pointed out there, from
possibly different utterance situations the agents carve out (and concomitant dif-
ferences in the games induced) as well as differences in their knowledge of the
language that includes the phenomenon of vagueness to be discussed in Chap-
ter 11. In other words, the divergences between what was conveyed and under-
stood are related to uncertainties each agent has about the content in the other
agent’s mind.
I have tried to tread a fine line in the preceding paragraphs. On the one hand,
common knowledge is, often enough, not that hard to come by, but, on the other,
it also does often fall short of what is required for an exact identity between
what is conveyed and what is understood. More of the locutionary content will
generally be identical as opposed to the illocutionary content but even with the
former there are differences that arise, especially on account of vagueness.
7.5 The Content Selection Game again
Based on the content 𝜎 that B infers from 𝐺𝑢(𝜑), she constructs the Content
Selection Game shown in Figure 7.1 in Section 7.2 for the first time. Until this
point in time only A has played the game as a private matter. He has had to
convert the optimal content 𝜎 into a public utterance of 𝜑 in 𝑢 in the Generation
Game to convey 𝜎 toB. She then infers 𝜎 from the utterance in the Interpretation
Game and so comes to construct the Content Selection Game. This is part of
the circularity in communication. In general, as I remarked in Section 7.2, her
model of the Content Selection Game may differ from A’s and there will again
be the same circumstance of an objective game and two subjective games. But,
to simplify things, I assume common knowledge of a single game. In the trivial
interaction at hand, B has just one action 𝑎, acceptance, to choose from, so she
simply carries out that action. Even here, this response is invisible to A and so
he has to wait for some other public action by B to infer not just the meaning
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she derived from his utterance but also whether she accepted this meaning or
not. Of course, in this trivial game, A knows that his content will be accepted
because that is the only available response.
When describing the Interpretation Game in the previous section, I had point-
ed to an asymmetry between A and B. The speaker has to potentially consider
multiple sentences in the Generation Game as indicated by Figure 7.8 but the
addressee need consider just the single utterance selected by the speaker. This
means the addressee never has to consider alternative utterances as is common-
place in Gricean pragmatics (e.g. Horn 1972; 1984, Levinson 1983; 2000). How-
ever, as will become clear in Part IV, she does have to consider alternative con-
tents when the Content Selection Game presents more complex possibilities. The
reason for this somewhat subtle difference is that while it is reasonable for ad-
dressees to reflect on what a speaker may be conveying, it is idle for them to
concern themselves with how a speaker may be conveying it as many different
ways of expressing the same content may exist. And, given the compositional
nature of generation and interpretation, this can lead to an inefficient regress
in processing, as I argue in Section 8.2. It is because much Gricean work is not
fleshed out in as much detail as Equilibrium Semantics provides that it becomes
possible to ignore this issue.
Once B has responded, the circle of communication is over and both agents re-
turn to the Setting Game where the whole enterprise began. All of this generally
takes no more than a few seconds in thought and speech for A and comprehen-
sion and response for B although a writer may take more time to formulate his
utterance and a reader may take more time to digest a sentence. All that has been
accomplished here is that A has communicated 𝜎 to B and she has accepted his
communication.
Below, I will look at two slightly more complex Content Selection Games
where both agents have a real choice of action.
7.6 Back to the Setting Game
Once they are back in the Setting Game where they are discussing the local elec-
tion and perhaps politics generally, A’s wish to elicit a certain sort of response
from B has been more or less fulfilled. They are now ready to begin the next
round of their conversation where B might, on the basis of what she has just
heard and the setting they are in, form her own wish to elicit a corresponding re-
sponse from A, leading to a new Content Selection Game. If we were interested
in modeling dialogue, this is how it would have to be done, allowing for cross-
references to the shared history the interlocutors build up. This shared history,
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and particularly the various objects the agents have referred to, become salient
for future utterances in the dialogue via what is called an information statewhich
maintains a record of the past contents conveyed. There are naturally three such
states – one objective one and two subjective ones which may be more or less
identical and common knowledge.
I have implicitly described a simpler kind of dialogue where each participant
utters just one sentence at a time but there is no difficulty in extending such a
picture to alternating discourses by each agent. It is possible to allow even more
general settings where the agents might be performing other nonverbal actions
such as gestures or interrupting the flow by a side exchange with some other
party or by some other intervening acts. All such settings involve a sequence of
utterance situations rather than a single one. Such sequences are called discourse
or dialogue situations and are denoted by 𝑑 .
I have so far not discussed the entire content conveyed in a communication,
just the infon 𝜎 and the parse tree 𝑡 , the latter being transmitted nonconsciously.
What actually happens is that an utterance describes a situation 𝑐 as supporting
or containing a content 𝜎 . That is, what is conveyed is the proposition 𝑝 = (𝑐 ⊨ 𝜎)
where 𝑐 is called the described situation.14 The content 𝜎 is tied to some situa-
tion that is also communicated. For example, if A and B are talking about New
York politics generally, then the situation of New York politics will be the de-
scribed situation. If they are discussing just the local election, then the situation
involving the local election will be the described situation. I have said above that
the full content 𝜎 = 𝜎 ℓ ⊙ 𝜎 𝜄 = Bill Smith ran in the local election and this implies
that 𝜎 𝜄 = in the local election is an illocutionary content of the utterance. This
in turn suggests that the described situation is some larger situation, either cov-
ering New York politics (𝑐) or even politics generally (𝑐′) or possibly New York
generally (𝑐″). But I could equally have said that the described situation is one
involving the local election (𝑐0) in which case there is no need for the illocution-
ary content 𝜎 𝜄 as it would be redundant. In other words, the described situation
is generally quite indeterminate and is seldom fully shared by the agents. Fur-
ther, whether something is an illocutionary content and occurs to the right of
the turnstile in the proposition conveyed or whether it is just a part of the de-
scribed situation and so occurs to the left of the turnstile is often indeterminate.
That is, the proposition conveyed could be any of 𝑐 ⊨ 𝜎 or 𝑐′ ⊨ 𝜎 or 𝑐″ ⊨ 𝜎 or
𝑐0 ⊨ 𝜎 ℓ or even other possibilities.
As I said in Section 2.1, it is agents who carve out situations and it is agents
who determine the boundaries of what they are discussing.These boundaries are
14I have used 𝑐 as a mnemonic for the situation supporting a content as the letter 𝑑 is reserved
for the discourse or dialogue situation.
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generally fuzzy and differently identified by the two agents.These differences are
in fact quite productive as they lead the interlocutors to pursue different possi-
bilities in what they contribute to the conversation as different contents suggest
themselves to each agent. If one agent thinks they are discussing politics gener-
ally (𝑐′), he may shift the discussion to the presidential election; if the other agent
thinks they are discussing New York generally (𝑐″), she may shift the discussion
to the excesses of Wall Street. As such, the described situation also keeps chang-
ing through a conversation, getting larger or smaller or going off in a different
direction altogether.
It is propositions that are true or false (or indeterminate) so that if the de-
scribed situation had for some reason been a local election in Mumbai (𝑐′0) then
the proposition 𝑐′0 ⊨ 𝜎 ℓ that Bill Smith ran in the local election in Mumbai would
have been false. Both versions of the proposition 𝑐 ⊨ 𝜎 and 𝑐0 ⊨ 𝜎 ℓ may well
be true. This raises the question how the described situation is even roughly de-
termined. Where does it come from? It is partly inferred from 𝑢 and the larger
dialogue situation 𝑑 , it partly issues from 𝜎 itself, and it is partly just creatively
constructed by each agent. There is considerable latitude in where its boundaries
are fixed and what matters to the communication is just whether it supports the
content 𝜎 or not. I will say more about this when I look at how truth plays a role
in meaning in Section 10.4.
For the time being, I just point out that the utterance and dialogue situation
are different from the described situation although both are part of the context as
I said in Section 2.2. This is a more general and, in my view, more accurate setup
than the framework of a context set introduced by Stalnaker (1998) which plays
both roles of utterance situation and described situation and consequently has
fewer degrees of freedom. As discussed in some detail in Parikh (2010: 65–66), if
𝑑 is made up of a sequence of utterances each taking place in utterance situations
𝑢1, 𝑢2, …, then, just as 𝑢1 contributes to constructing 𝑐1, 𝑐1 in turn contributes to
modifying 𝑢1 to establish the next utterance situation 𝑢2, which modifies 𝑐1 and
generates the next described situation 𝑐2, and so on.
7.7 The Communication Game
We have come full circle and we can now appreciate the explanation for A’s
utterance and B’s response. First, there is the setting 𝑢 in which everything takes
place. Part of this setting is the Setting Game which, in this case, is just a casual
conversation between A and B about a local election. This induces the Content
Selection Game for A, maybe because it is A’s turn to contribute something
to the dialogue. A solves this game and identifies the equilibrium content 𝜎 to
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convey to B in order to evoke some response 𝑎 in her, something as minimal as
reception or acceptance in this example. After this selection,A plays the induced
Generation Game and converts 𝜎 into possible sentences he could utter in 𝑢
to convey this content. One of these is 𝜑. He evaluates 𝜑 by mentally building
a model of the corresponding global game determined by the four Constraints,
Phonetic, Syntactic, Semantic, and Flow, and computing its net value based on
the global game’s value and the cost of the utterance. After possibly evaluating
other candidates as well, he chooses the optimal sentence and publicly utters it.
Upon hearing the utterance, B builds her mental model of the global game called
the Interpretation Game based on the same four Constraints and solves it. If the
communication is to succeed, the three global games – the objective game and
the two subjective models of it – have to be identical and common knowledge
and B arrives at the content 𝜎 . Based on this, she plays the Content Selection
Game and chooses her best response, just acceptance in this example. Finally,
both return to the Setting Game for further rounds of the conversation.
Thus, A, in attending to the Setting Game, starts with the Content Selection
Game and then plays the Generation Game. B starts with the Interpretation
Game and then plays the Content Selection Game. This double set of choices
that both agents have to make – selecting a content and then the utterance for
the speaker and choosing an interpretation and then an action for the addressee
– are quite reasonable once one realizes that one choice in each set of choices
would have been required even if telepathy were possible. However, in practice,
all this happens nonconsciously and seamlessly, possibly going back and forth
multiple times among the various games as small chunks rather than whole ut-
terances are processed in real time.
This is more or less the full structure of communication. There can be many
variations of it. It can be seen to be qualitatively quite rich but each part of it
is relatively simple. That is, its building blocks are uncomplicated and easily un-
derstood but the interactions among them make the overall system quite com-
plex. This is exactly what we should expect intuitively and, as will be seen below,
the solution to all these games is also quite straightforward and readily imple-
mentable either in human neural structures or in artificial agents such as robots.
We can now go back to the chart that was displayed in Section 3.1.
Utterance Situation
Setting Game
→ A’s wish to elicit some response from B
→ Content Selection Game
→ A’s equilibrium content
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→ Generation Game
→ A’s equilibrium utterance
→ Interpretation Game
→ B’s equilibrium content
→ Content Selection Game
→ B’s equilibrium response
→ Back to the Setting Game
It should now be very clear how this cycle of communication works for just a
single utterance. It is useful to assign symbols to all the games involved, so we
denote the Setting Game by 𝑆𝐺𝑢 and the Content Selection Game by 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 . The
GenerationGame already has the name𝐺𝐺𝑢(𝜎) and the InterpretationGame has
the name 𝑈𝐺𝑢(𝜑). In general, there will be other contents A will contemplate
in 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 but it is just the optimal one 𝜎 that induces the corresponding Genera-
tion Game 𝐺𝐺𝑢(𝜎). Likewise, there may be multiple candidate sentencesAmay
consider in 𝐺𝐺𝑢(𝜎) but it is only the optimal utterance of 𝜑 that induces the In-
terpretation Game 𝑈𝐺𝑢(𝜑). So we can leave these optimal arguments in there as
part of the definition of the whole game called the Communication Game which
has these four interlinked games as components. The Communication Game is
then Γ𝑢 = (𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐺𝐺𝑢(𝜎), 𝑈𝐺𝑢(𝜑)). But the content 𝜎 and sentence 𝜑 can
also be suppressed if desired to yield just Γ𝑢 = (𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐺𝐺𝑢 , 𝑈𝐺𝑢). Recall
that the global games 𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) = 𝐿𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) ∪ 𝐼𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑), 𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) = 𝐿𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) ∪ 𝐼𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑)
are part of 𝐺𝐺𝑢(𝜎) and 𝑈𝐺𝑢(𝜑), respectively. I have yet to describe the illocu-
tionary game component of these global games which will be taken up in Part IV.
There is also an objective global game 𝐺𝑢(𝜑) = 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) ∪ 𝐼𝐺𝑢(𝜑) that is in-
duced byA’s public utterance of 𝜑 which I have deliberately left out of the chart
above and from the definition of Γ𝑢 . It forms a kind of backdrop to the subjective
games that the agents actually solve but what happens is determined by the ob-
jective game which is the actual game that gets played as the subjective games
are just partial models of it. Of course, we will be largely concerned with situa-
tions where all three games are identical. If we wish, this missing objective game
can be made explicit by defining Γ𝑢 = (𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐺𝐺𝑢(𝜎), 𝑈𝐺𝑢(𝜑), 𝐺𝑢(𝜑)) =(𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐺𝐺𝑢 , 𝑈𝐺𝑢 , 𝐺𝑢). Finally, each global game is made up of several local
games that are either speaker games or addressee games or the corresponding
objective games.These are called games of partial information and it is their joint
solution that plays a crucial role in the process of communication.
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At this stage, we are in a position to say that communication (in its wide sense)
basically involves the playing of the Communication Game Γ𝑢 in some situation
𝑢. It is as simple or as complex as that, whichever way you wish to see it.
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8 Solving Communication Games
8.1 Solving Locutionary Global Games
Assuming common knowledge of the objective locutionary global game 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑)= {𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑔12, 𝑔′1, 𝑔′2, 𝑔′12} from Section 7.3 to keep things simple, I now look at
how this game can be solved. When there is common knowledge, 𝐿𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) =
𝐿𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) = 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑), so solving the objective game automatically implies a solu-
tion to the subjective games. As I said in that section, 𝑓𝑢 is a solution function
that maps games into their solutions and 𝑓𝑢[𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑)] = {𝑓𝑢(𝑔1), 𝑓𝑢(𝑔2), 𝑓𝑢(𝑔12),
𝑓𝑢(𝑔′1), 𝑓𝑢(𝑔′2), 𝑓𝑢(𝑔′12)} = {𝜎1, 𝜎2, 𝜎1𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡1𝑡2}. The solution to the syntactic
games can be trivially obtained in this example so I will focus on the semantic
games.
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Figure 8.1: Semantic lexical game 𝑔1
Recall the first local semantic game 𝑔1 = 𝑔𝑢(𝜑1) shown again in Figure 8.1.
In 𝑔1, A utters 𝜑1 = bill and B has to choose between 𝜎1 = Bill Smith or 𝜎 ′1 =
Bill Jones. The prior 𝜌1 = 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣ 𝑥2, 𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑢) where the 𝑥2 is a variable ranging
across the possible corresponding meanings 𝜎2, 𝜎 ′2 , and the 𝑦1, 𝑦2 are variables
standing for the possible corresponding parse trees 𝑡1, 𝑡2, respectively. Likewise,
the other prior 𝜌1′ = 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣ 𝑥2, 𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑢). Thus, there are different versions of es-
sentially the same game 𝑔1 when 𝑥2, 𝑦1, or 𝑦2 take on different values whenever
this is possible. In addition to choosing utterances and interpretations, the agents
also have to choose the particular values of the conditioning variables in the prior
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probabilities, that is, they have to choose between the two versions of the game.
This is what makes all the local games interdependent.
In solving such games, the players have to identify all the possible strategies
they could adopt and then choose the best one based on what the other player
might do. A strategy is just a specification of what an agent would do at each of
their information sets and of what version of the game they would choose.A has
two information sets, one at 𝑠1 and the other at 𝑠1′ , so he has to specify what he
would do at both of these. However, he has just one choice of action, 𝜑1, in each
set so there is no real choice. On the other hand, he can choose between the two
versions of 𝑔1 essentially by choosing 𝑥2 = 𝜎2 or 𝑥2 = 𝜎 ′2 , as the other condition-
ing variables 𝑦1 and 𝑦2 take on just one value 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 respectively, and as the
parameter 𝑢 is fixed. So his two strategies are (𝜑1, 𝜑1, 𝜎2) and (𝜑1, 𝜑1, 𝜎 ′2) where
the 𝜑1 is repeated in each strategy because that is the action in both 𝑠1 and 𝑠1′ .
Since 𝜑1 is the only possible action, it can just be ignored, and we can simply say
he has a choice between 𝜎2 and 𝜎 ′2 . B has just one information set, the elongated
oval, but she has two choices, 𝜎1 and 𝜎 ′1 , in that set and she has the same two ver-
sions of the game to choose from so her strategies are (𝜎1, 𝜎2), (𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2), (𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2),
and (𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2). A strategy profile is a combination of a strategy of A’s and a strat-
egy of B’s. All of their strategies listed above are called pure strategies; mixed
strategies involve a probability distribution on pure strategies. The description
of a strategy here is a generalization of the usual definition because of the need
to include the choice of version or of the values of the conditioning variables.
This is another reason why such games are called games of partial information.
One way to solve such a game is to look for strategy profiles that no player
will want to deviate from unilaterally. Such an equilibrium strategy, called a Nash
equilibrium as we saw in Section 2.2,1 will implicitly involve each agent taking
account of what the other agent might do. As I said in Section 5.1, the key idea
in decision-making is that an agent should maximize his expected utility modulo
what the other agent does. So we have to compare the expected utilities of dif-
ferent strategies for each agent and choose the ones that neither will want to de-
viate from unilaterally. Because 𝑔1 is part of the family of interdependent games
𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) = {𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑔12, 𝑔′1, 𝑔′2, 𝑔′12} and because each agent will want to choose the
version of 𝑔1 that the other chooses and that is compatible with the solutions
to the other local games, there is an additional compatibility condition that is
imposed on the solution that requires that both players play the same version
1Strictly speaking, the right solution concept is not quite a Nash equilibrium but a Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium but, in the simple structure of a single partial information game, this
nuance can be safely ignored. See Parikh (2010: Section 3.3.5).
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of each game and that this version have conditioning variable values that agree
with the choices made by B in the other games. For example, since there is a
choice in 𝑔1 between two values of the conditioning variable 𝑥2, either 𝑥2 = 𝜎2
or 𝑥2 = 𝜎 ′2 , the value chosen in equilibrium by both players must match with the
interpretation chosen in 𝑔2, where B has a choice between interpreting the utter-
ance of 𝜑2 as 𝜎2 or 𝜎 ′2 as shown in Figure 7.4. And such a requirement must be
satisfied in all six interdependent games.This means that while it is correct to see
each player as choosing the optimal version of each local game by specifying the
values of the conditioning variables in the prior probability distribution, each of
them will optimally want this choice to agree with the interpretive choices made
by B in the other local games. So there are fewer degrees of freedom than might
initially appear to be the case.
8.1.1 The two versions of 𝑔1
To be completely clear about the choice of version in each agent’s strategy, I
show the versions explicitly in Figures 8.2 and 8.3. The prior probability func-
tions 𝜌1 and 𝜌1′ have been replaced by the actual probabilities with different
combinations of the conditioning variables.
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Figure 8.2: The first version of the semantic lexical game 𝑔1
Consider Figure 8.2 which shows the first version of 𝑔1. Assuming this first
version is being played by both players as the compatibility condition requires,
we investigate which strategy profile is best. This leaves just one real choice to
be made: B has to decide between 𝜎1 and 𝜎 ′1 . If B opts for 𝜎1 then A’s expected
utility will be 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎A + 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐′A by tracing the paths
followed by starting with 𝑠1 through to the relevant terminal node resulting from
the branch labeled 𝜎1 and the payoff 𝑎A received there and by starting with 𝑠1′
through to the relevant terminal node resulting from the branch labeled 𝜎1 and
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Figure 8.3: The second version of the semantic lexical game 𝑔1
the payoff 𝑐′A received there. If B opts for 𝜎 ′1 then A’s expected utility will be
𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐A+𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎′A.B receives the same expected utilities
with A replaced by B in the above expressions.
As I said on page 101 in Section 7.3, 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) > 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) ow-
ing to the compatibility between the conditioning variables and parameter and
the conditioned variable in the first probability as opposed to the second. If, in
addition, it is assumed that the unprimed payoffs are identical to the correspond-
ing primed payoffs for both players, that is, if 𝑎A = 𝑎′A, 𝑐A = 𝑐′A, 𝑎B = 𝑎′B , and
𝑐B = 𝑐′B2 because these payoffs are endogenously generated by the agents trying
to coordinate with A’s intentions to convey 𝜎1 and 𝜎 ′1 in 𝑠1 and 𝑠1′ and because
there is no preference for any particular result in the ongoing conversation in 𝑢,
it follows that 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎B+𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐′B > 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐B+
𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎′B and so B’s 𝜎1 strategy is better than her 𝜎 ′1 strategy.3 In fact,
if B chooses 𝜎1 in the first version of 𝑔1 then both agents will receive a higher ex-
pected payoff than if she chooses 𝜎 ′1 . So, with respect to the first version, (𝜑1, 𝜎1)
is a Nash equilibrium as neither player will want to deviate unilaterally from it,A because there is nothing to deviate to given his single choice of utterance 𝜑1
and B because 𝜎 ′1 yields a lower expected utility to her. Therefore, all this part
of the solution process involves is comparing two prior probabilities. Indeed, as
I suggested earlier, their values could well be 5/6 and 1/6 and it would just be
2Actually, all that is required is that 𝑎A − 𝑐A = 𝑎′A − 𝑐′A and 𝑎B − 𝑐B = 𝑎′B − 𝑐′B as can be
seen from transposing terms in the inequality 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎A + 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐′A >
𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐A + 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎′A and in the corresponding inequality for B. This es-
sentially makes the game a coordination game of the kind considered in Section 2.2.
3Aswas discussed on page 99, the 𝑎 payoffs are always greater than the corresponding 𝑐 payoffs,
primed and unprimed, for both players because they represent the correct interpretation with
respect to what A is conveying.
128
8.1 Solving Locutionary Global Games
a matter of seeing which one is larger. This computation is quite undemanding,
either for the human brain or for an artificial agent.
Exactly the same reasoning shows that in the second version of 𝑔1 it is 𝜎 ′1
that gives the higher expected utility to B (and toA as well) because 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1,
𝑡2; 𝑢) < 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) as was established earlier. So (𝜑1, 𝜎 ′1) will be a Nash
equilibrium in this version as neither player will want to deviate unilaterally
from it. In fact, I had suggested that these probabilities could be 1/4 and 3/4, re-
spectively.
So, depending on which version is chosen by A and B, either 𝜎1 or 𝜎 ′1 will be
the equilibrium choice for B (and 𝜑1 is the only possible choice for A). A more
formal way of putting this is that the equilibrium of 𝑔1 will be either (𝜑1, 𝜎1, 𝜎2)
or (𝜑1, 𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2) where the choice of the conditioning variable between 𝜎2 and 𝜎 ′2
has been made explicit. Of course, the compatibility condition mentioned above
means that this latter choice will be fixed in solving 𝑔2. This makes the interde-
pendence among the games crystal clear. I repeat that the trees 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 do not
play any real role in this example as they are the only choices for the parses of 𝜑1
and 𝜑2. However, if we wish to make their role explicit as well, we can say that
the choice of equilibrium in 𝑔1 is between (𝜑1, 𝜎1, 𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2) and (𝜑1, 𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2).
Since only the real choices need to be mentioned, it is possible to drop 𝜑1, 𝑡1 and
𝑡2 from these Nash equilibria and write just (𝜎1, 𝜎2) and (𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2). Here, the first
component of the equilibrium, 𝜎1 or 𝜎 ′1 , is selected in 𝑔1 and the second com-
ponent of the equilibrium, 𝜎2 or 𝜎 ′2 , is chosen in 𝑔2 rather than 𝑔1 owing to the
compatibility condition. A choice of 𝜎2 in 𝑔2 favors a choice of 𝜎1 in 𝑔1 and a
choice of 𝜎 ′2 in 𝑔2 favors a choice of 𝜎 ′1 in 𝑔1.
As the readermight anticipate, a similar scenario obtainswith the two versions
of 𝑔2. In one version, 𝜎2 will be the best option for B based on the inequality
𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) > 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) and, in the other version, 𝜎 ′2 will be the
best option based on the inequality 𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) < 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢). This
time, by similar reasoning, we can conclude that (𝜎2, 𝜎1) and (𝜎 ′2 , 𝜎 ′1) are the two
Nash equilibria the players have to choose between. Here, the first component
of the equilibrium, 𝜎2 or 𝜎 ′2 , is selected in 𝑔2 and the second component of the
equilibrium, 𝜎1 or 𝜎 ′1 , is chosen in 𝑔1 rather than 𝑔2 owing to the compatibility
condition again. A choice of 𝜎1 in 𝑔1 favors a choice of 𝜎2 in 𝑔2 and a choice of
𝜎 ′1 in 𝑔1 favors a choice of 𝜎 ′2 in 𝑔2.
8.1.2 Looking for Pareto-Nash equilibria
These observations allow us to say that 𝜎1 and 𝜎2 are compatible with each other
and 𝜎 ′1 and 𝜎 ′2 are compatible with each other. An alternative way of putting
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this is that the first versions of 𝑔1 and 𝑔2 are compatible with each other and
the second versions of 𝑔1 and 𝑔2 are compatible with each other. In yet other
words, we have two Nash equilibria in 𝑔1 and we have two Nash equilibria in
𝑔2 with the unprimed contents mutually implying each other and the primed
contents mutually implying each other. How do we choose between these two
sets of compatible pairs? One way to eliminate one pair of Nash equilibria is by
bringing in the Pareto criterion and looking for what I have called Pareto-Nash
equilibria in Section 2.2, something Spence (2001) also recommends in a different
context.4 The Pareto criterion states that a Nash equilibrium is Pareto-efficient
if it is at least as good as the other Nash equilibrium for both players and is
strictly better for at least one player. For (𝜎1, 𝜎2) to be the unique Pareto-Nash
equilibrium of 𝑔1, we require that:
4Another possibility is to consider what are called risk-dominant Nash equilibria but they yield
the same result under the assumptions we have made and are less intuitive. See Harsanyi &
Selten (1988) and Parikh (2010: Section 3.3.5). More recently, so-called iterated best response
reasoning has been considered by Franke (2009) and Jäger (2012). While such reasoning can
occur in games where agents consciously reason about one another, it is highly implausible in
the context of communication which takes only milliseconds. Besides, as Jäger communicated
to me, it is 𝑁𝑃-complete. As we will soon see, while it is necessary to go through the Pareto-
Nash calculations that I am describing, their final result is dramatically simple to compute and
also does not involve each agent consciously reasoning about the other explicitly. In particu-
lar, while Pareto-Nash equilibrium is also 𝑁𝑃-complete, in our context of communication, its
complexity class is just 𝑃 .
Some theorists feel queasy about employing the Pareto criterion or even allowing agents
to choose among Nash equilibria on the ground that agents can choose between strategies but
cannot choose between strategy profiles, since the latter also include the other agent’s choice.
I have discussed this and related issues at some length in Parikh (2001: footnote 9, pages 40–41)
and in Parikh (2010: Section 3.3.5) but here are some further observations. The central worry
seems to be that some element of cooperation between the agents is required for the agents to
choose Pareto-Nash equilibria in coordination games of the kind we are concerned with here.
This may well be true. Earlier, I have suggested that such cooperation could result from one
aspect of Grice’s Cooperation Principle, which is being assumed in any case.
Agents can nevertheless sometimes choose different equilibria, and when they do, there
is miscommunication. I discuss this kind of error in Section 8.4 in some detail. Often, it will
lead to clarification requests, as Benz (2012) points out, and then the right equilibrium gets
explicitly selected. It is unlikely, however, that both agents will get stuck jointly in a subop-
timal equilibrium because the speaker knows what he intends to convey and his payoffs and
probabilities will reflect this and make his choice optimal.
Given the alternatives – risk-dominance or epistemic reasoning of the iterated best response
kind – assuming an element of cooperation in the choice of equilibria which, as we shall soon
see, amounts to no more than choosing the maximal options, seems rather innocuous. Many
game theorists such as Spence are not unduly troubled by this. I had mentioned in Parikh
(2006a: 108–109) that the calculations in van Rooij (2004) showing the inadequacy of the Pareto
criterion were flawed, as kindly conveyed to me by van Rooij himself.
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either
𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎A + 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐′A>𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐A + 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎′A
and
𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎B + 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐′B
≥𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐B + 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎′B
or
𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎A + 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐′A
≥𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐A + 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎′A
and
𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎B + 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐′B>𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐B + 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎′B
Likewise, for (𝜎2, 𝜎1) to be a Pareto-Nash equilibrium of 𝑔2, we require that:
either
𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎A + 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐′A>𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐A + 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎′A
and
𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎B + 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐′B
≥𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐B + 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎′B
or
𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎A + 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐′A
≥𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐A + 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎′A
and
𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎B + 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐′B>𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑐B + 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑎′B
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There are somany symbols in these inequalities that it is hard to decipher what
they amount to. It is convenient to let 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑗, 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) =
𝑘, 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑙, and 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑚 in order to see the probabili-
ties more clearly. This implies:
𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑃(𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) + 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)= 𝑗𝑗 + 𝑙
𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎
′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)
𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) + 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)= 𝑘𝑘 +𝑚
𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑃(𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) + 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)= 𝑙𝑗 + 𝑙
𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎
′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)
𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) + 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)= 𝑚𝑘 +𝑚
𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑃(𝜎1 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) + 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)= 𝑗𝑗 + 𝑘
𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎
′1 , 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)
𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) + 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)= 𝑙𝑙 +𝑚
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𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑃(𝜎1 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) + 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)= 𝑘𝑗 + 𝑘
𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎
′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)
𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) + 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)= 𝑚𝑙 +𝑚
Now we can substitute these simpler and more transparently interrelated frac-
tions into the inequalities above. The first set of inequalities becomes:
either 𝑗
𝑗 + 𝑙 𝑎A + 𝑙𝑗 + 𝑙 𝑐′A > 𝑘𝑘 +𝑚𝑐A + 𝑚𝑘 +𝑚𝑎′A
and 𝑗
𝑗 + 𝑙 𝑎B + 𝑙𝑗 + 𝑙 𝑐′B ≥ 𝑘𝑘 +𝑚𝑐B + 𝑚𝑘 +𝑚𝑎′B
or 𝑗
𝑗 + 𝑙 𝑎A + 𝑙𝑗 + 𝑙 𝑐′A ≥ 𝑘𝑘 +𝑚𝑐A + 𝑚𝑘 +𝑚𝑎′A
and 𝑗
𝑗 + 𝑙 𝑎B + 𝑙𝑗 + 𝑙 𝑐′B > 𝑘𝑘 +𝑚𝑐B + 𝑚𝑘 +𝑚𝑎′B
The second set of inequalities becomes:
either
𝑗
𝑗 + 𝑘 𝑎A + 𝑘𝑗 + 𝑘 𝑐′A > 𝑙𝑙 +𝑚𝑐A + 𝑚𝑙 +𝑚𝑎′A
and 𝑗
𝑗 + 𝑘 𝑎B + 𝑘𝑗 + 𝑘 𝑐′B ≥ 𝑙𝑙 +𝑚𝑐B + 𝑚𝑙 +𝑚𝑎′B
or 𝑗
𝑗 + 𝑘 𝑎A + 𝑘𝑗 + 𝑘 𝑐′A ≥ 𝑙𝑙 +𝑚𝑐A + 𝑚𝑙 +𝑚𝑎′A
and 𝑗
𝑗 + 𝑘 𝑎B + 𝑘𝑗 + 𝑘 𝑐′B > 𝑙𝑙 +𝑚𝑐B + 𝑚𝑙 +𝑚𝑎′B
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Recalling that 𝑎A = 𝑎′A > 𝑐′A = 𝑐A and 𝑎B = 𝑎′B > 𝑐′B = 𝑐B , cross-multiplying and
simplifying, and combining the two sets of inequalities, we get:
(𝑗𝑘 > 𝑙𝑚 and 𝑗𝑙 > 𝑘𝑚) for A and (𝑗𝑘 ≥ 𝑙𝑚 and 𝑗𝑙 ≥ 𝑘𝑚) for B
or (𝑗𝑘 ≥ 𝑙𝑚 and 𝑗𝑙 ≥ 𝑘𝑚) for A and (𝑗𝑘 > 𝑙𝑚 and 𝑗𝑙 > 𝑘𝑚) for B
This further simplifies to:
(5) 𝑗𝑘 > 𝑙𝑚 and 𝑗𝑙 > 𝑘𝑚 for both agents
Now Equation 5 can be simplified in two different ways. First, multiplying the
two inequalities, we get:
𝑗2𝑘𝑙 > 𝑚2𝑘𝑙
which implies:
𝑗 > 𝑚
As 𝑗 = 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) and 𝑚 = 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), this tells us that for (𝜎1, 𝜎2)
to be a Pareto-Nash equilibrium of 𝑔1 and for (𝜎2, 𝜎1) to simultaneously be a
Pareto-Nash equilibrium of 𝑔2, we must have:
𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) > 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)
As already noted above, 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) > 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) and 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1,
𝑡2; 𝑢) < 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢). This implies:
𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) > 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)
and
𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) > 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)
So 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) is the maximum among
{𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)}.
Looking back to Figure 7.6, this simply means that for (𝜎1, 𝜎2) to be a Pareto-
Nash equilibrium of 𝑔1 and for (𝜎2, 𝜎1) to be a Pareto-Nash equilibrium for 𝑔2,
all that is required is that the prior probability 𝜌12 = 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) be the
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maximumamong the four priors in the product game 𝑔12.This result could also be
obtained by solving 𝑔12 directly for its Nash equilibrium which can be seen to be
𝜎1𝜎2 by similar computations. Importantly, in examples with syntactic ambiguity
we would need to consider the full mixed semantic-syntactic sentential product
mentioned on page 110 and compute its Nash equilibrium.5
Keep in mind that this is the result when these pairs form the unique Pareto-
Nash equilibria of their respective games. There is no guarantee that this will
always happen. It is quite possible, in a particular locutionary game, to have
𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢). In such cases, the best that can be said is
that both sets of solutions are plausible contents of the communication. This can
certainly happen, and does, for example, with puns. But, in the communication
at hand, it can safely be asserted that:
𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) > 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)
and that 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) is the strict maximum of
{𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)}
given the nature of 𝑢. This is because the implicit shared goal of 𝑢 is to dis-
cuss the local election and so it gives a bigger boost to 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) than
to 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢). In other words, when it is warranted by 𝑢, the Pareto-Nash
inequalities will naturally yield a strict or unique maximum, and when it is not
warranted, they will not.
An alternative manipulation of Equation 5 implies:
𝑗𝑘 + 𝑗𝑚 > 𝑗𝑚 + 𝑙𝑚 and 𝑗𝑙 + 𝑗𝑚 > 𝑗𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚
and so: 𝑗
𝑗 + 𝑙 > 𝑚𝑘 +𝑚 and 𝑗𝑗 + 𝑘 > 𝑚𝑙 +𝑚
which is just:
𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) > 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) and 𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) > 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)
Therefore 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) is the maximum among the four priors
{𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)}
5See Chapter 9.
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in the two versions of 𝑔1 and 𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) is simultaneously the maximum
among the four priors
{𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)}
in the two versions of 𝑔2.
8.1.3 A theorem
Thus, 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) = {𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑔12, 𝑔′1, 𝑔′2, 𝑔′12} can be solved in two equivalent ways. We
can confine our attention to just the lexical games and select the maximum priors
across all versions in each game, ensuring that the priors are compatible, that is,
that the conditioning variable in one is a conditioned variable in the other and
vice versa. Or we can choose the maximum priors in the full mixed semantic-
syntactic sentential product game. In the simple example at hand, the parse trees
𝑡1 and 𝑡2 did not play any real role so wewere able tomanagewith just the seman-
tic sentential product, but when they do, then the full mixed semantic-syntactic
sentential product needs to be accessed. I record this important observation be-
low.6
Theorem 8.1. The locutionary global game induced by an utterance can be solved
either by solving just the lexical games in it or by solving just the full mixed
sentential game or by solving appropriate intermediate phrasal games.
From both a psycholinguistic and computational viewpoint as well, all that
has to be done is to work with either the conditional probabilities of the lexical
games or the joint probabilities of the product games and select the correspond-
ing maximum values. This gives us the solution to the locutionary global game
in a completely rigorous and foundational way assuming nothing more than the
rationality of agents.
The foregoing calculations show that there is a certain kind of overdetermina-
tion at work. First, the conditions for A’s best actions yield the same results as
the conditions for B’s best actions so they are, in a sense, superfluous. And we
know that A makes his choice of probability distributions or versions based onB’s choices in the other games. However, this is a nontrivial decision and it isA
who decides to let it depend on B’s choices in the other local games. The results
6Important statements are displayed as theorems rather than facts or propositions even though
their proofs are not particularly complex. I do not actually give proofs of any of the theorems
but I hope the example considered makes them plausible.
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therefore show that A’s making his choices compatible with B’s is in fact opti-
mal fromA’s viewpoint. Incidentally, the same decision procedure in her choice
of probability distribution or version works optimally for B as well.
8.1.4 The compact form
The information contained in the locutionary global game 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) = {𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑔12,
𝑔′1, 𝑔′2, 𝑔′12} is scattered across six separate local games. But these games are highly
interconnected and have a reciprocity through their prior probabilities. Is there
a way to capture these dependencies in a more compact way? The answer is yes,
as determined by the game theorist Ennio Stacchetti during a private discussion
about 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑). He came up with a single representation that compactly marshals
all the information dispersed among the six local games, assuming that A’s andB’s choice of version or probability distribution is compatible with B’s choices in
the other games. I call the former representation the distributed form of 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑)
and Stacchetti’s representation the compact form of 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑). The existence of the
compact form shows that it is right to think of 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) as a single game. I have
tried tomotivate this a little via the various calculations above.The compact form
is shown in Figure 8.4.7
𝑡1, 𝑡2 𝜎2 𝜎 ′2
𝜎1 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 1, 1 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 1, 1
𝜎 ′1 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 1, 1 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 ∣𝜎 ′2 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣𝜎 ′1 , 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 1, 1
Figure 8.4: The compact form of 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑)
In this new, more abstract representation of 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑), the players are no longerA and B but may be said to be the four lexical variables 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑦1, 𝑦2 correspond-
ing to the semantic and syntactic contents of the two words bill and ran in the
sentence 𝜑 uttered in 𝑢. (Alternatively, the words could be said to be the players
but each word would be taken as having two avatars, one semantic and one syn-
tactic.) Readers new to game theory may feel that the players in a game have to
7This representation can also be referred to as a normal or strategic form. It is in fact both, a
compact form and a normal form, the first because of its relation to the distributed form and
the second because it is itself related to a so-called extensive form which is different from the
distributed form. In other words, the distributed form can be translated into a single extensive
form as well. Thus, we have the distributed form ∼ the compact form ≡ the normal form ∼ the
extensive form.
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be agents as ordinarily conceived but it is possible to allow games to have a more
abstract kind of agency with more abstract kinds of players as we have here.
Recall that 𝑥1 stood for either 𝜎1 or 𝜎 ′1 and these are the two strategies avail-
able to the player 𝑥1. Similarly, 𝑥2 has the two strategies 𝜎2 and 𝜎 ′2 . These two
sets of strategies are shown on the left and on top of the payoff matrix. The other
two players 𝑦1 and 𝑦2 have just single strategies 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 so they are shown
in the upper left corner of Figure 8.4 in order to avoid having to present a four-
dimensional matrix with the third dimension labeled 𝑡1 and the fourth 𝑡2. Instead
of a four-dimensional matrix, multiple two-dimensional matrices can also repre-
sent the strategies of these players were they to have some real choice. In gen-
eral, for a sentencewith 𝑛words there would be a 2𝑛-dimensional matrix because
there would be 𝑛 semantic variables and 𝑛 syntactic variables.The payoffs for the
various combinations of strategies are shown in the cells of the matrix. For exam-
ple, in the first cell, we have the vector (𝑃(𝜎1 ∣𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎2 ∣𝜎1, 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 1, 1)
which indicates that the payoff to 𝑥1 is the first component, the payoff to 𝑥2 is
the second component, and the payoffs to 𝑦1 and 𝑦2 are just 1 and 1 because the
relevant conditional probabilities 𝑃(𝑡1 ∣𝜎1, 𝜎2, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 1 as shown in Figure 7.3
and 𝑃(𝑡2 ∣𝜎1, 𝜎2, 𝑡1; 𝑢) = 1 as shown in Figure 7.5.
The somewhat complicated mass of symbols in Figure 8.4 can be simplified
if we drop the players 𝑦1, 𝑦2 as they are just silent bystanders and make the
substitution of letters for conditional probabilities I had suggested above. The
result is shown in Figure 8.5.
𝜎2 𝜎 ′2
𝜎1 𝑗𝑗+𝑙 , 𝑗𝑗+𝑘 𝑘𝑘+𝑚 , 𝑘𝑗+𝑘
𝜎 ′1 𝑙𝑗+𝑙 , 𝑙𝑙+𝑚 𝑚𝑘+𝑚 , 𝑚𝑙+𝑚
Figure 8.5: The compact form of 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) with simpler symbols
This is now a familiar sort of game with a payoff matrix for two players. From
the distribution of payoffs, it can be immediately seen that there must be at least
one pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This is because a Nash equilibrium implies
that neither player would want to deviate unilaterally from it. If no such Nash
equilibrium existed, there would have to be a cycle with strategy profile (𝜎1, 𝜎2)
dominated by (𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2) for the first player (that is, the first player would deviate
unilaterally from its strategy 𝜎1 to another strategy 𝜎 ′1), which in turn would be
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dominated by (𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2) for the second player, which would itself be dominated by(𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2) for the first player again, which would finally be dominated by (𝜎1, 𝜎2)
for the second player. In other words, there would be no “resting place” or Nash
equilibrium.This would happen if the following inequalities among payoffs held,
where the symbol “≺𝑖” for 𝑖 = 1, 2 stands for “dominated by for player 𝑖”:
(𝜎1, 𝜎2) ≺1 (𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2) implies 𝑗𝑗+𝑙 < 𝑙𝑗+𝑙
(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2) ≺2 (𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2) implies 𝑙𝑙+𝑚 < 𝑚𝑙+𝑚
(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2) ≺1 (𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2) implies 𝑚𝑘+𝑚 < 𝑘𝑘+𝑚
(𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2) ≺2 (𝜎1, 𝜎2) implies 𝑘𝑗+𝑘 < 𝑗𝑗+𝑘
all of which together imply 𝑗 < 𝑙 < 𝑚 < 𝑘 < 𝑗, a contradiction. This means there
cannot be such a cycle. It should be clear by symmetry considerations that such
an argument will apply to any compact form. I record this below.
Theorem 8.2. Every compact form of a locutionary global game has at least one
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
For (𝜎1, 𝜎2) to be a Nash equilibrium, we must have:
𝑗
𝑗 + 𝑙 ≥ 𝑙𝑗 + 𝑙
and 𝑗
𝑗 + 𝑘 ≥ 𝑘𝑗 + 𝑘
These inequalities imply 𝑗 ≥ 𝑙 and 𝑗 ≥ 𝑘. For (𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2) to be a Nash equilibrium,
we must have:
𝑚
𝑘 +𝑚 ≥ 𝑘𝑘 +𝑚
and 𝑚
𝑙 +𝑚 ≥ 𝑙𝑙 +𝑚
These inequalities imply 𝑚 ≥ 𝑘 and 𝑚 ≥ 𝑙. If both (𝜎1, 𝜎2) and (𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2) are Nash
equilibria – as we saw earlier – then in order for the former to be the unique
Pareto-Nash equilibrium, we must have:
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either 𝑗
𝑗 + 𝑙 > 𝑚𝑘 +𝑚
and 𝑗
𝑗 + 𝑘 ≥ 𝑚𝑙 +𝑚
or 𝑗
𝑗 + 𝑙 ≥ 𝑚𝑘 +𝑚
and 𝑗
𝑗 + 𝑘 > 𝑚𝑙 +𝑚
This implies either 𝑗𝑘 > 𝑙𝑚 and 𝑗𝑙 ≥ 𝑘𝑚 or 𝑗𝑘 ≥ 𝑙𝑚 and 𝑗𝑙 > 𝑘𝑚, both of which
imply 𝑗 > 𝑚, exactly as we had when we considered the distributed form. But
notice how much easier it was to obtain the result.
So far, I have considered just the four lexical variables 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑦1, 𝑦2 derived
from thewords in the sentence as players but there are, in fact, potentially phrasal
and sentential variables too. These are 𝑥12 = 𝑥1 ⊙ 𝑥2 and 𝑦12 = 𝑦1 ⋆ 𝑦2. The four
possible strategies of 𝑥12 are 𝜎1𝜎2, 𝜎1𝜎 ′2 , 𝜎 ′1𝜎2, and 𝜎 ′1𝜎 ′2 and the single strategy
of 𝑦12 is 𝑡1𝑡2. But since these choices of the sentential variables are in fact de-
termined by the choices of the four lexical players, these sentential players have
no real choice beyond the lexical choices. And, indeed, this is reflected in the
fact that the payoffs the semantic sentential variables receive from the four strat-
egy choices – 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑗, 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑘, 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑙,
and 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑚 – are also ordered by the requirements we have dis-
played above for various equilibria. For example, as we just saw, if (𝜎1, 𝜎2) is
a Pareto-Nash equilibrium of the compact form, then 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢) = 𝑗 is
automatically the maximum among
{𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢), 𝑃(𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑢)}= {𝑗, 𝑘, 𝑙,𝑚}.
This leads to an insight that is parallel to Theorem 8.1 above.
Theorem 8.3. The compact form of a locutionary global game contains all the
information required to determine its equilibrium. There is no need to consider
nonlexical players.
Theorems 8.2 and 8.3 immediately imply the next observation.
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Theorem 8.4. Every locutionary global game has at least one Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies.
This result does not imply that mixed strategies may never appear as equilibria.
When there is more than one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, there may not
be a unique Pareto-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, in which case a unique
mixed strategy equilibrium may be optimal.
8.1.5 The main theorems
In general, a sentence 𝜑 can be expressed as 𝜑1○𝜑2○…○𝜑𝑛 = 𝜑1𝜑2…𝜑𝑛 where each
𝜑𝑖 is aword and there are 𝑛words in the sentence. If 𝜑 is uttered in some utterance
situation 𝑢, then each word 𝜑𝑖 has a range of possible referential meanings given
by the Semantic Constraint.The variable 𝑥𝑖 stands for these possible meanings of
𝜑𝑖 and all such 𝑥𝑖 together form the meaning vector 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛). Likewise,
the possible parse trees 𝑦𝑗 of each word 𝜑𝑗 can be collected in the parse vector
𝑦 = (𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑛). Here, the range of each variable 𝑦𝑗 is given by the Syntactic
Constraint.
The meaning and parse vectors 𝑥 and 𝑦 together form the content vector 𝑧 =(𝑥, 𝑦)with 2𝑛 components. This vector ranges over all the possible lexical mean-
ings and parses of 𝜑 uttered in 𝑢. Note that 𝑦𝑗 = 𝑧𝑛+𝑗 . Also, 𝑧−𝑘 = (𝑧1, 𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑘−1,
𝑧𝑘+1, … , 𝑧2𝑛). That is, 𝑧𝑘 is dropped from 𝑧 in 𝑧−𝑘 . Finally, 𝑧⋆ represents the equi-
librium meaning and parse of all the lexical items.
We are now ready to state the central result of this section based on all the
calculations above.
Theorem 8.5. Given an utterance and its locutionary global game (with symmet-
ric payoffs), its lexical meanings and parses are given by the following equivalent
characterizations:
(6) 𝑧⋆ = argmax
𝑧
𝑃(𝑧𝑘 ∣ 𝑧−𝑘 ; 𝑢) = argmax𝑧 𝑃(𝑧; 𝑢), 𝑘 = 1,… , 2𝑛
When there is more than one solution, each solution is given an equal probabil-
ity.8Themeaning and parse of thewhole utterance can be obtained by computing
the products of the lexical meanings and parses.
Equation 6 is called the Fundamental Equation of Equilibrium Linguistics. It
provides a constraint on the beliefs of speakers and addressees in communica-
tion. The term argmax𝑧 𝑃(𝑧𝑘 ∣ 𝑧−𝑘 ; 𝑢) after the first equality sign and the term
8By Theorem 8.4, a solution always exists.
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argmax𝑧 𝑃(𝑧; 𝑢) after the second equality sign refer implicitly to the lexical
games and to the full mixed semantic-syntactic sentential product game in the
locutionary global game. Equation 6 improves upon the equation in Parikh (2010:
Section 7.4) where the equivalence between the two ways of calculating 𝑧⋆ re-
mained implicit. In principle, all a computing agent has to do is to run through the
finite number of alternatives one by one until one or more vectors 𝑧⋆ is found to
solve the system. It would be very easy to extend it to the Phonetic Constraint and
to phonetic contents. At the start of this section, I mentioned the solution func-
tion 𝑓𝑢 which allows us to write 𝑓𝑢[𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑)] = {𝑓𝑢(𝑔1), 𝑓𝑢(𝑔2), 𝑓𝑢(𝑔12), 𝑓𝑢(𝑔′1),
𝑓𝑢(𝑔′2), 𝑓𝑢(𝑔′12)} = {𝜎1, 𝜎2, 𝜎1𝜎2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡1𝑡2}. This function is an equivalent way of
expressing 𝑧⋆.
The Fundamental Equation treats semantic, syntactic, (and phonetic) contents
in a completely homogeneous manner. This is what justifies calling them all con-
tents of the utterance. It also shows how the pipeline view of meaning – first
phonetics, then syntax, then semantics, and last pragmatics – is completely tran-
scended and replaced by a circular system of simultaneous equations. As I will
show in Section 10.2, this is one way in which Equilibrium Linguistics general-
izes Frege’s principle of compositionality because Frege assumed that semantics
reflects syntax but not the other way around. In Equilibrium Linguistics, all three
contents – semantics, syntax, and phonetics – reflect one another. I do not show
this right away as it is better to first complete the analysis fully and then discuss
the philosophical consequences that emerge.
I had assumed earlier that 𝑎A = 𝑎′A, 𝑐A = 𝑐′A, 𝑎B = 𝑎′B , and 𝑐B = 𝑐′B , mak-
ing the games coordination games. This is what allowed us to essentially ignore
the payoffs and this is why we got the pure probabilistic result above. However,
in general, these payoffs may not be symmetric because different outcomes cor-
responding to correct or incorrect interpretations may be valued differently by
each agent. It is not difficult to bring the payoffs back in by simply scaling the
conditional probabilities by appropriate factors in accordance with the inequali-
ties for Pareto-Nash equilibria on page 133 as shown in Figure 8.6.
𝜎2 𝜎 ′2
𝜎1 𝑗𝑗+𝑙 𝑎B + 𝑙𝑗+𝑙 𝑐′B , 𝑗𝑗+𝑘 𝑎B + 𝑘𝑗+𝑘 𝑐′B 𝑘𝑘+𝑚𝑎B + 𝑚𝑘+𝑚 𝑐′B , 𝑘𝑗+𝑘 𝑎′B + 𝑗𝑗+𝑘 𝑐B
𝜎 ′1 𝑙𝑗+𝑙 𝑎′B + 𝑗𝑗+𝑙 𝑐B , 𝑙𝑙+𝑚𝑎B + 𝑚𝑙+𝑚 𝑐′B 𝑚𝑘+𝑚𝑎′B + 𝑘𝑘+𝑚 𝑐B , 𝑚𝑙+𝑚𝑎′B + 𝑙𝑙+𝑚 𝑐B
Figure 8.6: The scaled compact form of 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑)
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I will not analyze this scaled form of the locutionary game but just state the
corresponding equation that results. Figure 8.6 reflects B’s payoffs rather thanA’s though a corresponding matrix exists forA even though he has no choice of
utterance. Let 𝑉B𝑘 (𝑧, 𝑧′𝑘) be B’s payoffs in the lexical game 𝑔𝑘 (or 𝑔′(𝑘−𝑛) if 𝑘 > 𝑛
and the game is syntactic rather than semantic) and 𝑉B(𝑧, 𝑧′) be her payoffs in
the full mixed sentential game: these payoffs vary with different values of the
vectors 𝑧 and 𝑧′, both of which represent full independent content vectors for 𝜑.
This notation compactly captures all the different individual payoffs such as 𝑎B ,
𝑎′B , 𝑐B , and 𝑐′B and need not be symmetric, even allowing for variations across
the different lexical games.
Theorem 8.6. Given a locutionary global game, the lexical meanings and parses
of an utterance are given by the following equivalent characterizations:
𝑧⋆ = argmax
𝑧−𝑘 ,𝑧′𝑘
∑
𝑧𝑘
𝑃(𝑧𝑘 ∣ 𝑧−𝑘 ; 𝑢)𝑉B𝑘 (𝑧, 𝑧′𝑘)
= argmax
𝑧′
∑
𝑧
𝑃(𝑧; 𝑢)𝑉B(𝑧, 𝑧′), 𝑘 = 1,… , 2𝑛(7)
When there is more than one solution, each solution is given an equal probability.
The meaning and parse of the whole utterance can be obtained by computing the
products of the lexical meanings and parses.
Equation 7 may be called the Fundamental Equation of Equilibrium Linguistics
with Payoffs. It expresses a more general result of our analysis and can also be
put in matrix form. Generally Equation 6 suffices although in certain contexts as
pointed out in Section 12.2 we have to resort to Equation 7.
This completes my discussion of how locutionary global games are solved.The
description has taken a few pages but the results are strikingly simple and in ac-
cord with our intuitions. All that needs to be done is to find the interpretations
with the highest probabilities in a compatible manner where by “compatible” I
mean the property that argmax𝑧 𝑃(𝑧𝑘 ∣ 𝑧−𝑘 ; 𝑢) = argmax𝑧 𝑃(𝑧; 𝑢) as described by
Equation 6. One aspect of this – identifying themost likely contents – is certainly
common in both human and artificial contexts. But the second aspect – maximiz-
ing these probabilities in a compatible manner – is less evident. That communica-
tion involves semantic, syntactic, and phonetic contents mutually determining
one another via such an intricate probabilistic structure is remarkable.
Just to be clear that not every probability distribution is compatible, Figure 8.7
shows a distribution 𝑃(𝑧1, 𝑧2) with two variables 𝑧1, 𝑧2 and three values in the
range of each variable that is not.
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𝑧1, 𝑧2 𝜎2 𝜎 ′2 𝜎″2
𝜎1 0.20 0.15 0.10
𝜎 ′1 0.15 0.15 0.00
𝜎″1 0.10 0.00 0.15
Figure 8.7: An incompatible distribution
For example, 𝑧1 could range over the contents 𝜎1, 𝜎 ′1 , 𝜎″1 corresponding to the
three rows and 𝑧2 could range over the contents 𝜎2, 𝜎 ′2 , 𝜎″2 corresponding to the
three columns. For this distribution,
argmax
𝑧
𝑃(𝑧) = (𝜎1, 𝜎2) but argmax𝑧 𝑃(𝑧𝑘 ∣ 𝑧−𝑘) = (𝜎″1 , 𝜎″2 ),
as can be checked by inspection. That is, the maximum of the joint distribution
occurs at the first row and first column and the maximum of the conditional
distributions occurs at the third row and third column. Such a distribution is
ruled out by Theorem 8.5.
Why do compatible probability distributions arise in communication? Recall
from page 100 in Section 7.3 that each prior probability is not the conditional
probability of some content but is rather the conditional probability of a speaker’s
conveying that content.That is, these prior distributions govern the intentions and
actions of rational agents, of what they would and would not choose to convey or
interpret if they were conveying or interpreting certain other things as well. So
compatibility describes the two-sided logic of rational intention and action. It is
co-extensive with rationality itself in the context of communication. Earlier, I had
mentioned that in many settings agents are not perfectly rational but because
the structures involved in locutionary global games are relatively simple and
because the payoffs are also assumed to be symmetric, there is little scope for
limited agents to falter. Even when scaled compact forms as shown in Figure 8.6
are used to derive the more general Equation 7, there is no reason for rationality
to fail.
Equally important, these probability distributions have nothing to do with lan-
guage per se. The same property would hold in any communication involving
images, gestures, and other symbol systems. It may even apply beyond commu-
nication to appropriately linked subsystems of a larger system, as I conjecture in
Parikh (2010: Section 7.1.4).
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Theorem 8.5 provides a theoretical foundation for and generalization of vari-
ous observations in both psycholinguistics and statistical natural language pro-
cessing, as I discuss in Chapter 12. On the other hand, to the best of my knowl-
edge, the philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics and artificial intel-
ligence do not appear to have entertained anything close to such ideas about
how locutionary meanings and other contents might be derived from first prin-
ciples. They usually just say such meanings are “conventional” and turn their
attention to deriving implicatures using some version of Grice’s conversational
maxims. The problem of rigorously deriving content is a philosophical and theo-
retical problem, not just some detail to be relegated to empirical investigation.
Where do all these probabilities come from? For human interpretation, they
would come partly from the grammar and partly from the utterance situation
and wider discourse situation and would be based on both objective and subjec-
tive factors.9 People are generally quite good at rough probability estimates (as
in figuring whether it is likely to rain by looking at the sky) and all they need to
determine here is whether certain probabilities are higher than others. No pre-
cise numerical estimates are required. For an artificial agent, these probabilities
would come from the grammar and from suitable corpora.
To a certain degree, all these probabilities rely on background knowledge of
one kind or another, some of which may be present in the encyclopedic knowl-
edge associated with the conventional meaning of a word and some of which
may be present in one or more knowledge or belief bases in the agent’s head.
Some linguists may feel that the explanation has just been pushed back to some
unknown probabilities but the problem of determining such probabilities is com-
mon to all action, not just communicative action, as should be clear from the very
wide applicability and, indeed, applications of decision and game theory. Rather
than say, as Chomsky has chosen to, that this makes the entire realm of human
choice and behavior a mystery, one has to approach it in the usual way of sci-
ence, which is to first divide the problem into two parts and then to tackle each
separately. In the case of communication, I have shown how the problem of de-
riving locutionary meaning can be reduced to some probabilistic computations.
Now, as computer scientists frequently do in limited domains, distributed and in-
terconnected knowledge bases can be set up and it would become very clear how
9See Mante et al. (2013) for some recent work on how contextual information is pro-
cessed by the brain involving a recurrent neural network model and experiments with
monkeys. See also http://engineering.stanford.edu/news/stanford-researchers-surprised-find-
how-neural-circuits-zero-specific-information-needed-decisi. These findings, which are still
in their infancy, are relevant for all the games in the book as they all make use of contextually
derived probabilities.
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such probabilities can emerge from such data. If an agent knows that black clouds
make rain likely and he sees black clouds, it follows that the probability of rain
is high. That is all. Indeed, it is not even necessary to build an actual knowledge
or belief base in the case of human communication; it suffices merely to assume
that it exists and that neuroscience will, in time, enable us to understand how
it figures in decision-making. Building satisfactory conversational agents based
on Equilibrium Semantics does require constructing and scaling the knowledge
base sufficiently but I think it is possible to say that the problem of determining
locutionary meaning has been solved. I touch upon this point briefly again in
Section 12.2.
An alternative response to this issue of explaining how such parameters arise
is to say that the complaint misunderstands the scientific problem. In physics,
for example, the solution to the problem of projectile motion is divided into two
parts: the relevant equation of motion and the initial or boundary conditions (e.g.
the initial velocity).The scientific problem is determining the equation of motion.
In different situations, the initial or boundary conditions will be determinable
with more or less precision but no one thinks it is reasonable to say that the
problem has just been pushed back to some unknown parameters.
I reproduce a paragraph frommy dissertation, Language and Strategic Inference
(1987b: 5):
We will argue for this thesis by developing a detailed account of one strate-
gic inference in isolation. Any complete utterance, that is, any utterance
that attempts to express a proposition, will involve many separate acts and
strategic inferences. For example, part of a communication will typically
involve a referential act, an act of referring to some object, and the com-
munication of this reference to the addressee. Each bit of information com-
municated will require its own strategic inference(s). Thus, any complete
utterance involves an entire system of simultaneous strategic inferences.
These inferences have to be simultaneous in general because they codeter-
mine each other in general. For example, an utterance of “Bill has the book”
will require inferring the designata of each of the four words in the sentence,
(not to mention its internal structure), in order to determine the proposition
expressed. No word has any particular priority in this determination. That
is, there may be interactions among the various strategic inferences. And
the embedding circumstances play a vital role in each inference. Mathemat-
ically, this amounts to a system of simultaneous equations.
Earlier, I didn’t know how to work out this idea. Now, several years later, I do.
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As the Interpretation Game 𝑈𝐺𝑢(𝜑) = 𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) = 𝐿𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑)∪𝐼𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) = 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑)∪
𝐼𝐺𝑢(𝜑) = 𝐺𝑢(𝜑) owing to our assumption of equality of the subjective and ob-
jective games and common knowledge of them, we have solved the locutionary
part of the Interpretation Game the addressee faces. Its illocutionary part will be
addressed in Part IV. The Generation Game is just a little more complicated as
multiple sentences may need to be evaluated and their costs taken into account.
8.2 My former partial information games
Readers familiar with my earlier books will have noticed that a game like the one
in Figure 8.1 would ordinarily have been shown as in Figure 8.8.
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Figure 8.8: Semantic lexical game 𝑔1
In this game, there are two more branches with alternative utterances 𝜑′1 at
𝑠1 and 𝜑″1 at 𝑠1′ . These are both unambiguous with respect to the ambiguity in
𝜑1 = bill. So 𝜑′1 = bill smith and 𝜑″1 = bill jones represent one set of possibil-
ities for these alternatives. As they are unambiguous, there is only one interpre-
tation of each possible, either 𝜎1 or 𝜎 ′1 . As they are costlier but involve correct
interpretations, the resulting payoffs 𝑏A, 𝑏B and 𝑏′A, 𝑏′B are somewhat lower than
the corresponding 𝑎 payoffs and higher than the corresponding 𝑐 payoffs.
The games I have drawn in this and the previous chapter do not have such al-
ternative utterances for two reasons. When deriving locutionary meaning, if we
allow an alternative like 𝜑′1 = bill smith, then this alternative itself needs to be
interpreted word by word, leading to a possible regress and further disambigua-
tions, which is unrealistic. In Parikh (2010: 88 and 120–121), I suggested dealing
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with such alternatives holophrastically but this is unnecessary. Alternative con-
tents are anyway considered by both agents in the Content Selection Game and
the speaker does occasionally consider more than one alternative sentence (or
subsentential expression) in the Generation Game so further alternatives within
the partial information game are not required. Secondly, such costs are best con-
sidered outside the locutionary global game 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) but within the Generation
Game 𝐺𝐺𝑢 . This makes it possible to include more sources of cost.
This dropping of alternative utterances may seem superficially like a small
change but it results in very different solution processes for these new games of
partial information, as readers familiar with the earlier solution processes will no
doubt have realized. This is what makes possible the two parts of the Fundamen-
tal Equation 6 and all the theorems in Section 8.1. Earlier, such finer calculations
of equilibria were not possible.
Another consequence of this truncated form of the game without the alterna-
tives is that such alternative utterances no longer need to be part of the definition
of speaker meaning. The subjective global game 𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) in Definition 5.1 in Sec-
tion 5.3 contains just the sentence 𝜑.
Others using game theory in this field (e.g. Benz et al. 2006), largely follow-
ing the form of my earlier games of partial information above, have also used
this idea of alternative utterances, apparently without realizing that these alter-
natives would themselves need to be evaluated using the same methods that are
being applied to the main sentence, which could lead to an undesirable regress.
To avoid this, they would once again have to follow my suggestion of locating
alternative contents in the Content Selection Game and alternative sentences in
the Generation Game outside the local games of partial information.
8.3 An interesting complication
While the results of Section 8.1 are quite powerful, they depend on a condition
that has been left implicit.10 Consider an utterance of the following sentence:
(8) The boy saw the girl with a telescope. (𝜇)
As is well known, the prepositional phrase with a telescope can attach either
to the verb saw (i.e. to the verb phrase saw the girl) or to the noun girl and
so 𝜇 is syntactically ambiguous. But there is no syntactic ambiguity at the level
of lexical categories if they are expressed as in an ordinary CFG. The product of
10I did this deliberately to simplify the discussion as will become clear in this section.
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the optimal lexical parses obtained via Theorem 8.5 would then always yield two
sentential parses even though the situation 𝑢 in which 𝜇 is uttered may suffice
to disambiguate between them.
This incomplete disambiguation can be completed by adding sufficient detail
to the lexical categories so that the preposition with has two distinct representa-
tions rather than just one. These representations may be described as grammati-
cal roles: when the preposition attaches to the verb saw (or the verb phrase saw
the girl), the role is that of an instrument, and when the preposition attaches
to the noun girl, the role is that of accompaniment. Such roles and other refine-
ments of lexical categories arise naturally in feature-based grammars of the kind
described in Shieber (1986) and Steedman (2001).
Here are some examples of feature structures from Shieber (1986: Chapter 3):
[cat: NP]⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
cat: NP
agreement:
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
number: singular
person: third
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Here the first feature structure is just our plain vanilla category of a noun
phrase. The second one shows the added feature of agreement. The value of this
second feature is itself a feature structure with features number and person and
corresponding values singular and third. This means the noun phrase is singular
and third person and would have to combine with an appropriate category and
feature structure to form a larger expression. The first feature structure above
carries less information than the second about the noun phrase in question and is
said to subsume the latter, leading to a natural lattice structure.The second, more
informative feature structure also shows how feature structures can possess a
nesting relationship.
In our example of the two roles for the preposition with, we could define the
following two different feature structures for such words:
[role: instrument]
[role: accompaniment]
These different structures would differentiate syntactically between the two uses
of the preposition at the lexical level as required.
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Feature structures can be and often are as finely articulated at the lexical level
as required. This feature-based way of describing a context-free grammar then
allows all syntactic ambiguities to be represented at the lexical level and so the
“lexical computations” of Theorem 8.5 – 𝑧⋆ = argmax𝑧 𝑃(𝑧𝑘 ∣ 𝑧−𝑘 ; 𝑢) – suffice to
give us exactly one solution when warranted.
Even when the sentence is indefinitely long, as inA1 saw thatA2 saw that
… that A𝑛 saw the girl with a telescope for any 𝑛 ∈ ℕ, the features can be
recursively defined to allow an indefinite degree of differentiation at the lexical
level for different attachments of the preposition with so that the lexical compu-
tations of Theorem 8.5 can still go through as required. In other words, all that
is needed for the earlier results to hold is a sufficiently detailed feature-based
representation of the grammar 𝐺. This is the condition that was left implicit in
Section 8.1.
What happens when 𝐺 is not feature-based (or, in other words, the feature
structures are minimal) and there is a lack of differentiation at the lexical level
for sentences like 𝜇 and similar sentences? In that case, the compatibility of the
probability distribution as specified above will have to be generalized so that it
applies to nonlexical levels as well.
Assume there is an utterance of a sentence 𝜑 as before. 𝐾 = {1, 2,… , 𝑛, 𝑛 +
1,… , 2𝑛} is the set of semantic and syntactic indices of 𝑧𝑘 which stand for the
possible lexical meanings and parses of 𝜑 uttered in 𝑢. Let the index set 𝐾𝜑 ⊂ 𝐾 be
a variable set that ranges over the indices of the possiblemeanings and parses of 𝜑
at a lexical, phrasal, and sentential level. For example, in a simple sentence such as
“John loves Mary,” 𝐾𝜑 ∈ {{1},{2},{3},{2, 3},{1, 2, 3},{4},{5},{6},{5, 6},{4, 5,
6}} where the indices {1}, {2}, {3} correspond to the three semantic indices of the
three words in the sentence, the set {2, 3} corresponds to the semantic indices
of the phrase loves mary, the set {1, 2, 3} corresponds to the semantic indices
of the whole sentence, and the indices {4}, {5}, {6} correspond to the three syn-
tactic indices of the three words in the sentence, the set {5, 6} corresponds to
the syntactic indices of the phrase loves mary, the set {4, 5, 6} corresponds to
the syntactic indices of the whole sentence. Clearly, the range of variation of 𝐾𝜑
will be determined by each possible parse of 𝜑 and is thus determined by the
grammar 𝐺. If we write 𝐾 𝑙𝐺(𝜑) for this range for the 𝑙th parse out of 𝐿 possible
parses (e.g. 𝐾1𝐺(𝜑) = {{1},{2},{3},{2, 3},{1, 2, 3},{4},{5},{6},{5, 6},{4, 5, 6}}
for the simple example where 𝐿 = 1 possible parse), we can then say 𝐾𝜑 ∈ 𝐾 𝑙𝐺(𝜑)
for the 𝑙th of 𝐿 possible parses. That is, the index set 𝐾𝜑 is always a member of a
particular range of variation 𝐾 𝑙𝐺(𝜑) based on which parse is being considered.
Define 𝑧𝐾𝜑 = {𝑧𝑘 ∣ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝜑} and define 𝑧𝐾 ′𝜑 to be its complement with respect
to 𝐾 . Again, for the simple example above, if 𝐾𝜑 = {2, 3} then 𝑧𝐾𝜑 = {𝑧2, 𝑧3} and
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𝑧𝐾 ′𝜑 = {𝑧1, 𝑧4, 𝑧5, 𝑧6}. In this case, 𝑃(𝑧𝐾𝜑 ∣ 𝑧𝐾 ′𝜑 ; 𝑢) = 𝑃(𝑧2, 𝑧3 ∣ 𝑧1, 𝑧4, 𝑧5, 𝑧6; 𝑢). Like-
wise, if 𝐾𝜑 = {4, 5, 6} then 𝑧𝐾𝜑 = {𝑧4, 𝑧5, 𝑧6}, 𝑧𝐾 ′𝜑 = {𝑧1, 𝑧2, 𝑧3}, and 𝑃(𝑧𝐾𝜑 ∣ 𝑧𝐾 ′𝜑 ; 𝑢)= 𝑃(𝑧4, 𝑧5, 𝑧6 ∣ 𝑧1, 𝑧2, 𝑧3; 𝑢).
While the two paragraphs above are notationally cumbersome, the basic idea
is very simple. Earlier, we found just the lexical level adequate when the grammar
was feature-based. When it is not, we need to access the indices at a phrasal and
sentential level as well so that the computations of Theorem 8.5 can be extended
to nonlexical levels in a way that provides a generalized notion of compatibility.
What the more general statement of Theorem 8.7 requires is to run through the
relevant indices at phrasal and sentential levels as well and the indices that are
relevant at such levels are the ones that are dictated by the possible parses being
considered.
Theorem 8.7. Given an utterance and its locutionary global game (with symmet-
ric payoffs), when the relevant grammar is not feature-based, its lexical meanings
and parses are given by the following equivalent characterizations:
(9) 𝑧⋆ = argmax
𝑧
𝑃(𝑧𝐾𝜑 ∣ 𝑧𝐾 ′𝜑 ; 𝑢) = argmax𝑧 𝑃(𝑧; 𝑢), 𝐾𝜑 ∈ 𝐾 𝑙𝐺(𝜑), 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿
When there is more than one solution, each solution is given an equal probabil-
ity.11 Themeaning and parse of the whole utterance can be obtained by appropri-
ately computing the products of the lexical, phrasal, or sentential meanings and
parses.
I urge the reader to mentally run through the more complex computations in-
volved with this extended idea of compatibility. Notice that the term
argmax
𝑧
𝑃(𝑧𝐾𝜑 ∣ 𝑧𝐾 ′𝜑 ; 𝑢)
in Equation 9 does not involve any mixed semantic-syntactic products whereas
the term argmax𝑧 𝑃(𝑧; 𝑢) does so that there is still a reduction in computational
effort by the equality of the two. If we call indefinitely articulated feature-based
grammars complex and ordinary context-free grammars simple and if we call the
lexical computations of Theorem 8.5 simple and the generalized computations
of Theorem 8.7 complex, then there is a nice and intuitive inverse relationship
between grammars and computations that follows from these two theorems. Let
the grammar of a language be 𝐺 and the corresponding computations of optimal
meanings and parses be 𝜅.
11Again, by Theorem 8.4, a solution always exists.
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Theorem 8.8. 𝐺 and 𝜅 are inversely related in their complexity: when𝐺 is simple,
𝜅 is complex, and when 𝐺 is complex, 𝜅 is simple.
For the rest of the book, I will assumewe have a sufficiently articulated feature-
based grammar𝐺 and that the computations 𝜅 are therefore simple. In Chapter 9,
I will attend to an example of syntactic ambiguity in detail, something I have
not addressed so far but there all the ambiguities will be present at the lexical
level itself so that issues of the kind raised by sentences like 𝜇 will not arise.
For the present, we have to complete our discussion of our primary example
𝜑 = bill ran and I return to this below.
8.4 Solving Generation Games
As we saw in Section 7.3 and Figure 7.8, the speaker may consider more than one
sentence and therefore more than one locutionary global game. Each such game
has a value 𝑣A𝑢 [𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑)] = 𝑎A + 𝑎A. Likewise, each corresponding illocutionary
game will have some value and it is the total value 𝑣A𝑢 [𝐺𝑢(𝜑)] that is computed.
Each global game 𝐺𝑢(𝜑) comes with a cost 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑) and so the net value to A,
𝑣A𝑢 (𝜑) = 𝑣A𝑢 [𝐺𝑢(𝜑)]−𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑), is determined.Then, the sentence with the highest
net value is chosen.
The cost 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑) is a crucial factor that controls what is actually uttered.12 In-
cidentally, considerations of cost are entirely absent in Lewis (1969) and also in
so-called cheap talk games in economics (e.g. Crawford & Sobel 1982; Farrell 1987;
1993; Farrell & Rabin 1996; Kartik 2009; Blume & Board 2013) and this is just one
reason why they are unsuitable for modeling linguistic communication.13 Cost
12I had first pointed this out in Parikh (1987b).
13The setup in Crawford and Sobel is that there is a sender and a receiver. The sender observes
a state which is equally likely to be either 0 or 1 (although the original account involves a
continuous state space). He then reports the state to the receiver either truthfully or not. The
receiver observes the report and makes a decision which can be any number. The receiver
prefers decisions that are closest to the value of the state and the sender prefers decisions that
are closest to the state plus a bias 𝑏 > 0.
There are two ways to view such a setup. The shared language between sender and receiver
either does not constrain interpretation at all or contains expressions that have only single
conventional meanings but then allows any interpretation.
Consider the first option. Suppose the sender observes a 0 and sends a 0. The receiver can
interpret this expression “0” as either 0 or 1. This means there is no shared conventional mean-
ing that the expression has that constrains its possible interpretations the way the word “bank”
limits its possible locutionary interpretations to either financial institution or land alongside a
river. In other words, the expression “0” is implicitly taken to be conventionally meaningless.
That is, the whole language (in this case, just “0” and “1”) has no conventional meanings and
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is based on a variety of factors, mostly objective ones such as the length and
complexity of the sentence and the effort required to mentally process it and
to physically produce it but also subjective ones especially related to the conse-
quences of making certain information explicit and leaving certain information
implicit.
It is possible that the primary decision is between what to make explicit or
leave implicit and objective factors such as length, complexity, and mental and
physical effort play a relatively smaller role. Conversational style, habits of
speech, special contexts of speech and writing (e.g. poetry and fiction and nonfic-
tion), and other aesthetic aspects are one factor that affect this primary decision
and different communities and individuals may follow different patterns in how
much is made explicit. This is a matter for sociolinguists and psycholinguists to
dig deeper into.
A second dimension involves the maintaining or altering of relationships as
pointed out by Pinker et al. (2008) based on the Politeness Theory of Brown &
Levinson (1987) and referred to in Section 5.2.14 This factor is extremely impor-
tant and plays a role not only in how some content is communicated but even in
its expressions can convey anything at all. As a result, whenever the sender has to convey a
content, he can use any expression in the whole language.
Consider the second option for viewing the setup. Here, the expression “0” always has only
the single conventional meaning 0 but this conventional meaning can be a springboard for
any further interpretation, 0 or 1. Therefore, any expression can again be used to convey any
content via a single conventional meaning and the whole language is again always available.
Whichever way the setup is viewed, such models do not investigate how a particular mean-
ing arises from potentially ambiguous expressions that have a fixed set of conventional mean-
ings. As Myerson (1989: 265) rightly observes, such models treat (literal) meaning as endoge-
nous to the setup rather than exogenous. The Semantic Constraint (i.e. the Conventional and
Referential Constraints) mentioned in Section 7.3 which allows an expression (e.g. “bank”) to
be conventionally ambiguous is therefore missed altogether. It is this constraint that restricts
the possible interpretations that are then disambiguated by the Flow Constraint. This is why
the whole language is never available to the speaker when he wishes to convey a particular
content.
The real question in linguistic communication is not about the conditions under which
“bank” will be treated as having a single meaning rather than having no shared meaning (the
first option) or as conveying some meaning other than its single conventional meaning (the
second option) but is about the conditions under which one of its shared conventional mean-
ings (e.g. either financial institution or land alongside a river) will prevail. See also Section 3.2
on the utility of conventional meanings. I believe more recent work such as Dewatripont &
Tirole (2005) that considers costly communication has the same limitations.
14Pinker et al. study this problem from a similar angle but use a different, somewhat ad hoc setup
in their explanations. They seem to conclude that indirect speech is used only when there
is a risk of some kind of penalty (as in overtly or covertly bribing a police officer) or some
kind of awkwardness in the relationship (as in directly or indirectly bribing the maître d’ of a
restaurant) or an alteration of a relationship (as in overtly or covertlymaking a sexual overture).
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the choice of what content to communicate. In other words, it affects both the
Content Selection Game and the Generation Game and I will be examining how
it enters into content selection in Sections 8.6 and 18.2 and Chapter 11. In Gener-
ation Games, if a sentence is too explicit or too implicit, it will incur a cost and
this may lead to its rejection owing to more suitable sentences. The utterance
situation 𝑢 obviously plays a pivotal role in this evaluation.
For example, suppose Bill Smith is not just amutual acquaintance of the two in-
terlocutors but is also someone B holds in high regard. Then in order to please B,A may choose to be more deferential and utter 𝜑′ = bill smith ran rather than
𝜑 = bill ran. This would be so even though 𝜑′ is slightly longer and possibly
stylistically too formal. This is because the higher cost due to greater length and
formality is offset by the reduction in cost due to A’s managing to please B by
his show of deference. Overall, 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑) > 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑′) and therefore 𝑣A𝑢 (𝜑) < 𝑣A𝑢 (𝜑′)
because 𝑣A𝑢 [𝐺𝑢(𝜑)] = 𝑣A𝑢 [𝐺𝑢(𝜑′)] in this instance, and so 𝜑′ would be uttered,
not 𝜑. This shows how factors like maintaining relationships and politeness to-
ward one’s interlocutors may alter the choice of sentence to convey even the
same content 𝜎 . Indeed, a great deal about the use and even existence of hon-
orifics and other such behavior can be explained in just this way. The example
just discussed involves greater explicitness but greater implicitness may also be
warranted in other situations where something like, say, a sexual overture has
to be handled delicately or indirectly.
There is at least a third important dimension to what is made explicit. This is
the avoidance of error in contexts where error can be costly. If a sentence leaves
too much implicit, the addressee may infer the wrong content and this may lead
to an undesired action and outcome. In the example at hand, it may notmatter too
much to A if B interpreted 𝜑 = bill ran as being about Bill Jones instead of Bill
Smith or about running in a race instead of in the local election or both because
they are involved in a casual conversation andmisunderstandings could be easily
Theyoverlook the fact that indirect speech is also used for themostmundane reasons: to reduce
effort. And, contrary to their point about the role of common knowledge in influencing indirect
speech (i.e. a direct statement becomes common knowledge whereas indirect speech doesn’t),
a great deal of indirect speech does in fact become common knowledge: “can you pass the salt?”
or “would you like to join me for coffee?” uttered in appropriate contexts. It is the cancelability
or defeasibility of indirect speech that makes people resort to it when, for example, they make
a sexual overture because it allows an escape route. One can deny the overture even though
it has become common knowledge. Of course, there are many cases where an overture may
be merely suggested rather than communicated, in which case it does not become common
knowledge. In either case, the overture can be canceled and this is what makes it relatively safe.
All of this depends on (a “thick description” of) the context. Once again, see Gilbert Ryle’s 1971
university lectures and especially Clifford Geertz (1973).
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corrected. But suppose that it did matter toA. Then he might prefer to utter alter-
native sentences such as 𝜑′ = bill smith ran or 𝜑″ = bill ran in the election
or even 𝜑‴ = bill smith ran in the election. Howmight such a preference for
a longer sentence requiring more physical effort, however small, be determined?
That is, how does the speaker decide whenmistakes matter and when they don’t?
In circumstances where errors count, the overall cost 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑) of a shorter, less
explicit sentence will be relatively high despite its shorter length and so its net
value 𝑣A𝑢 (𝜑) = 𝑣A𝑢 [𝐺𝑢(𝜑)] − 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑) will go down. This higher cost component
in 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑) arises by considering the wrong actions the addressee might pursue
by inferring an erroneous content. In other words, it is possible to look at the
Content Selection Game in Section 7.2, see what payoff is delivered in it if the
intended action 𝑎 is pursued by the addressee (e.g. 𝑣A), and compare this payoff
with the diminished payoff that would be realized if an undesired action 𝑎″ –
something like acceptance of an erroneous interpretation – were chosen (e.g.
𝑣″A).15 The difference between the two (i.e. 𝑣A − 𝑣″A) would give one the cost of
error. This error would occur with some probability, say 𝑞, and so the new cost
𝐾A𝑢 (𝜑) = (1−𝑞)𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑)+𝑞[𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑)+(𝑣A−𝑣″A)] = 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑)+𝑞(𝑣A−𝑣″A) > 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑)
when 𝑞 > 0 and 𝑣A − 𝑣″A > 0. This is just an average of the old cost without error
and the old cost with error and is greater than the old cost without error. This
higher cost could tip the balance in favor of a longer, more complex sentence
that is more explicit, as there would be a negligible possibility of error with such
sentences.
This makes it clear that mistakes count when 𝑣A − 𝑣″A ≫ 0 or when 𝑞 ≫ 0
or both. In the example as described, 𝑣A − 𝑣″A ≫̸ 0 because a misunderstanding
would be just mildly annoying and can be easily rectified. Also, 𝑞 ≫̸ 0 because,
as I showed, the different locutionary games 𝑔1 and 𝑔2 reinforce each other’s
equilibrium meanings (viz. 𝜎1 = Bill Smith for 𝑔1 and 𝜎2 = ran in an election for
𝑔2) which makes the likelihood of error small. As neither factor is significant,
the overall cost 𝐾A𝑢 (𝜑) = 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑)+ 𝑞(𝑣A − 𝑣″A) ≈ 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑) and so the speaker does
not need to reconsider the short sentence 𝜑 = bill ran. Notice that the actual
calculation involved is extremely simple as just the product 𝑞(𝑣A − 𝑣″A) has to
be evaluated and added to the cost if it is significant. Again, this is well within
the psycholinguistic grasp of the speaker and can be carried out in milliseconds
without materially altering the time for a person to generate a sentence.
There are situations where the added cost will be significant. To take Benz’s
(2012) example, if there are two doctors that John might be seeing and he has
to be picked up, it may not be enough to say “Please pick up John at the doc-
tor’s” as the identity of the doctor has been left implicit. This is so even though
15As should be clear, this undesired action 𝑎″ has not been explicitly represented in Figure 7.1.
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the speaker may be more likely to be referring to a particular doctor and this is
common knowledge. While it is possible for the addressee to infer which doc-
tor is intended in such circumstances, the cost of error is high because going to
the wrong location to pick up John is very undesirable (i.e. 𝑣A − 𝑣″A ≫ 0). The
probability of error 𝑞 will depend on how much higher the relevant prior proba-
bility corresponding to the intended doctor is than the one corresponding to the
unintended doctor in the locutionary game corresponding to the noun phrase
“the doctor’s.” If the former is close to 1, 𝑞 will be small, but if it is close to 0.5,
𝑞 will be large. Whatever the value of 𝑞, the cost of error will be high owing to
𝑣A − 𝑣″A ≫ 0 and so the speaker will usually take the trouble to spell out which
doctor is intended explicitly. This means that the speaker will instead utter some-
thing like “Please pick up John at Dr. X’s” which is perhaps a little costlier from
a cognitive point of view as something more specific has to be processed, which
takes more effort.
To be sure, agents are finite and partially rational and so they may not always
carry out the additional calculations on every occasion where they are required.
As ambiguity is rife in natural language, there could be errors in interpreting
practically every word of an utterance and certainly this would be far too bur-
densome computationally. Perhaps some possibilities of error are processed at a
more conscious level (e.g. those directly related to the addressee’s action in the
Content Selection Game which in turn is related to the conversational goal) and
it is only such potential errors that are averted. So, even though I went through
the calculations above for possible misinterpretations with 𝜑 = bill ran, the am-
biguities in these words in the circumstances described are likely to be handled
nonconsciously by both agents and so no error-related calculations are likely to
be carried out at all. In the case of the two doctors, the error calculations are
likely as this is a possibility that would be semiconscious if not fully conscious.
Such issues can be tested empirically to determine when speakers speak more
explicitly and when not.
If some possible misinterpretation is inadvertently missed by the speaker or
if mistaken estimates for 𝑣A − 𝑣″A and 𝑞 are used accidentally, the addressee
might notice the possible misinterpretation in the Interpretation Game and ask
for a clarification. Such clarifications are not a regular part of the original com-
munication as Benz suggests: they are new utterances in their own right and
can take a variety of forms and so cannot be included as mere “feedback” as they
need to be disambiguated and interpreted themselves.Why are clarifications trig-
gered?There could be a number of causes: the addresseemay infer an unexpected
meaning (e.g. Bill Jones ran in an election) because she selects the wrong prior
probabilities owing to a miscommunication, or she needs to be certain in order
to carry out her action in the Content Selection Game because the locutionary
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game results in a mixed strategy solution or because an error would be costly (i.e.
𝑣B − 𝑣″B ≫ 0 or her probability of error 𝑞B ≫ 0 or both).
Benz also misses the other two possibilities: neither party may notice poten-
tial misinterpretations and the communication may go through smoothly as in-
tended (such as going to the right location to pick up John even though it was left
implicit) or an undesirable outcome can occur (such as going to the wrong loca-
tion to pick up John).16 Benz overcompensates for errors and attempts to build a
model that eliminates them completely. But this is unrealistic because mistakes
can and do occur. Curiously, he does not apply his own “error model” to look
at how speakers might be more explicit but confines his attention to whether
“clarification requests” are generated. The key lack in his model is that there is
no estimate of the magnitude of error as a trigger either for more explicit sen-
tences or for clarifications, there is just the intuitive recognition that errors can
occur because communication is probabilistic. There is, in other words, no actual
model of error in his error model. This leads to the prediction that practically ev-
ery utterance will result in “clarification requests” from addressees, even when
they are intuitively not warranted. Nevertheless, Benz’s observation about the
possibility of error in communication, first noted by Zaefferer (1977), is impor-
tant, even though both Zaefferer and Benz focus exclusively on interpretation
whereas its most important impact is on how it compels speakers to be relatively
more explicit in some aspects of their utterances in certain circumstances.17
16The real-life case of Derek Bentley involving an armed robbery in the UK in 1952 where Bentley
may have uttered the ambiguous “Let him have it, Chris” to his accomplice is cited by Carston
(2008) in a different context. The utterance is ambiguous between shoot the police officer and
give the police officer your gun. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derek_Bentley_case. It is not
known whether Bentley actually uttered this sentence and, if he did, what he might have
meant.
17There are other issues with Benz’s (2012) model but I cannot go into them here as it would
require a detailed description of his model and would be a digression. One point is worth men-
tioning: he overlooks the fact that the prior probabilities in a game of partial information have
to do with what the speaker intends to convey and not directly with the probability of the
content as such. In the example of the doctor, the addressee may have to impute priors of 0.5
each (roughly, if fuzzy or interval probabilities are allowed) for the two doctors as there might
be no way of telling which one is intended on a particular occasion regardless of the fact that
John frequents one of them more than the other. This latter fact can inform the probability
estimate as part of the overall situation (see Section 10.4 for related considerations) but can-
not be identified directly with the probability estimate. If after everything is considered an
equiprobable prior distribution is selected, it would lead to a mixed strategy solution and the
addressee would not know with certainty where to go to pick up John. That is, the payoff the
speaker would receive from the locutionary game for the implicit utterance of “Please pick up
John at the doctor’s” would be reduced and this would further diminish the net value of the
sentence 𝑣A𝑢 (𝜑) = 𝑣A𝑢 [𝐺𝑢(𝜑)]− 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑) thereby favoring a more explicit sentence with a pure
strategy solution and higher overall net value. In such situations, not only does the cost go up
but the value of the game goes down, both leading to a lower net value.
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This completes my discussion of how Generation Games are solved. As I have
said in my earlier books, a comprehensive theory of cost is required but it is
doubtful it can be easily erected as the relevant costs have many sources in gen-
eral. Cost enters both in the choice of sentence which occurs in the Generation
Game outside the global games for each sentence and it enters also within the
global games via Theorem 8.6 that allows for non-symmetric payoffs. However,
in particular contexts it is usually straightforward to know what costs to assign
as is evident from the example of the doctor above as well as from the examples
discussed in Section 12.2. So it could be said that Equilibrium Semantics does
offer a more or less complete locutionary theory modulo costs which can be as-
signed on a case by case basis just as with the prior probabilities. In any case,
while the task is difficult, it is not insurmountable. I have identified practically
all the major sources of cost in the foregoing and it is just a matter of tackling
them one by one. I have also made plausible when costs are likely to be relatively
high or low, which means it is just a matter of assigning appropriate magnitudes
to them so that they can all be suitably combined.
I believe that treating natural language communication as cheap talk has been
a red herring. Also, without costs, everything would be expressed explicitly,
which is absurd. It is possibly because economists have been more concerned
with eliminating superfluous equilibria in economic settings that they have been
led to ignore some of the issues involved in linguistic communication. We could
now consider this motivating problem of economics – how to oust unwanted
equilibria in economic games – and see how these aspects of language can help
their goals. How, for example, do the right choices emerge in the job market sig-
naling situation studied by Spence (1973) when costly but beneficial interviews
are part of the game?
However, my concern is with language, and language is truly rich not just in
the quantitative sense assumed in cheap talk games but especially in the logical
and rhetorical devices it affords that enable us to persuade one another of our
beliefs and desires. But these resources do not come cheap, they come with costs
and benefits.
I repeat that I have looked at just the speaker’s key decision about what to
make explicit and what to leave implicit and have not modeled exactly how the
actual words are selected together with their order and structure and pronunci-
ation.
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Having solved the locutionary global game 𝐿𝐺(𝜑) and therefore the Interpreta-
tion Game 𝑈𝐺𝑢(𝜑) = 𝑈𝐺𝑢 , and the Generation Game 𝐺𝐺(𝜎) = 𝐺𝐺𝑢 , this leaves
just the Content Selection Game 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 in the overall Communication Game Γ𝑢 =(𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐺𝐺𝑢(𝜎), 𝑈𝐺𝑢(𝜑), 𝐺𝑢(𝜑)) = (𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐺𝐺𝑢 , 𝑈𝐺𝑢 , 𝐺𝑢).18 The Set-
ting Game 𝑆𝐺𝑢 does not need to be solved explicitly as the content conveyed by
the speaker and the action taken by the addressee will automatically contribute
to its solution. In the example at hand, as mentioned in Section 7.5, 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 is
trivial as there is just one action 𝑎 that B can select in response to the interpre-
tation 𝜎 = 𝜎 ℓ ⊙ 𝜎 𝜄 = Bill Smith ran in the local election derived from the global
game. The parse tree 𝑡 figures only in the latter and, as I said in Section 3.2, the
purpose grammatical structure serves is to facilitate communication by making
disambiguation easier.
It is worth going back to the chart displayed in Sections 3.1 and 7.7.
Utterance Situation
Setting Game
→ A’s wish to elicit some response from B
→ Content Selection Game
→ A’s equilibrium content
→ Generation Game
→ A’s equilibrium utterance
→ Interpretation Game
→ B’s equilibrium content
→ Content Selection Game
→ B’s equilibrium response
→ Back to the Setting Game
Now, all the lines above involving various equilibria have been filled in. In other
words, we have solved the Communication Game Γ𝑢 completely. The example
considered was a very simple one but it allowed us to see all the moving parts
involved in micro-semantics.
As I promised in Section 7.2, I will now look at a slightlymore complex Content
Selection Game.
18I remind the reader again that the illocutionary global game component of the global game
will be addressed in Part IV.
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8.6 An expanded Content Selection Game
In Section 7.2, I mentioned the possibility that B could have a choice between
accepting and rejecting what A conveys. This leads to another branch issuing
from the intermediate node in Figure 7.1 labeled 𝑎′ and corresponding payoffs
𝑣′A, 𝑣′B . If 𝑣A = 𝑣′A, it means A does not care whether B accepts or rejects his
communication. In this case, there is nothing more to be done except that, onceB has interpreted A’s utterance as before, she will have a choice between 𝑎 and
𝑎′ and will choose the action that yields the greater payoff, either 𝑣B or 𝑣′B . For
example, if B is inclined to be skeptical about A’s information, she may have
𝑣′B > 𝑣B and may reject 𝜎 . Now, if 𝑣A > 𝑣′A rather than 𝑣A = 𝑣′A, then A would
care about B’s acceptance and may strive to be more persuasive in imparting
his content. One way for him to do this is to convey some additional supporting
content that, say, he read 𝜎 in a newspaper, which might give B a reason to
believe him.19 Let 𝜎 plus this additional supporting information be 𝜎 ′. This leads
to a new action for A represented by a new branch issuing from 𝑠 labeled 𝜎 ′.
This makes the overall tree structure of the game more complex, as shown in
Figure 8.9.
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Figure 8.9: An expanded Content Selection Game
In this game, as assumed in the previous paragraph, 𝑣A > 𝑣′A but 𝑣′B > 𝑣B so
there is a certain degree of conflict between A and B. If A chooses 𝜎 , B would
prefer 𝑎′ or rejection, and if A chooses the costlier 𝜎 ′, B would choose 𝑎 or ac-
ceptance. In other words, the distribution of the payoffs – notice that 𝑣′B and 𝑣B
have been switched in the lower half of the tree and A would like B to choose
𝑎 with either choice of content – is such that B’s equilibrium action is 𝑎′ in the
19See Cialdini (2006), for example.
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upper half of the tree and 𝑎 in the lower half of the tree, soA is compelled to con-
vey 𝜎 ′ rather than 𝜎 . That is, the equilibrium path in this game is (𝜎 ′, 𝑎) where
the first member of the pair isA’s equilibrium action and the second is B’s. This
means A is willing to convey more information in order to win B’s acceptance
and this additional information comes at an additional cost because it has either
to be converted into a second sentence in the Generation Game or somehow con-
veyed as an implicature. As set up, the situation 𝑢 does not make it easy to convey
this information as an implicature – additional assumptions would be required –
and so a longer sentence than 𝜑 = bill ran or a second sentence would have to
be uttered by A. It can safely be assumed that this additional cost of processing
and speaking a little more is smaller than 𝑣A − 𝑣′A, the gain in utility A receives
from acceptance by B. Even though 𝜎 and 𝜎 ′ are invisible, they have been made
perceptible via the linkage of the Content Selection Game with the Generation
Game and the Interpretation Game.
This example shows how and why conflict, that is, slightly misaligned payoffs,
and related features of the Content Selection Game can lead a speaker to utter a
longer and costlier sentence or two. I pointed out in Sections 3.1 and 5.2 that the
maxims of Quantity and Manner do not work as Grice had envisaged because a
speaker may be driven to convey additional information beyond what is strictly
required and utter more than the most perspicuous choice of sentence in order
to succeed at his endeavor to evoke a desired response from the addressee.
Content Selection Games can get even more complex and I will describe two
such examples, one in Chapter 11 and the other in Section 18.2. As can be seen,
even this example introduced strongly evaluative dimensions of action of the
kind broached by Taylor (1985/1999) and discussed in Section 6.1 because mat-
ters involving the relationship between A and B come into play. Indeed, just
as many potentially conflicting factors ranging over aesthetic, relational, and
error aspects were all assimilated into a single cost 𝑘A𝑢 (𝜑) in Section 8.4, so a
very wide spectrum of cooperative and conflictual relationship-related elements
all enter into the payoffs and prior probabilities of the Content Selection Game.
That is, a very wide array of relationships is packed into relatively few numerical
slots. Such relational features can be purely psychological or sociological or even
anthropological.
For example, the reason why B is inclined to be skeptical about A’s informa-
tion could be almost anything:A is a known fibber orB is overly cautious or does
not wish to be easily influenced or A has a vested interest in the information or
they are themselves both members of certain political parties or whatever. But
all these possibilities lead just to B’s skepticism and to 𝑣′B > 𝑣B , that is all. This
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shows that the utterance situation can easily encompass much richer and more
realistic and more nuanced scenarios of the kind we encounter every day.
What the apparatus of a Communication Game does, in and through the Set-
ting Game, Content Selection Game, Generation Game, and Interpretation Game,
is to offer a way to reduce the great diversity of human and social phenomena to a
few numbers and inequalitieswithin a game-theoretic structure and therebymake
this variety scientifically manageable, as also argued in Chapter 6. For some, like
Taylor, this might appear reductionist and unacceptable but no relevant aspect
of the situation seems left out as far as predicting and explaining communicative
behavior is concerned. If a concrete feel for the situation is desired, then one does
have to return to the qualitative details of the situation. This is precisely the in-
terplay between abstract and concrete inquiry that is a necessary feature of the
social sciences as mentioned in Section 2.1.
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9.1 The example
In the simple example I have just finished analyzing, there was no syntactic ambi-
guity and so the syntactic games of partial informationwere all trivial. In order to
fully justify Theorem 8.5 in Section 8.1, I now consider an example with both se-
mantic and syntactic ambiguity. I will focus exclusively on the locutionary global
game 𝐿𝐺𝑢 in the overall Communication Game Γ𝑢 = (𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐺𝐺𝑢 , 𝑈𝐺𝑢 , 𝐺𝑢).
Suppose A is a reporter for the New York Times and writes the headline “Fed
raises interest” and B is a reader who reads the headline the next morning. Here
𝜑 is the whole sentence and 𝜑𝑖 its 𝑖th word. The situation 𝑢 includes the general
goings-on of the week and also related financial news.1
Intuitively, there are three possible meanings of this utterance, of which I will
consider two:
(10) the Federal Reserve augments the interest rate
(11) the Federal Reserve’s increments arouse curiosity
The second meaning seems improbable but is nevertheless a real possibility. The
third possible meaning – the Federal Reserve augments curiosity – will be ignored
here to keep things simple. If it is assumed as part of 𝑢 that there have been no
recent increases in the interest rate, the intended meaning of the reporter’s utter-
ance would be the first one above. As before, the utterance and its interpretation
involve four constraints:
• Phonetic Constraint
• Syntactic Constraint
• Semantic Constraint
• Flow Constraint
1I will be using the same symbols as before to avoid multiplying symbols unnecessarily.
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In general, the Phonetic Constraint generates all the possible words associated
with the speech wave corresponding to 𝜑 in 𝑢, the Syntactic Constraint gener-
ates all the possible parse trees of 𝜑 in 𝑢, and the Semantic Constraint generates
all the possible meanings associated with 𝜑 in 𝑢. The Flow Constraint then dis-
ambiguates all these ambiguities simultaneously and identifies the equilibrium
or intended content, that is, the words uttered, their parse, and their meaning.
As the example involves a written sentence, the Phonetic Constraint can be
omitted.There would be a corresponding Graphic Constraint that involves recog-
nizing the characters, but for our purposes it can just be assumed that the words
in the sentence 𝜑 are immediately available to B.
9.1.1 The Syntactic Constraint
The two possible parses of the whole sentence generated by an appropriate back-
ground grammar 𝐺 or algebraic system of trees (T , ⋆) are:2
• [S[NP[N Fed]][VP[V raises][NP[N interest]]]]
• [S[NP[N Fed][N raises]][VP[V interest]]]
It is the first parse above that is optimal as it corresponds to the first meaning
above. Thus, fed has two trees, raises has two trees, and interest has two trees.
The Syntactic Constraint gives us:
(12) fed:
• 𝜑1 ⟶ [NP[N Fed]] = 𝑡1
• 𝜑1 ⟶ [N Fed] = 𝑡′1
fed is a noun in both cases but in the first case it forms a noun phrase by itself
and in the second it forms a compound noun phrase with raises. In the first case,
it can be chained one level up to the NP level owing to a rule such as NP → N
whereas, in the second, no chaining is possible because the branch arising from
raises is encountered owing to a rule such as NP → N N.
(13) raises:
• 𝜑2 ⟶ [V raises] = 𝑡2
• 𝜑2 ⟶ [N raises] = 𝑡′2
2The grammar and algebraic system are naturally different from the ones in Sections 4.2 and
7.3. Also this sentence has a syntactic ambiguity at the lexical level itself so we do not need
recourse to the feature-based grammmars of Section 8.3.
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(14) interest:
• 𝜑3 ⟶ [NP[N interest]] = 𝑡3
• 𝜑3 ⟶ [VP[V interest]] = 𝑡′3
The Syntactic Constraint uses the elementary trees in (T , ⋆) to derive the
possible parses of each word, phrase, and the whole sentence. Earlier, there was
no syntactic ambiguity so there was just one syntactic content per word and for
the whole sentence; now, there are two syntactic contents for each word.
9.1.2 The Semantic Constraint
The Semantic Constraint consists of two subconstraints, the Conventional Con-
straint and the Referential Constraint. The first maps words into their conven-
tional meanings and the second maps each of these conventional meanings into
their potential referents relative to 𝑢.
Each word in 𝜑 has multiple conventional meanings. I will assume the first
word fed has just the one relevant conventional meaning and the latter two
words have just the two relevant conventional meanings each.3 Accordingly, the
Semantic Constraint gives us:
(15) fed:
• Referential Use: 𝜑1 ⟶𝑃𝜑1 𝑢⟶ the Federal Reserve = 𝜎1
(16) raises:
• Predicative Use: 𝜑2 ⟶𝑃𝜑21
𝑢⟶ augments = 𝜎2
• Referential Use: 𝜑2 ⟶𝑃𝜑22
𝑢⟶ increments4 = 𝜎 ′2
(17) interest:
• Referential Use: 𝜑3 ⟶𝑃𝜑31
𝑢⟶ interest rate = 𝜎3
• Predicative Use: 𝜑3 ⟶𝑃𝜑32
𝑢⟶ arouse curiosity = 𝜎 ′3
The intermediate conventional meanings are denoted by the various properties
𝑃𝜑𝑖𝑗 .
3This is just to keep the discussion simple without any loss of generality.
4This corresponds to a noun, not a verb.
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9.1.2.1 The Flow Constraint
The Flow Constraint gives us six lexical games, three semantic and three syntac-
tic, corresponding to the three words.
u r- r-
𝜌1
𝑠1 𝜑1 𝜎1 𝑎A, 𝑎B
Figure 9.1: Semantic lexical game 𝑔1
In Figure 9.1 showing the first semantic lexical game 𝑔1, 𝑠1 is the initial situa-
tion for thewriterA though it also includes the later facts about potential readers,
including B. The only action available to A in 𝑠1 is uttering 𝜑1 = fed and, since
there is only one possible meaning for fed, the addressee has just one possible
interpretation 𝜎1 as specified by the Semantic Constraint. When that action is
taken, it leads to the terminal situation at which two payoffs 𝑎A, 𝑎B are awarded
to the two interlocutors.
The initial symbol 𝜌1 represents the prior conditional probability that A is
conveying 𝜎1 given that he is conveying the othermeanings and parse trees of the
rest of the sentence in the utterance situation 𝑢 as we have seen before. In other
words, 𝜌1 = 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣ 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3; 𝑢) = 1 where the 𝑥𝑖 are variables standing for
the possible corresponding meanings 𝜎2, 𝜎 ′2 and 𝜎3, 𝜎 ′3 , and the 𝑦𝑖 are variables
standing for the possible corresponding parse trees 𝑡1, 𝑡′1 and 𝑡2, 𝑡′2 and 𝑡3, 𝑡′3.
The situation parameter 𝑢, which is not a random variable, also influences the
probability. Again, 𝜌1 is a function of the conditioning variables and parameter
but because there is just a single probability, its value is always 1 independent of
the values of the variables.
As before, this semantic lexical game 𝑔1 is obtained by applying the semantic
game map 𝑔𝑢 to the word 𝜑1. That is, 𝑔𝑢(𝜑1) = 𝑔1.
The syntactic game in Figure 9.2 is now a little more complex than before as
there are two possible contents rather than just one. Notice how all the primes
on the symbols work, especially symbols such as 𝑠′1′ and 𝜌′1′ where there is a
prime on the symbol and on the subscript. There is no easy way to avoid this and
once it is accepted, all the other symbols that arise flow naturally out of these
conventions.
In 𝑠′1 in Figure 9.2, the speaker is assumed to be conveying 𝑡1, although be-
cause 𝜑1 = fed is syntactically ambiguous between 𝑡1 and 𝑡′1, the addressee could
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Figure 9.2: Syntactic lexical game 𝑔′1
potentially interpret the word as having the parse 𝑡′1 as well. This choice is repre-
sented by two branches emanating from the upper intermediate situation inside
the information set, the elongated oval, rather than just one as we had in 𝑔1. The
payoffs for the two agents are 𝑎A and 𝑎B for making the right choice 𝑡1 as this is
whatA is conveying in 𝑠′1, and they are 𝑐A and 𝑐B for making the wrong choice 𝑡′1
as this is not whatA is conveying in 𝑠′1. The 𝑎 payoffs are therefore again greater
than the corresponding 𝑐 payoffs as they represent the correct interpretation byB.
In 𝑠′1′ in the lower half of 𝑔′1, a similar choice presents itself to the addressee
but this time the payoffs are reversed because in this hypothetical situation A is
conveying the other possible parse 𝑡′1. Again, the primed 𝑎 payoffs are greater
than the corresponding primed 𝑐 payoffs.
The prior probabilities are 𝜌′1 = 𝑃(𝑡1 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑦2, 𝑦3; 𝑢) and 𝜌′1′ = 𝑃(𝑡′1 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥2,
𝑥3, 𝑦2, 𝑦3; 𝑢) and these must sum to 1 as there are only two possible parse trees
the speaker could be conveying. Since these probabilities are also functions of the
conditioning variables and parameter 𝑢, there are different versions of essentially
the same game 𝑔′1 when, say, 𝑥3 or 𝑦2 take on different values. These versions
differ only in the numerical values of the prior conditioned probabilities; in all
other respects, they are identical.
This syntactic lexical game 𝑔′1 is obtained by applying the syntactic game map
𝑔′𝑢 to the word 𝜑1. That is, 𝑔′𝑢(𝜑1) = 𝑔′1.
As I have remarked before, Equilibrium Linguistics sees both meanings and
parse trees as different types of content communicated in an utterance and they
are treated analogously. All the possible meanings and all the possible parses
of an utterance codetermine one another to yield the equilibrium meaning and
parse. Not only does semantics reflect syntax as Frege believed, but syntax also
reflects semantics. Now, I show the next set of lexical games for the second word.
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Figure 9.3: Semantic lexical game 𝑔2
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Figure 9.4: Syntactic lexical game 𝑔′2
It should be relatively straightforward to interpret Figures 9.3 and 9.4. In 𝑠2 in
Figure 9.3, the speaker is conveying 𝜎2, although because 𝜑2 = raises is seman-
tically ambiguous as mentioned above, the addressee could potentially interpret
the word as conveying 𝜎 ′2 as well. As one would expect from the foregoing, this
choice is represented by two branches emanating from the intermediate situa-
tion rather than just one as we had in 𝑔1. The payoffs follow the same pattern as
in 𝑔′1.
In 𝑠2′ in the lower half of the same game, a similar choice presents itself to
the addressee but this time the payoffs are reversed because in this hypothetical
situation A is conveying the other possible meaning 𝜎 ′2 . Again, the primed 𝑎
payoffs are greater than the corresponding primed 𝑐 payoffs.
The prior probabilities by analogy with the earlier ones are 𝜌2 = 𝑃(𝜎2 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥3,
𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3; 𝑢) and 𝜌2′ = 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥3, 𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3; 𝑢) and these must sum to 1 as there
are only two possible meanings the speaker could be conveying. Since these prob-
abilities are also functions of the conditioning variables and parameter 𝑢, there
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are different versions of essentially the same game 𝑔2 when, say, 𝑥3 or 𝑦2 take on
different values.
The same kinds of choices and payoffs occur in Figure 9.4 except that this
time a syntactic ambiguity has to be resolved as in 𝑔′1. Now the prior conditional
probabilities are 𝜌′2 = 𝑃(𝑡2 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑦1, 𝑦3; 𝑢) and 𝜌′2′ = 𝑃(𝑡′2 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑦1, 𝑦3; 𝑢)
which must again sum to 1.
The games 𝑔2 and 𝑔′2 are obtained by applying the maps 𝑔𝑢 and 𝑔′𝑢 to 𝜑2. That
is, 𝑔𝑢(𝜑2) = 𝑔2 and 𝑔′𝑢(𝜑2) = 𝑔′2.
The third set of lexical games is shown in Figures 9.5 and 9.6.
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Figure 9.5: Semantic lexical game 𝑔3
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Figure 9.6: Syntactic lexical game 𝑔′3
By now, it should be very easy to interpret the diagrams. Again, 𝜑3 = interest
has two possible meanings and parse trees as discussed above and so the game
trees look similar to the ones for 𝜑2. Just for clarity, I mention that the prior
conditional probablities for 𝑔3 and 𝑔′3 are 𝜌3 = 𝑃(𝜎3 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3; 𝑢), 𝜌3′ =
𝑃(𝜎 ′3 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3; 𝑢) and 𝜌′3 = 𝑃(𝑡3 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑢), 𝜌′3′ = 𝑃(𝑡′3 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3,
𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑢), respectively, both sets of which must sum to 1.
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This completes the discussion of semantic and syntactic lexical games. The
next step is to look at the phrasal games that arise as a product of these lexi-
cal games. There are two nontrivial phrases, one in each parse, the verb phrase[VP[V raises][NP[N interest]]] in the first parse and the noun phrase [NP[N Fed][N raises]] in the second parse shown above. I will start with the semantic phrasal
game for the second phrase as it is the simplest. It is shown in Figure 9.7.
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Figure 9.7: Semantic phrasal game 𝑔12
As before, the tree diagram is a “product” of the trees of 𝑔1 and 𝑔2.5 Next, there
are two initial situations 𝑠12 = 𝑠1 ∪ 𝑠2 and 𝑠12′ = 𝑠1 ∪ 𝑠2′ . The latter situations 𝑠1, 𝑠2,
and 𝑠2′ are the initial situations of the two games 𝑔1 and 𝑔2 that are being mul-
tiplied. In other words, the initial situations of the product are derived from the
initial situations of the multiplicands as they should be and 1× 2 = 2 such combi-
nations are possible from one initial situation of 𝑔1 and two initial situations of
𝑔2.
The speaker’s utterance 𝜑1𝜑2 is a concatenation of the individual utterances
𝜑1 and 𝜑2 from 𝑔1 and 𝑔2. And the addressee’s possible actions are 𝜎1𝜎2 and
𝜎1𝜎 ′2 , where again the components are obtained from the respective games. As
before, the payoffs corresponding to the relevant branches in the multiplicands
are added to give the payoffs in the relevant branch of the product. For example,
the payoff forA in the topmost branch corresponding to the path 𝑠12, 𝜑1𝜑2, 𝜎1𝜎2
is 𝑎A + 𝑎A, which is the sum of the 𝑎A in 𝑔1 corresponding to the path 𝑠1, 𝜑1, 𝜎1
and the sum of the 𝑎A in 𝑔2 corresponding to the path 𝑠2, 𝜑2, 𝜎2.
Finally, the priors 𝜌12 = 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∣ 𝑥3, 𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3; 𝑢) and 𝜌12′ = 𝑃(𝜎1, 𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑥3, 𝑦1,
𝑦2, 𝑦3; 𝑢) which must sum to 1. Again, it should be easy to see how these proba-
bilities are generated from the corresponding probabilities in the multiplicands
5The game tree product is, of course, different from the parse tree product described earlier in
Section 4.2.
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𝑔1 and 𝑔2where the priors are 𝜌1 = 𝑃(𝜎1 ∣ 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3; 𝑢) and 𝜌2 = 𝑃(𝜎2 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥3,
𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3; 𝑢), 𝜌2′ = 𝑃(𝜎 ′2 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥3, 𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3; 𝑢).
The product game 𝑔12 = 𝑔1 ⊗ 𝑔2 can also be obtained directly by applying the
semantic map 𝑔𝑢 to the phrase 𝜑1 ○ 𝜑2. In other words, 𝑔12 ≡ 𝑔𝑢(𝜑1 ○ 𝜑2) =
𝑔𝑢(𝜑1) ⊗ 𝑔𝑢(𝜑2) ≡ 𝑔1 ⊗ 𝑔2.
Turning to the corresponding syntactic game, recall that the two trees of fed
are 𝑡1 = [NP[N Fed]] and 𝑡′1 = [N Fed], and the two trees of raises are 𝑡2 =[VP[V raises]] and 𝑡′2 = [N raises]. This means there are four potential parses of
the phrase 𝜑1𝜑2:
𝑡1 ⋆ 𝑡2 = [NP[N Fed]] ⋆ [V raises] = 𝑡0
𝑡1 ⋆ 𝑡′2 = [NP[N Fed]] ⋆ [N raises] = 𝑡0
𝑡′1 ⋆ 𝑡2 = [N Fed] ⋆ [V raises] = 𝑡0
𝑡′1 ⋆ 𝑡′2 = [N Fed] ⋆ [N raises] = [NP[N Fed][N raises]] = 𝑡1′2′
The only nonzero product corresponding to fed raises is the compound noun
under an assumed grammatical rule like NP → N N or, equivalently, a tree such
as [NP[N ][N ]] which would left multiply 𝑡′1 and then 𝑡′2 as follows:
𝑡′1 ⋆ 𝑡′2 = [N Fed] ⋆ [N raises]= ([NP[N ][N ]] ⊲ [N Fed]) ⊲ [N raises]= [NP[N Fed][N ]] ⊲ [N raises]= [NP[N Fed][N raises]]= 𝑡1′2′
Notice how the primes on 𝑡1′2′ work: we need to prime both subscripts 1 and 2
as the corresponding subscripts on both the multiplicands are primed. A product
such as 𝑡1 ⋆ 𝑡′2 = 𝑡12′ = 𝑡0 and likewise with the other products as there are
presumably no rules that correspond to such products in 𝐺.
The resulting syntactic phrasal game is shown in Figure 9.8.
This product should be straightforward to interpret. It follows the same pattern
as Figure 9.7. For example, there are four initial nodes as there are two initial
nodes 𝑠′1, 𝑠′1′ in 𝑔′1 and two initial nodes 𝑠′2, 𝑠′2′ in 𝑔′2 and 2×2 = 4. These situations
are the corresponding unions of the initial situations of the multiplicands, and
so on with the rest of the entities. We have again 𝑔′12 ≡ 𝑔′𝑢(𝜑1 ○ 𝜑2) = 𝑔′𝑢(𝜑1) ⊗′
𝑔′𝑢(𝜑2) ≡ 𝑔′1 ⊗′ 𝑔′2.
There is a similar semantic phrasal game 𝑔23 ≡ 𝑔𝑢(𝜑2○𝜑3) = 𝑔𝑢(𝜑2)⊗𝑔𝑢(𝜑3) ≡
𝑔2⊗𝑔3 with 2×2 = 4 initial nodes as can be seen from Figures 9.3 and 9.5. Likewise,
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𝑠′1′2′
𝑠′1′2
𝑠′12′
𝑠′12
𝜌′1′2′
𝜌′1′2
𝜌′12′
𝜌′12
𝜑1𝜑2
𝜑1𝜑2
𝜑1𝜑2
𝜑1𝜑2
𝑡1𝑡2
𝑡1𝑡2
𝑡1𝑡2
𝑡1𝑡2
𝑡1𝑡′2
𝑡1𝑡′2
𝑡1𝑡′2
𝑡1𝑡′2
𝑡′1𝑡2
𝑡′1𝑡2
𝑡′1𝑡2
𝑡′1𝑡2
𝑡′1𝑡′2
𝑡′1𝑡′2
𝑡′1𝑡′2
𝑡′1𝑡′2
𝑎′A + 𝑎′A, 𝑎′B + 𝑎′B
𝑎′A + 𝑐′A, 𝑎′B + 𝑐′B
𝑐′A + 𝑎′A, 𝑐′B + 𝑎′B
𝑐′A + 𝑐′A, 𝑐′B + 𝑐′B
𝑎′A + 𝑐A, 𝑎′B + 𝑐B
𝑎′A + 𝑎A, 𝑎′B + 𝑎B
𝑐′A + 𝑐A, 𝑐′B + 𝑐B
𝑐′A + 𝑎A, 𝑐′B + 𝑎B
𝑐A + 𝑎′A, 𝑐B + 𝑎′B
𝑐A + 𝑐′A, 𝑐B + 𝑐′B
𝑎A + 𝑎′A, 𝑎B + 𝑎′B
𝑎A + 𝑐′A, 𝑎B + 𝑐′B
𝑐A + 𝑐A, 𝑐B + 𝑐B
𝑐A + 𝑎A, 𝑐B + 𝑎B
𝑎A + 𝑐A, 𝑎B + 𝑐B
𝑎A + 𝑎A, 𝑎B + 𝑎B
Figure 9.8: Syntactic phrasal game 𝑔′12
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there is a four initial node syntactic phrasal game 𝑔′23 ≡ 𝑔′𝑢(𝜑2 ○ 𝜑3) = 𝑔′𝑢(𝜑2) ⊗′
𝑔′𝑢(𝜑3) ≡ 𝑔′2 ⊗′ 𝑔′3 as can be seen from Figures 9.4 and 9.6. In the case of the latter
game, it should be possible to see by inspection that the only nonzero parse tree
product is 𝑡2⋆𝑡3 corresponding to the verb phrase [VP[V raises][NP[N interest]]].
I will not tarry to draw these games.
The next two games are the semantic and syntactic sentential games corre-
sponding to the sentence 𝜑1𝜑2𝜑3. Both games can be obtained in either of two
ways. For the syntactic sentential game, we stipulate that 𝑔′123 = 𝑔′1 ⊗′ 𝑔′23 =
𝑔′12 ⊗′ 𝑔′3 despite the lack of associativity of ⋆. This is done by mandating that
when forming a three-term product such as (𝑡1 ⋆ 𝑡2) ⋆ 𝑡3 or 𝑡1 ⋆ (𝑡2 ⋆ 𝑡3), which
have different results, an intermediate nonzero grouping should be favored and
the other one dropped. Since (𝑡1 ⋆ 𝑡2) = 𝑡0 but (𝑡2 ⋆ 𝑡3) ≠ 𝑡0, it is the latter that
should be retained in place of the former (even if the final three-term product
proves to be zero). If this were not stipulated, there would be two distinct syntac-
tic sentential games which is undesirable because then the two possible parses
of the sentence 𝑡1 ⋆ (𝑡2 ⋆ 𝑡3) and (𝑡′1 ⋆ 𝑡′2)⋆ 𝑡′3 cannot be directly compared in the
same game. This turns out to be felicitous for other reasons too as the set of syn-
tactic games remains associative with respect to ⊗′. The reader is urged to write
out the sixteen possible parse tree products of the three lexical trees and see how
eight of them are discarded in forming the syntactic game.This stipulation is just
part of the overall way in which the product of syntactic games is defined, that
is all.
In exactly the same way, for the semantic sentential game too, we stipulate
that 𝑔123 = 𝑔1 ⊗ 𝑔23 = 𝑔12 ⊗ 𝑔3 despite the lack of associativity of ⊙. This game
also has eight initial nodes just like the syntactic sentential game, and eight zero
products equal to the zero 0 of the infon lattice introduced in Section 2.1 are
discarded. As I have not described this operation in any detail in this book, I will
simply say the matter is analogous to what happens in the case of the syntactic
sentential game.
Finally, we would form the full mixed semantic-syntactic sentential product as
before by multiplying the semantic sentential product with the syntactic senten-
tial product. This is straightforward to do and I leave it to the reader to confirm
that it would have as many as 8×8 = 64 initial nodes and, likewise, 64 interpretive
branches emerging from each of the 64 intermediate nodes in the information set
for B. This confirms that these full mixed sentential product games grow rapidly
in size as also mentioned on page 110 in Section 7.3. Recall that we do not need a
Pareto-Nash equilibrium for these full mixed products; just the Nash equilibrium
will do, and if there is more than one, we just assign them equal probabilities.
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We can collect all these interdependent games as before into the locutionary
global game 𝐿𝐺(𝜑) = {𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑔3, 𝑔′1, 𝑔′2, 𝑔′3} where the product games have been
dropped as all the required information is contained in the lexical games as indi-
cated byTheorem 8.1 in Section 8.1. I have chosen to describe the distributed form
of 𝐿𝐺(𝜑) rather than the compact form which would involve a 2𝑛 = 2 × 3 = 6
dimensional matrix as there are 𝑛 = 3words in the sentence uttered. Such a high-
dimensional matrix can be represented by several two-dimensional matrices.
All that remains is to show that the global Pareto-Nash equilibrium of all these
games yields the intended meaning 𝜎 = 𝜎1(𝜎2𝜎3) and parse 𝑡 = 𝑡1(𝑡2𝑡3) for the
utterance. This can be seen informally by noting which prior probabilities are
higher in each of the lexical games and ensuring the corresponding solutions are
compatible with one another as indicated byTheorem 8.5 in Section 8.1. The fact
that this is easy to do by inspection is reassuring because the calculations would
happen in milliseconds in the heads of the writer and reader of the sentence as
only a few probabilities have to be compared in a compatible manner.
Assuming just basic facts about ontology, the language, grammar, and par-
tial rationality, we have been able to compute the intended parse and meaning
of the utterance in the presence of both syntactic and semantic ambiguities. This
approach can be extended to any utterance in principle. Aspects of syntax such as
movement (e.g. wh-movement) require some small adjustments that are straight-
forward to devise.
The full content conveyed by A is the proposition 𝑝 = (𝑐 ⊨ 𝜎) where 𝑐 is the
described situation as before and could be something like the (financial) news of
the day. As noted earlier, the latter’s boundaries are somewhat indeterminate.
I leave it to the reader to see how the solution to the locutionary global game
fits into the Generation Game on the speaker’s side and into the Interpretation
Game on the addressee’s side and to make appropriate assumptions to construct
a Content Selection Game for the example, which could be assumed to be trivial.
9.2 Locutionary meaning
The locutionary meaning of an utterance is the meaning that comes “directly”
from the words in the relevant utterance situation. As such, finding it involves
just disambiguating between alternative referential meanings of words that have
homonymous or polysemous conventional meanings and fixing the reference of
pronouns. It does not involve other phenomena such as free enrichment, mod-
ulation, implicature, and direct and indirect illocutionary force. All of the latter
belong to the illocutionary meaning of an utterance, although modulation strad-
dles locutionary and illocutionary meaning as will be seen in Chapter 17. I will
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say more about this distinction between locutionary and illocutionary meaning
and the crosscutting distinction between literal meaning and implicature at the
end of Part IV.
In the foregoing, I have shown in a very thorough manner how lexical and
structural disambiguations work. This can be extended to fixing pronoun refer-
ence in a straightforward way as that problem is also just one of disambiguation
among alternative possible referents. All aspects of communication involving al-
ternative possibilities, whether of a locutionary or illocutionary kind, are just
problems of disambiguation and the Flow Constraint treats them all uniformly.
The only difference that arises is in how the possibilities are generated. In the
case of fixing pronoun references, if the pronouns are anaphoric, the possible
referents come from the sentence or the discourse, and if they are deictic, they
are available directly in the utterance situation 𝑢 or in induced resource situa-
tions 𝑟𝑢 that depend on 𝑢. The rudimentary model described in Clark & Parikh
(2007) can easily be extended to cover all such cases so I will not say more about
this problem here (except briefly in Section 18.2) and will take the problem of
locutionary communication as fully solved.
It is fitting to first solve this problem completely in a detailed way and then
look at some general philosophical results that concern the system of locutionary
communication and, in particular, games of partial information. I now turn to this
latter task.
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10 Universality, Frege’s principles,
indeterminacy, and truth
10.1 The universality of games of partial information
The games of partial information shown so far were formed with respect to par-
ticular examples but it is possible to construct such games more generally by
the maps 𝑔𝑢 and 𝑔′𝑢 on utterances to obtain two monoidal systems (G, ⊗) and(G′, ⊗′) with zeroes as mentioned in Section 4.3.1 The solution to locutionary
global games can then be compactly described by the commutative diagram in
Figure 10.1.C𝑢 and C′𝑢 are the semantic and syntactic content maps and they can be de-
composed into two sets of maps (𝑔𝑢 , 𝑔′𝑢) and (𝑓𝑢 , 𝑓 ′𝑢) where the latter represent
functions from the relevant games to their solutions. In general, families of inter-
dependent games corresponding to a whole utterance will need to be considered
1The identity of (G, ⊗) is the empty game 𝑔𝑒 , which is just the trivial game with a single initial
node (with prior probability 1) and a branch labeled with 𝑒, the empty string, issuing from it, a
further branch labeled 1, the identity of (I , ⊙), issuing from the node that ends the first branch,
and any terminal payoff, preferably 0. The reader should check that for any game 𝑔 ∈ G, we get
𝑔 ⊗ 𝑔𝑒 = 𝑔𝑒 ⊗𝑔 = 𝑔 and that 𝑔𝑢(𝑒) = 𝑔𝑒 and 𝑓𝑢(𝑔𝑒) = 1. There is also a similar zero game 𝑔0 with
a single branch labeled 0, the zero of (L, ○), and a further branch labeled 0, the zero of (I , ⊙),
such that 𝑔 ⊗ 𝑔0 = 𝑔0 ⊗ 𝑔 = 𝑔0 for all 𝑔 ∈ G and that 𝑔𝑢(0) = 𝑔0 and 𝑓𝑢(𝑔0) = 0. Pictorially:
(i) Identity of (G, ⊗): 𝑔𝑒u r- r-
𝜌𝑒 = 1
𝑠𝑒 𝑒 1 0, 0
(ii) Zero of (G, ⊗): 𝑔0u r- r-
𝜌0 = 1
𝑠0 0 0 0, 0
The identity 𝑔′𝑒 and zero 𝑔′0 of (G′, ⊗′) can be defined analogously by replacing 1with 𝑡𝑒 , the
identity of (T , ⋆), and by replacing 0 with 𝑡0, the zero of (T , ⋆), in the above games.
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(I , ⊙) (G, ⊗) × (G′, ⊗′)𝑓𝑢oo 𝑓 ′𝑢 // (T , ⋆)
Figure 10.1: The commutative diagram: C𝑢 = 𝑓𝑢 ○ 𝑔𝑢 and C′𝑢 = 𝑓 ′𝑢 ○ 𝑔′𝑢
in order to specify a solution as their interdependence through the prior condi-
tional probabilities requires their simultaneous solution.This diagrammakes the
uniform treatment of all contents by Equilibrium Linguistics even clearer. The
following fundamental results establishing the universality of games of partial
information for the semantics and syntax of natural language are stated without
proof as they are straightforward.2 They are so basic that from the standpoint
of Equilibrium Linguistics they could well be called “The MainTheorems of (Lin-
guistic) Communication.”
Theorem 10.1. 𝑔𝑢 ∶ L→ G and 𝑔′𝑢 ∶ L→ G′ are isomorphisms.
Theorem 10.2. Given a semantic interpretation function C𝑢 ∶ L→ I and given
the semantic game function 𝑔𝑢 ∶ L→ G, there is a unique function 𝑓𝑢 ∶ G → I
such that C𝑢 = 𝑓𝑢 ○ 𝑔𝑢 .
Theorem 10.3. Given a syntactic interpretation function C′𝑢 ∶ L→ T and given
the syntactic game function 𝑔′𝑢 ∶ L→ G′, there is a unique function 𝑓 ′𝑢 ∶ G′ → T
such that C′𝑢 = 𝑓 ′𝑢 ○ 𝑔′𝑢 .
These theorems imply that there is always a unique solution to the locution-
ary global game. It may happen that the solution involves a mixed strategy and
so in fact involves multiple contents, each with some probability as in a pun,
but this mixed strategy is then uniquely given. These results involving the uni-
versality of 𝑔𝑢 and 𝑔′𝑢 and therefore of semantic and syntactic games of partial
2They require formal definitions of 𝑔𝑢 and 𝑔′𝑢 as shown in the Appendix.
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information have the following fundamental consequence: if there is any other
theory (e.g. mainstream rule and convention based semantical theory, syntactic
theory, optimality theory, relevance theory, etc.) that succeeds in providing an
account of the locutionary content functions C𝑢 and C′𝑢 , the theorems say that
it has to be essentially equivalent to the maps 𝑓𝑢 and 𝑓 ′𝑢 . Thus, they state that
games of partial information are essential to communication or are “universal.”3
If we wish to represent mixed semantic-syntactic products then the two trian-
gles in Figure 10.1 can be folded into one by defining just a single monoid of
semantic-syntactic games and a single map to it and a single solution map from
it.
Finally, if phonetics is included in the framework, there would be a further
set of phonetic games and more or less the same kind of treatment would be
available where the words uttered and the equilibrium parse and meaning can
be simultaneously derived from the speech wave produced by a speaker.
10.2 Frege’s compositionality and context principles
It should be evident that Theorem 8.5 in Section 8.1 is related to Frege’s century-
old principle of compositionality and context principle because it gives a way to
determine the referential meaning of an utterance from first principles just as
these principles attempt to do. The compositional principle states that the mean-
ing of a composite expression is a function of the independently givenmeanings of
its component parts and the context principle states that the meaning of a word
or subsentential expression is what it contributes to the meaning of the whole
sentence. Many, notably Dummett (1993: 4–5), have remarked on the tension
between these two principles because one requires the meaning of a sentence
to depend on the meanings of its constituent words and the other requires the
meanings of the constituent words to depend on the meaning of the sentence.4
The first thing to note is that the Fundamental Equation of Equilibrium Lin-
guistics is about utterances rather than sentences as contrasted with Frege’s two
principles. That is, it takes account fully of the context in which sentences are
3For more about this, see Parikh (2010: Section 4.11).
4There are different ways of interpreting especially the context principle as pointed out byMati-
lal & Sen (1988). Indeed, they also show that there were quite remarkable debates in classical
Indian philosophy of a similar sort from roughly the 5th century CE to the 17th. Their key
proponents espoused “sentence holism” (similar to the context principle) and what is called
“designation before connection” (similar to compositionality) and “connected designation” (in-
termediate between the two principles). These discussions went on for centuries. It is a shame
that Western philosophers do not generally include such non-Western ideas in their writings.
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uttered as sentences by themselves cannot convey contents.5 I believe there is
currently no other competing account that shows how to compute the (locution-
ary) meaning of an utterance from scratch. Following Grice (1989c), the tendency
is simply to say that it is given by convention with the actual processes of lexi-
cal and structural disambiguation and pronoun reference fixing left completely
mysterious.
The second thing the Fundamental Equation makes clear is that the optimal
(referential) meanings of words, subsentential expressions, and sentences are in-
terdependent: they codetermine one another via the interdependence of prior
probabilities and the concomitant interdependence of the corresponding locu-
tionary games of partial information as expressed through a fixed point process.
This shows that Frege’s principle of compositionality does not hold for referen-
tial meanings because the meanings of the component parts in turn depend on
the meanings of the other parts and also on the whole. It is possible to re-express
the fundamental equation as follows:
C𝑢(S) = ℎ1(C𝑢(NP),C𝑢(VP))C𝑢(NP) = ℎ2(C𝑢(S),C𝑢(VP))C𝑢(VP) = ℎ3(C𝑢(S),C𝑢(NP))
where ℎ1, ℎ2, ℎ3 are suitable functions derived from Equation 6 in Section 8.1.5.
The function ℎ1 in particular is obtained by taking the product of the relevant
components of 𝑧⋆ in Equation 6 to get C𝑢(𝑆). A similar result can be derived from
themore general Equation 7 in Section 8.1.5 as well.The noun phrase NP and verb
phrase VP can be further broken down into their constituents in these equations.
It is the presence of the second and third equations above that disqualifies the
Fregean principle of compositionality since the principle requires the meanings
of the component parts to be determined independently and directly. This set of
equations can perhaps be more perspicuously expressed as follows:
C𝑢(S) = ℎ1(C𝑢(NP),C𝑢(VP))C𝑢(NP) = ℎ4(C𝑢(VP))C𝑢(VP) = ℎ5(C𝑢(NP))
5See Strawson (1956) and Parikh (2010: 20–21 and Section 2.7) and Section 1.2 of this book.
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and as follows:
C𝑢(S) = ℎ1(C𝑢(NP),C𝑢(VP))C𝑢(NP) = ℎ6(C𝑢(S))C𝑢(VP) = ℎ7(C𝑢(S))
the first set corresponding to the first equality in Equation 6 and the second set
to the second equality.
Here, too, it is the second and third equations in each set that disqualify Fre-
gean compositionality. Only in the special case where there are no lexical am-
biguities will the Fregean principle work. In general, we will have to resort to
Theorem 8.5 to determine the meanings of all expressions, whether simple or
composite.This is a complex process of simultaneous interaction between the po-
tential meanings of each component part and whole which results in the actual
(optimal) meanings of the parts and the whole. Thus, the principle of composition-
ality has to be replaced by the more general fixed point principle as indicated by
Equation 6 or its more general variant Equation 7.
For greater clarity, I urge the reader to see how the examples we have just dis-
cussed, bill ran and fed raises interest, fit into these equations. For example:
C𝑢(bill ran) = ℎ1(C𝑢(bill),C𝑢(ran))C𝑢(bill) = ℎ4(C𝑢(ran))C𝑢(ran) = ℎ5(C𝑢(bill))
and:
C𝑢(bill ran) = ℎ1(C𝑢(bill),C𝑢(ran))C𝑢(bill) = ℎ6(C𝑢(bill ran))C𝑢(ran) = ℎ7(C𝑢(bill ran))
Also, since there are no conventional meanings at the level of phrases or sen-
tences, Frege’s principle automatically fails to hold at the level of conventional
meaning.
Thus, what I am calling the fixed point principle represents a generalization of
Frege’s principle of compositionality. But these very equations, the third set in
particular, also show how the former principle generalizes the context principle
because the optimal referential meanings of subsentential expressions depend on
the optimal referential meaning of the whole sentence and vice versa. Indeed, at
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this more general level, both principles are reconciled without any tension at all
between them. This is a remarkable result.
But this is not all. The third observation is that implicit in Frege’s composi-
tional principle (and, arguably, in the context principle) is the priority of syntax
over semantics and the idea that semantics mirrors syntax. The function of the
meanings of the component parts of a sentence depends on first optimally pars-
ing the sentence. It is only on the basis of this optimal parse that the component
meanings can be properly identified and composed. The fixed point principle, on
the other hand, asserts that semantics and syntax, and phonetics for that matter,
are completely interdependent and more loosely reflect one another. Nothing has
priority; everything is simultaneous and interdependent! In particular, each bit
of semantics influences each bit of syntax and vice versa. Each component 𝑧∗𝑘
of the vector 𝑧∗ is affected by all the other components 𝑧∗−𝑘 (not to mention by
all the suboptimal content values) irrespective of whether they are semantic or
syntactic. All the (possible) contents are intermixed. When an utterance is being
processed in real time, the fixed point principle will be modified to take account
of the temporal appearance of words as I discuss in Section 12.1. But, in either
case, the process of inferring the locutionary content of an utterance – its seman-
tic, syntactic, and phonetic values – involves a thoroughgoing interdependence.
This, then, is a further generalization of both the compositionality principle and
the context principle of Frege.
Not only does Equation 6 provide a way to reduce the computation of locu-
tionary content to a mere comparison of probabilities (or expected values in a
more general setting as indicated by Equation 7), that is, to mere arithmetic, this
fixed point principle of Equilibrium Linguistics encompasses all the relevant di-
mensions – generalizing from sentence to utterance, generalizing the nature of
the interdependence between word meaning and sentence meaning, and gener-
alizing the relation between syntax and semantics – seamlessly. Frege’s principle
of compositionality and the context principle are completely transcended.
In fact, if these results are seen in the context of the discussion about Wittgen-
stein, Austin, and Grice in Section 3.2 and Chapter 5, they show how certain
aspects of both Fregean ideas about reference and Wittgensteinian, Austinian,
and Gricean ideas about use and communication are not only unified but also su-
perseded. As I said in Parikh (2010) and Chapter 6, the fundamental concepts of
semantics are reference, use, indeterminacy, and equilibrium.The foregoing shows
in a precise way how three of these four notions are unified in Equilibrium Lin-
guistics. The earlier ideas are also superseded because they are rendered more
precisely and perhaps more generally.
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Interestingly, Equation 6 and its more general variant Equation 7 also apply to
other symbol systems, including images and gestures. I discuss in Parikh (2010:
Section 7.5) how the meanings of pictures, for example, can be inferred from
appropriate part-whole or mereological relationships in a visual “utterance.” The
syntactic side of the equation has to be interpreted carefully as most symbol
systems lack the elaborate structure that language possesses.
10.3 Indeterminacy
Indeterminacy, the fourth notion mentioned above, is dealt with in some detail
in Parikh (2010: Chapter 5) so I will be brief here. It is pervasive in both locution-
ary and especially illocutionary communication for a variety of reasons. One of
them is the occasional absence of full common knowledge with the result that
each component of the relevant Communication Game can separate into distinct
objective and subjective games. Apart from the speaker and addressee inferring
slightly different contents, there can also be outright miscommunication. An-
other factor is the occasional presence of mixed strategies in the global game
owing to equal prior probabilities in one or more games of partial information
as can happen with puns where the multiple meanings are intended. An inter-
esting aspect of indeterminacy, mentioned at the end of Section 7.4, is the un-
certainty surrounding each agent’s inferred meaning in the other agent’s mind
owing to the invisibility of interpretations and, often, also of addressee responses.
A key source, perhaps completely overlooked by all writers on meaning, is the
indeterminacy of utterance situations. When 𝑢 is differently carved out by the
interlocutors, as happens frequently in literature and art and less often in ordi-
nary communication, there is no unique meaning that can be ascribed. Because
the speaker’s intentions can be partially implicit in examples like “His weight
is 150 lbs.,” the primacy given to speaker meaning is purely a prejudice issuing
from the misplaced Gricean focus on speaker meaning. Addressee meanings are
equally important and, in general, there will be as many meanings as there are
agents in a conversation. As a result, there is also no need to proclaim the death of
the author as Barthes (1977) did a half-century ago orWimsatt & Beardsley (1946)
did much earlier, although less dramatically. However, Barthes was more correct
than the New Criticism of Wimsatt and Beardsley and others in allowing for an
open text with open-ended interpretations, a consequence Equilibrium Linguis-
tics effortlessly enables simply by altering 𝑢 and related aspects of the discourse
in a systematic and methodical manner rather than through vague declarations
of the kind many writers influenced by Continental philosophy revel in.
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A major source of indeterminacy that I did not consider in my previous book
is vagueness. I give a thorough account of this phenomenon in the next chapter.
I will also say a little more in Part IV about indeterminacy as it relates to illo-
cutionary meaning because that is where the bulk of the indeterminacy lies, es-
pecially when 𝑢 is itself indeterminate, but it should be apparent how this fourth
concept also ties in smoothly with reference, use, and equilibrium, and flows in-
eluctably out of the framework. It is something that has largely been neglected
in the literature, partly owing to a lack of precise ways to handle it and partly
owing to sheer prejudice against the very idea, as it threatens the rigid picture
of meaning the ideal language philosophers bequeathed to the field. Uncertainty,
generally, can be quite unsettling. But when the tools of probability and game
theory are brought to bear on the phenomenon, it is possible to handle it with
precision and rigor.
10.4 Meaning and truth
So far, we havemanaged to derive content from usewithout anymention of truth.
However, there is a minor need for truth in some cases in computing content.
Since interpretation involves disambiguation, the truth of a possible proposition,
if independently available, can help in this task. If the situation described by an
utterance is 𝑐 and if 𝑐 is, say, perceptually accessible, then a possible content 𝜎
can be evaluated against 𝑐 to see if it makes the proposition 𝑐 ⊨ 𝜎 true. If it does,
then this fact can bolster the choice of 𝜎 against some other possible content 𝜎 ′.
Naturally, there will be many other factors that also push toward one or other
choice of content so truth cannot play an overriding role; it is just one among
many pushes and pulls on alternative contents.
Specifically, the way in which truth enters the computation of content is via
the prior probabilities of local partial information games that are members of
the global game. As we have seen, the priors are affected by multiple objective
and subjective elements, and truth, when it is independently available, is one of
them. This kind of role does not result in the kind of vicious circularity between
meaning and truth referred to in Dummett (1996) and in Section 1.2.
The determination of truth can occur through the fixing of the described situa-
tion but the selection of resource situations and even the utterance situation itself
can also play a role. Thus, this role of truth in deriving meaning can be reversed
and help in fixing or narrowing these three types of situation as well: described,
resource, and utterance. When this happens, meaning and truth become more in-
terdependent. For example, a particular choice of described situation might make
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a particular choice of content more likely via the resulting proposition’s being
true, and vice versa, the choice of that content might make that corresponding
described situation more likely. Such mutual reinforcement and “circularity” are
not vicious because the possiblemeanings are not defined in terms of truth as they
are based wholly on the Phonetic, Syntactic, and Semantic Constraints which, in
turn, depend only on the grammar and on conventional meaning and on the ut-
terance situation. Thus, only the choice of optimal meaning may be based partly
on truth.
It has never been clear exactly what the place of Lewis’s (1981) principle of
accommodation is within a theory of meaning. Now that the role of truth in the
derivation of meaning from use has been spelled out, it should be possible to
extend it to include Lewis’s idea but I do not pursue this here.
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11 Vagueness
Practically every word in a natural language is vague. And yet, the attention
this fact has received in semantics on the whole is surprisingly scant, perhaps
because quite new ideas and tools are required to accommodate it. Borderline
cases and, indeed, borders that shift with context pose additional difficulties in
understanding communication. Without an account of vagueness, any semantic
theory is seriously incomplete.
There have been a number of recent attempts to understand vagueness includ-
ing Keefe & Smith (1996); de Jaegher (2003); Puglisi et al. (2008); Lipman (2009);
Égré & Klinedinst (2011); Jäger et al. (2011); Hampton& Jönsson (2012); and Blume
& Board (2014). This is a large area and I focus mostly on foundational issues.
I start by characterizing clear cases and borderline cases of a vague concept.
Next I tackle the sorites paradox. It is perhaps this classical puzzle that has oc-
cupied most writers on vagueness, especially philosophers and logicians. I then
look briefly at the important subclass of vague concepts called essentially con-
tested concepts. Last, I apply these insights to communication.
I approach these tasks by adapting models from cognitive psychology as it
appears that psychologists understand this domain better than philosophers or
linguists owing to the psychologists’ emphasis on experimental data. I also apply
these adapted models in new philosophical and linguistic ways. With the right
models, the sorites paradox yields to a natural and intuitive resolution. Essen-
tially contested concepts become easier to understand. Once I describe vague-
ness, it can be readily incorporated into a larger theory of communication and
meaning.
I first clarify some basic terminology. Concepts are taken to be mental rep-
resentations of collections of things and categories the collections themselves.
Concepts correspond to properties or attributes or features, all terms referring
to abstract entities. So an agent’s vague concept bald corresponds to a vague
property of baldness. Since each agent will have a slightly different concept bald,
the corresponding vague property can be thought of in two ways: as a kind of
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social and abstract average of these individual representations1 and as a kind of
abstract individual counterpart to the concept, one for each agent. Both kinds of
property are important, the average kind and the individual kind. Vague words
such as bald have vague concepts conventionally attached to them that serve as
their conventional meanings.
It has been taken for granted from classical times until Wittgenstein (1953/
1968: Sections 66 and 67, pages 31–32) questioned it that most concepts have clear
definitions, that is, noncircular necessary and sufficient conditions. This implies
every object is or is not a member of the corresponding category. As discussed by
Smith & Medin (1981), this classical view and its variants are untenable primarily
because most concepts are vague and have borderline cases.2 Here is Murphy’s
(2004: 21) account of why vagueness is ubiquitous:
The Necessity of Category Fuzziness
The existence of unclear examples can be understood in part as arising from
the great variation of things in the world combined with the limitations on
our concepts. We do not wish to have a concept for every single object –
such concepts would be of little use and would require enormous memory
space. Instead, we want to have a relatively small number of concepts that
are still informative enough to be useful (Rosch 1978). The ideal situation
would probably be one in which these concepts did pick out objects in a
classical-like way. Unfortunately, the world is not arranged so as to conform
to our needs.
⋮
The gradation of properties in the world means that our smallish number of
categories will never map perfectly onto all objects: the distinction between
members and nonmembers will always be difficult to draw or will even be
arbitrary in some cases. If the world existed as much more distinct clumps
of objects, then perhaps our concepts could be formed as the classical view
says they are. But if the world consists of shadings and gradations and of
a rich mixture of different kinds of properties, then a limited number of
concepts would almost have to be fuzzy.
1As I said in Section 2.1, properties are individuated from reality by agents and so are social but
abstract constructs that nevertheless have a certain objectivity. For example, the number 5 can
be thought of as being abstracted from collections of five objects just as the property of being
blue can be thought of as being discriminated from blue objects.
2The other important theoretical reason is that they are unable to account for typicality effects.
And much of the experimental evidence disconfirms them.
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As described by Murphy (2004: Chapter 3), there are three new views that
have emerged: the exemplar approach, the prototype approach, and the knowl-
edge approach. The first uses the information provided by each encounter with
an exemplar for a category separately; the second works with a summary repre-
sentation of a category derived from the experience of exemplars; and the third
integrates concepts with the broader knowledge schemata in which they must
reside via plausible reasoning.
Because concepts are used in very diverse tasks, none of these approaches is
able to account for all the empirical data. Indeed, as Murphy (2004: Chapter 13)
concludes, some amalgam of the three will probably be required for a “Big The-
ory of Concepts” as they also appear to be somewhat complementary in their ex-
planatory adequacy. In other words, each approach focuses on a different source
of information, and any one or more of these sources may be summoned for a
particular task based on its suitability.
I will adapt the first two approaches for my purposes. The third knowledge
approach is, in a sense, not really an independent stand-alone approach but one
that operates by combining knowledge effects with one or both of the other ap-
proaches. I construct the simplest models required for the tasks at hand and do
not aim at more comprehensive versions.
11.1 Basic setup
Both the exemplar and prototype approaches rely on the idea that each exem-
plar of a concept has multiple properties that take on particular values. For ex-
ample, the concept bald may involve features such as the number of hairs on the
scalp, the number of completely hairless patches on the scalp, the fraction of the
scalp that is hairless, and so on;3 each exemplar will instantiate these attributes
with particular numbers. In other words, each concept is associated with an 𝑛-
dimensional attribute space and each exemplar can be represented by a point in
this space. Some dimensions may be continuous and some may be discrete.
Let 𝑏𝑖 with 𝑖 = 1, 2,… ,𝑁 be clear exemplars of bald that an agentA has encoun-
tered in his experience. Likewise, let 𝑏′𝑖′ with 𝑖′ = 1, 2,… ,𝑁 ′ be clear exemplars
of not bald. A negative category such as the latter is a little unusual in that it con-
tains not just personswith a full head of hair but also random items such as clocks
3Such a listing of features is an idealization as they are not entirely independent of one an-
other. It is not clear, however, whether agents actually operate with completely independent
attributes. Presumably, this depends on what they know and this is one way in which knowl-
edge effects may enter.
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and cars. There is no problem with this as all potential exemplars are assessed
relative to the relevant attributes which come from the corresponding positive
category. Thus, only persons with relatively full heads of hair will qualify as ex-
emplars and items such as clocks and cars will be discarded as junk. A different
way to think about negative categories is that in any particular situation where
its exemplars are accessed, there will always be a default reference category that
will automatically limit the possibilities to the relevant types of individuals. In
the case of not bald, the possibilities will be limited to persons; in the case of not
tall to men or women or basketball players, depending on the situation; and in
the case of not chair, the default category might be items of furniture.
Let 𝑥𝑖𝑗 be the value of the 𝑗th attribute of 𝑏𝑖 and, similarly, let 𝑥′𝑖′𝑗 be the value
of the 𝑗th attribute of 𝑏′𝑖′ . That is, 𝑏𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖𝑗) and 𝑏′𝑖′ = (𝑥′𝑖′𝑗), the right-hand side
of both equalities being vectors with 𝑗 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛.
Now suppose A has to judge whether the candidate 𝑎 is bald or not bald or
borderline bald in 𝑢. Then 𝑎 will also be a point in the same space with value 𝑥𝑎𝑗
in the 𝑗th dimension. That is, 𝑎 = (𝑥𝑎𝑗).
The basic idea underlying both approaches is to see how “far” 𝑎 is from all the
exemplars taken separately or from an “average” exemplar (i.e. the prototype)
and, based on this, to see how similar 𝑎 is to the other members in the category.
This computation allows A to decide where 𝑎 stands with respect to bald.
11.1.1 The exemplar model
This model has its roots in Medin & Schaffer (1978); Nosofsky (1992); and Nosof-
sky & Palmeri (1997). I build upon the description in Murphy (2004: 65–71). Schif-
fer (2010) informally mentions the possibility of using weighted distance in the
context of vagueness.
In order to get at the psychological distance between 𝑎 and 𝑏𝑖 , we need to first
note the following. For certain attributes such as the number of hairs on an in-
dividual’s scalp, if 𝑎’s value 𝑥𝑎1 is less than 𝑏𝑖’s value 𝑥𝑖1 then the psychological
difference between these values along this dimension is not ∣𝑥𝑎1 − 𝑥𝑖1∣ but 0 be-
cause 𝑏𝑖 is an exemplar and 𝑎 has, so to speak, met the bar set by 𝑏𝑖 . Likewise,
if the attribute is the number of completely hairless patches on the individual’s
scalp, and if 𝑥𝑎2 > 𝑥𝑖2, then again the difference is 0 by the same reasoning. There
may, of course, be attributes where only an exact equality 𝑥𝑎𝑗 = 𝑥𝑖𝑗 results in a
zero difference.4 So we can define a psychological difference function 𝛿(𝑥𝑎𝑗 , 𝑥𝑖𝑗)
4For example, the category blue is such because overshooting the relevant color frequency in
either direction counts as a nonzero difference. With such attributes, only an exact equality
results in a zero difference.
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which is either 0 or ∣𝑥𝑎𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖𝑗 ∣ based on the nature of the concept and attribute
being considered.5
Now define the weighted psychological distance between 𝑎 and 𝑏𝑖 as follows:
𝑑𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏𝑖) =
¿ÁÁÁÀ 𝑛∑
𝑗=1 𝑤𝑗(𝑢) 𝛿(𝑥𝑎𝑗 , 𝑥𝑖𝑗)2
Here, 𝑤𝑗(𝑢) are weights issuing from the situation 𝑢. The psychological distance
thatA perceives between a candidate and an exemplar thus varies with the situ-
ation he is in. This variation implies that certain attributes and therefore certain
exemplars will play a more or less important role in A’s judgment.
This distance function is not a metric in the technical sense as it is not sym-
metric: 𝑑𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏𝑖) may not equal 𝑑𝑢(𝑏𝑖 , 𝑎) because the underlying psychological
difference function 𝛿 is not symmetric. Also, many different forms for it can be
used; I have restricted myself to the commonest Euclidean variety.
Correspondingly, the weighted psychological distance between 𝑎 and 𝑏′𝑖′ will
be:
𝑑𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏′𝑖′) =
¿ÁÁÁÀ 𝑛∑
𝑗=1 𝑤′𝑗(𝑢) 𝛿(𝑥𝑎𝑗 , 𝑥′𝑖′𝑗)2
Shepard (1987) has shown that behavioral similarity between items is an expo-
nentially decreasing function of their psychological distance.
𝑠𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏𝑖) = 𝑒−𝑐(𝑢)𝑑𝑢(𝑎,𝑏𝑖)
where 𝑐(𝑢) > 0 is a situation-based parameter. Again, a larger or smaller 𝑐(𝑢)
will determine the relative importance of items that are near and items that are
far.
Analogously:
𝑠𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏′𝑖′) = 𝑒−𝑐′(𝑢)𝑑𝑢(𝑎,𝑏′𝑖′)
Finally, define the psychological probability that 𝑎 is bald rather than not bald
for the agent A as follows:
𝑃(bald ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢) = ∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑠𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏𝑖)∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑠𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏𝑖) +∑𝑁 ′𝑖′=1 𝑠𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏′𝑖′)
5There is some empirical warrant for such a result as reported in, for example, Hampton et al.
(2005).
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Then:
𝑃(not bald ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢) = ∑𝑁 ′𝑖′=1 𝑠𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏′𝑖′)∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑠𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏𝑖) +∑𝑁 ′𝑖′=1 𝑠𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏′𝑖′)
Note that 𝑃(bald ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢) + 𝑃(not bald ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢) = 1. These psychological probabilities
are measured with respect to the agentA as they are based on his exemplars. So
they are agent-relative probabilities. But they are not “subjective” probabilities
in the usual sense of being A’s beliefs.
11.1.2 The prototype model
This model has its roots in Rosch & Mervis (1975) but the account below is based
on a certain natural construal of a summary representation of a category.
The only difference between the exemplar model and the prototype model is
that the latter does not compute the psychological distance between the candi-
date and each exemplar separately as above but first averages the values of all
the exemplars and then computes the distance from this average.
So we first define the average values as follows:
𝑥𝑗 = ∑𝑁𝑖=1𝑤𝑖(𝑢)𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑁
𝑥′𝑗 = ∑𝑁 ′𝑖′=1𝑤′𝑖 (𝑢)𝑥′𝑖′𝑗𝑁 ′
This tells us that the prototypes for bald and not bald are just 𝑏 = (𝑥𝑗) and
𝑏′ = (𝑥′𝑗 ). The weights 𝑤𝑖(𝑢), 𝑤′𝑖 (𝑢) are different from the earlier weights above
described in the exemplar model, and are also indexed with respect to 𝑖 and not 𝑗
as before. These weights play an important role because sometimes extreme ex-
amples such as a completely hairless person count as prototypes. Such extreme
exemplars can be selected as the relevant prototypical average by adjusting the
weights suitably. Alternatively, they can be selected as the minimum or maxi-
mum of the relevant attribute values.6
We can use the same idea for the psychological difference as before except
that it is measured with respect to the average values. So 𝛿(𝑥𝑎𝑗 , 𝑥𝑗) is either 0 or
6Generalized means are a family of functions for aggregating sets of numbers and we can draw
upon any of these based on the nature of the concept and its attributes. See, for example,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalized_mean.
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∣𝑥𝑎𝑗 − 𝑥𝑗 ∣ based on the nature of the concept and attribute being considered and
likewise with 𝛿(𝑥𝑎𝑗 , 𝑥′𝑗 ).
Now the weighted psychological distance from the prototype is defined as
follows:
𝑑𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏) =
¿ÁÁÁÀ 𝑛∑
𝑗=1 𝑤𝑗(𝑢) 𝛿(𝑥𝑎𝑗 , 𝑥𝑗)2
𝑑𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏′) =
¿ÁÁÁÀ 𝑛∑
𝑗=1 𝑤′𝑗(𝑢) 𝛿(𝑥𝑎𝑗 , 𝑥′𝑗 )2
This in turn leads to similarity.
𝑠𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑒−𝑐(𝑢)𝑑𝑢(𝑎,𝑏)
𝑠𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏′) = 𝑒−𝑐′(𝑢)𝑑𝑢(𝑎,𝑏′)
And finally to the psychological probabilities for A as above.
𝑃(bald ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢) = 𝑠𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏)𝑠𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝑠𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏′)
𝑃(not bald ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢) = 𝑠𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏′)𝑠𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝑠𝑢(𝑎, 𝑏′)
As stated above, the key difference is that distances and similarities are mea-
sured with respect to a “summary representation,” an average (or generalized
mean) of all the exemplars.
Both models give us somewhat different ways to compute the same psycho-
logical probabilities 𝑃(bald ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢) and 𝑃(not bald ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢). I now put them to use.
11.2 Characterizing vagueness
Intuitively, if a candidate is sufficiently similar to clear exemplars of both bald
and not bald, it is reasonable to think it is a borderline case. This suggests the
following definitions:
Definition 11.1. A candidate 𝑎 is a borderline case of a concept 𝐶 for an agentA
in situation 𝑢 if and only if ∣𝑃(𝐶 ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢) − 𝑃(not 𝐶 ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢)∣ < 𝜖𝑢 where 0 < 𝜖𝑢 < 1
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is A’s threshold in 𝑢. If 𝑎 is not a borderline case, then it is classified as clearly
belonging to 𝐶 if and only if 𝑃(𝐶 ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢) > 𝑃(not 𝐶 ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢) and as clearly belonging
to not 𝐶 if and only if 𝑃(𝐶 ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢) < 𝑃(not 𝐶 ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢).
Definition 11.2. A concept is vague for an agentA in situation 𝑢 if and only if it
has borderline cases. Otherwise, it is precise or “classical.”
The decision to count an item as borderline or clear is derived from agent-
relative psychological probabilities but is not itself probabilistic or belief-based
(e.g. 𝑎 is borderline with “subjective” probability 𝑞). So it is doubly immune to the
charge against subjective probability views made by Schiffer (2003: Chapter 5):
it is not based on beliefs and it is deterministic.
The threshold 𝜖𝑢 is a kind of limiting value but it should not be confused with
any direct cutoff between clear and borderline cases as that would be assuming
what has to be established. It operates at the more basic level of psychological
probabilities and enables us to draw a line between clear and borderline cases.
Moreover, 𝜖𝑢 can be conceived as a precise number or a fuzzy number.7 It should
also be seen as something the agent does not know for himself in different situ-
ations. Lastly, it arises through communicative interactions and so agents in the
same community tend to share it to a greater degree than intuition might sug-
gest. Here, knowledge effects of the kind alluded to earlier when I described the
knowledge approach to concepts may play an important role as such thresholds
tend to partly arise also from the goals and interests of agents.A’s cognitive system determines when a case is borderline or clear. It is not
entirely a conscious decision. This is confirmed by the familiar feeling of being
stymied when we are asked to make a conscious judgment about a borderline
case. There is simply no way to reason decisively about it based on the external
facts.
An item 𝑎 that is a borderline case for one agent need not be so for another
agent. Likewise, the borderline cases of a concept shift with 𝑢 for the same agent
because all aspects of the definition depend on 𝑢, the probabilities as well as the
threshold. The same agent A may choose to call Bill bald in one situation but
7A fuzzy number 𝐴 is generally expressed as a function 𝐴 ∶ ℝ→ [0, 1] such that:
𝐴(𝑥) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝑓 (𝑥) for 𝑥 ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏]
1 for 𝑥 ∈ [𝑏, 𝑐]
𝑔(𝑥) for 𝑥 ∈ [𝑐, 𝑑]
0 for 𝑥 < 𝑎 and 𝑥 > 𝑑
where 𝑎 ≤ 𝑏 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑑 , 𝑓 is a continuous function that increases to 1 at point 𝑏, and 𝑔 is a
continuous function that decreases from 1 at point 𝑐. See Klir et al. (1997: 170).
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not in another as the sentence bill is bald may be true for A in one situation,
false forA in another, and indeterminate forA in a third. Consider the sentences
she won’t date bill – he’s bald and bill isn’t bald – he needs a haircut. In
the first case, the situation 𝑢 is such that a less stringent membership condition
for bald is operative, either because relatively less-bald exemplars are weighted
more or because the magnitude of the threshold 𝜖𝑢 is relatively smaller making
the penumbra, the region of borderline cases, correspondingly smaller as well,
or possibly because both factors apply simultaneously. In the second case, the
situation 𝑢 is the opposite – a more stringent membership condition is used.This
explains what Schiffer (2010) calls penumbral shift in a natural way.
In order to obtain “natural” concepts of the kind that would be useful in think-
ing and communication, we must assume that the positive exemplars (i.e. the set{𝑏𝑖} for bald) are so distributed that all members of their convex closure are in-
stances of 𝐶 . Otherwise, we would get strange and seemingly arbitrary outcomes
for what belongs to 𝐶 , what is borderline 𝐶 , and what is not 𝐶 . This requirement
translates into a restriction on 𝜖𝑢 : it must be sufficiently small. In other words, if
𝑏 = (𝑏𝑖), 𝑏′ = (𝑏′𝑖′), the latter in each case being the vectors of positive and neg-
ative exemplars of bald, then 0 < 𝜖𝑢 < 𝜁𝑢(𝑏, 𝑏′) < 1 where 𝜁𝑢(𝑏, 𝑏′) is a function
of the 𝑁 positive exemplars and 𝑁 ′ negative exemplars that derives from the
convexity assumption. The same kind of condition is obviously not required for
the negative exemplars as they can, in general, lie anywhere outside the convex
closure of the positive exemplars in the 𝑛-dimensional attribute space. A candi-
date 𝑎 that is judged to belong to 𝐶 need not lie within the convex closure. All
that is required is that it be sufficiently close to it. Indeed, subsequently, 𝑎 would
become a positive exemplar itself and the convex closure could be correspond-
ingly enlarged. This suggests a dynamic model of concept learning that results
in possibly expanded convex closures as more exemplars are encountered. After
a while, the category would converge to a convex polytope in the attribute space
with somewhat different boundaries for different situations 𝑢.
This convexity assumption is very similar to the convexity assumption made
by Gärdenfors (2000) and Warglien & Gärdenfors (2013). My approach of us-
ing exemplars to derive concepts seems to allow a clearer development of these
ideas from a more foundational starting point. Also, their decision to banish
the external significance of language from their model seems unnecessary and
raises too many problems (e.g. Putnam 1975; Barwise & Perry 1983: 28–31). As
I show presently, conventional meanings are mental representations but refer-
ential meanings are external entities such as the individuals and properties that
make up propositions. It is possible to have one’s cake and eat it too.
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What may be true or false or indeterminate for one agent may not be so for
another. There is no agent-independent or objective truth value in other words.
However, because the agents must belong to the same linguistic community and
the exemplars each agent draws upon are often shared through communication,
they may agree more often than expected. In fact, for a concept to be socially
useful as most are, its exemplars must be sufficiently shared among the commu-
nity. This points to a community model of interacting agents where concepts are
constantly being revised to have sufficient overlap.
The definitions above suggest that if the threshold is a precise, nonfuzzy num-
ber there is no higher-order vagueness, the phenomenon that the borderline be-
tween clear and borderline cases is itself unclear, resulting in borderline border-
line cases and so on ad infinitum. If we wish to allow for higher-order vagueness,
the threshold can be identified with a fuzzy number. In this case, there is no pre-
cise cutoff between clear and borderline cases and higher-order vagueness can
be admitted.8 The evidence seems to indicate that higher-order vagueness is real.
This implies that the threshold 𝜖𝑢 must be a fuzzy number and not a precise
number.
The mistake “epistemicists” such as Williamson (1994) seem to make is to as-
sume the existence of sharp cutoffs between clear cases of a concept and its com-
plement. That is, they not only reject higher-order vagueness but also first-order
vagueness, which is completely unrealistic.
Indeed, it is possible to characterize higher-order vagueness by treating Defi-
nition 11.1 as a base case for an inductive definition. The key idea is to identify
exemplars at each level, and therefore, psychological distance, similarity, and
psychological probabilities at each level. For example, Definition 11.1 provides a
precise or fuzzy account of first-order borderline cases.Then we can identify pos-
itive and negative exemplars for what is clearly borderline and what is clearly
not borderline which, in turn, gives rise to psychological distance and similarity
and psychological probabilities at the next level. The latter can then be used in a
manner analogous to Definition 11.1 to define borderline borderline cases or, in
other words, second-order vagueness. And so on to higher-order vagueness for
all 𝑛.
In the definition below, I assume that we have the exemplars for 𝑛th-order
vagueness and therefore the 𝑛th-order psychological probabilities 𝑃𝑛(𝐶𝑛 ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢)
8I believe my model is richer than Hampton’s (2007) because it allows for both graded member-
ship in a category as well as fuzzy judgments of when a case is clear or borderline whereas
Hampton (2007: 377) only allows for the former while pointing to the latter as important ex-
perimental evidence. Something like Definition 11.1 would have to be added to his model.
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and 𝑃𝑛(not 𝐶𝑛 ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢) where 𝐶𝑛 is the 𝑛th-order concept of being 𝑛th-order bor-
derline 𝐶 and not 𝐶𝑛 is the corresponding complementary concept. When 𝑛 = 0,
this is understood as just standing for the concepts 𝐶 and not 𝐶 .
Definition 11.3. A candidate 𝑎 is an (𝑛+1)st-order borderline case of a concept 𝐶
for an agentA in situation 𝑢 if and only if ∣𝑃𝑛(𝐶𝑛 ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢)−𝑃𝑛(not 𝐶𝑛 ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢)∣ < 𝜖𝑛,𝑢
where 0 < 𝜖𝑛,𝑢 < 1 is A’s threshold in 𝑢. If 𝑎 is not an (𝑛 + 1)st-order borderline
case, then it is classified as being clearly 𝑛th-order borderline or clearly not 𝑛th-
order borderline according to whether 𝑃𝑛(𝐶𝑛 ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢) or 𝑃𝑛(not 𝐶𝑛 ∣ 𝑎; 𝑢) is greater.
Combining this definitionwith Definition 11.1 yields a characterization of high-
er-order vagueness for all 𝑛. Now, the threshold 𝜖𝑛,𝑢 has to be understood as
fuzzy and this gives rise to a fuzzy fractal9 set with no crisp boundaries even in
the limit. There is some indirect evidence for the fractal nature of higher-order
vagueness in Hampton et al. (2012). In practice, of course, an agent will not ac-
tually possess or construct the threshold 𝜖𝑛,𝑢 for all 𝑛, only for first- and possi-
bly second-order borderline cases as there is no practical utility in having such
higher-order thresholds.
Vague properties can now be easily characterized.
Definition 11.4. A property is vague if and only if it is based on the community’s
corresponding vague concepts, either as an average or as an individual counter-
part.
Definition 11.4 covers both types of property, the average kind and the individ-
ual kind. It is deliberately vague as there are somewhat messy issues relating to
what happens if some members of the community have incorrect concepts and
also if some members are vague and others are precise about the same concept.
As should be obvious, the same sorts of observations, mutatis mutandis, hold for
vague properties as for vague concepts. However, propositions involving aver-
age vague properties are objectively true or false or indeterminate as the latter
are derived from the concepts of all the individuals in a community. But in gen-
eral there is no way to know with certainty which of these truth values actually
obtains as we have only approximate epistemic access to such a property.
Incidentally, the foregoing observations about how properties result from the
averaging of individual concepts may provide a new way of defining properties
as social constructs in a precise way. All sorts of averaging operations may be
utilized for this purpose based on the particular property being defined.
9A fractal is an object or quantity that displays “self-similarity” on all scales. See https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Fractal.
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11.3 The sorites paradox
The sorites paradox can be formulated for any vague property. It consists of the
following type of argument:
1. A hairless person is bald.
2. For all 𝑘, if a person with 𝑘 hairs is bald, then a person with 𝑘 + 1 hairs is
bald.
3. Therefore, all persons are bald.
Most proposed solutions to the paradox deny the second premise on either
semantic or epistemic grounds. Schiffer (2003: Chapter 5) does an able job of dis-
pelling such proposals. My resolution also denies the same premise but on psy-
chological grounds. First, consider an agent-relative concept-based (or individual
property-based) restatement of this premise:
• For all 𝑘, if A judges a person with 𝑘 hairs to be bald then he would judge
a person with 𝑘 + 1 hairs to be bald.
The key to the resolution is that such judgments are made on the basis ofmulti-
ple exemplars or a category prototype which is also based on multiple exemplars.
So it is quite possible for A to judge a person with 𝑘 hairs to be bald and then
judge a person with 𝑘 + 1 hairs to be only borderline bald for some definite or
fuzzy 𝑘⋆. This would be true even if we restricted our attention to all the exem-
plars in the sequence, that is, 1, 2, 3,… , 𝑘 that have already been judged by A to
be bald. As the value of 𝑘 increases, the distance from the early members of the
series (or from the dynamically changing prototype) keeps growing, their simi-
larity keeps dropping, and, at 𝑘⋆, A finds himself with a borderline case that is
not clearly bald. This follows easily from Definition 11.1.
I am not saying that there is a definite cutoff between bald and not bald as
many attempts at solution do; I am saying there is either a precise or fuzzy cutoff
between clearly bald and borderline bald (and also between borderline bald and
not bald). Whether 𝑘⋆ is a precise or fuzzy number depends on whether A’s
threshold 𝜖𝑢 is a precise or fuzzy number. Moreover,A’s own cutoff will change
with the situation 𝑢 in which he is asked to make the judgments because 𝜖𝑢
depends on 𝑢. Finally, different agents will have different cutoffs because their
thresholds will generally be a little different.
The reason why the sorites argument seems plausible is that its formulation
tricks us into consciously focusing on just a single exemplar: the previous case
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𝑘 in the second premise. Because our judgments about vague concepts are typi-
cally subpersonal and nonconscious, we are not aware of the multiple exemplars
1, 2, 3,… , (𝑘 − 1), and 𝑘 (and we are not aware of the thresholds) that go into our
judgments. Indeed, our judgments also lack the kind of firm conviction we have
in judging that 2 + 2 = 4 and we may waffle over the exact value of 𝑘⋆. So the
sorites works by forcing us to make intermediate judgments in a conscious and
unnatural way and then freeing us to judge the conclusion that all persons are
bald in a nonconscious natural way.
Since properties are abstract social constructs built out of community mem-
bers’ individual concepts, it follows that the agent-independent property version
of the sorites paradox will also have the same kind of resolution. That is, there
will be some function of the individual 𝑘⋆ values for each agent that yields some
social cutoff 𝐾⋆ although it will not be possible for anyone to know what its
precise or fuzzy value is.
11.4 Essentially contested concepts
Because practically every word in a natural language is vague, practically every
word is potentially evaluative, that is, it involves standards of judgment. These
standards result from the exemplars present in the definition of vagueness and the
calculation of distance from them and also from the thresholds. This observation
applies not only to weighty concepts like art,10 science,11 politics, and good but
also to mundane ones like bald and tall. Such concepts are inherently contestable
as pointed out by Gallie (1956) in a pioneering analysis because, in the context of
my model, individual and group agents may have somewhat different exemplars,
may consider somewhat different attributes for each exemplar, or may weight
these dimensions differently, and, as a consequence, arrive at potentially quite
different concepts with substantially less overlap than I have discussed so far.
My use of the term is wider than Gallie’s as he restricts it to traditional areas
of philosophy such as ethics, aesthetics, and political philosophy where contests
over the meaning of a word are endless and conceptual differences are greater.
But admittedly transitory and less material contests also occur over everyday
concepts such as bald that can therefore be assimilated to the same idea.
Besides, not all of Gallie’s necessary conditions seem essential to the core no-
tion. He offers seven: the concept must be evaluative, internally complex, vari-
ously describable, and undergo penumbral shift; the parties to the contest must
10The ensuing discussion has some relevance for attempts to define art. See Adajian (2012).
11The discussion that follows has some relevance for the demarcation problem in the philosophy
of science. See Popper (1935/2002).
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be aware of the contest and must share an original exemplar; and the contest it-
self must enable the original exemplar’s “achievement” to be optimally developed
or at least sustained. Of these, the first four result from my model of vagueness,
and the last three can be dropped. In particular, a vague concept’s attributes make
it internally complex and also variously describable by altering either some at-
tributes themselves or their values or their relative weights. It is also susceptible
to penumbral shift. This suggests the following definition.
Definition 11.5. A concept is essentially contestable if and only if it is vague.
Since most concepts are vague and therefore evaluative, language is an ago-
nistic site of innumerable large or small potential contests against a background
of partially shared (conventional) meanings. The actual disputes that take place
over the meaning and use of terms reflect the large or small differential interests
of the members of the linguistic community. Two individuals or groups may di-
verge over whether someone is bald or, more significantly, over whether some
policy is democratic.12 Thus vagueness has an extremely important consequence:
it gives language a normative and even amoral dimension. While the gross struc-
ture of meanings classifies and partially constitutes the entities individuated by
a society as described in Section 2.1 and Chapter 6, its fine structure as given by
the definitions in this chapter corresponds to and partially constitutes the con-
trasting values that prevail in society. As Wittgenstein (1953/1968: Section 242,
88) said: “If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement
not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments.” If com-
munication is understood as an identity between content conveyed and content
grasped, then Wittgenstein is fully right but, as I argued in Parikh (2001; 2006b;
2010), this identity condition is just an ideal limiting case that is seldom realized
in practice. Less than ideal communication is in fact the norm. This entire book
also reinforces the same point.
In Section 6.2, I described Taylor’s (1980/1999) arguments for an expressive di-
mension of language. It should now be clear that the constitutive role he assigns
to language is not restricted just to subject-referring emotions, social relation-
ships, and moral values but is widespread as it applies equally to ordinary words
such as bald and tall. The uses of such words, too, partially constitute their
contents. This kind of constitution does not make these contents linguistic: they
12Connolly (1993) offers an illuminating discussion of the contests surrounding fundamental
concepts in political theory such as politics, interests, power, and freedom. He goes on to show
how these debates are constitutive of politics itself and therefore how conceptual revision is a
necessary condition for political change.
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retain their abstract character. Moreover, vagueness in language is essential to
human beings because, given the fuzzy nature of the world as described in the
quote at this chapter’s start, it allows us to agree and disagree in subtler andmore
efficient ways about such matters that can only be subjective or intersubjective
but not objective, and the possibility of such flexible (dis)agreement is necessary
to our emotions, concerns, relationships, and moral lives.
Lastly, because properties may be viewed as appropriately derived averages
of the individual concepts in a community, it is not just vague language but also
vague properties that are normative in the sense discussed. Since most concepts
are vague, most properties are vague, and thus we get the somewhat startling
view that the individuated informational space or world described in Section 2.1
is largely one based on human norms.13 As I said in Section 1.2, one of the benefits
of approaching meaning via communication is that the normative character of
language and the world emerge in an especially clear light.
11.5 Back to communication
Recall from Section 7.7 that the CommunicationGame Γ𝑢 = (𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐺𝐺𝑢(𝜎),
𝑈𝐺𝑢(𝜑), 𝐺𝑢(𝜑)) = (𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 , 𝐺𝐺𝑢 , 𝑈𝐺𝑢 , 𝐺𝑢). As I have addressed locutionary
communication quite thoroughly already, I will confine myself to a few remarks
about where vagueness may alter the foregoing analysis. It turns out that the con-
ceptual difficulties it poses do not overly complicate our semantic frameworks.
One somewhat new phenomenon that arises with vague concepts is how pre-
cise an agent needs to make his utterance to balance the conflicting demands of
costs and benefits. If A makes the content more precise, then it may be more
costly but may also yield greater benefits depending on the nature of his goals.
This is similar but not identical to the issue of how much to explicitly disam-
biguate the lexical and structural ambiguities in a sentence as discussed in Sec-
tion 8.4. There, the issue had to do with the particular sentence that was optimal
in 𝐺𝐺𝑢 to capture the same optimal content from 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 . With vagueness, the
issue is how precise to make the content itself and, therefore, the corresponding
sentence. This requires us to look at 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 rather than 𝐺𝐺𝑢 .
For example, the question before A might be whether he should convey the
content 𝜎 = Bill is very bald or 𝜎 ′ = Bill is bald to B in some utterance situation
13Vagueness is not the only language-related source of normativity. The Romantic conception
of language provides another way for norms to arise through language. A third way is based
on the speech act theory of Austin (1975) and especially Habermas (1976/1998; 1988/1998).
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𝑢 based on some Setting Game 𝑆𝐺𝑢 . The former content would more tightly cir-
cumscribe the range of baldness conveyed and this may be desirable on account
of the response A wishes to elicit from B in 𝑢 and the effect it might have on B
in 𝑢.
Specifically, let the Setting Game 𝑆𝐺𝑢 be one where B faces a decision about
whether or not to date Bill andA has information that can help her. Assume it is
common knowledge in 𝑢 that A is a well-wisher of B and that B prefers not to
date Bill if he were very bald but would be okay with it if he were somewhat bald.
Owing to this common knowledge, B generally trusts A’s judgment and, other
things being equal, would prefer not to go against his word. Further, assume Bill
can be either very bald or just bald as far asB knows butA knows it is the former
that is true.14 Note the quite realistic and complicated preferences and knowledge
the two agents have in the situation. This somewhat involved scenario together
with the decision problem 𝑆𝐺𝑢 induces the Content Selection Game 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 shown
in Figure 11.1.
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Figure 11.1: A Content Selection Game with vague contents
Now, there are two initial situations 𝑠 and 𝑠′ in the center of the diagram in-
stead of just one as we had in Figures 7.1 and 8.9. The first of these is factual and
is a part of 𝑢 and contains the fact that Bill is very bald. The second situation is
also a part of 𝑢 and includes the counterfactual possibility that Bill is just bald.A
knows 𝑠 is factual but B does not and so both agents have to consider both initial
situations. In the absence of any further information, the prior probabilities 𝜌,
𝜌′ can both be taken to be 0.5.15 In both situations, A can convey either 𝜎 or 𝜎 ′
14It is the property of being very bald that matters here, not the concept, and, as I said earlier, the
property does allow objective truth.
15There is a certain subtlety involved here because A knows that 𝑠 is factual and therefore that
𝜌 = 1 for him. One could say either that the game is played prior to his knowing this (the usual
assumption in standard game theory) or, what I prefer, that they have common knowledge ofB’s belief of equiprobability. That is, A adopts B’s ignorance for the sake of the situation.
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assuming that when Bill is bald, that is, in 𝑠′,A could be said to exaggerate Bill’s
baldness if he were to choose 𝜎 . These choices lead to two ovals or information
sets (as we had in the earlier partial information games) and then to B’s possible
responses 𝑎 = don’t date Bill and 𝑎′ = date Bill.
The preferences described informally above together with the slightly greater
cost of 𝜎 translate into the numerical payoffs shown in Figure 11.1. It is a little
tedious to go through how each pair of numbers is arrived at so I will explain
just two pairs. Consider the path 𝑠, 𝜎 , 𝑎 on the upper right. Here, in the unnamed
terminal situation that results, A has accurately conveyed that Bill is very bald
as that is the fact in 𝑠 and B has chosen not to date Bill. Both parties are happy
with the outcome given their preferences and so both get positive payoffs of +7
and +5, respectively. Now consider the path 𝑠, 𝜎 ′, 𝑎 on the upper left. Here,A has
chosen the slightly vaguer and cheaper content 𝜎 ′ but B’s decision remains the
same so A gets a slightly higher payoff of +8. On the other hand, B has chosen
not to date Bill despite receiving the content that Bill is just bald (rather than
very bald) so, while she is happy with the outcome since 𝑠 contains the fact that
Bill is very bald, she is also a little conflicted because she has gone against A’s
judgment that Bill is just bald (and that, in effect, it is okay to date Bill). So she
gets a positive payoff of +3 which is a little lower than she got in the first case.
All the other payoff numbers can be analyzed in a similar way. Perhaps the key
thing to note is that there is a combination of cooperation and conflict in this
Content Selection Game.16
I have gone into some detail to show how the preferences and payoffs are
determined by psychological and social factors in the utterance situation of an
intricate and nuanced sort. I repeat what I said in Section 8.6: a great diversity of
human and social phenomena get resolved into relatively few numerical slots, the
prior probabilities and the various payoffs. In this instance, however, the game
tree has grown more complex with many more branches and so there are more
numbers than before to be set.
This completes the description of the relevant 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 in Γ𝑢 . Its more complex
form has nothing to do with vagueness per se. It all depends on 𝑢 and I happened
to include a choice between a relatively more precise statement and a less precise
one as this kind of occurrence is not uncommon. The (Nash) solution to this
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 is that A should choose to convey 𝜎 = Bill is very bald in 𝑠, which is the
situation that matters since it is factual. As yet, B does not even know 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢
exists as nothing has been uttered. But when A does utter something like 𝜑 =
16It is possible to complicate the model further by noting that the property of being bald or
very bald is an average of the individual properties of the members of the community and so is
epistemically inaccessible.This would make the payoffs depend on the beliefs of the two agents
and would require the psychological games of Geanakoplos et al. (1989).
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bill is very bald as part of 𝐺𝐺𝑢(𝜎) and B interprets the utterance via 𝑈𝐺𝑢(𝜑)
as conveying 𝜎 , she can then construct and play 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 . When she does this, her
part of the (Nash) solution will be to respond with 𝑎 = don’t date Bill.Awill thus
get a payoff of +7 and B of +5 by playing 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 .
I have mentioned both full rationality and partial rationality. In the partial in-
formation games that constitute the (locutionary and illocutionary) global game,
full rationality is likely to operate as those games essentially involve comparing
probabilities based on Equation 6 from Section 8.1.5. Even here, there are fur-
ther simplifications that I will describe in the next chapter that make it easier
to be fully rational. But when more complex calculations of the kind shown in
Figure 11.1 are involved and when they have to be done in real time, resource
bounds are likely to kick in, making full rationality harder to employ. In such
circumstances, there will be a variety of measures the agent may adopt: using
a fragmentary or approximate form of 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 ; using a different model of payoffs
and solutions as dictated, for example, by a theory such as Kahneman&Tversky’s
(1979) prospect theory; using heuristics to solve the game; or a combination of
these. As the theory of partial rationality is still in its infancy, it is best to simply
display the full model and outline the solution without trying to anticipate how
it would be implemented. On the addressee’s side, often she may see only the
fragment of the game issuing from the actual content conveyed but there will be
times when she might want to think about what alternative contents the speaker
could have conveyed but chose not to.
How the issue of common knowledge of 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 should be dealt with is unclear.
One could baldly assume it despite all the partial information the agents are likely
to have about the game. As handling the alternative possibilities is messy, I will
just leave the matter unresolved with the warning that realism about the details
is going to be quite thorny.This is where games with unaware players of the kind
studied by Halpern & Rego (2006; 2007) are likely to be of use.
There is no need to go through 𝐺𝐺𝑢(𝜎) and 𝑈𝐺𝑢(𝜑) in detail. Both involve
four constraints: Phonetic, Syntactic, Semantic, and Flow. I will confine myself
to the Semantic Constraint that says that every word in an utterance is trans-
formed by a conventional map into its conventional meaning(s) and then further
transformed by a referential map into its referential meaning(s).
So far, the conventional meanings of a word have been its conventionally asso-
ciated andmore or less shared properties. But, as mentioned in Chapter 3, sharing
a language partly involves sharing its conventional meanings but now, in light
of our discussion of vagueness, it becomes clear that there is at best an overlap
among, rather than common knowledge of, the concepts (or the corresponding
individual, not average, properties) associated with a word.
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It is convenient to say that each conventional meaning for an agent is the
word’s conventionally associated concept (rather than individual property), and
each referential meaning is the corresponding individual or property into which
the former is mapped relative to the utterance situation 𝑢.
word⟶ conventional meaning(s) 𝑢⟶ referential meaning(s)
Symbolically expressed for each agent separately, this becomes:
𝜔 ⟶𝐶𝜔 𝑢⟶𝑃𝜔
assuming the concept 𝐶𝜔 is converted into the corresponding property 𝑃𝜔 in
𝑢. The 𝑢 on top of the second arrow implies that it is an argument of the refer-
ential map together with the conventional meaning. This schema combines the
internal and external significance of language as claimed earlier. It allows agents
to compute referential meanings based on the conventional meanings in their
heads and to convey abstract propositions that are not in their heads.
Consider now an utterance by A to B in 𝑢 of the sentence 𝜑 = bill is very
bald. Then the two maps above will apply to each of the four words in the utter-
ance. As our interest is in bald, we get the picture:
bald⟶𝐶bald 𝑢⟶𝑃bald
Each concept and property can be understood as marked by the relevant agentA or B implying that there are actually two such arrow diagrams for the word,
one for each agent.The vague concept 𝐶bald can be more or less any of the many
situated concepts that A (or B) has used in the past or it can be some average of
these. Further, in the current situation 𝑢, it gets transformed via a new 𝑢-relative
concept into its corresponding vague property. That is, the concept 𝐶bald that
is the conventional meaning shifts to a related concept 𝐶′bald relative to 𝑢 and
thence to the corresponding property. This shift is required to accommodate the
different kinds of uses of bald that may occur – for example, in the sentences
she won’t date bill – he’s bald and bill isn’t bald – he needs a haircut.
Here, the penumbra of the same agent’s concept shifts in accord with the use
by accessing different exemplars or attributes or weights. The transformation of
𝐶bald to the shifted concept 𝐶′bald also depends on truth as discussed in Sec-
tion 10.4. Working out the details is likely to be a bit involved but the broad
contours of penumbral shift, the change of truth value of the same sentence in
different situations, do not seem to raise any special problems once the general
205
11 Vagueness
context-sensitivity of language is accounted for. This can be displayed as an ex-
tended Semantic Constraint as follows:
bald⟶𝐶bald 𝑢⟶𝐶′bald 𝑢⟶𝑃bald
The property that is the referential meaning can be taken to be either the in-
tersubjectively derived average property or the subjective property and, in the
former case, it can be assumed that each agent has just a partial and “vague” un-
derstanding of the content of the utterance. Also, with an actual utterance of 𝜑,
there would be more than two diagrams as the word bald is ambiguous besides
being vague. For example, it can also mean plain or blunt as in a bald state-
ment. So there will be two or more conventional meanings, each of which will
be mapped into their respective referential meanings for each agent. But we can
ignore this complexity here. I will also omit consideration of the use of very with
bald but it can be said in passing that it makes the threshold 𝜖𝑢 more stringent.
A third question to ask is what made it possible for A to choose 𝜎 and utter
𝜑 in the first place. In order to do so, he would have had to determine that Bill
is (very) bald and to make that determination he would have had to resort to the
earlier calculations. That is, he would have ascertained that ∣𝑃(𝐶′bald ∣Bill; 𝑢) −
𝑃(not 𝐶′bald ∣Bill; 𝑢)∣ ≥ 𝜖𝑢 and that 𝑃(𝐶′bald ∣Bill; 𝑢) > 𝑃(not 𝐶′bald ∣Bill; 𝑢), ap-
plying Definition 11.1 to the shifted concept. Because the threshold is more likely
to be fuzzy, and fuzzy numbers involve membership functions, the calculation
will involve some situated rule based on interval arithmetic for deciding what de-
gree of membership is sufficient for counting someone very bald. In other words,
such calculations are an integral part of content selection and natural language
generation. Since most words in language are vague, this shows that speakers
have quite a bit to do and it is something of a psycholinguistic mystery how so
much is accomplished so quickly. Perhaps the human brain’s parallel processing
just is very fast with such probabilistic comparisons. On B’s side, she simply has
to access her concept 𝐶bald and then her shifted concept 𝐶′bald and correspond-
ing property 𝑃bald, although in circumstances where the truth of the proposition
conveyed matters in determining it as described in Section 10.4, she would have
to go through the same arithmetic with her own threshold.
The rest of the analysis for such an example is identical to what we have seen
with nonvague language.Thus, once one has the right approach to vagueness, its
apparent hurdles seem to melt away.
I have construed the exemplar and prototype approaches of cognitive psychol-
ogy in certain ways to characterize vagueness, approach the sorites paradox in
a new way, analyze essentially contested concepts, and describe certain relevant
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aspects of vague communication.Themodels appear to have some empirical sup-
port as well though I want to emphasize the kind of reasoning that is involved in
addressing these problems. More realistic models of vagueness will doubtless be-
come available but the underlying structure of explanation I have offered is not
likely to change materially. For example, the explanation for the sorites based on
the presence of multiple exemplars as opposed to a single exemplar is likely to
survive further refinements of the underlying models of vagueness.
11.6 Communication and categorization
I want to now briefly point out that I have so far applied ideas of categorization
to communication but it is possible to go in the reverse direction as well. There
could be a two-way interaction between the study of category formation and lan-
guage use. One could applymymodel of communication to categorization and, in
particular, compare the exemplar and prototype approaches in a domain where
these competing ideas have not been compared before, namely their potential to
explain the use of vague concepts in communication. This could ground psycho-
logical categorization in a broader context of linguistic interaction, which could
further our understanding of its social nature. This integration of mathematical
models of category formation and a mathematical theory of communication is a
contribution to both fields separately as well as to the growing interdisciplinary
effort to bridge pure psychological and language-related research.
Incidentally, this model also provides a basic scaffolding for formulating com-
putational models of vague utterance generation and interpretation that can be
applied to building dialogue and conversational agents, question-answering sys-
tems, and related areas in artificial intelligence.
I cannot address these matters here but do briefly discuss the generation of
conventional word meanings in Part V.
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12.1 The connection with psycholinguistics
The foregoing analysis presents the broad framework for (locutionary) commu-
nication. Psycholinguists study the actual processes of utterance production and
comprehension. So the Communication Game Γ𝑢 has to be specialized and re-
fined in various ways to fit with their experimental data. Fortunately, the basic
approach of Equilibrium Semantics is largely compatible with the findings re-
ported in, for example, the textbook by Fernández & Cairns (2011: Chapters 5–8)
and elsewhere.
As confirmed by Swinney (1979); Onifer & Swinney (1981); and Kawamoto
(1993), multiple senses of ambiguous lexical items are activated and disambigu-
ated exactly as dictated by games of partial information. Rodd et al. (2002) found
that homonyms, that is, words like bank with unrelated conventional meanings
take more time to process than polysemes, words like eye or school with related
senses. Pylkkänen et al. (2006) and Frisson (2009) suggest that the conventional
meanings of polysemous words are likely to be relatively abstract and impover-
ished underspecified cores relative to the full meanings they are given during pro-
cessing. This implies some further alterations to our conception of conventional
meaning that I discuss in Chapter 17. These findings are based on ingenious ex-
periments rather than mathematical models and so this provides an opportunity
to connect the latter from Equilibrium Semantics with the former. This kind of
work cannot be pursued here but I say a little about one refinement to my model
to illustrate the point.
As I said in Section 8.1, the meaning and parse vectors 𝑥 and 𝑦 are parts of the
content vector 𝑧 = (𝑥, 𝑦) with 2𝑛 components where 𝑛 is the number of words in
the sentence.This vector ranges over all the possible lexical meanings and parses
of 𝜑 uttered in 𝑢. I repeat Equation 6 from Section 8.1.5 below for the reader’s
convenience.
𝑧⋆ = argmax
𝑧
𝑃(𝑧𝑘 ∣ 𝑧−𝑘 ; 𝑢) = argmax𝑧 𝑃(𝑧; 𝑢), 𝑘 = 1,… , 2𝑛
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This can be broken down into two symmetric equations, one for meanings and
one for parses, as follows:
(18) 𝑥⋆ = argmax
𝑥,𝑦
𝑃(𝑥𝑖 ∣ 𝑥−𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 , 𝑦−𝑖 ; 𝑢) 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛
(19) 𝑦⋆ = argmax
𝑥,𝑦
𝑃(𝑦𝑖 ∣ 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥−𝑖 , 𝑦−𝑖 ; 𝑢) 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛
In real-time computations, the meanings and parses of earlier words can affect
those of later words but not vice versa unless backtracking is required owing to
a garden-path sentence or similar problem. So the symmetric equations above
can be modified to reflect this temporality.
(20) 𝑥⋆ = argmax
𝑥,𝑦
𝑃(𝑥𝑖 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑖−1, 𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑖−1, 𝑦𝑖 ; 𝑢) 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛
(21) 𝑦⋆ = argmax
𝑥,𝑦
𝑃(𝑦𝑖 ∣ 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑖−1, 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑖−1; 𝑢) 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛
Equations 20 and 21 capture some of the constraints on real-time sequential pro-
cessing. These can be further refined to reflect different experimental results (e.g.
the fact that the comprehension of the underspecified core sense of a polysemous
word occurs instantaneously but the full meaning is realized only at the end of
the sentence, if at all – Frisson 2009).
At a more general level, it is far from clear from the data whether the vari-
ous games themselves are played or whether just equations like the ones above
involving probability comparisons are solved directly. Secondly, I have devel-
oped the broadest construal of Generation Games as including a model of the
addressee and the various partial information games. This is likely to require
some modifications. The Content Selection Game appears to be completely ab-
sent in psycholinguistic studies because the experiments start with an already
selected content to be conveyed. It is also unclear whether and how meanings
and parses interact in actual processing especially when we take account of the
different sites in the brain where such activity might occur. For example, it may
be that the utterance situation plays a greater role in the determination of opti-
mal meanings than in the determination of optimal parses.The same observation
also applies to phonetic processing. In other words, while the abstract framework
of Equilibrium Linguistics makes possible the interdependence of phonetics, syn-
tax, and semantics in relation to an utterance situation – which may be useful in
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building artificial agents – the psycholinguistic evidence may suggest that these
three types of content are not so closely coupled. If this turns out to be so, then
for psycholinguistic purposes a slightly less integrated framework can be devised
keeping its basic principles intact.
Such observations and others suggest the possibility that an entire suite of psy-
cholinguistic and neurolinguistic experiments may be conducted in light of Equi-
librium Linguistics and there is much scope for fruitful interactions between the
two. This could lead to one kind of unification of the separate fields – psycholin-
guistics and semantics – of the science of language mentioned in Section 1.4 and
at the end of Chapter 6. Current work in semantics is so remote from psycholin-
guistic practices that there is no easy way to bring them together. It is to the
credit of Equilibrium Linguistics that its results are both more general and more
precise than what exists in semantics and are therefore more directly testable.
12.2 The connection with natural language processing
Not only does my framework connect with psycholinguistics and neurolinguis-
tics, it also offers multiple bridges to computational linguistics and natural lan-
guage processing. Artificial intelligence involves different kinds of constraints
as compared with real-time human processing and is generally divided into log-
ical, statistical, and hybrid approaches, although most contemporary methods
involve some use of probabilities.
Hobbs (2004) provides an overview of logical techniques involving abduction
in natural language understanding. Recall from footnote 4 in Section 5.1 that in
abduction we conclude from an observable 𝑄 and a general principle 𝑃 ⇒ 𝑄
that 𝑃 must be the underlying reason that 𝑄 is true. We assume 𝑃 because it ex-
plains 𝑄. In practice, there may be many such possible 𝑃 ’s, some contradictory
with others, and therefore any method of abduction must include a method for
evaluating and choosing among alternative explanations. This provides an infer-
ence to the best explanation. Indeed, as I show now, the choice-based approach
of Equilibrium Semantics is just a species of abduction in which the choice struc-
ture is far more sophisticated and detailed than that provided by Hobbs or in the
literature.
Consider the game shown earlier in Figures 7.2 and 8.1 and repeated for con-
venience in Figure 12.1. Recall that 𝜑1 = bill, 𝜎1 = Bill Smith, and 𝜎 ′1 = Bill Jones.
The speaker is conveying 𝜎1 in 𝑠1 and 𝜎 ′1 in 𝑠1′ . Both facts imply that A utters
𝜑1. So if we identify 𝑃 withA is conveying 𝜎1 and 𝑃 ′ withA is conveying 𝜎 ′1 and,
further, if we identify 𝑄 withA utters 𝜑1, we can write 𝑃 ⇒ 𝑄 and 𝑃 ′ ⇒𝑄. The
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Figure 12.1: Semantic lexical game 𝑔1
pure abductive task is then to infer which of 𝑃 and 𝑃 ′ best explains the observable
𝑄. But the game 𝑔1 in Figure 12.1 resolves precisely this question in conjunction
with the other partial information games associated with the whole utterance.
As we have seen, this complex strategic inference results in the Fundamental
Equation. Thus, strategic inference is a more refined form of abduction.
Those pursuing purely logical approaches do not seem to realize that their set-
ups miss a great deal of structure that is present in the problem.This is part of the
reason they tend to be rather brittle and do not scale well in real natural language
understanding applications. This lack cannot be rectified simply by adding in a
few costs here and there as Hobbs attempts to do. A strategic inference, on the
other hand, is a very tightly knit structure containing all kinds of relations among
the various bits of information in the problem. That is why we get something as
elegant and powerful as Equation 6.
Incidentally, these observations are orthogonal to the issue of how so-called
real world knowledge is best represented as I also said in Section 8.1. Both pure
abduction and more refined strategic inference require it as any full-fledged ap-
proach would. Some of it may be present in the encyclopedic entries for lexical
items and some of it in some kind of knowledge base. It would enter the com-
putation of meaning both through conventional (lexical) meanings and through
the prior probabilities in the locutionary global game. But, importantly, the need
for explicit representation of some of it would be circumvented by using corpus-
based probabilities for different alternatives. But it cannot be avoided altogether.
Consider the following example:
(22) The weight went through the wall because it was made of iron.
Here, some world knowledge has to be used to set the conditional probabilities
for the two possible referents of the pronoun. The probability for weight would
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presumably be higher than for wall. We also used such world knowledge in the
earlier examples, including the simple sentence bill ran (e.g. knowing that politi-
cians run in elections). Humans have ready access to it so it can be assumed to be
available. For the sentence above, it is enough to say that most human interlocu-
tors would have the background knowledge that iron would go through many
ordinary materials and so the possible referent weight has a higher probability.
This is really all that is required for a semantic theory for humans in my opinion.
It is not a gap in the theory to say we cannot assign higher or lower probabilities
without such background assumptions. Artificial agents, on the other hand, do
not have such knowledge so it has to be made explicit. This is best done in the
context of actually building such agents. In any case, such orthogonal matters
cannot be addressed here but suffice it to say that Equilibrium Linguistics offers
a hybrid approach to the problem.
Statistical natural language processing has exploded in the last two decades
and the textbooks by Manning & Schütze (1999) and Jurafsky & Martin (2000;
2009) have been quickly outpaced by ongoing work.
Perhaps the key connection between Equilibrium Linguistics and contempo-
rary approaches in statistical NLP is that they both see the resolution of ambi-
guity broadly construed as the common feature of many problems that arise in
communication and other tasks. Jurafsky & Martin (2009: Section 1.2) make this
observation up front and it is something I have emphasized in all my work. Am-
biguity is not just lexical or structural or phonetic but occurs wherever there are
multiple possible contents that can be phonetic, syntactic, or semantic, the last
category of which includes all of pragmatics and discourse.
In my view, and as Jurafsky & Martin (2009: 592) also say, this key problem
remains unsolved despite many advances in computational lexical semantics and
in parsing.Manymodels such as Naive Bayes, HiddenMarkovModels, Maximum
Entropy Models, Conditional Random Fields, and others have been developed to
address a variety of tasks.1
The results of Section 8.1 show that Equilibrium Linguistics can potentially of-
fer a more satisfying theoretical foundation for such statistical models by ground-
ing them in rational human agency in a way that is philosophically sound and
empirically adequate and can also offer more general computational techniques.
All the models listed in the previous paragraph make the basic assumption that
communication is a stochastic process with no further constraints. The Com-
munication Games developed in this book capture the further constraint that
1See Rabiner (1989); Sutton & McCallum (2006); Manning & Schütze (1999: Chapters 7, 9); and
Jurafsky & Martin (2009: Chapters 5, 6, 20).
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communication is more or less rational. This brings in more cutting power and
enables sharper conclusions to be drawn as Theorem 8.5 and the more general
Theorem 8.6 show.
For example, it is easy to see that Equation 6 is more general than the Naive
Bayes equation for word sense disambiguation:
𝑠′ = argmax
𝑠𝑘
𝑃(𝑠𝑘 ∣ 𝑐)
= argmax
𝑠𝑘
[log𝑃(𝑠𝑘) + ∑
𝑣𝑗∈𝑐
log𝑃(𝑣𝑗 ∣ 𝑠𝑘)]
where the 𝑠𝑘 are the word senses, the 𝑣𝑗 are the words in the context 𝑐, and the
𝑃 represents probability.2 The key generalization is that the conditioning (and
conditioned) variables in my equation are the “senses” and parses themselves, as
opposed to words, because of the circular and fixed point nature of my concep-
tion.
While Hidden Markov Models are also not sufficiently general as they rely
essentially on Bayesian inference, Maximum Entropy Markov Models and Con-
ditional Random Fields are sufficiently general and do allow in principle for the
kind of fixed point inference that occurs in Equation 6. All these models involve
manipulations of conditional probabilities and the latter two make it possible
to condition on a wide range of features including the ones required by Equa-
tion 6. But because these models are not based on rationality, they cannot derive
Equation 6 itself and cannot conclude that the probability distributions involved
in communication are compatible distributions. In practice, moreover, semantic
and syntactic (and phonetic) contents are seldom thrown in together as they are
in Equilibrium Linguistics so even though the latter two models could include
the relevant conditioning variables, they almost never do.
To illustrate how bringing in rationality can generalize such purely probabilis-
tic considerations, consider the problem of classifying a piece of text as spam or
not spam. This example also shows, incidentally, how the tools of Equilibrium
Linguistics can be extended to related tasks such as text classification as men-
tioned earlier in Section 7.3. A rudimentary version of the spam identification
task can be modeled by the simple game shown in Figure 12.2. Being spam or not
spam is just a more abstract kind of content of an utterance.
Clearly, the Nash solution involves comparing expected values of payoffs
rather than pure probabilities. By adjusting the B payoffs we can get different,
more fine-grained results. For example, ordinarily we would want false positives
2See Manning & Schütze (1999: Section 7.2.1) for more details.
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Figure 12.2: Text classification game 𝑔𝑡𝑐
(i.e. classifying some text as spamwhen it is not spam) to be penalized more heav-
ily. If it is assumed that the sender in 𝑠 is spamming and in 𝑠′ is not spamming
then such a heavier penalty can be realized by making 𝑐′B sufficiently low, that is,
bymaking the cost of interpreting a text that is not spam as spam high. If, instead,
we were doing sentiment analysis, a false negative, that is, a negative sentiment
in 𝑠 interpreted as positive may be penalized more heavily by making 𝑐B suffi-
ciently low. And so on. Needless to say, this only scratches the surface of the
text classification problem but it shows how Equilibrium Linguistics offers addi-
tional degrees of freedom. This flexibility carries over to the much harder task of
inferring the content of communication as well, as made clear by Figure 8.6 and
Theorem 8.6, because it is also just a classification problem. It can also help in
natural language generation and in building conversational agents and in other
tasks such as machine translation (see Chapter 21) and information extraction.
I hope I have convinced the reader that Equilibrium Linguistics has something
to offer to statistical NLP. Its main contribution is its comprehensive definition
of the problem and its better grounded and more general solution. I believe it is
the closest any theory in semantics has come to computational accounts.
As one would expect, the illumination goes in the other direction from statisti-
cal NLP to Equilibrium Linguistics as well. Recall from Section 7.3 where the Flow
Constraint and partial information games were first discussed that the probabil-
ities 𝜌 were taken to be the prior conditional probabilities thatA was conveying
a certain content given that he was conveying the other meanings and parse
trees of the rest of the sentence in the utterance situation 𝑢. This assignment
was based on the empirical observation that the meanings and parses of words
are interdependent in a rational utterance. As statistical NLP shows, such condi-
tioning variables can be thought of very generally as a wide variety of features.
For example, if the word brown is capitalized in a written sentence, it helps the
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reader to see that it is likely to be a name rather than an adjective. So features
like capitalization can further aid disambiguation. In human understanding, too,
such features can supplement the primary features of semantic, syntactic, and
phonetic contents. All that is required is to augment the conditioning variables
in the prior probabilities by such extended features and then carry through the
game-theoretic analysis as before.
This shows that if the approaches of Equilibrium Linguistics and statistical
NLP are combined then both can be enriched, the former by addingmore features
to the list of conditioning variables, and the latter by bringing in both rationality
as well as a more satisfying and foundational basis for the results.
I believe Part III gives a more or less complete solution to the problem of locution-
ary communication that is, as advertised in Section 1.4, philosophically sound,
mathematically solid, computationally tractable, and empirically ade-
quate. The Setting Game, Content Selection Game, Generation Game, and In-
terpretation Game that constitute a (locutionary) Communication Game are de-
veloped in detail. So are the four Constraints: Phonetic, Syntactic, Semantic, and
Flow. The solution I offer shows, moreover, that partial information games are
universal in the algebraic sense discussed in Section 10.1. Frege’s two historic
principles of compositionality and context are both reconciled and transcended.
I develop a theory of vagueness and address the sorites, relate vagueness to essen-
tially contested concepts, and model vague communication. Finally, as promised
in Section 1.4, I connect arguments in philosophy, linguistics, psychology, and
computer science, unifying them through the framework of Equilibrium Linguis-
tics.
In the next Part, I consider illocutionary communication and explore the wider
varieties of meaning.
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Illocutionary meaning and
beyond
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Much of this Part falls under the topic of the global game 𝐺𝑢(𝜑) = 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) ∪
𝐼𝐺𝑢(𝜑). I deferred considering this aspect of meaning as it requires some new
insights that are best studied separately. Illocutionary meaning includes free en-
richment, implicature, modulation, illocutionary force, and perhaps other things,
all very interesting phenomena that allow speakers to convey meanings beyond
what is conveyed directly by the words in an utterance, that is, beyond locution-
arymeaning.The same sorts of Constraints operate in this realm.There is no need
for a new Phonetic or Syntactic Constraint; they are the same as with locutionary
meaning as it is the same sentence 𝜑 that gives rise to illocutionary meaning.The
Semantic Constraint, which generates the possible illocutionary meanings of an
utterance, is no longer based on the conventional meaning of the words in the
sentence and so does not split into two sub-Constraints, Conventional and Refer-
ential, as happenedwith locutionarymeaning. It is based instead on two different
sub-Constraints of Relevance and Distance that are needed only for illocution-
ary meaning, not for locutionary meaning. They perform the same function as
the earlier sub-Constraints of generating the possible (illocutionary) meanings.
The Flow Constraint then disambiguates these possibilities via partial informa-
tion games as before. Thus, there are many similarities between locutionary and
illocutionary meaning, the fundamental one being that the possibilities are first
generated and then disambiguated. This is one reason to take all of meaning as
belonging to the single realm of semantics as argued in Section 5.4.
After describing how the illocutionary meaning of an utterance is computed,
I will look at further kinds of meaning that lie beyond illocutionary meaning.
At the end of the Part, we will classify all these meanings and discuss the issue
of what literal meaning is. But, as was pointed out in Section 5.4, all these dis-
tinctions are somewhat indeterminate, even the so-called primary one between
literal meaning and implicature.
I will start by discussing the two sub-Constraints of Relevance and Distance
in this chapter and the next.
I had defined relevance as the value of information, an idea from choice theory,
in Parikh (1992; 2006b; 2010). In the later two references, I had extended the stan-
13 Relevance
dard decision-theoretic notion to game theory, though this extension remained
incomplete there for technical reasons. In this chapter, I complete it.
I first examine the general notion more closely, starting with some of the limi-
tations of the way the Relevance Theorists have defined it, and then broadening
the discussion to my own idea.
13.1 The Relevance-Theoretic concept of relevance
RelevanceTheory1 has been around now for over thirty years and has contributed
many rich insights to the fields of semantics, pragmatics, and the psychology
of language comprehension. Yet, the formulation of its foundational concept re-
mains weak. This is partly because the idea of relevance is extraordinarily diffi-
cult to pin down. But it is also partly because the Relevance-Theoretic approach
is flawed in certain key respects. This weakness threatens the integrity and op-
eration of the theory because both of its primary pillars – how gaps between
sentence meaning2 and speaker meaning are to be filled and how, more broadly,
utterance comprehension occurs – rest upon computations based on relevance.
For this reason, a close examination of its eponymous concept is warranted. Here
is their own description.
When is an input relevant? Intuitively, an input (a sight, a sound, an ut-
terance, a memory) is relevant to an individual when it connects with back-
ground information he has available to yield conclusions that matter to him:
say, by answering a question he had in mind, improving his knowledge on
a certain topic, settling a doubt, confirming a suspicion, or correcting a mis-
taken impression. According to relevance theory, an input is relevant to an
individual when its processing in a context of available assumptions yields a
POSITIVE COGNITIVE EFFECT. A positive cognitive effect is a worthwhile
difference to the individual’s representation of the world: a true conclusion,
1There are many accounts of the theory in the literature. I have referred primarily to Sperber &
Wilson (1986; 2002) and Wilson & Sperber (1986; 2004).
2Relevance theorists take sentence meaning to be a kind of logical form that is an incomplete
proposition as opposed to the mainstream Gricean view that it more or less coincides with
literal meaning modulo certain linguistically mandated items that need to be filled in contex-
tually. My own view, described in Parikh (2010) and in this book, is more radical in that I believe
there is nothing like sentence meaning involved in interpretation, just conventionally given
word meanings and utterance meaning based on a generalized compositionality, as discussed
in Part III. That is, the difference between the Relevance-Theoretic view and the Gricean view
is one of degree, not one of kind – as mine is.
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for example. False conclusions are not worth having; they are cognitive ef-
fects, but not positive ones.
The most important type of cognitive effect is a CONTEXTUAL IMPLICA-
TION, a conclusion deducible from the input and the context together, but
from neither input nor context alone. For example, on seeing my train arriv-
ing, I might look at my watch, access my knowledge of the train timetable,
and derive the contextual implication that my train is late (which may it-
self achieve relevance by combining with further contextual assumptions
to yield further implications). Other types of cognitive effect include the
strengthening, revision or abandonment of available assumptions. For ex-
ample, the sight of my train arriving late might confirmmy impression that
the service is deteriorating, or make me alter my plans to do some shopping
on the way to work. According to relevance theory, an input is RELEVANT
to an individual when, and only when, its processing yields such positive
cognitive effects.
Relevance is not just an all-or-none matter but a matter of degree. There
are potentially relevant inputs all around us, but we cannot attend to them
all. What makes an input worth picking out from the mass of competing
stimuli is not just that it is relevant, but that it is MORE relevant than any
alternative input available to us at that time. Intuitively, other things being
equal, the more worthwhile conclusions achieved by processing an input,
the more relevant it will be. According to relevance theory, other things
being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by process-
ing an input, the greater its relevance will be. Thus, the sight of my train
arriving one minute late may make little worthwhile difference to my rep-
resentation of the world, while the sight of it arriving half an hour late may
lead to a radical reorganization of my day, and the relevance of the two
inputs will vary accordingly.
What makes an input worth attending to is not just the cognitive effects
it achieves. In different circumstances, the same stimulus may be more or
less salient, the same contextual assumptions more or less accessible [my
emphasis], and the same cognitive effects easier or harder to derive. Intu-
itively, the greater the effort of perception, memory and inference required,
the less rewarding the input will be to process, and hence the less deserving
of attention. According to relevance theory, other things being equal, the
greater the PROCESSING EFFORT required, the less relevant the input will
be. Thus, RELEVANCE may be assessed in terms of cognitive effects and
processing effort:
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(1) Relevance of an input to an individual:
a. Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects
achieved by processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input
to the individual at that time.
b. Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended,
the lower the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.
(Wilson & Sperber 2004: 608–609)
The key word in the foregoing is worthwhile difference to the individual’s repre-
sentation of the world. Sperber and Wilson develop this idea through the “max-
imization” of positive cognitive effects relative to processing effort. Cognitive
effects are taken to be contextual implications or the strengthening, revision,
or abandonment of assumptions. This last equation – of cognitive effects with
contextual implications and other kinds of inference – is primarily where the
Relevance-Theoretic idea falls short in a number of ways.
13.1.1 The first difficulty
To start with, it seems that there is no practical way for the individual to assess
which of many cognitive effects is greater. In most of their examples, the mag-
nitude of these effects is taken to be the number of contextual implications or
inferences each input generates. This raises the obvious difficulty that if 𝑝 and 𝑞
are contextual implications of an input, are these to be taken as two propositions{𝑝, 𝑞} or as just the single conjunction {𝑝 ∧ 𝑞} or as the triple {𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑝 ∧ 𝑞}, and
so on? Is 𝑝 itself just one proposition or more than one?3 There is no unique way
to individuate implications and each way is equally arbitrary. While the authors
appeared to take this exclusively numerical route in Sperber & Wilson (1986),
they try to avoid it in their more recent Wilson & Sperber (2004: 609–610) by ex-
panding the scope of cognitive effects to other less quantitative aspects: “In the
first place, only some aspects of effect and effort (e.g. processing time, number
of contextual implications) are likely to be be measurable in absolute numerical
terms, while others (e.g. strength of implications, level of attention) are not.”
Unfortunately, their comparative approach is applicable only to the very sim-
plest of comparisons involving entailment of one input by another. If two inputs
were picked randomly from a large pool of inputs, the likelihood of their compa-
rability would be zero, making the determination of optimal relevance a rarity.
3For example, for some input an implication may be that the ball is round. Now, is that one
implication or two or more? It could be said that the implications are that the ball has a shape
and that this shape is round, and so on.
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13.1.2 The second difficulty
Theproblem of comparing the relevance of different inputs is in practice sidestep-
ped by bringing in the idea of accessibility mentioned in the first quote. Based
on the “definition” of relevance in (1) from the quote above, the following com-
prehension procedure is described in Wilson & Sperber (2004: 613):
Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure:
a. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test in-
terpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, impli-
catures, etc.) in order of accessibility.
b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (or abandoned).
But it is not clear what is accessible and there is a grave danger of circularity
because what is regarded as optimally relevant is usually what is most accessible
and vice versa. There is no explanation for why things always seem to turn out
this way. Why isn’t a less accessible interpretation ever optimally relevant?
Besides, nothing of consequence is said about an interlocutor’s expectations
of relevance. How much relevance is enough? This question is never addressed
though it plays a crucial role in stopping the process before a comparison of the
relevance of different interpretations can occur.
Their examples (e.g. Wilson & Sperber 2004, Sperber &Wilson 2002) are fram-
ed in a way that encourages the reader to conflate their own intuitive concept of
relevance with the Relevance-Theoretic one. They are lulled into thinking that
there is a definite procedure being followed when in fact a highly incomplete
and vague series of steps is described with crucial gaps filled in with one’s own
intuitions.
The problem is that no comparison between the relevance of competing inputs
is ever required because the comprehension procedure stops operating after the
first and most accessible input’s relevance invariably meets the addressee’s ex-
pectations of relevance.
Basically, we are simply told that certain interpretations are more accessible
than others based on commonsense reasoning that we employ, not the protago-
nists in their examples. By pointing out that the correct interpretation is the one
that is the most accessible, no real work is done by the theory because there is
no theory of accessibility. What starts off as an account of a relevance-theoretic
procedure for comprehension ends up as an accessibility-theoretic procedure but
there is, in fact, no such procedure made available by the theory because there is
no such theory to begin with.
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Unfortunately, even if an empirical theory of accessibility became available,
more serious difficulties with following the Relevance-Theoretic comprehension
procedure and evaluating relevance would still remain.
13.1.3 The third difficulty
The problem with the Relevance-Theoretic notion is graver still. Even its qualita-
tive notions appear, on closer inspection, to be on the wrong track conceptually.
As I said earlier, the key word in the first quote above was worthwhile differ-
ences to an individual’s representation of the world. In those paragraphs, rele-
vance is related to positive cognitive effects and positive cognitive effects are
related to worthwhile differences in an individual’s representation of the world.
These differences are cashed out initially in epistemic terms: “a true conclusion,
for example.” It is asserted that false conclusions are not worth having; they are
not positive cognitive effects. Later, such effects are elaborated in terms of the
number and strength of contextual implications, as we have seen.
Both of these dimensions of positive cognitive effects are misplaced. It is just
not true that false conclusions do not have positive cognitive effects. Indeed, most
if not all human beings entertain their share of false beliefs; it is precisely these
false beliefs that enable them to get by. The truth may be too unbearable and so
people invent all sorts of polite behaviors and euphemisms and other circumlo-
cutory modes of being that border on or are falsehoods. Not only that, even en-
tire systems of belief – like various religions and ideologies – may help alleviate
human suffering to a considerable degree while being completely false. People
typically choose hope over despair even when such a choice is not warranted.4
Often, believing something false will get a person into trouble but, depending
on how marginal the false belief is to the practical realities of life, the person
may in many cases be better off holding onto the false belief.5 This psychological
phenomenon is well known enough to not require further argument.
More importantly, though, it is the identification of cognitive effects with
the number and strength of contextual implications, the heart of the Relevance-
Theoretic view, that is the real problem. Implicit in this identification is the equa-
tion of effects with the amount of information extractable from an input rather
than with the value of that information to the individual. That is, a worthwhile
difference or effect is one that is valuable, not one that involves large amounts
4As Woody Allen has said: “More than any time in history mankind faces a crossroads. One
path leads to despair and utter hopelessness, the other to total extinction. Let us pray that we
have the wisdom to choose correctly.”
5“She loves me, she loves me not … .”
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of information. Once one has this clear insight – first expressed in Parikh (1992)
and later in Parikh (2006b; 2010) – then the conceptual flaw in the Relevance-
Theoretic notion becomes obvious. Simply put, more information is often but not
always better for the individual than less information because that additional in-
formation may simply not matter. Would you prefer a gift of the Encyclopedia
Brittanica or the winning lottery number?
It is to address such issues that Grice’s (1975; 1989c) maxim of quantity referred
to the purposes of the exchange. Suppose two bank robbers had robbed a bank
some years ago and one of them had hidden the loot without the knowledge of
the other at a river bank they frequented. Now, the first robber is dying and the
second asks him where the loot is, and he says:
(23) It is at the bank.
It appears prima facie that the financial bank should be more accessible and
should yield sufficient relevance to meet the second robber’s expectations be-
cause, asWillie Sutton reminded us, “that is where the money is.” But it is equally
arguable that the river bank is the right choice because both the robbers know
the location and it is possible to stash loot in such places. Indeed, with some
more reasoning it is clear that the dying robber meant the river bank because he
would otherwise have provided some more information about how to retrieve
the money from the financial bank (e.g. what the account number was, etc.). On
the other hand, the financial bank reading may have many more contextual im-
plications (e.g. how long the loot had been accumulating interest and how much
the balance might now be, whether it was in a savings account or certificate of
deposit, and so on). But, intuitively, all these implications are irrelevant to the
matter at hand.
It might be said that the context could be construed differently but such ma-
neuvers begin to beg the question. It is as if the context is being tailored to fit
our pre-theoretic notion of relevance which is then shown to yield an outcome
based on the Relevance-Theoretic notion resulting in an identity of the two.
It is the purposes of the exchange that are missing from the Relevance-Theo-
retic account. By confining worthwhile differences to the individual’s represen-
tation of the world, Relevance Theory treats relevance in a purely epistemic way.
There is no room for purposes or goals or preferences in this view. A better intu-
ition is that an input is relevant if it warrants a change in the individual’s intended
actions because this idea is intimately bound up in a concrete way with the pur-
poses and goals of the individual. Here, the term “action” includes both external
behavior as well as internal, that is, “mental” actions like assessing a statement
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as true and forming a corresponding belief. As I point out in Parikh (1992; 2006b;
2010), this is just the choice-theoretic notion of the value of information. It read-
ily admits of degrees of relevance and allows one to compare the relevance of
two inputs. And it more accurately captures the idea of worthwhile differences
because worth and value are one and the same thing.
13.1.4 The fourth difficulty
Lastly, the point made in the last paragraph above is worth making more broadly.
Relevance Theory, influenced by Grice, Chomsky, and Fodor as it is, faces an in-
surmountable meta-difficulty with the very way in which it approaches seman-
tics – what it calls pragmatics – involving a narrow focus on the cognitive aspects
of agency and ignoring its practical aspects. This leads to prematurely conflating
the related domains of semantics and psycholinguistics by directly importing
psychological notions like accessibility without any theoretical underpinning via
speculations about specialized pragmatic modules and the like.6 Semantics and
psycholinguistics ought to be studied at somewhat different levels of abstraction,
as the discussion in Section 12.1 makes clear.
For example, memory certainly plays a key role in utterance comprehension
but a semantic theory of communication would not typically attempt to incor-
porate its structure and would abstract from this constraint. In cases of disam-
biguation, it is true that we are not aware of all the senses of all the words we
encounter in a sentence; our memory plays a key role in enabling the mecha-
nism of priming, for instance, which leads to the suppression of some alternative
senses of words in a sentence. But the semantic task is to explain how disam-
biguation occurs. If such a theory is right, its main ideas will be transferable to
the psychological level. A communicative theory of priming will abstract from
the details of memory and use just its broad contours.7 By seeing linguistics as a
branch of cognitive psychology – as Chomsky first proposed – RelevanceTheory
falters methodologically because the proper domain of semantics is the domain
of actions and interactions, not just the cognitive processes of the mind. And this
requires a more abstract level of inquiry.
6See Sperber & Wilson (2002).
7While Equilibrium Semantics as described in Parikh (2010) and in this book does not consider
the phenomenon of priming in any detail, its framework is set up in a way that readily allows
explicit disambiguation to occur when required and allows priming to eliminate alternative
possibilities directly when required. It is then up to a psychological theory to specify when
different mechanisms operate based on how memory functions. The precise details of how
priming works will have to be described at the level of memory. This is analogous to the way
in which, say, the levels of physics and chemistry are separated.
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Such a level is, indeed, provided by decision and game theory, as I have argued
inmy publications.This abstract level does not mean that the framework is not in-
tended to be an empirical one – it is. But it will still be a more general framework
compatible with multiple psychological frameworks. It is interesting to observe
this empiricism in its own domain. Earlier, rational choice theory was regarded
by many as the right theory to employ when modeling action and interaction be-
cause it was sufficiently abstracted from the details of psychology and sociology
and it appeared to give the right predictions. But, as Allais (1953), Simon (1955;
1956), and Kahneman & Tversky (1979); Kahneman et al. (1982) among many oth-
ers in a large literature have argued, the utility-theoretic axioms of rationality
do not in fact always give the right results and this has led to a major revolution
in the theory of choice. So far, no single theoretical alternative has emerged as
the clear successor although there are many competing approaches. The number
of experiments has also mushroomed and the field of behavioral decision theory
has begun to partially merge with the even more nascent and experimental field
of neuroeconomics.8 If a clear theoretical winner does emerge eventually, it will
also be relatively abstract and devoid of the details of neuroscience and psychol-
ogy and sociology, and just like utility theory in its broad form, but will include
new features abstracted from such details.
Incidentally, Grice himself is also always clear that he is pursuing philosoph-
ical psychology, not psychology per se, even though he, too, remains confined
to an epistemic view of agency as I have argued in Section 5.1. This collapsing of
the distinction between semantics and psychology creates insuperable method-
ological problems for RelevanceTheory. Overall, RelevanceTheory is an advance
on traditional theories because it does try to countenance the pervasiveness of
context and offer a method to derive content. It unfortunately errs by remaining
trappedwithin the same epistemic view of agency that also ensnared the tradition
and by conflating semantics with psychology. And its key underlying concept of
relevance is deeply flawed.
13.2 The value of information
I will not develop the idea of the value of information in any mathematical detail
here; I have done this in the references cited at the start of this chapter, although,
as I said, the extension of the concept to games as opposed to single-person de-
cisions remained incomplete, something I rectify here.
8See Glimcher (2004).
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The basic idea is that an agent may be faced with some choices and, based
on his goals and preferences as well as on the uncertain consequences that may
ensue if he were to pursue each particular choice, he identifies an optimal course
of action. Now, he may also be in a position to get some information that could
reduce his uncertainty about the events following his actions. If he acquires this
information by asking an informed person a question, he may find that, with
this additional information, he may be able to pursue either the same action or a
different action with better payoffs. In either case, he can assess the value of the
information he has received by computing the difference in payoffs. If his optimal
choice does not change, wemay say that the information was not relevant or that
it was not relevant enough. But if his optimal action changes, then we can not
only say that the information was relevant but we can also say how relevant it
was depending on how much better off he is after receiving the information. In
other words, information is relevant to an agent when it makes him better off.
The virtue of decision theory is that it allows us to express this commonsense
reasoning in a precise way. An excellent informal introduction can be found in
the classic by Raiffa (1970).
This is very different from counting the number or strength of implications;
the latter notion is logical and epistemic and is concerned solely with relations
among propositions. Practical agency does not enter into this calculus at all and
so it is no wonder that it fails to get a grip on how information might matter to
an agent. RelevanceTheory falls short because it, like much of linguistics and the
philosophy of language, has only a conception of a reasoning agent but none of
practical agency as discussed in Section 5.1.
Now, to make the ideas above a little more concrete, recall that A and B are
involved at the outset in a Setting Game. This Setting Game may in fact be just
a decision problem for either agent which I am calling a game to make the ter-
minology more convenient. In this event, the value of information as dictated
by decision theory would apply directly. A possible implicature, for example,
would be tested for its value in the context of this decision problem. If its value is
sufficiently positive relative to some threshold, it might become a candidate for
further processing by the Flow Constraint. In other words, this criterion of Rele-
vance or the value of information would be one sub-Constraint of the Semantic
Constraint as mentioned at the start of this chapter.
The difficulty arises when there is no apparent isolated decision problem that
either agent faces in the Setting Game.The choice problem is really a two-person
game (or even a multi-person game). How then do we evaluate the value of infor-
mation? The idea, which eluded me in Parikh (2006b; 2010), is straightforward.
One can always extract a single-person decision problem from a game because a
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game is just an interactive decision problem between two or more persons. All
that has to be done is to set up some choices of action for a player based on his
available strategies in the game and uncertainty about what the other player will
do based on her strategies and then use the first player’s payoffs in the game to
determine his payoffs in the decision problem so constructed. And this allows
one to compute the value of information of a possible implicature in the usual
manner of decision theory. So all that has to be done is to reduce a game to a
component decision problem to compute the relevance of possible illocutionary
meanings.
However, there are two formidable difficulties with the value-theoretic con-
cept as well.
13.2.1 The first difficulty
Suppose John has tentatively decided to opt for a surgical procedure but decides
to get some more information from his doctor. His doctor may say either of the
following:
(24) a. 90% of the patients survive the procedure.
b. 10% of the patients do not survive the procedure.
It is well known that an agent’s response to each of these two statements is
often not the same.9 With (24a) John is likely to want to go ahead with the proce-
dure but with (24b) he might, like a number of other imperfectly rational agents,
balk at the choice.This is so even though the information conveyed by both state-
ments is equivalent. That is, if 𝜎 represents the information conveyed by (24a)
and 𝜎 ′ the information conveyed by (24b), we have 𝜎 ⟺ 𝜎 ′. This is clearly a
situation where the form in which information is couched matters and so this
phenomenon is called framing, a result of the intensionality of choice.
In other words, relevance cannot simply be taken as the value of information
without assuming that agents are perfectly rational in the sense of utility the-
ory. If they are not, the concept has to be defined in terms of behavioral choice
theory rather than rational choice theory and this kind of behavioral relevance
9See Arrow (1982). The experiment Arrow discusses concerns clinicians’ recommendations for
surgery based on information about the survival probabilities. When told that the chance of
survival was 90%, some 80% of surgeons who were asked recommended surgery. However, of
those told that the same course of action was associated with a 10% chance of death, only 50%
recommended surgery. Since the contents of both statements were equivalent, this implies that
the preferences of some surgeons must have been intensional. I have changed the example a
little.
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may not yield the right results. If behavioral relevance can be defined in a gen-
eral way that accounts for intensionality, that is, if it encompasses the value of
framed information, then it may predict an agent’s behavior correctly but give
an incorrect view of relevance from a normative standpoint. This would create
problems in explaining how communication occurs between imperfectly ratio-
nal agents because each agent would have to consider the other agent’s possible
imperfections. As I argued in Section 5.2, all utterances involve framing, whether
by design or not, and this poses problems for a theory of relevance.
One way to address the intensionality of choice is to use the prospect theory
of Kahneman & Tversky (1979), though I will not pursue it here. Another way to
begin considering the value of framed information is to first notice that situation
theory as opposed to competing frameworks like possible worlds theory that
game theorists and philosophers tend to favor does differentiate between equiva-
lent infons 𝜎 and 𝜎 ′ because it is more fine-grained and can potentially avoid the
problem of logical omniscience.10 So it is possible to represent an agent’s know-
ing 𝜎 without knowing 𝜎 ′. Then an agent who is partially rational in a certain
situation can be modeled as knowing some (framed) information such as 𝜎 but
not knowing other equivalent information such as 𝜎 ′. With these assumptions,
the value of this partial information can be computed. This procedure would, in
principle, give the behavioral relevance of some information. But it is not entirely
clear how such a computation might be carried out in practice and when such
partial rationality would have to be assumed.
The intensionality of choice rests on framing or the intensionality of language
but, interestingly, the intensionality of language itself rests on what might be
called the intensionality of metaphysics, the phenomenon that I briefly alluded
to in Section 2.1 as that of the glass being half full or half empty. If the infon
𝜏 = ⟨⟨half full; glass ⟩⟩ and 𝜏 ′ = ⟨⟨half empty; glass ⟩⟩ then we have the further
fact that 𝜏 ⟺ 𝜏 ′. These are two equivalent ways of individuating the world.
This kind of situational framing is basic to how we interact with the world and
with each other and has profound effects on us even though, often, the different
facts or infons we individuate are equivalent. Whether we see 𝜏 or 𝜏 ′ may re-
sult in the difference between hope and despair. Even surgeons, experts in their
fields, behaved differently when the survival rates of surgery were differently
but equivalently described.
10There is a large literature on this problem in epistemic logic. It occurs because with certain
standard closure axioms, whenever an agent knows all of the formulas in a set and a formula
follows logically from this set, the agent also knows this formula. See Hendricks & Symons
(2015), Fagin et al. (2003: Chapter 9), and Stalnaker (1991), for example. If Dretske’s (1981: Chap-
ter 9) argument is right, then his account does not have this problem.
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Why is it that human beings respond differently to 𝜏 and 𝜏 ′ even though
𝜏 ⟺ 𝜏 ′? It is because they do not always realize that 𝜏 ⟺ 𝜏 ′ and, in my view,
this lies at the heart of the problem of rationality. This is why an intensional on-
tological framework like situation theory that distinguishes between 𝜏 and 𝜏 ′ is
required. Only the underlying reality is the same, almost everything else – situ-
ations, infons (and facts), properties and relations, and perhaps other objects –
are intensional. It is not just that human beings perceive the same fact in differ-
ent ways; the facts themselves – of the glass being half full and half empty – are
distinct but equivalent. (I believe this situation is different from Wittgenstein’s
(1953/1968) duck-rabbit, which is, as he says, a case of seeing different aspects.)
What happens is that people interact with reality to individuate it and produce
the ontologies we then see as real. This is very similar to the Buddhist idea of
dependent origination as well asQuine’s ontological relativity mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.1. Where both fall short is in missing the further idea that only a subclass
of ontologies is optimal (as argued in Parikh (2010: Section 7.6), where I call the
codeterminative process equilibrium metaphysics) and so cannot be dismissed ei-
ther as merely conventional as the Buddhist does or as merely relative asQuine
does. This optimal subset has a certain immovability and this makes the “tran-
scendental” aims of Buddhism all the more difficult to realize and the radical
indeterminacy claims of Quine suspect.
I am not suggesting some kind of unbridled relativism (with optimality). Real-
ity does offer resistance and does constrain the class of possible ontologies. The
glass can only be half full or half empty or both; it cannot be one-third full in the
situation under consideration. Frameworks like possible worlds theory that do
not make such distinctions are ineffectual because they cannot hope to explain
how human beings act. It is also revealing that possible worlds theory describes
this indistinguishability as the problem of logical omniscience which indicates its
logicist origins as it sees the problem as concerning just the epistemic dimension
of agency rather than being much more widespread.
In any case, as I just said, such finer ontologies lie at the heart of the prob-
lem of rationality. Even though a half-full glass is the “same” as a half-empty
glass, we may not realize this and so our responses to them may be different.
Sometimes, even when their equivalence is pointed out, we may persist in giv-
ing them different weights and thereby respond differently even when we know
they are the same. (Also, a glass being one or the other is usually just a metaphor
for more complex situations, and then the posited equivalence can be somewhat
more difficult to see.)
Of course, the intensionality of metaphysics is not confined to different ways
of individuating equivalent infons. The problem is far more pervasive. In Sec-
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tion 8.6,A’s goal is to have B accept his statement that Bill Smith ran in the local
election and he has two fundamentally different and also nonequivalent ways
of realizing this goal: either to issue a bald statement or to give B a reason to
accept the information by adding that he read the information in a newspaper.
While these two ways may not be informationally equivalent, they do possess
what we may call act-equivalence, that is, they are meant to induce the same act
by B. This ties in how we individuate our choices in a situation very closely to
human psychology, relationships, and perception, and the way we individuate
our choices depends on how we can individuate the world. We will discuss an
example of this act-equivalence in some detail later in Section 18.2.
While the behavioral revolution in decision-making of the last three decades
covers a wider ground than the intensionality of metaphysics and language and
choice, I believe the latter lies at its core. Because of this, a certain level of cre-
ativity or idiosyncrasy or indeterminacy may be ineradicable from human action
and choice and, even though we may be able to explain certain actions partially
after the fact, a truly predictive science that is also explanatory and not just data-
driven, especially for large-scale phenomena like economy and society, may lie
beyond our means. Intensionality also makes the problem of natural language
generation much harder than the reciprocal problem of natural language under-
standing.
In Section 2.1, I mentioned the presence and general indeterminacy of context
as a barrier to developing a complete science of communication; now the inten-
sionality of metaphysics and language and choice and action can be seen as a
further impediment.
13.2.2 The second difficulty
A different sort of difficulty arises when we recognize that communication does
not always involve statements.What if a speaker says something that changes an
addressee’s goals or preferences? For example, the doctor in the example above
may recommend the procedure to the patient by saying something like:
(25) I recommend the procedure.
How, now, should the addressee evaluate the relevance of the exhortation? Or,
a mother may command her child:
(26) Drink your milk.
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In such cases, it could be argued that the addressee changes his current goals
and preferences in light of his larger goals and preferences; the patient could
reason that the doctor’s recommendation would be good for him in the long
term and the child could reason in the same sort of way. But this complicates
the simpler theory of relevance as the value of information where a goal and
decision problem are simply given. For example, the patient may earlier have
decided against the procedure on the basis of his initial preferences; now, he
changes these preferences by taking account of his longer-term preferences and
then decides to opt for the procedure. In the course of this evaluation, the imme-
diate preferences have changed, so how exactly should the value of information
be computed?This raises thorny questions of intertemporal choice among others.
Portner’s (2004) proposal that imperatives result in a change in the addressee’s
To-Do List does not help because he seems to lack the crucial idea of evaluating
actions (i.e. the members of To-Do Lists) in terms of preferences. The value of
information involves calculating the change in payoff and the problem is which
payoffs to use, the prior ones or the posterior ones after the utterance.
Both these and perhaps other such issues pose hurdles to developing a sat-
isfactory theory of relevance, even one that is able to incorporate ideas of the
value and worth of information. This behooves us to look at what role relevance
is required to play in a theory of communication.
13.3 The role of relevance
In Relevance Theory, relevance is meant, roughly speaking, to replace the four
Gricean maxims (Grice 1975; 1989a) with a single principle that can serve to ex-
plain human interpretive behavior. But the natural question that arises is whether
any maxim or principle is required to explain human behavior once one has the
apparatus of rationality and rational action (and of possible deviations from ra-
tionality in the sense of utility theory). If this rhetorical observation is correct,
then of the three choices – four maxims (and their variants11), one principle, or
just rational action with no further layer – it is clear that the last option is to
be preferred. This is not only because of an obvious scientific principle of econ-
omy but also because it would bring the field of communication in line with the
rest of the social sciences by recognizing a full-fledged notion of agency that is
conspicuously absent from linguistics and the philosophy of language.
As I have argued in several places and as we have seen in detail in Part III,
rationality by itself suffices to explain the transmission of locutionary meaning.
11See the neo-Gricean work of Horn (1984) and Levinson (2000).
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It is only when illocutionary meaning comes into play that we need to rely on
relevance viewed as the value of information. The key reason for having to intro-
duce some external Constraints like Relevance (and Distance) is that for illocu-
tionary contents like implicature we do not have any counterpart of linguistically
sourced entities like conventional meanings (e.g. the conventional meanings of
bank enable us to identify its range of possible referential meanings) to gener-
ate the possibilities which the Flow Constraint would disambiguate. Illocution-
ary meanings are more or less purely contextual and emerge through a kind of
bootstrapping process which is facilitated by having access to the notion of the
value of information. In other words, the sub-Constraints of Relevance and Dis-
tance together identify the illocutionary possibilities from the entire universe of
contents; then the games of partial information disambiguate among these and
determine one or more contents as those communicated. This is very different
from the role of relevance in Relevance Theory where it determines all contents
directly, both locutionary and illocutionary.
To the extent relevance is required, perhaps the main obstacle to using it is
intensionality. As described in footnote 9, all the surgeons did not deviate from
rationality, only some did. This makes things somewhat unpredictable since dif-
ferent agents in identical situations behave quite differently. I will accept these
limitations of the decision-theoretic notion of the value of information to serve
as our criterion of relevance and use it in what follows.
Because illocutionary meanings are not constrained by conventional mean-
ings as locutionary meanings are, they may bear no very direct relation to locu-
tionary meanings as is familiar from many examples of implicature. Almost any-
thing can be illocutionarily implied given the appropriate circumstances. This
means the potential candidates from which the Flow Constraint enables a choice
of one or a few optimal meanings can come from anywhere in the infon spaceI mentioned in Section 2.1. In the main example 𝜑 = 𝜑1𝜑2 = bill ran of Part III,
an enrichment or completion such as Bill Smith ran for President of the US might
be very relevant by almost any criterion of relevance, whether the amount of
information notion of Relevance Theory or my less problematic value of infor-
mation notion. By both these criteria, this content would be far more relevant
than the more plausible and intuitively acceptable content Bill Smith ran in the
local election because it would either generate many more contextual implica-
tions (i.e. positive cognitive effects) as required by Relevance Theory or would
deliver a greater change of payoff as required by my account. This observation
likely applies even to any intuitive criterion of relevance such as Grice’s.
This ought to make it clear that relevance by itself is not sufficient for identi-
fying the potential candidates or possibilities that enter into the Flow Constraint.
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Some other constraint is also required and this turns out to be the new idea of
distance. Incidentally, this idea has nothing to do with the measure of weighted
psychological distance introduced in the discussion of vagueness in Chapter 11.
As we will see, it may even be possible to manage just with this new idea and do
without the idea of relevance altogether.
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It is reasonable to suppose that just as people form intuitive judgments about
physical distance which may be more or less accurate, so people routinely form
intuitive and subpersonal judgments about the distance between two infons.This
judgment about informational distance is always relative to the situation in
which it is made and also relative to the goals of the agents in that situation.
It is a subjective assessment that sometimes becomes conventionalized.
Just as one thinks of physical distance in terms of the path that takes one from
here to there, one can think of informational distance in terms of the steps that
take one from one infon to another, so perhaps the best way to fix this notion
is through human reasoning. Agents attempt to derive information that enables
them to fulfill their goals. Such inferences involve a variety of modes of reasoning
including especially abduction, but also deduction, induction, probabilistic (e.g.
Bayesian) and plausible reasoning, and so on.1
To start with, there is a situation 𝑢 and a corresponding Communication Game
Γ𝑢 . Γ𝑢 contains a Setting Game 𝑆𝐺𝑢 which has information about the setting with
respect to which some communication takes place. Either because of prior utter-
ances or because of the interaction between the agents, both of which are housed
within 𝑆𝐺𝑢 , some information about the agents’ explicit or implicit goals may be-
come public. If the goals are not already common knowledge, the agents invoke
the Cooperative Principle to assume that their goals are shared. For example, A
andBmay be discussingwhere to eat, in which case their (implicit) goal would be
to eat out together. This goal is common knowledge so the Cooperative Principle
is already satisfied.
Next, an agent may utter a sentence 𝜑 based on a Generation Game 𝐺𝐺𝑢 in-
duced by a Content Selection Game 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑢 which in turn is induced by 𝑆𝐺𝑢 . This
utterance is evaluated by B in the Interpretation Game 𝑈𝐺𝑢 and will have some
locutionary content 𝜎 ℓ determined via the locutionary game 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) as discussed
in Part III. Recall that the Setting Game or conversational goals influenced the for-
mation of preferences and prior probabilities in 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑)which helped determine
locutionary meaning. Nowwewill see how they help in identifying illocutionary
meaning.
1Adler & Rips (2008) is a large collection of papers that discuss a variety of modes of reasoning.
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Once B derives 𝜎 ℓ he checks if it fulfills their shared goal, shared either by
virtue of it being common knowledge or by being assumed via the Cooperative
Principle. If it fulfills the goal, there is nothing more to be done. In this event the
whole intended meaning of the utterance is just 𝜎 ℓ. If it falls short of the goal,
then a search for one or more illocutionary meanings is triggered.
It is in the course of this search that distance and relevance play a role in gen-
erating the possibilities for illocutionary meaning that are later disambiguated
by the illocutionary Flow Constraint which is made up of the illocutionary global
game 𝐼𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑). There are no conventional meanings to generate the possibilities
as there were for locutionary meaning. So the illocutionary Semantic Constraint
can no longer rely on the Conventional and Referential sub-Constraints. Instead,
it must use the Relevance and Distance sub-Constraints to generate the possibil-
ities. The search for illocutionary possibilities takes place within the infon spaceI and involves a derivation of one or more contents from the locutionary content
relative to 𝑢. This derivation involves a sequence of steps from initial premises
to conclusions and has a length.
In general, the situated distance 𝑑B𝑢 (𝜎, 𝜏) between two infons 𝜎 and 𝜏 for B
with respect to 𝑢 can be defined as the length of the derivation from 𝜎 to 𝜏 thatB actually undertakes in 𝑢 relative to B’s goals in 𝑆𝐺𝑢 (that are assumed to be
shared with A) and relative to other infons in 𝑢. These other infons in 𝑢 may be
part of the agent’s explicit beliefs, they may come from what she is perceiving,
they may come from the common ground of the dialogue taking place, and so on.
In any event, they constitute a finite set.2
To clarify what is meant in the above definition of distance by “relative toB’s (shared) goals in 𝑆𝐺𝑢 ,” there is always a step in the reasoning involving an
implication such as 𝜏 ′ → Goal where Goal is an infon representing a conversa-
tional goal. Then, either because Goal is common knowledge or because it can
be assumed via the Cooperative Principle, B can infer 𝜏 ′ by abduction. Usually,
𝜏 ′ = 𝜏 , the end state of the derivation, but occasionally there may be one or more
steps beyond 𝜏 ′ to 𝜏 . Also, there may be other such implications like, for example,
𝜏″ → Goal, in which case 𝜏″ could be another conclusion reached by the search.
This will become clearer when I discuss concrete examples below. As I will also
2It is not clear how the underlying space of infons through which the agent searches is struc-
tured but it may be thought of as a graph of some kind. A graph is a set of vertices representing
the infons in the space together with directed or undirected edges linking them that represent
various kinds of inferential steps. This notion of distance is not a metric as the symmetry con-
dition 𝑑A𝑢 (𝜎, 𝜏) = 𝑑A𝑢 (𝜏 , 𝜎) for all 𝜎 and 𝜏 may not be satisfied. In any case, this condition
is not required for the idea to work. See Barwise & Etchemendy (1991: Section 3) for a partial
implementation of such a graph.
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show, because human reasoning is extremely broad and versatile, employing all
kinds of inferential steps, it is probably not possible to capture it in any logical
calculus or pin down the definition of distance more precisely.
There will be a corresponding distance 𝑑A𝑢 (𝜎, 𝜏) for A as both agents have to
reason from 𝜎 to 𝜏 , one in the Generation Game and the other in the Interpreta-
tion Game. This is what would make the final result 𝜏 common knowledge if it
survives all the other requirements for being an illocutionary meaning. But the
precise derivations for the two agents may differ and so 𝑑A𝑢 (𝜎, 𝜏)may not equal
𝑑B𝑢 (𝜎, 𝜏).
This idea of distance constitutes the second sub-Constraint of the Semantic
Constraint for illocutionary meaning. The way the two sub-Constraints of Rele-
vance and Distance are meant to work together once a search is triggered is as
follows. Assume for themoment that the only indirect meaning being considered
is an implicature.3 Essentially, the infon 𝜎 and other infons present through 𝑢 and
through B’s goals provide a space through which B searches either consciously
or nonconsciously for derivations to a sufficiently relevant set of conclusions.
When the distance, that is, the length of these derivations, is also sufficiently
small, they become possible candidates for the Flow Constraint. In other words,
distance and relevance have to be compared with situated thresholds. Crucially,
one does not have to check each infon in I to find the candidates, which is an
infinite task. One starts from the locutionary content or its proper parts and then
proceeds locally until one reaches a relevant conclusion that fulfills one’s goal
within a specified radius.
Suppose the distance and relevance thresholds are 𝜖𝑑,𝑢 and 𝜖𝑅,𝑢 respectively. I
have omitted the agent superscripts on these thresholds to avoid clutter but dif-
ferent agents will, in general, have different thresholds. One can now identify an
“open ball” BallB𝑢 (𝜎 ℓ, 𝜖𝑑,𝑢) = {𝑥 ∈ I ∣ 𝑑B𝑢 (𝜎 ℓ, 𝑥) < 𝜖𝑑,𝑢} inside which all distances
from 𝜎 ℓ to 𝑥 must lie.4 Further, only those 𝑥 that also have Relevance𝑢(𝑥) > 𝜖𝑅,𝑢
qualify as possible implicatures. Thus, the set of possible implicatures is given by{𝑥 ∈ BallB𝑢 (𝜎 ℓ, 𝜖𝑑,𝑢) ∣ Relevance𝑢(𝑥) > 𝜖𝑅,𝑢}. Because agents are finite, the space
searched is finite. So it becomes possible to search locally in a computationally
tractable way within the ball for sufficiently relevant candidate implicatures. Ju-
rafsky & Martin (2009: Section 1.3) discuss a variety of algorithms (e.g. graph
3In earlier chapters, I have used the terms locutionary and illocutionary for direct and indirect
contents. Here, I will use the two pairs of terms interchangeably to make the writing and
reading smoother. The first terms of each pair correspond to the content that results primarily
from the conventional meanings of the uttered words whereas the second terms of each pair
correspond to the content that arises primarily from the context. This is not meant to be a
black-and-white distinction.
4I have borrowed the term “open ball” from the context of metric spaces.
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algorithms such as depth-first search) for such tasks when they have to be per-
formed by artificial agents. These candidate implicatures can then be supplied to
the illocutionary FlowConstraint which disambiguates among them and chooses
the best ones.
The reason why the two thresholds above are subscripted with 𝑢 is that they
may be different for different kinds of communication. When interpreting a
novel or a poem, for example, it is reasonable to form extended derivational
chains consciously. In such cases, the open ball will be much larger than it would
be for ordinary face-to-face communication. In the case of Relevance, too, differ-
ent kinds of conclusions might be found relevant depending on what is being
interpreted, whether some immediate communication or some remote text. In
the latter case, an addressee’s tolerance may be greater, making the correspond-
ing threshold lower.
I repeat that the local search for implicatures and other indirect meanings
is triggered by the locutionary content or its proper parts falling short of the
agent’s goals in one way or another. If such a content is adequate, there will
be no need to search for further meanings. This means there are three steps in
eliciting indirect meanings: first check if the locutionary content or its proper
part fulfills the conversational goal appropriately and, if not, then search locally
via the illocutionary Semantic Constraint consisting of Relevance and Distance
to produce candidate implicatures or other indirect meanings, and, last, submit
these candidates to the illocutionary Flow Constraint for disambiguation.
The procedure sketched above provides a more or less complete description of
the task of computing the implicatures of an utterance, when to look for them and
how to find the possibilities and how to identify the best ones. In implementing
such an idea computationally it would be necessary to set up an actual search
space of infons and various inferential modes of traversing this space. Needless
to say, this is nontrivial to do. To make things more concrete, reconsider Grice’s
example of the stranded motorist I discussed in Section 5.2. Let the sentence
uttered by the passerby in response to the motorist saying “I am out of gas” be:
(27) There is a garage around the corner. (𝜓 )
As I noted earlier, an utterance of 𝜓 in the context described has been generally
taken to have the implicature that the speaker thinks the garage might be open.
Howwould such an implicature be derived in a rigorous and complete way given
just the locutionary content of the utterance and 𝑢?
First, note that the prior utterance, “I am out of gas,” makes the goal of the
motorist public in the Setting Game for the utterance of 𝜓 in 𝑢. Since it is not
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common knowledge this goal is shared by the passerby, this is assumed by in-
voking the Cooperative Principle. The locutionary content 𝜎 ℓ of 𝜓 in 𝑢 does not,
by itself, fully meet this goal of getting gas. So a local search for one or more
implicatures is triggered.
If the implicature referred to above is denoted by 𝜏 , then it is plausible to say
that in the utterance situation 𝑢 the two infons 𝜎 ℓ and 𝜏 are relatively near each
other, that is, 𝑑𝑢(𝜎 ℓ, 𝜏) is within the threshold 𝜖𝑑,𝑢 or, equivalently, 𝜏 lies inside
the corresponding open ball. This is because the chain of reasoning from 𝜎 ℓ to
𝜏 is quite short and the distance may even be just 3 or 4 units depending on
how one counts the steps, which depends on how the search space is set up in
the agent’s head. For example, the addressee may start with common knowledge
of 𝜎 ℓ that the garage is around the corner and common knowledge that 𝜎 ℓ falls
short of his goal. Then he may observe that the speaker has uttered the sentence
𝜓 in response to his goal. If the speaker’s cooperation is assumed, it follows that
the speaker would not have said this if he knew the garage was closed. Indeed,
it is plausible to conclude that the speaker thinks it is open because this fulfills
the addressee’s goal. This is about 3 or 4 steps to 𝜏 and all of them are common
knowledge. So the distance from 𝜎 ℓ to 𝜏 is about 3 or 4 units as undertaken in 𝑢
and would certainly be contained within the open ball. So the first requirement
of Distance has been met.
Since clearly Relevance𝑢(𝜏) > 𝜖𝑅,𝑢 as well because the motorist is out of gas
and needs to fill up (i.e. this value of information is also related to the interlocu-
tor’s goal), one strand of the local search stops with 𝜏 and we can conclude that
𝜏 qualifies as a candidate implicature. Crucially, it is not necessary to pull 𝜏 out
of thin air and then evaluate its distance and relevance. On the contrary, 𝜏 is
discovered by the agent as he searches locally through the associated space. This
candidate implicature then becomes one possible interpretation in the relevant il-
locutionary partial information game. As will be shown in the next chapter, such
an implicature would be derived with some probability as a solution to this game
so that its being an implicature is seldom certain.This is because it is possible that
the passerby does not give any thought to whether the garage is open or not.
Both the Distance and Relevance sub-Constraints are evaluated relative to the
agent’s goals. But the nature of the computation in each case is quite different.
In the former, a derivation is constructed, and in the latter, the value of the in-
formation is computed. It may happen that there is no derivation that fulfills the
goals and then a suitable conclusion has to be drawn (e.g. that the speaker does
not know the required information or is cooperating only partially or not at all).
I will look at such an example in Chapter 16.
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How does the search algorithm know where to stop as it reasons along the
search space starting from 𝜎 ℓ? With each step it takes to some 𝑥 ∈ I , it tests
whether Relevance𝑢(𝑥) > 𝜖𝑅,𝑢 and whether the goal is fulfilled. If not, it keeps
going. For example, the intermediate steps in the three- or four-step reasoning
above were not sufficiently relevant. Finally, it either reaches an infon like 𝜏
which is sufficiently relevant and which fulfills the goal or it goes outside the ball.
If the former, 𝜏 is accepted as a candidate; if the latter, it returns empty-handed
to 𝜎 ℓ. In either case, a new local search begins.
If we assume both interlocutors are aware of a few gas stations nearby then
such a new searchmight lead to another possible implicature 𝜏 ′ that the gas avail-
able at the garage around the corner is inexpensive as the passerby may be offer-
ing the best option among the available ones. This is because 𝜏 ′ is also near 𝜎 ℓ as
𝜏 was and is discovered in the same way. It is possible that 𝑑𝑢(𝜎 ℓ, 𝜏) < 𝑑𝑢(𝜎 ℓ, 𝜏 ′)
even though 𝜏 ′ may also lie within the open ball. Its relevance is also sufficiently
high in 𝑢 though, again, it is likely that Relevance𝑢(𝜏) > Relevance𝑢(𝜏 ′). So
𝜏 ′ could also become a candidate implicature. It is hard to be sure whether the
speaker is possibly conveying 𝜏 ′ or not because goals such as a general prefer-
ence for inexpensive gas can be implicitly shared. Most likely, it can be taken to
be an implicature by the Flow Constraint with an even lower probability than 𝜏 .
Such considerations show how much indeterminacy can be present at the level
of both the Semantic and Flow Constraints.
A possibility I have never seen addressed is why the passerby might not be
implying that he would fetch the gas from the garage for the motorist. Call this
𝜏″. It is assumed because Grice assumed it that the implicature is 𝜏 and not 𝜏″.
The latter certainly fulfills the motorist’s goal and is certainly relevant: indeed,
its value may be potentially higher even if its probability may be lower. But, in
most circumstances, 𝜏″ would be ruled out by everyone. It would not be near
𝜎 ℓ as even though 𝜏″ → Goal, the abductive inference to 𝜏″ would be blocked
because it is not the best explanation. So even though it is relevant, its distance
is infinite or at least beyond the open ball. Practically every method of deriving
implicatures (e.g. Gricean or Relevance-Theoretic or Benz 2010) fails to disqualify
such possibilities. As such examples are omnipresent, this shows their account
of implicature is seriously inadequate.
Finally, as mentioned in Section 5.4, there is a certain indeterminacy between
whether the illocutionary meaning in question is the implicature 𝜏 or is the mod-
ulated meaning 𝜏‴, the content that there is a possibly open garage around the
corner. That is, the distance 𝑑𝑢(𝜎 ℓ, 𝜏‴) is also small.
The search algorithm terminates its search when no new steps can be taken
from 𝜎 ℓ. Note that I have informally described one version of depth-first search
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and it is not the only way that this search might be organized. The goal of any
algorithm is to locate all the infons in {𝑥 ∈ BallB𝑢 (𝜎 ℓ, 𝜖𝑑,𝑢) ∣ Relevance𝑢(𝑥) >
𝜖𝑅,𝑢}, the set of possible indirect meanings starting from 𝜎 ℓ.
In principle, there could be other sets of possible indirect meanings issuing
from the proper parts of 𝜎 ℓ aswell.The distance to 𝜏‴ that I took to be 𝑑𝑢(𝜎 ℓ, 𝜏‴)
would actually be 𝑑𝑢(⟨⟨garage ⟩⟩, 𝜏‴) where ⟨⟨garage ⟩⟩ is the proper part of 𝜎 ℓ
that corresponds to the word garage in 𝜓 . Such examples arise not just with
modulated meanings but also with implicatures and free enrichments and other
indirect meanings triggered by subsentential expressions.
In the discussion of this example I have throughout used distances without
any agent superscript. In fact, similar computations have to be undertaken by
both agents, the speaker in the Generation Game and the addressee in the In-
terpretation Game. Even though the details of the calculations are private, each
agent has common knowledge that such calculations exist in the other’s mind.
This is what results in common knowledge of the implicature once it passes the
further requirement of the illocutionary Flow Constraint.
I have given a fairly detailed analysis of this example but it is not, in fact,
detailed enough. I have focused mainly on the addressee’s goal which is assumed
to be shared via the Cooperative Principle. But the speaker’s goals also play a role
as they are also implicitly shared. For instance, the inference to 𝜏″ is blocked in
most circumstances because it is implicitly shared that the passerby has other
goals of his own and would not want to fetch the gas for the motorist. Thus,
there is generally a mutual sharing of both agents’ explicit and implicit goals that
permit some candidates to be licensed while others are eliminated. This implies
that cooperation is almost always partial, a nuance that is missing from Grice’s
Cooperative Principle.
I have implicitly assumed that each step of a derivation is equally easy for the
agent. But this may not be true. For example, the steps involved in reaching 𝜏 ′
may be harder than those involved in reaching 𝜏 as 𝜏 ′ is less related to the agent’s
immediate need. So one can assume that each step comes with a weight or cost
and the distance then is not the length of a derivation but its cost. If the search
space is a graph, then its edges would haveweights.This idea of a weighted graph
couldmodel themore imaginative kinds of reasoning involved in interpreting the
indirect meanings of a poem or novel. There is a certain creativity involved in
such interpretations and the task of the literary critic is a costly one.
The conception of distance I have offered does not yet tell us how the im-
plicature of an utterance of he is a fine friend might be derived because the
implicature is precisely the negation of the locutionary content as discussed in
Section 5.2. How can the agent start from a content and arrive at its negation?
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For this, a slight adjustment in the procedure is required. Recall that the distance
between two infons 𝜎 and 𝜏 is to be calculated relative to other infons present
in 𝑢. Such other infons include background knowledge that the agents share or
are perceiving as well as the common ground of the dialogue taking place. So
the procedure has to start with a whole set of premises, not just a single infon 𝜎 .
This set could be internally inconsistent – the speaker could not be conveying the
locutionary meaning because it contradicts the common knowledge the agents
have that the person is question has cheated the speaker – and so the reasoning
process must include cases where such a set of infons may need some revision,
just as happens in situations where our beliefs have to be revised sometimes
in the light of new knowledge or because they are internally inconsistent. This
kind of revision may result in rejecting 𝜎 , the starting point, or one of the other
premises, depending on which of these are potentially alterable. In our example,
only the locutionary content can be negated as the other situational infons are
taken as true. This broader conception of reasoning that includes such revision
is therefore required to account for all cases of illocutionary meaning.
In general, then, the locutionary meaning 𝜎 ℓ or its proper parts serve as the
baseline relative to which distances for various types of potential illocutionary
meanings are measured. I will assume henceforth that people are able to form
such intuitive judgments (either consciously or nonconsciously) about the mag-
nitude of distances like 𝑑𝑢(𝜎 ℓ, 𝑥) for various 𝑥 in I . If one wishes, one can call
the Distance sub-Constraint a theory of “accessibility,” recalling that this was
precisely one of the questions Relevance Theory had simply begged.
In Relevance Theory, relevance and accessibility are more or less equated be-
cause the most accessible meaning always turns out to be the most relevant. In
Equilibrium Semantics, Relevance is the value of informationwhich is completely
distinct from Distance or the derivational accessibility of information, and both
of these sub-Constraints are quite different from the Flow Constraint. It is the
three constraints together that lead one to a complete theory of illocutionary
meaning. And, moreover, in Equilibrium Linguistics, the goals and preferences of
the interlocutors present in the Setting Game always enter all three constraints,
the calculation of relevance and distance, and the calculation of equilibria of par-
tial illocutionary games.
Why are illocutionary partial information games required? Isn’t it enough to
identify the maximally relevant meanings inside the open ball? Unfortunately,
all such nearby relevant meanings may not be compatible with the speaker’s
and addressee’s viewpoints. They also have to satisfy the requirement of “opti-
mality” based on the agents’ preferences. Otherwise, for instance, an addressee
could infer a very valuable proposition that is easy to access derivationally but
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that was not intended by the speaker. This kind of miscommunication occurs
quite frequently, in fact. For instance, in the garage example, as I just noted, the
passerby may not have given any thought to whether the garage is open or not.
In such a case, the motorist would be wrong to infer 𝜏 as an implicature even
though it is both relevant and near. But this ties in with the general fact of the
indeterminacy of indirect meanings.
To the best of my knowledge, neither Grice nor any of his followers have ever
shown a way to find candidate implicatures or other candidate illocutionary
meanings such as free enrichments and modulations. They have, at best, pro-
vided more or less convincing ways – usually less convincing, as I have argued
in Section 5.2 and in this chapter – to determine if a candidate is actually an
implicature, say, given that it is a candidate. But the candidate itself is always
pulled out of thin air. It is to the credit of my first book, The Use of Language
(2001: Chapter 7), that this problem was first considered partially, and to the
credit of Equilibrium Semantics that it now offers a complete and computation-
ally tractable solution to the problem, at least in principle. If suitable assumptions
are made about the search space, it may become possible to put the theory of im-
plicature and other indirect meanings on a solid scientific footing and explain
how it applies to humans at a psycholinguistic level. It may also make it feasible
for robots to communicate effectively with indirect meanings, maybe for limited
purposes rather than for open-ended conversations, as they can be endowedwith
appropriate search spaces. Texts such as Manning & Schütze (1999) and Jurafsky
& Martin (2000; 2009) are largely silent about how indirect meanings may be de-
rived. Jurafsky (2004) does compare and contrast the logical Plan Inference (or
Belief-Desire-Intention) Model developed mainly by Allen, Cohen, and Perrault
(see Allen 1995) with his probabilistic Cue-based Model in the context of speech
act interpretation and similar tasks like reference resolution and discourse struc-
ture interpretation. As will be seen below, the approach of Equilibrium Semantics
integrates the two methods in some sense, as it provides the depth of the first
and the breadth of the second.
I now consider an example in greater detail to showhow the sub-Constraints of
Relevance and Distance work together in enabling the identification of candidate
illocutionary meanings, that is, the illocutionary possibilities, that would then be
disambiguated by the Flow Constraint, that is, by 𝐼𝐺𝑢(𝜑), the global set of local
illocutionary games. I discuss this in the context of free enrichment so it also
shows how the same method applies to other types of indirect meaning.
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15 Free enrichment
Everyone acknowledges the phenomenon of incomplete utterances requiring
free enrichments, contents that Grice never quite foresaw. But there are signifi-
cant differences in how they are perceived and, to the best of my knowledge, no
one has seriously tried to present a method to derive them from first principles.
Before we do so, it is helpful to set the background and context for the discussion.
15.1 Representationalism and Contextualism
Representationalism and Contextualism are two influential approaches to enrich-
ment. The Representationalists, descendants of the logicists, admit that illocu-
tionary contents intrude into what is said1 but argue that these meanings are
conventionally mandated by covert parts of the utterance in line with Grice’s
conventionalist conception of what is said. They allow context and inference to
play a role in determining enrichments but insist that they are nevertheless trig-
gered by “syntactic” elements represented in the utterance. In other words, they
see all such meanings arising from saturation, the filling of an explicit or implicit
slot (i.e. a constrained variable) in a sentence. The Contextualists, descendants
primarily of ordinary language philosophers, regard these contents as not being
conventionally enjoined but resulting entirely from the context.
Representationalism is a frankly rearguard action to defend a losing position.
If illocutionary encroachments upon what is said are granted and the role of
context and inference in their determination is allowed, then much of the battle
has been lost. The conventionalist view that what is said is largely conventional
has to give ground to the contextualist view that what is said is largely contex-
tual. Indeed, if an actual derivation from first principles is attempted, it would
become obvious just how much of the former position is untenable. So bringing
in conventional triggers is a feeble bulwark from this larger perspective, espe-
cially when it is grasped how rapidly these hidden variables multiply. A simple
1By “what is said,” I mean the literal meaning or content or what is generally called the truth-
conditional content, though I prefer to call it the information-conditional content. The reason
for preferring the latter is that truth conditions are not fine-grained enough to distinguish
between an utterance of “He is playing” and “He is playing and 2 + 2 = 4.”
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sentence with only five words like “Every man wants to leave” could have as
many as four “aphonic” or covert slots!
Sometimes the best defense is an offensive action and it is the Representation-
alists’ criticisms of Contextualism that are important. One advantage Representa-
tionalists tout is that the slots they posit constrain enrichments. They see context
as being too unruly to be able to control what can become an indirect content.
Can an utterance of “Every Frenchman is seated” ever convey that every French-
man or Dutchman is seated, and can an utterance of “Everyone loves Sally” ever
convey that everyone loves Sally and hermother?2 Representationalists and Con-
textualists both share the intuition that they cannot, though the Contextualists
seem unable to rule out such additions to the direct content as they appear not
to have any access to the kinds of constraints associated with the slots of the
Representationalists. This is the overgeneration problem for the Contextualists:
they have no mechanism to outlaw certain types of seemingly unwarranted indi-
rect or illocutionary contents. Recanati (2010), one of the foremost proponents of
Contextualism, has even conceded that modulation is unsystematic, that is, that
no principled derivation of modulations is possible.
This has led to a kind of impasse because Representationalism is just too
baroque to be taken at face value and Contextualism appears unable to subdue
problems like overgeneration. In my view, many of these difficulties stem from
the fact that neither side in this debate actually knows how to derive any content,
whether illocutionary or even locutionary (e.g. “straightforward” disambiguation
of a word like “bank” or “ran” in an utterance as presented in Part III).3 If they did,
many aspects of this situation would no longer require an appeal to questionable
intuitions.
I will show how to solve, even dissolve, the overgeneration problem. Both sides
take indirect contents to be an either-or or zero-one matter. Either some content
is possible or it is not. I will argue not only that almost any indirect content can
attach to any direct content in some context or other – contrary to the common
intuition of Representationalists and Contextualists – but also that content as
such is often more nuanced than being a simple all or nothing issue. Grice (1975;
1989a: 39–40) himself more or less required such indeterminacies in the calcula-
tion of implicatures but this subtle point has been largely forgotten. Indeed, the
procedure I outline applies equally to all indirect contents including implicature,
and once this is recognized, it becomes clear that overgeneration is a potential
2See Stanley (2007: Chapter 7) and Recanati (2010: Introduction) for a discussion of these
examples.
3I have already argued in Section 13.1 that the mechanism offered by Relevance Theory is seri-
ously flawed.
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problem for implicature as well.4 But the real lesson from this observation of a
uniform approach to all illocutionary contents is this: since no slots are possible
for implicatures as they would be too limiting and even perhaps a little absurd,
so no slots are necessary for other illocutionary contents like enrichment and
modulation either! If a method can be shown to work for implicatures without
slots, then the same method is likely to work for other indirect contents as well.
15.2 How to think about content
Early on, Frege (1892/1980) and Russell (1919) and others who followed attended
to just the putative single literal content of a sentence. The pervasive ambiguities
of utteranceswere seldom acknowledged, let alone dealt with.5The laterWittgen-
stein (1953/1968) and Austin (1961) did much to broaden this picture by bringing
in utterances as the bearers of meaning, but even they succumbed to the lure of
single determinate contents. Grice did allow indeterminacies in implicature, in
fact making them one of its necessary attributes. But, influenced by the logicist
view of what is said, he left literal content determinate and singular. This view
still persists and even the indeterminacy of implicatures has been largely ignored.
So while new kinds of meaning have been identified – such as enrichments and
modulations – the idea that the overall content is singular and determinate still
holds sway.
In Parikh (2006b; 2010), I argued for a very different way to think about the
content of an utterance. I tried to show that meaning is almost never determinate
or singular. As I say in Parikh (2010: 217–218):
First, the content of an utterance is not just a single infon (or proposition)
as is usually assumed, but rather a collection of infons, possibly infinite in
number, relative to a described situation. Second, each of these infons is just
partially present as a member of the content through a probability attached
to it. Third, not every component of the content may be explicitly intended
by the speaker or explicitly inferred and represented by the addressee. And
lastly, the content may be different for the speaker and the addressee – there
is no “objective” content. This lack of objectivity is reinforced by … various
sources of indeterminacy… .Thus, in general, the flow of information is also
4As I said in Section 5.2, Grice’s own mechanism is also seriously flawed and, in any case, it
provides little protection against overgeneration because the mechanism is so vague.
5To repeat, by “ambiguity” I mean something broader than mere lexical and structural ambigu-
ity, though these are the plainest kinds. I intend to include all the multiple interpretations an
utterance might possibly convey.
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a partial affair, determined by the degree of overlap between the speaker’s
meaning and the addressee’s interpretation.
A visual image one might draw of content is as follows. Given a space of
points representing the entire class of infons (i.e. a lattice), the content for
each agent would be a subspace with each point assigned a number rep-
resenting its probability. Then each agent involved would have his or her
subspace and the overlap between them would determine the degree and
nature of the flow of information that took place between them.
This is a very different conception of content, whether literal or not. If we
reflect in a naïve way how we experience utterances in ordinary exchanges and
in literature, it should be apparent that there is some plausibility to the picture
I am proposing. In this view, meaning is not a singular or binary affair as the
Representationalists and Contextualists both assume. Multiple contents are all
partially present in the overall meaning of an utterance. This partial presence is
captured via the probabilities that the respective infons or propositions are being
conveyed by the speaker; they are not the probabilities of the contents themselves.
The points in the subspaces above can be shaded darker or lighter depending on
the strength of their presence.
Regarding the third point in the quote above about the necessity of intentions,
here is a quote fromThomason (1990: 349) that is indirectly related to this view:
All this shows, I think, is that ‘Did you mean to say’ is used to query peo-
ple about the consequences of what they have said, without distinguishing
these clearly from what they said. More generally, ‘Did you mean to do’
does not distinguish between intentions and foreseeable side effects, which
is exactly the distinction we need to make here. To achieve some progress
in these negative cases, it seems that we will need to say more about the
intensionality of intentions in general, and of intentions to assert in partic-
ular, and also to find tests that extract more reliable conclusions from the
evidence. The philosophical background, of course, suggests that it won’t
be easy to make progress on these matters.
This passage reveals that Thomason was grappling with this very issue of in-
determinacy in how to attribute meaning to an utterance in the special case per-
taining to what is said and its consequences. But because he was locked into the
intentional and Gricean way of seeing content, he felt that progress would be
difficult. As observed in Section 5.3, intentions are not required to be explicitly
present for all that is meant. Looking to the example of 𝜑 below, the fact that
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Smith’s weight refers to his weight on Earth in most ordinary situations could be
part of what was meant without it being intended by the speaker, simply because
we are usually on Earth and this is just taken for granted. (And it could be under-
stood as such by the addressee without being explicitly inferred and represented
in her beliefs.) It would be quite reasonable for the speaker to assent if he was
asked later if “he meant to say it.” In addition, it is equally plausible that such
contents be only partially present in the overall content of the utterance with
greater or lesser probability.
Consider the sentence 𝜑 discussed by Cappelen & Lepore (2005b):
(28) Smith weighs 150 lbs. (𝜑)
An utterance of 𝜑 by itself does not tell us whether Smith weighs 150 lbs.
1. when naked in the morning
2. when dressed normally after lunch
3. after lunch in heavy outer clothing
4. after being force-fed four liters of water
5. four hours after having ingested a powerful diuretic
6. on Earth
7. on the moon
8. and his height is five and a half feet
In the appropriate circumstances, one or more of the above completions could
be legitimate probabilistic meanings of 𝜑, even #8. It all depends on how much is
shared between speaker and addressee, what is available to both in the utterance
situation, andwhat their goals are. Indeed, there is even an indeterminate number
of possible completions for such an utterance, not all of which might have been
explicitly intended by the speaker but which neither agent can entirely eliminate
because the circumstances might be sufficiently ambiguous and unclear. We can
often ask after an utterance has elapsed: could the speaker also have meant this?
And equally often the answer will be: possibly, though maybe with rather small
probabilities. It is this more generous conception of meaning I am advocating as
it appears to fit the evidence better. Whether an indirect meaning is triggered
or not depends on the interlocutors’ goals in part and these may not always
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be explicit and explicitly shared. Of course, when a context is specified more
or less determinately, some of these enrichments may well become intuitively
implausible and their probabilities will then plummet to zero.
The solution to the overgeneration problem then is to recognize two things.
First, it is almost impossible to eliminate a possible enrichment or modulation
as a potential candidate relative to some context or other. There could always be
a context that allows a certain indirect content to become plausible. Secondly,
depending on the utterance situation, a potential illocutionary candidate could
become a partial presence in the overall meaning of an utterance. A probability
of zero would be attached to the majority of infons simply because there are so
many infons, but zero is also not so different from a vanishingly small positive
number.
These two things, possibility and probability, correspond to two steps in the
method of Equilibrium Linguistics. First, the possible enrichments have to be
generated via the Semantic Constraint consisting of the sub-Constraints of Rele-
vance and Distance after the need for them has been triggered because the direct
content or some proper part of it falls short of the shared conversational goals.
Second, some of these have to be retained and others discarded in a probabilistic
way via the Flow Constraint. I now proceed to show how these two steps work.
15.3 The Semantic Constraint: Generating possible
indirect contents
The direct or locutionary content of 𝜑, Smith weighs 150 lbs., is given by the in-
fon 𝜎 ℓ ≡ 𝜏0. This content, which I will refer to as 𝜏0, together with each of the
completions above will give rise, respectively, to the infons 𝜏𝑖 with 𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 8.
Thus, 𝜏1, for example, will be the content Smith weighs 150 lbs. when naked in the
morning, 𝜏2 will be the content Smith weighs 150 lbs. when dressed normally after
lunch, and so on.
Each of these contents will be plausible candidates in some context or other.
In many ordinary situations, 𝜏0 itself will satisfy the goals in the Setting Game
and so there will not be any need for a completion. But, in other situations, 𝜏0
might fall short of these goals and then a search for completions will be triggered.
I leave it to the reader to imagine such circumstances for each completion and
will simply assume that they are available to trigger a search. Thus, as we have
seen in Chapter 14, the set of possible completions for B for each 𝑢 is given by{𝑥 ∈ BallB𝑢 (𝜏0, 𝜖𝑑,𝑢) ∣ Relevance𝑢(𝑥) > 𝜖𝑅,𝑢}.
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If, for example, Smith’s doctor is making a statement about his weight, then
completions 𝜏1 and 𝜏2 may have high relevance and so would perhaps 𝜏5 and 𝜏6
although it is possible that, say, 𝜏3 could also be included for either the speaker or
the addressee. The locutionary content 𝜏0 would also potentially be sufficiently
relevant by itself. In such a scenario, the distance to these infons from 𝜏0 might
also be sufficiently small. One can estimate the distances as was done in the
example of the stranded motorist.
Given this specification of 𝑢, a new facet of triggering becomes visible. As
I have just said, a local search for completions would have to be triggered by
some inadequacy in 𝜏0 with respect to the conversational goals inferred from the
Setting Game in 𝑢. But this inadequacy may not always be clear-cut because 𝜏0
may only partially or hazily fulfill it. In the case of the garage, this inadequacy
seemed relatively straightforward to ascertain but even there it is not completely
obvious. This is why the locutionary content (or a proper part of it) often figures
as a probabilistic presence in the illocutionary content. This will become clearer
presently.
Returning to the Semantic Constraint, if we consider only relevance and ignore
distance we may end up with a content the addressee would like to infer but for
which there is little warrant because it is too remote – as argued at the end of
Section 13.3.This is also the kind of case that was mentioned earlier when I raised
the question whether “Everyone loves Sally” could ever imply the content that
everyone loves Sally and her mother.This may be very relevant for the addressee
to know but it may be too distant a content given what has been uttered. It all
depends on the utterance situation and it may be possible to describe a context
where the distance is not so great. In any case, relevance by itself is not sufficient.
Likewise, if we include distance but drop relevance, then we may get possible
completions that do not matter to the addressee and that the addressee would
not have any reason to entertain. This could occur if 𝜑 were uttered in a casual
conversation where the detailed nuances of Smith’s weight are irrelevant to the
addressee and would never be inferred even postdictively if he were asked for his
assent or dissent. So distance by itself is also not sufficient but it should be noted
that it is often less onerous to admit an irrelevant meaning than it is to admit a
remote meaning because the latter may lead to more serious errors about what
the speaker was trying to convey.
Nevertheless, it may be possible to develop a complete theory based only on
distance and the Flow Constraint, that is, without considering relevance. This
would naturally greatly simplify the picture as we would be rid of the problems
(e.g. the intensionality of choice) the notion of relevance faces. The argument
for this is that the notion of distance accounts sufficiently for the goal of the
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interlocutor. That is, if the distance requirement is satisfied then the relevance
requirement will automatically be satisfied. In yet other words, sufficient infor-
mational proximity implies sufficient relevance. This is an interesting conjecture.
For now, I prefer to retain both sub-Constraints since it is easier to drop some-
thing later than add it in. I will return to this alternative way of developing the
account in Section 18.1.
The set of candidate completions {𝑥 ∈ BallB𝑢 (𝜏0, 𝜖𝑑,𝑢) ∣ Relevance𝑢(𝑥) > 𝜖𝑅,𝑢}
does not require 𝜏0 to be a part of 𝑥 . This allows one to include possibilities
where the direct content may be rejected altogether, as happens in cases of irony
– for example, an utterance of “He is a fine friend” where exactly the opposite is
being conveyed. I have also simplified the notation by using 𝜏0 in the distance
calculation rather than any part of 𝜏0 because it can and often does happen that
enrichments attach to parts of the locutionary content rather than to the whole
locutionary content.6 Not only that, it may often not be necessary to compute
the whole locutionary content before deriving a local enrichment.
Because agents are limited, they may fail to compute the set of candidate com-
pletions exhaustively. Later, someone may inquire of a speaker if some content
was part of what he meant or of an addressee if that content was part of what she
inferred. If it had not been evaluated earlier, these agents would need to then test
that content postdictively. For example, in most ordinary situations, the comple-
tion #6 (i.e. the content 𝜏6) would be felt to be both of high relevance and close
proximity relative to the agents’ goals but neither agent may consciously pause
to compute its relevance and distance because it may not appear “salient”: it
may be taken for granted implicitly and so no triggering inadequacy would be
detected. It would remain latent unless it is brought up later in the exchange or
an ethnographer asks the interlocutors about it.
Not only are the assessments of relevance and distance rough and subjective,
the two thresholds are also rough and subjective, and all these things vary from
situation to situation too. So it is not unlikely that the speaker and different ad-
dressees come up with somewhat different possible enrichments. This is part of
the indeterminacy of any utterance. What about completion #8 or 𝜏8? Can it ever,
so to speak, cross these thresholds? I don’t see why not. Certainly, its relevance
may be high in 𝑢 as the addressee may be interested in Smith’s height. Its dis-
tance from 𝜏0 would generally also be high rather than low as required because
it is unlikely to bear an inferential relation to 𝜏0 in most circumstances where
the goals do not permit it. So it would generally be eliminated as a possibility.
But weight is roughly correlated with height within a certain range and if two
6See Parikh (2010: 156) for more details.
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doctors were discussing Smith’s weight it is conceivable that his height could fig-
ure as an indirect content even if only his weight was made explicit because the
distance between the two would be relatively low in such circumstances relative
to their goals.
While the inferential relations between weight and height may be partly phys-
iological, the possible inferential relations between Sally and her mother may be
social and the possible inferential relations between Frenchmen and Dutchmen
may be social or historical. Even merely hypothetical inferential relations can
contribute to the candidacy of an indirect content by making the relevant dis-
tances low enough. So almost any indirect content can be added to any direct
content given the right circumstances and goals if the inferential relations be-
tween the infons make the distance between them small assuming the infon also
has high relevance. The reason why such enrichments appear impossible in ordi-
nary circumstances is that they are generally inferentially unrelated to the direct
content. That is, the distance lies outside the open ball in ordinary circumstances
as no appropriate goal has been specified.
It now becomes clear that not only are slots not required for triggering the
search for possible enrichments (or modulations), they may in fact be too con-
straining if they prevent certain types of possibilities and they may be too lax
in licensing other possibilities. This is an interesting twist to the overgeneration
problem because in a certain sense this observation dissolves the problem alto-
gether. The trouble with positing slots is that they are always present in the sen-
tence itself quite independent of the circumstances and, in particular, goals. This
means they have no connection to what is actually going on in the communica-
tion and so will sometimes undergenerate (e.g. as in the examples of weight and
height or Sally and her mother) and sometimes overgenerate (e.g. when no com-
pletion is warranted). Goals and the circumstances are appropriately connected
to the communication and they, therefore, generate just the right completions
for every utterance.
Here is a quote from Recanati (2010: 11):
I agree with Stanley that certain things don’t happen, that would happen if
modulation were totally unconstrained. But who claimed that modulation
was totally unconstrained? Work in this area precisely needs to address the
issue of what is possible and what is not (step one), in order to arrive at
suitable generalizations (step two), which it will then be incumbent upon
pragmatic theory to derive (step three) (Elbourne 2008).
I believe the criterion involving Relevance and Distance does carry out all
three steps. In a related footnote, Recanati says, “One obvious constraint, implicit
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in my writings on the topic, is that modulation should preserve semantic types,
just as adjunction preserves syntactic types.” If such a constraint on semantic
types really does turn out to be required, it would automatically be handled via
the Distance sub-Constraint because two infons involving different types might
naturally be too remote in most situations. This situated way of bringing in pos-
sible constraints on semantic types is better because it allows a more contextual
formulation of the generalization. Language is usually too rich for unsituated
“semantic” diktats to work.
More conscious and deliberate processes of determining candidate comple-
tions and other illocutionary candidates are required when interpreting litera-
ture. Consider this poem by Emily Dickinson (1993: 18):
Tell all the Truth but tell it slant –
Success in Circuit lies
Too bright for our infirm Delight
The Truth’s superb surprise
As Lightning to the Children eased
With explanation kind
The Truth must dazzle gradually
Or every man be blind –
The broad meaning of the poem appears to be fairly clear, but what about its nu-
ances? What, for example, is to be included in “all the Truth?” Interpreting such
utterances requires some creativity and not only because the context for the text
is incompletely specified and, indeed, specifiable. There is a range of possibilities
and even coming up with them involves some imagination. This can now be ex-
plained by the cost of certain inferential paths being higher and requiring greater
effort. One may have to consciously but informally judge distances as part of an
extended deliberation about the poem. This is part of the reason why literary
criticism is a professional activity. And it is part of the pervasive indeterminacy
of language and meaning.
Deciding which candidates are in fact part of the poem’s meaning is another
matter altogether. It is to this latter problem, the matter of deciding what in fact
is the content of an utterance, that I now turn. This brings in a further filtering
action, this time via game theory.
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15.4 The Flow Constraint: Eliminating possible indirect
contents
For the sake of concreteness, I will assume that the Relevance and Distance cri-
terion is triggered and generates just 𝜏1, 𝜏2, and 𝜏6 as possible indirect contents
for our example. The rest can be deemed to be either irrelevant or too distant or
both.
The first thing to notice is that some items in the list have to be mutually
exclusive whereas others can coexist. Both 𝜏1 and 𝜏2 cannot hold simultaneously
though they can both coexist with 𝜏6. This introduces a slight complication in
how we evaluate the possibilities. Sets of mutually exclusive candidates have to
be considered together in the same game whereas those that do not conflict must
be treated separately.
The second thing to notice is that 𝜏6 may never be consciously entertained by
either speaker or addressee. It is, so to speak, fully situated though it may come
up later in the conversation in an explicit way.
Let us start with the games that arise from contemplating 𝜏1 and 𝜏6. Both games
will involve comparing the relative merits of just 𝜏0, the direct or locutionary
content, with the possible indirect or illocutionary contents 𝜏1 and 𝜏6. Take a
look at the illocutionary game 𝑔𝜄1 ≡ 𝑔𝜄𝑢(𝜑) in Figure 15.1.7
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Figure 15.1: The game 𝑔 𝜄1 for illocutionary content 𝜏1
This is a partial information game as before but it is an illocutionary partial in-
formation game.A utters 𝜑 = smith weighs 150 lbs. in 𝑢, its optimal locutionary
meaning 𝜎 ℓ ≡ 𝜏0 = Smith weighs 150 lbs. (and optimal parse 𝑡) are determined byB via the locutionary game 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑), and then they trigger various illocutionary
enrichments that need to be derived via corresponding illocutionary games.
7The superscript of 𝑔 𝜄1 is the Greek letter “iota,” a mnemonic for “illocutionary.”
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I have avoided subscripting the initial situations 𝑠 and 𝑠′ which should be 𝑠1
and 𝑠′1.The reader should read the symbols as carrying the appropriate intentions
to convey 𝜏0 and 𝜏1 in this game and appropriate contents in later games that will
soon appear. The payoffs are as they were in the locutionary games and obey
the same inequalities. The symbols for the prior probabilities are 𝜚1 and 𝜚′1 and
are distinct from the earlier symbols of Part III which were 𝜌1 and 𝜌′1. They are
different forms of the Greek letter “rho.”
These prior probabilities are also conditional probabilities like those of the lo-
cutionary games of Part III. In particular, 𝜚1 = 𝑃(𝜏0 ∣ 𝜏0; 𝑢). Recall the meaning of
the probability notation: 𝑃(𝜏0 ∣ 𝜏0; 𝑢) indicates the probability 𝑃(A is conveying
𝜏0 in 𝑔𝜄1 ∣A is conveying 𝜏0 in 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑); 𝑢) or, more simply, 𝑃(A is conveying 𝜏0
indirectly ∣A is conveying 𝜏0 directly; 𝑢). Here, the first occurrence of 𝜏0 is part
of the illocutionary game 𝑔𝜄1 whereas the second occurrence of 𝜏0 is part of the
locutionary game 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑). If the two games had been the same, then obviously
𝑃(𝜏0 ∣ 𝜏0; 𝑢) is just 1. But we are trying to determine whether 𝜏0 is also an indirect
content given that it is a direct content. As I said a short while ago, a locution-
ary content may be hazily inadequate and so it may occur probabilistically as an
indirect content as well.
In the same way, 𝜚′1 = 𝑃(𝜏1 ∣ 𝜏0; 𝑢). Here, there is no clash between the symbols
of different games as the indirect content is 𝜏1 and the direct content is 𝜏0.
We can naturally allow 𝑡 , the optimal parse of 𝜑 = smith weighs 150 lbs., to
also influence these indirect contents by simply adding it in as follows: 𝜚1 =
𝑃(𝜏0 ∣ 𝜏0, 𝑡 ; 𝑢) and 𝜚′1 = 𝑃(𝜏1 ∣ 𝜏0, 𝑡 ; 𝑢). Whether 𝑡 actually influences the indirect
content is an empirical question; my purpose here is just to show that both situ-
ations can be easily accommodated in the framework.
This also raises the much more interesting question whether indirect mean-
ings influence direct meanings and parses. If this is the case, then again it is very
easy to capture this simply by adding in the relevant indirect meaning 𝜏0 or 𝜏1 as
a conditioning variable that would play a role in determining locutionary mean-
ings and parses. And simultaneous two-way influence can be readily entertained
by having variables such as 𝑥′1 for the indirect meanings 𝜏0 and 𝜏1 and variables
such as 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑦𝑗 for direct meanings and parses. Then, everything would be
one grand system of equations encompassing both locutionary and illocution-
ary contents. However, there may be no empirical warrant for this in ordinary
face-to-face communication and one should be cautious about advocating such a
comprehensive system. When reading is involved, on the other hand, especially
with literature where interpretive efforts are more likely to be extended, such
a comprehensive system is more likely to be present than not, as a reader may
consciously reject a direct meaning and parse because their indirect meanings
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prove unsatisfactory relative to the indirect meanings of alternative direct mean-
ings and parses. In such cases, the direct meaning and parse are selected on the
basis of their more satisfying indirect meanings and so depend on them. In gen-
eral, the matter should be decided purely on empirical grounds and my purpose
here is just to show that both kinds of possibilities can be effortlessly represented
in the framework of Equilibrium Linguistics. An entirely new effect that can be
conceived is the influence of indirect meanings on optimal parses and vice versa.
One such example of a seemingly common type that can occur even in face-
to-face communication is as follows. Suppose A and B are talking about Russia
and B asks: “Is Russian literature any good?” Then A may respond: “Well, Dos-
toyevsky was Russian.” Then “Dostoyevsky” could refer to either the novelist or
other Russians with the same last name and it seems it is the implicature that
Russian literature is great that enables the addressee to choose the novelist. In
other words, the indirect meaning helps to determine the direct meaning and
vice versa.
One difficulty such a comprehensive system faces is in explaining why subop-
timal direct meanings and parses do not seem to generate their own illocutionary
possibilities which would then feed back into bolstering them, however feebly.
For example, 𝜑 = smith weighs 150 lbs. has the alternative suboptimal (in 𝑢) lo-
cutionary meaning 𝜏 ′0 that Smith determines the weight of £150 (in coins). This
suboptimal meaning would require its own enrichments (e.g. in coins) but we are
not generally aware of them.We are not generally aware of the locutionarymean-
ing 𝜏 ′0 either but, as mentioned in Section 12.1, we seem to unconsciously activate
alternative lexical meanings. Most likely, the processing does not go beyond this
to a full-scale sentential referential meaning such as 𝜏 ′0 and so the warrant for
alternative indirect meanings triggered by 𝜏 ′0 may be weak in such face-to-face
interactions unless the indirect meanings result from a proper part of 𝜏 ′0 . In any
case, in more literary situations, such interdependent effects are likely to be more
common.
From a computational standpoint, too, it may be interesting to consider such
comprehensive influences as they provide some more data for eliminating un-
wanted possibilities though they also substantially complicate the calculations.
To keep things simple in this book, I will assume just a one-way influence (with-
out the intervention of the optimal parse 𝑡) and take 𝜚1 = 𝑃(𝜏0 ∣ 𝜏0; 𝑢) and 𝜚′1 =
𝑃(𝜏1 ∣ 𝜏0; 𝑢).8
Even to the newcomer to game theory, 𝑔𝜄1 should now be easy to solve. All that
is required is a simple Nash equilibrium that can be computed by evaluating the
inequalities between corresponding expected payoffs:
8Such two-way influences were explicitly considered in my previous book in Chapter 4.
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either
𝜚1𝑎A + 𝜚′1𝑐′A < 𝜚1𝑐A + 𝜚′1𝑎′A
and
𝜚1𝑎B + 𝜚′1𝑐′B < 𝜚1𝑐B + 𝜚′1𝑎′B
or
𝜚1𝑐A + 𝜚′1𝑎′A > 𝜚1𝑎A + 𝜚′1𝑐′A
and
𝜚1𝑐B + 𝜚′1𝑎′B > 𝜚1𝑎B + 𝜚′1𝑐′B
which simplifies to:
𝜚1
𝜚′1
<> 𝑎′A − 𝑐′A𝑎A − 𝑐A
and 𝜚1
𝜚′1
<> 𝑎′B − 𝑐′B𝑎B − 𝑐B
As assumed in Section 8.1, if the payoffs are “symmetric” then each of the two
numerators on the right-hand side equals the corresponding denominator on the
right-hand side, and this leaves us simply with:
𝜚1 < 𝜚′1 or 𝜚1 > 𝜚′1
Often, there will be no situational evidence to warrant either strict inequality
and we will simply have:
𝜚1 = 𝜚′1
as both possibilities will be equally likely. When this happens, an infinite number
of mixed strategy equilibria with some probability weight 𝜋0 on 𝜏0 and therefore
𝜋1 = 1 − 𝜋0 on 𝜏1 become available. It is possible for 𝜋0 to be 0 or 1 in which
event the corresponding pure strategy, either 𝜏1 or 𝜏0, would be selected as the
equilibrium.9 In actual practice, as I pointed out in Section 8.1, all A and B have
to do is compare certain probabilities, which is what the computation of Nash
equilibria under the assumptions about symmetric payoffs amounts to, and this
seemswithin the grasp of partially rational agents.Moreover, if we do not assume
a two-way influence between locutionary and illocutionary meanings then the
probability comparisons are much simpler. How do the agents pick the weights
𝜋0 and 𝜋1? Again, in practice, these are generally rough estimates like high, me-
9I have omitted 𝜑 from these equilibria as it is always present.
260
15.4 The Flow Constraint: Eliminating possible indirect contents
dium, and low, which can be thought of as fuzzy intervals (but see the discussion
below as well).
So if 𝜚1 < 𝜚′1 then 𝜏1 is the solution with probability 𝜋1 = 1 and if 𝜚1 > 𝜚′1
then 𝜏0 is the solution with probability 𝜋0 = 1. In cases where 𝜚1 = 𝜚′1 and some
mixed strategy solution is expected, the solution to 𝑔𝜄1 might be (𝜏1, 𝜋1) with
the understanding that this implies the complementary solution (𝜏0, 𝜋0). For all
situations then, we can write the general form of the content roughly as collec-
tions of sets like {(𝜏𝑖 , 𝜋𝑖) ∣ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼} where 𝜏𝑖 are the range of indirect contents, 𝜋𝑖
their probabilistic weights as derived from the relevant games 𝑔𝜄𝑖 , and 𝐼 an index
set. For example, the game in Figure 15.2 might have the solution (𝜏6, 𝜋6) where
𝜏6 = Smith weighs 150 lbs. on Earth. Both of these indirect solutions would be
gathered together and the indirect content expressed as {{(𝜏1, 𝜋1)},{(𝜏6, 𝜋6)}}.
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Figure 15.2: The game 𝑔 𝜄6 for illocutionary content 𝜏6
Intuitively, this tells us that 𝜏1 (i.e. Smith weighs 150 lbs. when naked in the
morning) is a meaning of the utterance of 𝜑 in some situation 𝑢 with a probability
of 𝜋1 (which would be some number like 0 or 0.3 or 0.7 or some interval) and that
𝜏6 (i.e. Smith weighs 150 lbs. on Earth) is also ameaning of the same utterance with
a probability of 𝜋6 (also a number or interval, presumably higher, like 0.9 or even
1 depending on 𝑢). In other words, there will be a range of indirect contents, each
with some probability weight. Obviously, as I said earlier, these weights are not
the probabilities of the infons themselves but the probabilities that the respective
contents are being conveyed by the speaker.
When mutually exclusive indirect contents are considered, they have to be
evaluated simultaneously in the same game. So the game for 𝜏1 and 𝜏2 would
not be 𝑔𝜄1 and a corresponding 𝑔𝜄2 similar to it, but would be 𝑔𝜄12 as shown in
Figure 15.3 where I have deliberately left out the payoffs. In this case, the mixed
strategy solutionwould bewritten as {(𝜏0, 𝜋0), (𝜏1, 𝜋1), (𝜏2, 𝜋2)}with the natural
proviso that 𝜋0 + 𝜋1 + 𝜋2 = 1.
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Figure 15.3: The game 𝑔 𝜄12 with two illocutionary contents 𝜏1 and 𝜏2
If we now consider the overall content of the utterance, assuming that only
items #1, 2, and 6 or 𝜏1, 𝜏2, and 𝜏6 get through the Relevance plus Distance filter,
it would have to include 𝜏0 with probability 1 as the direct content,10 it would
then include 𝜏0, 𝜏1, and 𝜏2 as one set of mutually exclusive indirect contents with
probabilities 𝜋0, 𝜋1, and 𝜋2, respectively, and, last, it would include 𝜏0 and 𝜏6 as
indirect contents with probabilities 𝜋 ′0 and 𝜋6. This content would be expressed
as follows:
{ {(𝜏0, 1)}, {(𝜏0, 𝜋0), (𝜏1, 𝜋1), (𝜏2, 𝜋2) ∣𝜋0 + 𝜋1 + 𝜋2 = 1},{(𝜏0, 𝜋 ′0), (𝜏6, 𝜋6) ∣𝜋 ′0 + 𝜋6 = 1} }
If we make the constraints on the probabilities implicit, this simplifies to:
{ {(𝜏0, 1)}, {(𝜏0, 𝜋0), (𝜏1, 𝜋1), (𝜏2, 𝜋2)}, {(𝜏0, 𝜋 ′0), (𝜏6, 𝜋6)} }
This is exactly the form of the content I referred to earlier in Section 15.2 where
10The probability that some direct content is being conveyed is not always 1. With a pun, it might
be 0.5.
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I said it was a collection of infons each with a probability. This can be visualized
on the infon lattice as suggested earlier. The entire proposition expressed would
be:
𝑐 ⊨ { {(𝜏0, 1)}, {(𝜏0, 𝜋0), (𝜏1, 𝜋1), (𝜏2, 𝜋2)}, {(𝜏0, 𝜋 ′0), (𝜏6, 𝜋6)} }
where 𝑐 is some appropriate described situation. For this example, this would
be the literal content of the utterance. It includes both the locutionary content
𝜎 ℓ ≡ 𝜏0 with probability 1 as well as various indirect contents that have crossed
the Relevance plus Distance barrier. In other examples, theremay bemodulations
and other indirect contents to consider as well as we will see in the next two
chapters.
Note that 𝜋0 is in general different from 𝜋 ′0 and both are in general different
from 1, and yet these three numbers all attach to the same content 𝜏0. This re-
quires some interpretation. The direct content 𝜏0 (i.e. Smith weighs 150 lbs.) is
fully part of the overall content with probability one in this example. Its pres-
ence in the other indirect contents is relative to the other indirect components
(i.e. either 𝜏1 and 𝜏2, or 𝜏6). It provides a constraint on the other indirect infons
by limiting their participation in each indirect content.
Also, the speaker and addressee are unlikely to share the same content not
only because they may have generated different possibilities but also because
the game-theoretic computations may yield different solutions. In other words,
the single content expressed above would split into two separate contents, one
for the speaker and the other for the addressee, with possibly different infons
and possibly different probabilities. This again is just a related aspect of indeter-
minacy. These literal meanings would look as follows:
𝑐A ⊨ { {(𝜏0, 1)}, {(𝜏0, 𝜋A0 ), (𝜏1, 𝜋A1 ), (𝜏2, 𝜋A2 )}, {(𝜏0, 𝜋A′0 ), (𝜏6, 𝜋A6 )} }
and
𝑐B ⊨ { {(𝜏0, 1)}, {(𝜏0, 𝜋B0 ), (𝜏1, 𝜋B1 ), (𝜏2, 𝜋B2 )}, {(𝜏0, 𝜋B′0 ), (𝜏6, 𝜋B6 )} }
We should remind ourselves that the illocutionary games 𝑔𝜄𝑖 I have been dis-
cussing belong to the objective illocutionary global game 𝐼𝐺𝑢(𝜑) which is a part
of the objective global game 𝐺𝑢(𝜑) = 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) ∪ 𝐼𝐺𝑢(𝜑), as I have said ear-
lier. There are naturally the corresponding subjective global illocutionary games
𝐼𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑), 𝐼𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) which are in turn parts of the corresponding subjective global
games 𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) = 𝐿𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) ∪ 𝐼𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) and 𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) = 𝐿𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) ∪ 𝐼𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑). To stay
within the bounds of communication as delineated by Definition 5.3 in Section 5.3,
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I have simply assumed that 𝑢 is such that𝐺𝑢(𝜑) = 𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) = 𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) and 𝐼𝐺𝑢(𝜑) =
𝐼𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑) = 𝐼𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑) and, further, that they all become (nonconscious) common
knowledge betweenA andB. But, especiallywith illocutionary games, it is all too
common that there is miscommunication or a weaker flow of information than
strict communication and this is then often explained by a divergence among
these three games or by the lack of common knowledge.
Indeed, the solutions even to identical subjective games that are common
knowledge can diverge because different probabilistic weights 𝜋A, 𝜋B may at-
tach to these contents. Since some of the prior probabilities in such games are
often equal, an infinite number of mixed strategy equilibria result, and in these
circumstances A and B may well arrive at different weights for various indirect
contents.
There appear to be two possible sources of such weights. Recall that {𝑥 ∈
Ball𝑢(𝜏0, 𝜖𝑑,𝑢) ∣ Relevance𝑢(𝑥) > 𝜖𝑅,𝑢} is the set of candidates that contains
infons that are both sufficiently close and sufficiently relevant. However, the
distance and relevance of each candidate will, in general, be different. Those can-
didates with greater proximity and greater relevance ought to be more proba-
ble than those candidates with lower proximity and lower relevance as they are
the contents more likely to be conveyed by the speaker. Thus, the probabilistic
weights 𝜋A, 𝜋B come from the relative proximity and relevance of different in-
direct contents in the solution. If there had been just one criterion, either just
Distance or just Relevance, the proportion of the probabilistic weights would
just be the same as the proportion of either distance or relevance. Since there are
two criteria, some suitable function of the two is required to work out the ratio
of the probabilistic weights.
There will also be situations when one prior probability outweighs the oth-
ers and then the corresponding illocutionary content could be the pure strategy
equilibrium for both agents with probability 1. This outcome is not unusual but
since there will always be a range of indirect contents, it is likely that at least
some of them will enter the literal content probabilistically. For example, it may
be that, in the above two contents for A and B, 𝜋A6 = 𝜋B6 = 1 but that the other
probability weights lie strictly between 0 and 1.
There may be some interest in actuallymeasuring just how much B’s inferred
meaning diverges fromA’s intended meaning.11 For this, one way is to enlist the
11As noted earlier in Part III, A knows what he wants to convey with certainty but he never-
theless has to derive it based on the Generation Game which contains his subjective repre-
sentation of the relevant games of partial information. That is, he has to figure out what B
would infer and it is this meaning that is given by { {(𝜏0, 1)},{(𝜏0, 𝜋A0 ), (𝜏1, 𝜋A1 ), (𝜏2, 𝜋A2 )},{(𝜏0, 𝜋A′0 ), (𝜏6, 𝜋A6 )} }.
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idea of relative entropy or the so-called Kullback-Leibler divergence from infor-
mation theory.12 Since each content is a collection of probability distributions
𝜋A𝑗 and 𝜋B𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, 2,… , over the same corresponding spaces of sets of infons,13
we can compute the relative entropy for corresponding pairs of distributions
which is defined as:
𝐷(𝑝 ∥ 𝑞) = ∑
𝑥∈𝑋
𝑝(𝑥) log 𝑝(𝑥)𝑞(𝑥)
where 𝑝, 𝑞 are the two probability mass functions being compared, the logarithm
is with respect to base 2, and 𝑋 is the relevant set of infons. Extremal cases in-
volving zeros are defined thus: 0 log 0/𝑞 = 0 for all 𝑞 and otherwise 𝑝 log 𝑝/0 = ∞.
𝐷(𝑝 ∥ 𝑞)measures the expected number of extra bits required to code samples
from 𝑝 when using a code based on 𝑞, rather than using a code based on 𝑝. Gen-
erally, 𝑝 represents the “true” distribution of data, observations, or a precisely
calculated theoretical distribution. The measure 𝑞 typically represents a theory,
model, description, or an approximation of 𝑝.14
For each pair of corresponding distributions 𝜋A𝑗 , 𝜋B𝑗 with A’s distribution
substituted for 𝑝 and B’s for 𝑞, this will yield a number. Since a content involves
multiple pairs, we can take the sum of these numbers to find the total relative
entropy of the two contents. To ensure that we have the same corresponding pairs
of distributions in A’s and B’s contents, we may occasionally need to introduce
a distribution in either content where certain infons get a zero probability. This
may pose a small problem of interpretation because when 𝑝(𝑥) /= 0 and 𝑞(𝑥) = 0
the divergence would become infinite. To avoid this, we could apply some kind
of smoothing operation (e.g. introducing a small positive number in place of the
zero).
As there is no “true” or “objective” meaning, this formula yields simply the
total divergence (i.e. the sum of the expected number of extra bits required with
respect to each pair of corresponding distributions 𝜋A𝑗 , 𝜋B𝑗 ) ofB’s derivedmean-
ing from A’s intended meaning.15 The obvious use of this measure is to see how
far apart the two are, which would give an idea of the extent to which the com-
munication has been a success. An identity of speaker meaning and addressee
12See Manning & Schütze (1999: 72).
13I am taking 𝜋A𝑗 and 𝜋B𝑗 to be just one pair of distributions within the content. As we have
just seen, there will in general be multiple such pairs of distributions within the overall literal
meaning. That is, the superscript 𝑗 is different from the subscripts on the probabilities 𝜋 , the
latter representing actual probabilities, not whole distributions.
14This measure of proximity between two distributions is not a metric in the usual sense. There
are other ways of measuring distance (e.g. Bhattacharyya distancewhich is given by𝐷𝐵(𝑝, 𝑞) =− ln(∑𝑥∈𝑋 √𝑝(𝑥)𝑞(𝑥))) which involve real metrics.15I have deliberately ignored the possible differences between 𝑐A and 𝑐B .
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interpretation is seldom achieved and represents just an ideal case.16 Yet, this
assumption has been the norm for much of semantics.
If there are two or more addressees and one speaker in an utterance situation,
we can now compare whose meanings are closer to each other and whose further
apart. Another application is to extend this formula to a further sum for entire
discourses or dialogues. A third is to situations like Chinese whispers where a
relay of utterances that attempts to preserve content is involved.
To recap what we have achieved: I have described the process of deriving in-
direct contents such as free enrichments from first principles as involving three
steps: first, the need for indirect contents is triggered by the agents’ goals not be-
ing met by the locutionary content, then finding candidate possibilities through
local search via relevance and distance, and then solving certain games of par-
tial information to either eliminate or include these candidates in a probabilistic
way. The same kind of reasoning would enable us to derive the literal meaning
of the sentence 𝜑 = bill ran from Part III, enriching its locutionary content Bill
Smith stood (for election) to Bill Smith ran in the local election. The steps com-
prise four illocutionary Constraints: the same Phonetic and Syntactic Constraint
as before obviously, a new Semantic Constraint involving the sub-Constraints
of Relevance and Distance which generates the possible indirect contents, and a
new Flow Constraint involving illocutionary games of partial information that
eliminates the suboptimal ones.
Illocutionary meanings such as 𝜏6 (i.e. Smith weighs 150 lbs. on Earth) may
never be consciously entertained by either speaker or addressee. In this case, the
game 𝑔𝜄6 would not be played by either agent and so its solution would not enter
into either agent’s conscious content. It is then up to the theorist or ethnographer
to impute this fully situated meaning to them. There is no mystery about this: if
they were asked if they counted it as part of their understanding, they would
invariably give their assent in most situations.
I have considered whether illocutionary meanings could affect locutionary
meanings and parses, a possibility Equilibrium Linguistics effortlessly allows.
I have chosen to err on the side of caution in this book for oral utterances by
assuming that locutionary meanings influence illocutionary ones but not vice
versa.
The picture of the meaning of an utterance as spread out over the entire space
of infons with each point in the infon lattice assigned a probabilistic weight based
on the likelihood of its being conveyed by the speaker appears very attractive as
16See Parikh (2001; 2006b; 2010).
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it seems to fit our empirical uncertainty about whether some (direct or indirect)
content is in fact part of the meaning or not.
The Nash and Pareto-Nash equilibrium concepts more readily lend themselves
to such probabilistic infons than does the Risk Dominant Nash equilibrium con-
cept. If this probabilistic picture of content that I have informally visualized is
found to be empirically accurate, then it suggests that the Nash and Pareto-Nash
ideas are perhaps the more appropriate ones to consider.
In the example of implicature about the garage in Chapter 14, the reader should
have no trouble seeing how both the implicatures 𝜏 and 𝜏 ′ might be derived in
corresponding illocutionary games, one with 𝜎 ℓ and 𝜏 as B’s choices and the
other with 𝜎 ℓ and 𝜏 ′ as B’s choices, the solution to the first assigning a relatively
high probability to 𝜏 and the solution to the second assigning a lower probability
to 𝜏 ′.
Processing Relevance and Distance as well as the Flow Constraint may seem
like a lot psycholinguistically even though the brain is very fast. This is why
human agents generally derive and become aware of just a few indirectmeanings,
especially in oral communication. But it is clear that implicatures such as 𝜏 ′ can
be derived if we spend more time reasoning. This is especially true when more
complex forms of communication are involved as happens with literature. The
inferences take more time and we are more conscious of them. This is an added
reason why semantics and psycholinguistics should not be conflated.
I have also tackled the problem of overgeneration in two stages both of which
involve indeterminacies. Based on Relevance and Distance and the Flow Con-
straint, I argued that almost any indirect content can attach to a direct content
in some (possibly outlandish) context or other.
This single argument ought to kill two birds, the overgeneration problem
raised by the Representationalists and their charge of unsystematicity that Re-
canati has acknowledged. I have tried to show by actually deriving the enriched
content of a sample utterance from first principles that both can be defeated and
the broad position of Contextualism defended if one adopts the ideas of Equi-
librium Linguistics. This requires giving up many cherished Gricean tenets but
these are suspect anyway. And my framework does a lot more: it offers more
precise and robust ways of computing not just direct contents but also indirect
contents, including not just enrichments but also modulations and implicatures,
all using just a few uniform and more or less self-evident principles of ontology
and partial rationality.
This completes my discussion of free enrichment. I now briefly consider impli-
cature before moving on to modulation.
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16 Implicature
This is the classical type of illocutionary or indirect meaning. It involves a range
of examples that are often differently classified. As I have already analyzed a
couple of examples of implicature informally in the previous two chapters, I will
not develop a more full-blown account here. The considerations are very similar
to those in Chapter 15 in the discussion of free enrichment.
Once the need for one or more implicatures is felt because the locutionary
content does not fully realize the goals of the conversation that are more or less
public in the Setting Game, the addressee undertakes a local search using the
Distance and Relevance sub-Constraints and then submits the candidates thus
found to the Flow Constraint. This is in fact the procedure more or less for all
indirect meanings and especially for free enrichment and implicature.
Just to amplify my discussion, I will briefly analyze two more examples. The
first is a slightly modified example from Grice (1975). One agent asks another
where Pierre lives, saying he wants to send him something, and the reply he gets
is:
(29) Somewhere in the south of France. (𝜂)
First, 𝜂 needs to be enriched to Pierre lives somewhere in the south of France be-
cause without this the first agent’s goal would not be met. The enrichment is not
only derivable at a close distance and high relevance, it also sails through the
Flow Constraint. But even with this enrichment, B’s goal is not fulfilled. There is
no implicature available given the information in 𝑢 that allows an actual address
to be inferred. So the only possible conclusions that can be drawn are that A
does not know or is unwilling to cooperate (i.e. the Cooperative Principle does
not hold). This is within derivational reach, that is, they are within the open ball
as they can be inferred from an ambient fact like if A had known and if he were
cooperating, he would have given the details and they are also relevant in the sense
that they provide a negative answer to the query. And the two possibilities can
be shown to go through the Flow Constraint with appropriate probabilities.
This is not all. A has not simply said he will not reveal Pierre’s address, he
has provided partial information regarding his whereabouts. This indicates he is
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not being completely uncooperative which might be taken as rude given some
prior relationship between the two agents. As I said in Chapter 14, cooperation
is often partial. This further fact – that the Cooperative Principle is nevertheless
partially observed – can also be inferred as an implicature in the same way. Such
contents based on maintaining relationships and being polite play a role in the
corresponding Content Selection Game as well.
The next example is from Hugly & Sayward (1979: 22) who argue convinc-
ingly that Grice’s own way of handling it was circular. In a conversation about
whether Eisenhower was a great US president, one participant offers evidence of
Eisenhower’s generalship during the war and his great popularity, upon whichA says:
(30) And he had a wonderful grin too. (𝜂′)
The locutionary content of this contribution does not achieve the conversa-
tional goal. So it triggers the search for an implicature. It can then be inferred
in a few short steps that it would be common knowledge that it obviously does
not meet the goal because having a wonderful grin has nothing to do with being
a president, let alone a great one. Because of this obviousness, it draws a paral-
lel with the other statements about Eisenhower’s generalship and popularity as
also being irrelevant, although less obviously so. This parallel is drawn because
otherwise there would have been no good reason to make such an obviously ir-
relevant statement. In other words, its real meaning is to draw attention to the
earlier statements as being similar with regard to its salient irrelevance. Thus,
a locutionary content that had no value in the locutionary information it pro-
vided with respect to the conversational goal leads to a conclusion within the
derivational ball that is also relevant to the goal. Further, it also goes through
the Flow Constraint as the ambient facts are all common knowledge and so is
the corresponding illocutionary game.
One can see from such examples that the kind of reasoning the agents have
to undertake to derive implicatures can be quite sophisticated. It employs the
full breadth of inferential modes and strategies available to us and so cannot
be easily formalized. It includes even analogical reasoning as happened in the
example above where the blatant irrelevance of a statement implies a relation of
similarity to the less clear-cut irrelevance of the preceding contributions. Grice
was right to emphasize such complex inferences and the Relevance theorists’
approach becomes manifestly inadequate because they have no place for goal-
and purpose-driven derivations, only for the completely blind process of deriving
a large number of implications.
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How do these analyses square with the maxim of Communication I introduced
in Section 5.2? Pretty well, except that the more precise procedure I have offered
in this chapter dispenses with the need for such an informally stated rule as
implicatures are obtained from basic principles of rational agents trying to fulfill
their goals, that is all.
Before I turn to modulation, I should mention that it is not only the addressee
who infers implicatures and enrichments. Modulo various indeterminacies, the
speaker, too, has to go through the calculations in his Generation Game by imag-
ining how the addressee would carry out the required calculations. Only then
can he choose his sentence optimally so that it achieves its ends in an optimal
way by making certain things explicit and leaving others implicit.
Lastly, scalar implicatures of the kind discussed by Horn (1972; 1984), Levinson
(1983; 2000), and many others can also be handled similarly. The key thing to
note here is that not all the implicatures that a scale may license will actually be
generated because the relevant goals may not be present. It will all depend on
the situation. In this sense, there are possibly no generalized implicatures of the
kind Grice had originally envisaged. Incidentally, Ross (2006) was probably the
first to employ game-theoretic methods to analyze complex scalar implicatures.
He showed that games of partial information (and Pareto-Nash equilibria) scale
effortlessly toward this end.
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17 Modulation
Modulation is possibly the most complex aspect of meaning. It straddles both
locutionary and illocutionary meaning, unlike both free enrichment and impli-
cature, and involves a more complex Semantic Constraint consisting not only of
the Conventional and Referential sub-Constraints of Part III but also of the Rele-
vance and Distance sub-Constraints of Part IV. Moreover, it requires for the first
time a back-and-forth interaction between the Semantic and Flow Constraints.
Modulation was perhaps first identified by Cohen (1985; 1986), who cites Ross
(1981) as an influence.1 It was later picked up by several writers including Re-
canati (2004; 2010) and Wilson & Carston (2007) as an essential component of
literal meaning. Cohen’s own example is the use of a phrase like the stone lion
where the content of lion has to be modulated to be made compatible with its ad-
jective stone. This fascinating aspect of meaning, possibly responsible for much
in meaning change as one dimension of language change, can only be tackled
by applying a more complex combination of the locutionary and illocutionary
Semantic Constraints and a Flow Constraint that interacts with them.
It is best to understand the phenomenon through Cohen’s (1986) own words.
He contrasts “insulationism” and “interactionism” as two different ways in which
the meaning of the utterance of a sentence depends on the meanings of its com-
ponent words.
According to the insulationist account the meaning of any one word that
occurs in a particular sentence is insulated against interference from the
meaning of any other word in the same sentence. On this view the com-
position of a sentence resembles the construction of a wall from bricks of
different shapes. The result depends on the properties of the parts and the
pattern of their combination. But just as each brick has exactly the same
shape in every wall or part of a wall to which it is moved, so too each stan-
dard sense of a word or phrase is exactly the same in every sentence or
part of a sentence in which it occurs. We may sometimes need to look at
1Barsalou (1983; 1987) investigated the related idea of ad hoc categories in a different psycho-
logical context.
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neighboring words in order to discover the sense in which a word is func-
tioning in the sentence in question, as we might infer the concavity of one
brick from the convexity of its neighbor. But even then the meanings that
we discover are not made what they are by one another, any more than
the presence of a convex brick alters the shape of its neighbor. Rather, the
words in the sentence have been given these meanings by diachronic facts
of etymology. (page 223)
⋮
Interactionism makes the contradictory assertion: in some sentences in
some languages the meaning of a word in a sentence may be determined
by the word’s verbal context in that sentence, though the extent and nature
of this determination shows awide range of variation. On this view the com-
position of a sentence is more like the construction of a wall from sand-bags
of different kinds.Though the size, structure, texture and contents of a sand-
bag restrict the range of shapes it can take on, the actual shape it adopts in
a particular situation depends to a greater or lesser extent on the shapes
adopted by other sand-bags in the wall, and the same sand-bag might take
on a somewhat different shape in another wall or in a different position
in the same wall. By exploiting local context in this way a language can
be much more prolific of semantic variety than insulationism can give it
credit for being. Moreover these sense-refinements or sense-modifications
are generated by verbal interaction with a particular synchronic state of a
language. Many of them, especially metaphors, are not common enough to
be recorded in dictionaries or assigned dates and places of origin. (page 223)
⋮
Once the difference between insulationism and interactionism has been rec-
ognized it becomes clear that we cannot construct a semantics for any nat-
ural language along the same lines as a semantics for a formal system of
any currently familiar kind. Projects like Davidson’s or Montague’s cannot
succeed. And one can see the temptation for philosophers of language to
relapse into a later-Wittgensteinian emphasis on anomalism. (page 230)
⋮
The interactionist must certainly grant that the borderline between the two
types of meaning-determination is a fluid and flexible one. …Moreover, just
as it is possible to shift the borderline between the two kinds of meaning-
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determination so as to make the insulationist story more extensively appli-
cable, so too one could shift the borderline in the other direction. … In short,
while homonyms like ‘pen’ and ‘case’ are definitely on the side of the bor-
derline where insulationism holds sway, and indefinitely pliable verbs like
‘drop’ and ‘make’ are definitely on the interactionist side, there is a lot of
polysemy in natural language that can apparently be treated in either way
because it is just not knownwhether all the word-meanings concerned have
actually occurred in human utterances. In such ambivalent cases consider-
ations of theoretical simplicity are the only factors that can determine the
issue. (232–233)
⋮
It has to be emphasized, of course, that the details of verbal interaction in
natural language are as yet little understood and that very many problems
remain as yet unresolved. For example, when one word dominates another,
as “stone” dominates “lion” in (1), or “geography” dominates “drop” in (2),
what ensures that the domination proceeds in one direction rather than the
other?2 Does the less ambiguous dominate over the more ambiguous, or
topic over comment, or the relatively abstract over the relatively concrete,
or the inanimate over the animate? But whatever be the correct solution
of these problems, it seems highly unlikely that we shall obtain any guid-
ance towards finding it from the ideas of Tarski, Montague, etc., about the
semantics of artificial languages. Recognition of the difference between in-
sulationist and interactionist conceptions forces us to treat the semantics of
natural language as a largely autonomous discipline, rather than as a topic
for Davidsonian or Montagueian theory. (page 234)
This book, and my earlier work, has tried to tread precisely the fine line be-
tween the Scylla of “formalism” or, more precisely, “logicism” (Russell, Tarski,
Montague, Davidson) and the Charybdis of “anomalism” (the laterWittgenstein’s
lack of system as described in the quote from Dummett in Section 1.2 as well
as the similar outlooks of Austin, Strawson, and Searle). But the modulation of
meanings shows us how formidable the task is. To date, there are no adequate
theories of this phenomenon except for descriptive attempts by Recanati and the
Relevance theorists and a few others.
The kind of disambiguation Part III looked at dealt with homonyms (e.g. words
like bank which can actually be thought of as two or more distinct words with
2(1) Four stone lions occupy the corners of Trafalgar Square. (2) Most students here drop geog-
raphy in their final year (where “drop” means “drop studying”).
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the same spelling). It does not show specifically how such meanings can bemod-
ulated in the context of a sentence. Cohen also seems to focus exclusively on
the verbal context and leaves out modulations that occur on account of the situ-
ational context.
There is also sometimes real indeterminacy about whether a particular indirect
meaning is a modulation or free enrichment or implicature. Both of the latter
can often be viewed simply as modulations as I mentioned with Grice’s example
of the possibly open garage and as could also be said of the example of Smith
weighing 150 lbs. on Earth. It is nevertheless right to treat the three phenomena
as distinct and allow for indeterminacies from time to time. In such events, one
agent may treat the matter one way and the other agent may treat it the other
way.
The classic – and perhaps obvious – first approach to such a problem would
be to mimic Grice’s approach to implicature as might be suggested, for example,
by Grice (1975) and Searle (1979). This involves computing the whole locution-
ary meaning of the utterance first, finding it inadequate in one or another way,
and then recomputing a related meaning such as an implicature or a modulated
meaning to make up for the inadequacy. Unfortunately, the experimental evi-
dence (e.g. Frisson 2009) makes this kind of computation highly implausible as
the time delays implied by the model are incompatible with those found empiri-
cally.
The alternative is to undertake “local” computations as opposed to “global”
ones but use roughly the same kind of reasoning. In the case of the stone lion,
both the determiner the and the adjective stone play a role in constraining the
possibilities for the content of lion, the first by guiding the addressee to some
resource situation or anaphoric anchor and the second by eliminating the pos-
sibility of a real animate lion in most ordinary contexts as inadequate. Modula-
tions are generally activated by other words in the sentence (e.g. stone) whose
referential meanings seem incompatible with those of the word in question (e.g.
lion).
Any theory that is developed must be compatible with the psycholinguistic ev-
idence. But, at this stage, such experiments themselves are still in their infancy
and so it is not clear what the final findings will be. So it is essential to build a
framework that can itself be modulated in different directions and can offer dif-
ferent theories based on the data. I will offer one such theory in what follows. But
the framework of Equilibrium Linguistics is flexible enough to house alternative
accounts of the phenomena.
As I said in Section 12.1, Pylkkänen et al. (2006) and Frisson (2009) suggest
that the conventional meanings of polysemous words are likely to be relatively
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abstract and impoverished underspecified cores relative to the full meanings they
are given during processing. As Frisson says, the comprehension of the under-
specified core sense of a polysemous word occurs instantaneously but the full
meaning is realized only at the end of the sentence if at all. Such delays are likely
to be present even when conventional meanings are modulated. This empirical
result gives us a way into the problem. Essentially, it is the Semantic and Flow
Constraints that will need to be modified.
Tomake things concrete, consider the following situation 𝑢. Batman and Robin
are perched above a tall building in Gotham City in the dead of night and they
have the following exchange:
Robin: People were busy today.
Batman: The city is asleep. (𝜑 = 𝜑1𝜑2𝜑3𝜑4)3
Here, the Setting Game is just one involving the making of commonplace ob-
servations. But all four words 𝜑𝑖 in 𝜑 cannot be given their conventional mean-
ings because cities do not sleep. Intuitively, its three possible meanings could be
the residents are asleep or the city is quiet or the residents are quiet, all of which are
modulated contents. It is reasonably clear from 𝑢 that Batman could have meant
any of these three meanings. How might such meanings be derived?
17.1 The Semantic Constraint
As indicated in Section 12.1, there are homonyms like bank with unrelated con-
ventional meanings and polysemes like eye or school with related conventional
meanings, the former taking more time to process than the latter. Indeed, one
sense of bank is itself also polysemous because there can be many different
kinds of financial institutions that are all called bank.These more specific senses
can also be conveyed in an utterance. The different related senses of a polyseme
can all be thought of as conventionalized modulations, that is, modulations that
become conventionalized with use.
Recall the extended Semantic Constraint from Section 11.5,4
𝜔 ⟶𝐶𝜔 𝑢⟶𝐶′𝜔 𝑢⟶𝑃𝜔
Any modification of this schema must preserve the possibility of penumbral
shift that occurs with vague concepts. Remember that vagueness is ubiquitous
3Recanati (2004: 34-36) discusses this example.
4See especially page 205.
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and it is very likely that it is a vague property (subjective or intersubjective) that
undergoes modulation.
Earlier, in Part III, 𝐶𝜔 was assumed to be the full conventional meaning of
𝜔 even when it was polysemous. Now, based on Frisson’s (2009) experimental
findings, it can be said to be the common, underspecified core of all the related
senses when such related senses exist. For example, in the sense of bank which
is a financial institution, just this core, that is, just financial institution, will be
designated as one homonymic conventional meaning 𝐶bank1 , where the subscript
1 is used to distinguish this sense from the other homonymic sense of river bank.5
Refinements of this core such as a retail bank or a savings and loan institution
or a credit union or a shadow bank or whatever will not be included in this core.
This core is a concept in the agent’s head. So are the refinements all concepts in
the agent’s head.
If bank is used in an utterance with this first sense rather than river bank
then the shifted concept 𝐶′bank1 may be such that 𝐶′bank1 = 𝐶bank1 , that is, no
penumbral shift may occur. There is likely to be a great deal of indeterminacy
here as it may not be clear whether a shift occurs owing to, say, a different set
of exemplars being taken into account for the vague concept financial institution
or whether its meaning is being modulated. But let us suspend the possibility of
a penumbral shift for now and take 𝐶′bank1 = 𝐶bank1 .
The last step in the extended Semantic Constraint is from 𝐶′bank1 to 𝑃bank1 , the
corresponding subjective or intersubjective property that is a possible constituent
of the proposition conveyed. There will be as many such properties as there are
conventionalized refinements of the core concept available either in the agent’s
head or intersubjectively. For example, the concept financial institution may get
refined to the property shadow bank in some particular situation. The “null” pos-
sibility of no refinement, that is, just the property financial institution can also
occur because in many utterances this core is all that may be intended. Which
one of these is selected will depend on the Flow Constraint. This game-theoretic
process of handling polysemy is identical to that of handling homonymy except
that there are usually many more polysemous senses.
Let us take it, then, that in cases of both homonymy and polysemy, there is
a possibly underspecified core concept that is the conventional meaning, which
may ormay not undergo penumbral shift, that is then transformed by the referen-
tial map into a possibly refined subjective or intersubjective property. There will
be as many such possibilities as there are conventional meanings and their refine-
ments.6 These possibilities then enter the Flow Constraint where they get disam-
5There are several other conventional meanings of bank but I will deal with just these two.
6This actually depends on the kind of word being considered. There are different things that
happen when, for example, the word is a quantifier like the or every as discussed in Parikh
(2010: Chapter 6), but I am not concerned with such words here.
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biguated by interdependent partial information games as discussed in Part III. All
I have done so far is to change the conventional meaning from its full meaning
to an underspecified core in the case of polysemy. The rest of the process is the
same as before.
To understand modulation, return to the example of Batman and Robin and
focus, for themoment, on the word 𝜑2 = city. Howmight its sense get modulated
to residents? Assume that the latter content is not a conventionalized refinement
of the core concept even though it maywell be. If it were, it would just be handled
as described above. But, for the sake of the argument, assume it is not.
The locutionary Semantic Constraint applies as follows:
city⟶𝐶city 𝑢⟶𝐶′city 𝑢⟶𝑃city
I now make three assumptions to keep things simple. First, assume that city has
just one conventional meaning. Second, assume that it is not polysemous so that
𝐶city is fully specified rather than being just a common core. (The reason for
tackling polysemy above is that modulation can apply to either a fully specified
or partially specified concept so the analysis must apply to both cases.) Third,
assume there is no penumbral shift. Notice that city is a vague concept because
it just stands for a “large” town so penumbral shifts are certainly possible, but in
the current utterance situation 𝑢, they can be ignored. In such a situation, then,
the property 𝑃city will be just the usual vague property of being a city. This is
one possible content of the word that will enter the Flow Constraint.
That is, the (locutionary) FlowConstraint would be activatedwith the unmodu-
lated locutionarymeaning 𝑃city as one interpretation. I will look at this presently.
Before I do so, I want to look at what enables the modulation of 𝑃city to residents.
In order to get to residents, it becomes necessary to avail of the illocutionary Se-
mantic Constraint involving the sub-Constraints of Relevance and Distance. Re-
call that Robin had earlier uttered, “People were busy today.”This means the con-
cept residents is derivationally near the baseline concept 𝐶city (actually 𝐶′city,
but the two are the same here) and the former is also relevant. Why can this be
asserted? It is because Batman’s goal, which can be assumed to be cooperative,
is to respond to Robin’s observation about the people or residents of the city.
So, the property residents7 can be derived from the corresponding property 𝑃city
within the open ball BallB𝑢 (𝑃city, 𝜖𝑑,𝑢) = {𝑥 ∈ I ∣ 𝑑B𝑢 (𝑃city, 𝑥) < 𝜖𝑑,𝑢}. Such
synecdochic derivations from whole to part are just routinely available reason-
ing strategies. For example, the agent may first observe that Robin has just talked
7We deal with the corresponding properties rather than concepts as there is no guarantee that
the final destination infon will be in the agent’s head from the outset. As he reasons, he is led
to discover the result and this result may lead him outside his head, that is, outside his initial
memory.
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about the residents being busy. Then he may suppose that if Batman were also
talking about the residents the conversational goal of discussing more or less the
same topic would be fulfilled. And, so, partly by abduction, he would conclude
that Batman is in fact talking about the residents. The length of such a deriva-
tional chain might be just two or three steps. Moreover, residents is also relevant
because it has positive value for the interlocutors on account of adding informa-
tion to the dialogue. So residents is both relevant and sufficiently close and could
be admitted as a possibility.
But whywould the local search for this content be triggered at all?Whywould
the agent not be satisfied with just 𝑃city which is available from the locutionary
Semantic Constraint? This is where the back and forth between the Semantic
and Flow Constraints comes in. In other words, the missing first step in the short
derivation above is that 𝑃city is not adequate, as I will demonstrate below.That is
why the agent has to search for something that is derivationally related to 𝑃city
within the ball. This something will turn out to be residents because of the rest
of the derivation suggested above.
Before we get to the back and forth, I want to make a couple of observations.
First, a city has many parts and has many aspects, not just its residents. So why
is residents near but not some other related aspect of a city?Why is only residents
within the open ball? This is because it is the only aspect of a city that would,
in 𝑢, contribute to the conversational goal as made clear by the abductive step
above. In some other setting, a speaker may wish to refer to a city’s buildings as
that meaning may contribute to the goal there. And so on. So only residents is
found as a possibility after a search is triggered by the inadequacy of 𝑃city.
Second, consider 𝜑4 = asleep. Again, a similar argument can be employed to
show that the property quiet or inactive is close to the baseline property asleep
because these properties contrast with Robin’s use of the word busy.Thesemean-
ings also have relevance because Batman could be seen as drawing a contrast
between the residents being quiet or inactive at night and busy or active dur-
ing the day, and thereby contributing to his dialogue with Robin. Intuitively, the
physical city’s being quiet or inactive does not seem to fulfill any “direct” conver-
sational goal but it could also be a possibility if Robin’s earlier utterance implied
the physical city was noisy and full of movement during the day. In such loose
conversations especially, just like the sentence bill ran in Part III, relevance or
the value of information is itself measured quite liberally.
I will therefore assume that the illocutionary Semantic Constraint can, if trig-
gered, make meanings such as residents and quiet available as possibilities for
the Flow Constraint. Thus, both the locutionary and illocutionary Semantic Con-
straint may play a role in generating the possibilities, the latter only when trig-
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gered. When this happens, the resulting meaning may no longer be clearly clas-
sifiable as locutionary or illocutionary, reinforcing the fuzziness of all these cat-
egories that attempt to partition meaning.
17.2 The Flow Constraint
As I said above, the locutionary Semantic Constraint is activated upon encoun-
tering 𝜑2 = city and it results in 𝑃city, which is just the vague subjective or
intersubjective property of being a city. This assumes there was just one conven-
tional meaning 𝐶city and there is no polysemy and no penumbral shift so that
𝐶city = 𝐶′city. This generates the game in Figure 17.1 where 𝜎2 = 𝑃city.
u r- r-
𝜌2
𝑠2 𝜑2 𝜎2 𝑎A, 𝑎B
Figure 17.1: The locutionary partial information game for 𝑃city
Likewise, the locutionary Semantic Constraint operates on 𝜑4 = asleep and
results in 𝑃asleep and generates the game in Figure 17.2 where 𝜎4 = 𝑃asleep.
u r- r-
𝜌4
𝑠4 𝜑4 𝜎4 𝑎A, 𝑎B
Figure 17.2: The locutionary partial information game for 𝑃asleep
Recall from Part III that 𝜎4 is a conditioning variable in 𝜌2 and 𝜎2 is a condition-
ing variable in 𝜌4. (I am ignoring the other conditioning variables that arise from
the games corresponding to the words 𝜑1 = the and 𝜑3 = is as they do not play
any significant role in this example.8) The prior probability 𝜌2 is the probability
that A = Batman is conveying 𝜎2 = 𝑃city given that he is conveying 𝜎4 = 𝑃asleep
(and the other semantic and syntactic contents). Similarly, the prior probability
𝜌4 is the probability that A is conveying 𝜎4 = 𝑃asleep given that he is conveying
𝜎2 = 𝑃city (and the other semantic and syntactic contents). But, obviously, A
could not possibly be conveying either content given that he is conveying the
8For more on such games relating to the and is, see Parikh (2010: Chapter 6).
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other(s) because cities and sleep are incompatible and even a partially rational
agent would not so contradict himself.
This mutual incompatibility of 𝜎2 = 𝑃city and 𝜎4 = 𝑃asleep is what provides the
desired trigger that activates the local search for a modulated meaning for either
or both contents. Observe that I have used Grice’s and Searle’s idea that there
should be a trigger for modulation based on some kind of inadequacy together
with the idea that this inadequacy should be detected without computing the
entire locutionary content as they believed. In the mechanism I have described,
the mutual contradictoriness of 𝜎2 = 𝑃city and 𝜎4 = 𝑃asleep is realized locally,
without computing the full locutionary proposition.
Some trigger is required because, otherwise, agents would be trying to modu-
late everyword they encountered andwould take unconscionably long to process
every utterance. This is where Sperber &Wilson (2008) and Wilson (2011) err be-
cause in their system, vaguely specified as it is, there is no trigger and what they
call “mutual adjustments” occur ubiquitously even when an unmodulated mean-
ing is perfectly acceptable. The term “mutual adjustment” is fine as an informal
description but a theory needs to spell out what this back and forth consists in.
That is precisely what Equilibrium Linguistics offers. In addition, this agrees with
Frisson’s (2009) empirical assertion that the core conventional meaning is instan-
taneously accessed but the full, refined – or modulated – meaning is computed
at the end of the sentence if at all.
Because the interpretive process as it occurs within the speaker’s Generation
Game and the addressee’s Interpretation Game runs up against this block of con-
tradictoriness, it backtracks to the Semantic Constraint from the FlowConstraint.
This time the illocutionary Semantic Constraint is activated and the Distance and
Relevance criterion is put to use. Now that 𝑃city and 𝑃asleep have been found to
be mutually inadequate, two local searches ensue based on derivational proxim-
ity and relevance relative to the goals of the agents as inferred from the Setting
Game. The result of the two searches is the discovery of the property residents
starting from 𝑃city and quiet or inactive starting from 𝑃asleep. Thus, these two
properties become new possibilities as the computation returns to the Flow Con-
straint from the Semantic Constraint.
In the new games that emerge, 𝑃city and 𝑃asleep are still viable contents be-
cause they are only mutually contradictory and so cannot both be present in the
equilibrium content. Either of them singly may well persist. The next round of
games is shown in Figures 17.3 and 17.4 with 𝜎 ′2 = residents and 𝜎 ′4 = quiet or
𝜎 ′4 = inactive. (Figure 17.3 and Figure 9.3 look the same but stand for completely
different things.)
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Figure 17.3: The partial information game for the modulation of 𝑃city
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Figure 17.4: The partial information game for the modulation of 𝑃asleep
Interestingly, these games are neither wholly locutionary or wholly illocution-
ary because one content in each is locutionary and the other is illocutionary.
By now the reader is likely an expert in solving such games and it should be
easy to see that the joint solution can be either (𝜎 ′2 , 𝜎4) = (residents, 𝑃asleep) or(𝜎2, 𝜎 ′4) = (𝑃city, quiet) or (𝜎 ′2 , 𝜎 ′4) = (residents, quiet). It cannot be (𝜎2, 𝜎4) =(𝑃city, 𝑃asleep) as the prior probabilities will not allow it.9
So we started with the locutionary Semantic Constraint and then went to the
locutionary Flow Constraint. The latter involved a mutually contradictory pair
of contents 𝑃city and 𝑃asleep and so we backtracked to the illocutionary Seman-
tic Constraint, found possible modulations of these two meanings through local
searches of the infon space, and then returned to a mixed locutionary and illo-
cutionary Flow Constraint where the games could be solved with mutually com-
patible solutions. This is the back and forth or mutual adjustment between the
9See Section 8.1 to see how such games are solved. I have dropped the locutionary contents 𝜎1
and 𝜎3 of the and is for convenience. Also, I have dropped the meaning inactive, although it
should be evident that such indeterminacies among possible modulations will be rife.
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Semantic and Flow Constraints mentioned earlier. All three possible meanings
that I referred to as meanings Batman could have conveyed emerged naturally as
solutions. If desired, the equilibria can be augmented with probabilities to show
that each of the solutions has some range of probability based on 𝑢 and on how
close and relevant the modulations are. The equilibrium content of the whole
utterance 𝜑 = the city is asleep is then partly locutionary and partly illocution-
ary because the words the and is have locutionary equilibria and one or both of
city and asleep have illocutionary contents.
Just to make this process crystal clear, I set it out more graphically:
Utterance Situation
→ Individual words of sentence become available
→ Locutionary Semantic Constraint activated
→ Possible referential contents become available
→ Locutionary Flow Constraint activated
→ Mutual incompatibility among locutionary contents detected
→ Need for modulation triggered
→ Illocutionary Semantic Constraint activated
→ Possible modulated contents found and made available
→ Mixed Flow Constraint with locutionary and illocutionary contents acti-
vated
→ Mixed equilibrium contents
What is the range of possibilities for modulations of locutionary meanings?
Consider the example of metaphor from Sperber & Wilson (2008: 27) where a
woman says to an uncouth suitor, “Keep your paws off me.” The authors claim
that “the ad hoc concepts constructed to carry these implications will then at
least overlap with the concepts encoded by the utterance (otherwise we would
be dealing with purely associationist rather than inferential relations). Since the
concepts PAWandHANDhave disjoint extensions, we claim that ‘paw’ could not
be used to convey the meaning HAND.” But this is patently false and shows that
their conception of inferential relation is too narrow. Indeed, as I discussed in
the case of he is a fine friend in Chapter 14, human reasoning is sophisticated
enough to revise and reject one or more of its premises. In their example, it is
quite clear that the utterance has the rough meaning keep your clumsy, grasping
hands off me and the locutionary starting point paw has been discarded. It is
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true, as Sperber and Wilson claim, that the exact meaning conveyed may not
be paraphrasable but this is because the number of properties constituting the
modulated meaning is indefinite and because these properties are also vague,
making it hard to reproduce the same effects with a paraphrase.
Returning to Cohen’s example of the stone lion and his concern about how
which word dominates which is to be determined, consider the examples of the
large mouse and the large elephant. In the latter two phrases, it is clear
that the adjective is modulated whereas in the former the noun is modulated.
So one can say that it is unlikely that any syntactic determination of what is
modulated is at play. In the stone lion, in most situations, no modulation of
stone will be found in the set of possible modulations {𝑥 ∈ Ball𝑢(stone, 𝜖𝑑,𝑢) ∣
Relevance𝑢(𝑥) > 𝜖𝑅,𝑢}. That is, this set will be empty. But lion will get modu-
lated successfully to something like representation of a lion. The opposite will
happen with the large mouse in most contexts and large will be modulated,
not mouse. But, given the highly situated nature of language, one should always
expect that some rare context will invert these possible modulations.
17.3 Recapitulation
I have now shown in detail how modulation works. When it occurs, unlike free
enrichment and implicature, the partial information games in the Flow Con-
straint are part of the locutionary global game 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑) even though they con-
tain illocutionary modulated contents uncovered by the illocutionary Semantic
Constraint. As such, they interact with the games corresponding to all the other
semantic, syntactic, and phonetic possible contents thrown up by the sentence
uttered as described in Part III. The only reason modulation was analyzed in this
Part is that we needed the illocutionary Semantic Constraint.
Earlier, I discussed polysemy and its associated conventional meaning which
is an underspecified core that gets shifted and refined if required. In the city
is asleep, this issue did not come up explicitly as I assumed no polysemy was
involved. But, in practice, all three kinds of lexical meaning – homonymy, pol-
ysemy, and vagueness – can occur simultaneously, as evinced by a word like
bank, which has two homonymic meanings, of which one is polysemous, and of
which both could also be vague. So, in attempting a full account of the mecha-
nism of modulation, it is necessary to ensure that none of these possibilities are
neglected. When there is polysemy and vagueness, the underspecified core 𝐶𝜔
gets shifted to 𝐶′𝜔 and it is the latter concept from which a corresponding sub-
jective or intersubjective property 𝑃𝜔 is formed. This property then provides the
starting point for a local search for a modulated meaning if such a need arises.
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Additionally, as Frisson (2009) says, the comprehension of the underspecified
core sense of a polysemous word occurs instantaneously but the full meaning is
realized only at the end of the sentence if at all. Modulations behave similarly to
polysemous refinements in this respect except that they are not conventionalized
but arrived at through inferential search. Indeed, polysemy can be viewed as
conventionalized modulation as I remarked earlier. If it turns out that Frisson’s
result cannot be so extended to modulation, then a revision of the theory I have
presented might be required. But Equilibrium Linguistics is a framework which
allows multiple theories to be developed within it and I have developed just one
option.
I have also shown how all three classical aspects of lexical meaning – homon-
ymy, polysemy, and vagueness – would be handled by Equilibrium Linguistics.10
The first and third of these were analyzed in Part III and polysemy required just
a small modification of the conventional meaning. Modulation, what might be
called the fourth aspect though it applies not just to words but also to phrases,
builds on the first three.
Figures of speech like metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, hyperbole, and oth-
ers can all be seen as instances of modulation. For example, an utterance of the
pen is mightier than the swordwould result in a modulation of both nouns. In
this case, the whole sentence would have to be evaluated locutionarily as there
is no direct incompatibility between pen and sword. As discussed in Section 10.4,
the truth of the utterance may also play a role in this determination. The mean-
ing of this particular aphorism is now obviously conventionalized and so agents
do not actually need to infer its meaning any more. Other tropes might result
from implicature as happens with some examples of irony. So by giving an ac-
count of all these types of indirect meaning, I have also provided accounts of
such phenomena.
More complex examples such as the city which is polluted is unhappy can
also be tackled. Here, the word polluted is about the city itself and the word
unhappy possibly makes a reference to its residents. I leave it to the reader to
apply the theory I have described to this example.
As always, we have to contend with indeterminacy. I have already alluded
to the indeterminate modulation of 𝑃asleep to either quiet or inactive or both
as well as to other possible properties that may not be easy to make verbally
explicit. All such modulations will lie within the set of possible modulations
10See Murphy (2010: Chapter 5) for a discussion of these three aspects of lexical meaning. Also,
look back to Footnote 9 in Section 3.1 to see how can you pass the salt? would be handled
as an instance of polysemy or conventionalized modulation.
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{𝑥 ∈ Ball𝑢(𝑃asleep, 𝜖𝑑,𝑢) ∣ Relevance𝑢(𝑥) > 𝜖𝑅,𝑢} though an agent may not al-
ways be able to articulate them. The other indeterminacy, also discussed earlier,
is between modulation on the one hand and free enrichment and implicature on
the other. As the example of the garage being open shows, one agent may handle
it as a modulation, another as an implicature.
A psycholinguistic issue is whether all these indirect meanings are stored in
the agent’s memory or lie outside and are discovered afresh. I have tried to em-
phasize that the process of local search will sometimes lead an agent outside his
head, that is to say, it will lead him to entertain an entirely new idea that he has
never contemplated before. This is also presumably how creativity occurs and
an understanding of modulation-like processes may lead to deep insights into
creativity.
A computational issue is how the complex and flexible human reasoning in-
volved in search can be modeled. The usual tack is to model some subset of the
infon space and some subset of possible reasoning strategies and thereby suc-
ceed with a subset of indirect meanings. It seems unlikely that the full range
of possibilities can be mapped although, with machine learning techniques, one
may be able to annotate training data sufficiently to allow such algorithms to
work fairly well. In any case, I have at least shown how, in principle, the realm
of illocutionary or indirect meaning can be brought within the ambit of science
via a model that is philosophically sound, mathematically solid, computationally
tractable, and empirically adequate.
Having made these observations, I now point out perhaps the most important
one. Does the account of the fixed point principle which generalizes Fregean com-
positionality and the context principle as discussed in Section 10.2 need to be al-
tered in any way to accommodate modulation? As modulation involves just the
locutionary global game 𝐿𝐺𝑢(𝜑), and as it therefore involves interdependence
among the various local partial information games and among all the possible
semantic, syntactic, and phonetic contents of the sentence uttered, no change
needs to be made to it. All the results of Section 8.1 continue to apply including
Theorem 8.5 and Equation 6 from Section 8.1.5 in particular.
This completes my discussion of modulation.
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18 Overview of illocutionary meaning
18.1 Review of the argument for indirect meaning
I have now described in full detail how the notions of relevance and distance
that constitute the illocutionary Semantic Constraint can, together with the illo-
cutionary Flow Constraint, yield the indirect meanings of an utterance. I have
also shown how these meanings are generally indeterminate and involve multi-
ple infons with different probabilities, thus justifying the picture of meaning as
smeared out on the infon lattice, one region for each interlocutor in the exchange.
Combining this model with the one in Part III for locutionary meaning gives
us a way to compute both direct and indirect meanings. In particular, I have
discussed how lexical and structural disambiguation and reference-fixing or sat-
uration on the side of locutionary meaning and free enrichment, implicature,
and modulation on the side of illocutionary meaning are handled. This also pro-
vides insight into how many tropes work so figurative speech also falls within
their scope. The one aspect of meaning I have not explicitly considered is direct
and indirect illocutionary force, that is, the stating, commanding and requesting,
asking, promising, and other forms of doing things with words, to use Austin’s fe-
licitous phrase, that accompany every utterance. Force does not pose any special
obstacles and can be resolved by the same partial information games as worked
with other direct and indirect meanings.
A small adjustment that needs to be made in the model for illocutionary mean-
ing is that I have assumed that the baseline from which distances are measured
is either the locutionary meaning or one of its proper parts. But when all types
of indirect meanings are evaluated together, the baseline may change to, for ex-
ample, a modulated meaning or an enriched meaning or both. I will show one
example of this in the next section. In any case, such changes to the model are
straightforward to make.
One unfinishedmattermentioned in Chapter 15 is whether informational prox-
imity implies sufficient relevance. Because the account of distance is difficult to
formalize it may be hard to give a proof of this. But one might argue as follows.
First, it could be noted that some information 𝜏 is relevant just in case it ful-
fills the shared conversational goal because that is what leads to an increased
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value for the agent. If 𝜏 is already adequately near the locutionary meaning (or
its proper part), then it (or information derivable from it or information it is de-
rived from) must abductively or otherwise fulfill the shared conversational goal
within the open ball. Thus, proximity implies fulfillment of goals. And fulfillment
of goals implies increased value of information, which is relevance. So relevance
is superfluous to the derivation of indirect meaning. I am not sure if this informal
argument can stand up to greater scrutiny but if it does it would greatly simplify
the account as then only distances within the open ball need to be calculated
to find illocutionary meanings. That would also emasculate the problems raised
by intensionality as well as other difficulties for the notion of relevance. And it
would sever ties completely with the Gricean maxims while retaining the Co-
operative Principle and also the Gricean reasoning involved in the analysis of
particular examples.
In the Gricean scheme it is the maxims that provide a “standard” against which
literal meaning is measured. If it fails, an implicature is triggered to restore ade-
quacy. In my account it is the goals of the agents as they emerge in the Setting
Game that provide the standard against which locutionary meaning is measured.
When such goals are not met, illocutionary meanings are triggered to restore
adequacy. So the maxims can be seen in a somewhat new light, as approxima-
tions to goals or as high-level goals that can be overridden by the more specific
goals, as I argued in Section 5.2.1 When viewed this way, it becomes clear why
maxim-based explanations of implicature are often unsatisfactory and vague. It
is because maxims can only partially account for the breadth and variety of goals
that interlocutors can have and it may often seem that we are force-fitting them
into one or another maxim. Horn (2014) offers a very rich set of examples to show
howmaxims such as being orderly are, in fact, realized in many different ways in
different subcommunities and sets of situations, which helps to particularize oth-
erwise “universal” maxims, thereby bridging the gap somewhat between abstract
and concrete goals.
Another issue is to what degree the requirements of common knowledge can
be said to be met in computing illocutionary meaning. This is a delicate matter
and in theoretical work it is best to just assume it. But its lack is often responsible
for all kinds of miscommunication and partial communication as captured by
the overlapping regions of the infon space representing each agent’s content. So
when our interest lies in such aspects of communication it may become necessary
to more carefully specify the nature of the shared knowledge as I have discussed
1Earlier, in Parikh (2001: Section 7.7), I had seen them as approximations to rationality which
seems a bit unspecific relative to goals.
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inTheUse of Language (2001: Chapters 5 and 6) in some detail.There, I also tackled
other flows of information, such as suggesting, where full common knowledge
does not obtain.
I remind the reader how thoroughly pragmatic and practical my model for
both locutionary and illocutionary meaning is as opposed to the more epistemic
inclinations of most other researchers as mentioned in Section 5.1. The goals and
preferences of the agents play a crucial role in all the derivations. This is com-
pletely missing in Relevance Theory and is relatively absent in Grice as well
despite his talk about purposes and despite some of his actual analyses. As most
others have followed Grice, they also share the same limitations.
18.2 A complete example
I now deal relatively briefly with a more or less complete example bringing espe-
cially the Content Selection Game back into focus. This will help connect what
we have accomplished in Parts III and IV.
Suppose a seven-year-old child is playing quietly by himself in a room. His
activity may partly be described by his ongoing actions and partly by choices
he may be considering. His mother is working on her book on communication,
Deconstructing Derrida, in the same room. Her activity may likewise be described
by her thoughts and possible actions like writing. Now, the child cuts himself on
his finger very slightly and a drop of blood appears. He begins to cry loudly. The
mother sees it is a very minor cut and, as she is absorbed in her thoughts, she
wants him to stop crying while she interrupts her work to attend to the cut. This
forms the context or the background situation 𝑢 for the communication that tran-
spires between them. The Setting Game 𝑆𝐺𝑢 incorporates the partly convergent
and partly divergent interests of the two agents. From all the examples I have
looked at so far it should be apparent that such situations can be extremely var-
ied. What is remarkable is that situation theory and situated game and decision
theory allow us to represent this wide range of possibilities quite compactly.
Informally, what happens next is that she utters the sentence, “The cut is not
serious.” And the child hears her and stops crying. How is this exchange to be
analyzed and understood?
Based on 𝑆𝐺𝑢 the motherAwants to stop the childB’s crying. She could bring
this about in a number of ways. One way is to directly convey to the child that he
should stop crying.This includes both the locutionary content to stop crying and
the corresponding illocutionary force of a “command” or firm request. Another
way is to convey a more circuitous content that the cut is not serious and so the
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child should stop crying. There are many other possibilities depending partly
even on the creativity of the mother.2 If telepathy were possible, the mother
would convey these direct or indirect contents immediately, that is, without the
mediation of language. But before she can do any conveying, either via telepathy
or via language, she has to select what to convey, either the direct or indirect
content or some other content altogether.
Such contents do not come ready-made into A’s mind. They have to be indi-
viduated based on her goal to get B to stop crying because the cut is not serious.
As I said in Section 13.2, the contents possess what I call act-equivalence since
they have the same purpose. This is a kind of intensionality of choice and action
as equivalent contents may induce different responses.
On the one hand, the human brain is extraordinarily fast, but on the other,
we are not usually aware of such content selection when we speak, let alone
all the other decisions that are involved. What actually happens in the body is
not known, but we can try to identify the broad structure of constraints – the
philosophical psychology – that must be respected in a roughway. For example, I
am presenting these constraints as a problem of choice. It is not necessary that the
choices be made in the detailed way I am about to describe, but the constraints
predict that choice of certain kinds must be present.3
The Content Selection Game that results is shown in Figure 18.1.
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Figure 18.1: The mother and child Content Selection Game
2For example, she could try to distract the child.
3See Glimcher (2004) for some preliminary evidence that supports this view.
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The utterance situation 𝑢 contains a great deal of information, some of which
is shared and some of which is not. For example, the fact that the child is crying
loudly is shared, in fact, it is common knowledge between them in the nonwell-
founded way described earlier. But the child isn’t sure whether the mother has
the mental space to fuss over him or merely attend to him and return forthwith
to her work. This uncertainty on the child’s part may be represented by a set
of two possible situations, 𝑠 itself where she will not fuss and 𝑠′ where she will
fuss. Both these situations are a part of 𝑢. As far as he is concerned, he could
be either in 𝑠 or in 𝑠′, the two situations being identical except for this single
uncertainty about fussing. The mother knows that she cannot spare the time to
fuss and so knows that she is in 𝑠. But she is also aware that the child does not
know if she will fuss or not, that is, if the situation that obtains is 𝑠′ or 𝑠. So
she is forced to consider 𝑠′ even though she knows it is not a factual situation.
Because enough of the foregoing is shared between them, these two possibilities
become common knowledge between them. Since there is no further information
about the situations between them, it is common knowledge between them that
the probabilities 𝜌 and 𝜌′ of these initial situations 𝑠 and 𝑠′ being factual are the
same.4
I will restrict myself to just the two contents explicitly considered above, the
indirect content labeled 𝜏 and the direct content labeled 𝜏 ′. These are the two
contents the mother could convey in both situations and they are represented
by four branches emanating from them. At this stage, there are different possi-
bilities. We can assume the child is aware of these possible contents, though the
argument for that in this setting is somewhat thin. Or we can assume that only
the mother has these possibilities in mind and chooses between them and so only
she represents the full strategic situation between them. Different settings will
dictate different local assumptions: both can be accommodated within the choice
situation I am developing.
In response to conveying 𝜏 or 𝜏 ′, the child can either stop crying – the action
represented by 𝑎 – or continue crying – the action represented by 𝑎′. And once
both mother and child have acted, certain consequences ensue for each of them
that are most conveniently represented by utilities. The particular numbers have
been chosen to reflect their relative preferences for these consequences in the
4As I also pointed out in Section 11.5, there is a certain subtlety involved here because themother
actually knows that 𝑠 is factual and so that 𝜌 = 1. One could say either that the game is played
prior to her knowing this or, what I prefer, that they have common knowledge of the child’s
belief of equiprobability. That is, the mother adopts the child’s ignorance for the sake of the
situation.
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setting. These preferences are dictated by the complexities of the background
situation which involve the following salient features:
1. The shared goal of getting the child to stop crying by attending to him
2. The partly convergent, partly divergent personal subgoals of the partici-
pants because the mother does not want to fuss and the child wants the
mother to fuss
3. The effort of conveying and interpreting a content
4. The psychological fact that if the child has a reason to stop crying, he will
be more inclined to do so. Such a reason presumably functions like an
Aristotelian enthymeme.
5. The desire of the mother to reassure her child and to reinforce her parental
bond, that is, their relationship
The first three of these have been amply examined so far but the last two have
been looked at less thoroughly. The latter two facts involve a moral dimension
as mentioned in Taylor (1985/1999) and in several places in Parts I, II, and III.
Such moral facts, whether of a major kind or a minor kind, are often present in
interactions involving communication and this normative dimension of language
forms its second fundamental aspect, the first being its acquisition of meaning in
the first place. But the two are intertwined as is evident from this example and
from Chapter 11.
For example, if the mother chooses to convey 𝜏 in 𝑠 and if the child chooses 𝑎,
then the mother gets a payoff of 7 and the child gets 5. These payoffs include both
costs and benefits. If the mother chooses the direct content 𝜏 ′ in 𝑠, and if the child
once again chooses to stop crying, then they get 7 and −3, respectively. Here, the
mother’s net payoff stays roughly the same owing to two opposing pressures: the
lower effort of conveying 𝜏 ′ reduces the cost but the ignoring of the third and
fourth factors raises the cost, with the result that the payoff remains roughly the
same. On the other hand, the child’s reward plummets as he is not offered any
basis for his action and is not reassured by his mother’s self-centered response.
Remember that the situation 𝑠 involves the mother’s not wanting to fuss over
the child and it is in this context that the child makes his evaluations. The other
payoffs can be analyzed similarly keeping in mind that 𝑠′ involves the alternative
situation where the mother is inclined to fuss. The key thing to note is that the
payoffs reflect both cooperation and conflict and also costs and benefits.
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By now, having seen the examples in Section 8.6 and Chapter 11, it should be
clear how quite complex psychological, social, anthropological, and moral fea-
tures of the utterance situation become part of the Communication Game. The
idea is that the structural essences of these attributes are abstracted from the
concrete situation and inserted into the abstract game-theoretic model, that is
all. This is what would allow the so-called thick aspects of the utterance situa-
tion and even the larger environment, the focus of so much inquiry in the social
sciences, to be accommodated by the framework of Equilibrium Linguistics.
It turns out that the solution to the choice situation in Figure 18.1 is that the
mother should choose to convey 𝜏 in 𝑠, which is the situation that matters since it
is factual. But now the mother, having solved the content selection problem, has
to figure out how to convey the indirect content that the cut is not serious and
so the child should stop crying. For this, she turns to language as one modality
among others. So far, the child knows nothing of what is brewing except perhaps
that she has noticed his crying.
As we know, this figuring out of how to convey a content via language is
also a choice situation called the Generation Game. In a sense, I got ahead of
myself because I expressed 𝜏 in English. Needless to say, 𝜏 has to have some
more abstract representation in the brain. And the mother’s task is to convert
this abstract representation into an English sentence. Part of this task is what to
make explicit and what to leave implicit, that is, what words to utter and what
to convey as an illocutionary content (e.g. implicature). For example, the mother
could say any of the following:
• The cut is not serious so please stop crying
• The cut is not serious
• The cut is small
• It’s a small cut
⋮
⋮
We are not usually conscious of how such choices get made, but the brain
nevertheless does have to make them. The second, third, and fourth options, for
example, say something about the cut but leave the child to figure out the impli-
cature that he should stop crying as a result. As mentioned in Section 8.4, there
are objective (e.g. length, complexity) and subjective (e.g. style, maintaining or
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altering relationships, avoiding errors) aspects of cost that determine the optimal
sentence and what is made explicit and left implicit. In addition, it is not just the
sentence that has to be selected but also how it should be produced, with what
intonation and so on. Once the best sentence is uttered the Interpretation Game
emerges.
Overall, the explanation for the mother’s utterance of “The cut is not serious”
and the child’s stopping crying runs as follows. First, there is the setting 𝑢 within
which everything takes place and an associated Setting Game. Next, the mother
plays the induced Content Selection Game and selects the indirect content 𝜏 over
𝜏 ′ as that is the equilibrium of that game. This is so because their preferences
were based on the fact the child would be more likely to respond as desired if
given a reason. Without it, he is unlikely to be persuaded not to mention the
reassurance he receives. After this selection, the mother chooses a sentence 𝜑
(“The cut is not serious,” possibly) by playing the Generation Game. Then this
sentence 𝜑 is uttered and the child plays the Interpretation Game. He infers the
full meaning of 𝜑 (i.e. the literal content + implicature) which is 𝜏 and then plays
the Content Selection Game where he chooses the appropriate response to 𝜏 ,
namely, 𝑎, and so stops crying. In inferring 𝜏 the methods and results of both
Parts III and IV have to be used.
Thus, the mother (i.e. the speaker) starts with the Content Selection Game and
then plays the Generation Game. The child (i.e. the addressee) starts with the
Interpretation Game and ends with the Content Selection Gamewhich could also
be called the Response Game from his point of view. This double set of choices
that both agents have tomake – selecting a content and then the utterance for the
speaker and choosing an interpretation and then an action for the addressee – are
quite reasonable once one realizes that one choice in each set of choices would
have been required even if telepathy were possible. Both players then return to
the Setting Game.
As we have been seeing throughout, this is more or less the full structure of
communication and it constitutes what I have called the Communication Game.
A more complex example that builds on this analysis can also be considered.
Assume 𝑢 is the same as before but now there is a slight edge in the mother’s
response to the child’s crying, maybe because she is concentrating on a partic-
ularly challenging point in her writing. She might then utter a slightly sharper
sentence like “You are not going to die.” This would result from a somewhat dif-
ferent but related Content Selection Game where the content 𝜏″ is that the child
will not die from the cut and so he should stop crying because the cut is not se-
rious. This time there is not only a locutionary content and an implicature but
also a completion from the cut and the saturation of the pronoun you. Indeed, as
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mentioned in Chapter 16, the implicature is discovered starting from the baseline
of the enriched meaning, not the locutionary meaning. The payoffs in the Con-
tent Selection Game would also be a little different as they would account for the
chance the mother gets to express her annoyance at the interruption. The reader
should now be able to supply the details for such an utterance.
Small variations of this kind in the exact choice of content and sentence will
always be possible in a situation and this makes the process of content selection
and generation a fundamentally creative process to some degree even when the
goals from the Setting Game and 𝑢 are fully specified. This is what makes it
difficult to fully spell out the structure of the Communication Game. But I have
shown that it is possible to go quite far in this process nevertheless.
If I had to find one line to summarize the ground traversed, it would have to
be that the influence of logicism and truth-conditional approaches to meaning
more generally have kept the field from appreciating a fuller idea of agency and
therefore of communication and language and perception and metaphysics. In
a sense, the field has more to do with rhetoric than logic, and game theory and
situation theory provide the right means to approach it. Utility is perhaps more
important than truth in semantics and communication.
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An utterance is an extraordinarily complex event. We underestimate and are usu-
ally unaware of this complexity because we are able to handle not just one but
multiple utterances in quick succession with relative ease. If you tell a layper-
son about the study of meaning and content, they are generally puzzled by ex-
actly what difficulties the field could possibly pose when a certain level of un-
derstanding appears so readily and transparently available. On further thought,
they might feel that more intricate texts of the kind found in literature may raise
some real questions but then wonder how something as amorphous as content
could be explored rigorously, even mathematically.
These are legitimate questions. So far I have been explaining the part of semio-
sis I have called micro-semantics, something that has been attempted in modern
times since the inaugural work of Frege and Russell and in classical times in at
least four different traditions.1 This puzzle of meaning, its relative ease of partial
access despite its immense complexity, should now be at least partly resolved. It
is helpful at this stage to step back and survey just what the range of phenomena
are that have to be explained. A variety of contents are associated with even a
single utterance and what these are often remains in an elusive background with
just the particular content of interest becoming the focus of inquiry, whether it
is literal meaning or implicature or some other type of meaning.
In this chapter, I try to identify just this scope of the content of an utterance.
My geography of content is theoretically underpinned by Equilibrium Linguistics.
Its key feature is that many types of content can be derived in a more or less
uniform manner using the tools of situation theory and situated game theory.
This computation typically involves two stages within a larger Communication
Game: first generating the possible interpretations and then choosing one ormore
among them. Sometimes, we can avoid carrying out these steps separately and
linearly by allowing them to interact in a circular process that is more efficient.
Importantly, there are less acknowledged contents that I address now that re-
quire somewhat different methods from the ones I have described so far. They go
beyond illocutionary meaning. My goal here is less to describe detailed deriva-
tions than to identify as much as possible of the entire field of meaning.
1See van Bekkum et al. (1997).
19 Beyond illocutionary meaning
To start with, I have shown that syntactic and phonetic contents are to be
treated as legitimate contents of an utterance on par with semantic contents
such as locutionary and illocutionary meaning. This insight is often obscured be-
cause the processes that determine all three are seldom seen to be analogous and
interdependent in the way suggested by Equilibrium Linguistics. So this identifi-
cation depends very much on the underlying theoretical framework that tackles
the three problems in a uniform way.
I have also suggested in the past that higher-order implicatures (and weaker
flows of information that do not require common knowledge) may exist. As I say
in Parikh (2001: Section 7.9):
In principle, there is nothing to stop us from considering higher-order im-
plicatures. These would arise when a first-order implicature gives rise to
a second-order implicature, the second-order implicature to a third-order
implicature, and so on. Such higher-order implicatures are more difficult to
derive and so are not commonly found in ordinary conversation. They re-
quire more explicit calculation and so are more often found in literary texts
like novels and poems, where part of the point is not to state things too
explicitly, but to leave them to the imagination of the reader (“show, don’t
tell”). This leaves room for creative readings and misreadings and enriches
the text. A reader has to work harder to derive higher-order implicatures,
and common knowledge at this relatively rarefied level becomes increas-
ingly more tenuous. As a result, the reader has to bring in his own private
background of belief and knowledge, and fill in the text to create a dense
world of meanings and associations. As this begins to happen, implicature
shades off into suggestion, and we are no longer in the realm of communica-
tion and shared understandings, but rather in the fluid world of imagination
and other transformations of thought.
When a literary critic says that Crime and Punishment is about the absence
of god (or a moral order) in the modern world, that is an example of a higher-
order meaning or even possibly a higher-order implicature. While the passage
above refers to higher-order implicatures that are communicated, there is no rea-
son to suppose that corresponding higher-order meanings that are not common
knowledge cannot arise.
Quite ordinary utterances can also give rise to higher-order meanings. In the
example of the mother and child in the previous chapter, it is possible for the
child to infer not only that the mother is conveying 𝜏 in the Content Selection
Game but also that the situation is 𝑠 and not 𝑠′. This tells him that the mother
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is in a situation where she will not fuss over him. Should this inferred content
be seen as a second-order implicature? It is not something the mother intends
to convey perhaps but she may be aware that the child can infer it and, in fact,
the information becomes common knowledge between them. Alternatively, the
content can also be seen as so-called inverse information, a point I return to below.
I now introduce certain types of contents that are perhaps less recognized and
are seldom admitted into the favored circle of the objects of semantical inquiry.
This may partly be because Grice largely defined the terms of the discussion and
for reasons that are hard to surmise the field has stuck to what he charted out
as the scope of semantics and pragmatics. These Gricean terms have involved a
more or less exclusive focus on what is communicated via an utterance rather
than on the information available to be extracted from an utterance. While this
restriction makes sense for Grice’s own project of naturalizing meaning, it is
not the only aspect of meaning that can and should be studied and the goals of
the field need to be broadened. To a certain degree, it is continental philosophy
that has looked at such meanings, although with no clear understanding of their
scope and limits or of how they arise.
19.1 Significance
I have argued that there is already a fair bit conveyed by an utterance as direct
and indirect contents. The following question now arises. If 𝜎 is a locutionary or
illocutionary meaning of 𝜑 uttered in 𝑢, and if 𝜎 ⇒ℓ 𝜎 ′ as defined in Section 2.1,
should 𝜎 ′ also count as part of what is conveyed, whether explicitly or implicitly?
If, for example, the content I see the murderer “logically” implies the content I see
a person, should the latter also be counted as part of what is conveyed by the
utterance? To repeat the quote fromThomason (1990: p. 349) from Chapter 15:
All this shows, I think, is that ‘Did you mean to say’ is used to query peo-
ple about the consequences of what they have said, without distinguishing
these clearly from what they said. More generally, ‘Did you mean to do’
does not distinguish between intentions and foreseeable side effects, which
is exactly the distinction we need to make here. To achieve some progress
in these negative cases, it seems that we will need to say more about the
intensionality of intentions in general, and of intentions to assert in partic-
ular, and also to find tests that extract more reliable conclusions from the
evidence. The philosophical background, of course, suggests that it won’t
be easy to make progress on these matters.
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AsThomason asks, how can we distinguish between what is conveyed and its
consequences? My answer is that it may not always be possible to distinguish
between intended and unintended consequences and so, depending on our inter-
ests, such consequences and others could be included in what is conveyed.
Just as I raised a question about ⇒ℓ, if 𝜎 and 𝜎 ′ are both part of the content,
should 𝜎 ∧ 𝜎 ′ also be part of the content? The response should again be positive
even if an agent does not quite realize this and themeet of the two infons remains
implicit.
Based on this, we can say how this more capacious content should be charac-
terized. If C𝑢(𝜑) is the combined direct and indirect content of an utterance, then
the (logical) significance of the utterance is the smallest filter containing C𝑢(𝜑).2
Unfortunately, things are not so simple because there are probabilities present
in C𝑢(𝜑) and I need to first specify how these should be handled.
We can tentatively define (𝜎, 𝜋) ∧ (𝜎 ′, 𝜋 ′) to be (𝜎 ∧ 𝜎 ′,min(𝜋, 𝜋 ′)) and stip-
ulate that if 𝜎 ⇒ℓ 𝜎 ′ and 𝜋 ′ ≤ 𝜋 then it follows that (𝜎, 𝜋) ⇒ℓ (𝜎 ′, 𝜋 ′). To
simplify things, we could just set 𝜋 ′ = 𝜋 for the latter. With this understanding,
the definition of logical significance is complete.
Recall that if 𝑠 ⊨ 𝜎 and 𝜎 ⇒ℓ 𝜏 then 𝑠 ⊨ 𝜏 and also that 𝑠 ⊨ 𝜎 ∧ 𝜏 if and only if
𝑠 ⊨ 𝜎 and 𝑠 ⊨ 𝜏 . These facts tell us that propositions can naturally be broadened
to include significances as well.
Intuitively, it makes sense to include all the consequences of the direct and indi-
rect meanings even though agents may not explicitly realize many of them. In an
ongoing conversation, such significances can often be taken for granted as part
of the understanding among interlocutors. Significance should therefore also be
treated as part of what I have called the referential meaning of an utterance in
addition to direct and indirect contents. If one refers to a murderer, one has also
referred to a person and this property is therefore also part of the meaning even
if an agent doesn’t quite work it out. All the referential meanings dealt with so
far can be thought of as conveyed by the speaker to the addressee and some sub-
set of this may even be communicated in Grice’s special sense. In addition, the
intentions attaching to such meanings may be either explicit or implicit because
it may not be possible for a speaker to foresee all the logical consequences of his
utterance. It can happen that a person makes a claim without grasping one or
more of its consequences; if some untenable consequence is pointed out to him,
he may want to withdraw his claim and this lends some weight to the intuition
that such significance be included in the referential meaning of an utterance.
2Recall that filters were defined in Section 2.1.
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Also, as we have seen in the derivation of illocutionary meaning, situated hu-
man reasoning is much broader than this narrower notion⇒ℓ allows. So the idea
of significance can also be broadened to encompass such more flexible inferences
(relative to 𝑢) as might be involved in getting to what Crime and Punishment is
about, for example. This kind of content becomes more difficult to readily admit
into what is conveyed by the speaker or author as remote consequences of utter-
ances are harder to compute. Some interpretations may be foreseen by speakers,
others not.Thematter is highly indeterminate. But this is precisely why the char-
acterization of what is conveyed by an utterance is not the only goal semantics
should pursue. A broader goal is to characterize all the information extractable
from an utterance relative to some reference situation such as 𝑢. In interpreting
fiction, moreover, the context 𝑢 is often highly indeterminate and this is what
gives rise tomultiple interpretations of the same text. As long as a valid argument
exists for such a conclusion it has to be admitted as legitimate and the criterion
for assessing alternatives shifts to whether an interpretation is insightful or in-
teresting.
Consider the pithy significance of the simple but profound statement by the
poet Wallace Stevens that art is an attempt to see the world again with fresh
eyes. Its direct and indirect meanings are quite straightforward to determine but
its significance is very rich and different recipients will get it to different extents
depending on their own depth of experience.
19.2 Associations and extended meaning
It is possible to go even further if we allow mental processes that are less con-
strained to operate on the referential meanings derived from an utterance. I call
such meanings associations and they are almost entirely subjective and depend
on all kinds of connections that may be triggered by a referential meaning. A lot
of creative thought is associative in just this way and associations should also be
included in the range of meaning. To be sure, there is no way to reproduce ex-
actly the same associations in the same external circumstances and they are not
as “logical” as referential meanings but so what? The logical bias of the field has
prevented the recognition of associations as legitimate meanings even though
they form a very important part of our experience especially when we read some
more complex text like a novel or poem. Much of the richness of literature and
other art relies on evoking associations in people however much these may dif-
fer from person to person. A mere mention of a beautiful sunset can conjure all
kinds of mental images.
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Consider the following examples from Fernández & Cairns (2011: 244–245).
(31) a. He was pounding the nail when …
b. He was looking for the nail when …
The first of these is likely to lead an addressee to infer that an instrument like a
hammer was being used. This is less likely with the second utterance. Such infer-
ences are stored together with the direct and indirect meaning of the utterance
and may not be easily separable from it. In fact, addressees are frequently mis-
taken about precisely what they have heard because such associations are mixed
in with the meaning.
Can associations be inferred from first principles with the same rigor that Equi-
librium Linguistics brings to the derivation of direct and indirect meanings? The
key thing to realize here is that each association is a connection between one or
more referential meanings and a cluster of other infons in an agent’s brain gen-
erally based on world knowledge. In other words, all associations are a proper
subset of an agent’s memory which in turn is a proper subset of the infon spaceI . The second thing to notice is that what gets activated depends to a great extent
on how the particular agent’s memory is organized. If 𝜎 is a referential meaning
and it involves items that are stored near 𝜏𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, … 𝑛, then some or all of
the 𝜏𝑖 could be triggered. But different agents will inevitably have different ar-
rangements of the same infons and that is why their associations will, in general,
be different. Part of this structure of memory, as the study of neural networks
has shown, is the relative strengths of the linkages between infons. As science
progresses, there is no reason why we should not be able to probe the memory
of an agent, form a model of it, and then predict its associations when subjected
to an utterance. For this task, situation theory should have an important role to
play in understanding mental representation and its role in evoking associations.
Another type of expanded meaning is the implications of referential meanings
and associations when combined with the knowledge and beliefs of an agent. If
𝜎 is part of the referential meaning (including significance) and if 𝜎 ′ is an associ-
ated belief of the agent, then the consequences of putting 𝜎 and 𝜎 ′ together is part
of what I am calling the extended meaning of the utterance. It, too, is largely sub-
jective although, since many beliefs are shared, two or more agents may arrive
at some overlap in their extended meanings. We may wish to restrict the set of
beliefs taken into account to just the set of activated beliefs or something a little
broader such as beliefs activated upon later reflection as well. Extended mean-
ings are roughly the smallest filter containing all referential meanings including
significances, all associations, and all considered beliefs and all the associations
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of this filter, and so on. In other words, it is the closure of both operations of
association and extension carried out simultaneously.
Associations and extendedmeanings are generally not part of what is intended
by an utterance even if theymay be intended to be evoked abstractly by an author,
especially in fiction. But they are nevertheless part of the content of the utterance
and this is part of why I started this chapter by saying that even a single utterance
is an extraordinarily complex event. So far, I have been trying to show that the
meanings of an utterance can cover a potentially wide and even infinite territory.
But this should not mislead one into thinking that this kind of meaning is always
vast. It can occasionally be fairly simple and quite small.
19.3 Inverse information
Barwise & Perry (1983) introduced the idea of inverse information which is the
information you can infer from so-to-speak external or, better, inverse aspects
of an utterance. For example, the accent of a speaker may reveal his Indian ori-
gins or a statement may reveal a speaker’s location (e.g. if he says what time it
is). This kind of information can be quite subtle depending on the circumstances
and on the actual sentence uttered especially if it is combined with public knowl-
edge or private knowledge. Occasionally, such information may qualify as both
part of the (intended) indirect content as well as part of inverse information.This
can happen if, for example, a speaker emphasizes his accent or other character-
istic in some way available to him in order to actively convey something about
his background. Certain presuppositions of an utterance may also sometimes be-
long more to inverse information than to the referential meaning. Since it is well
known that the United States has a president then saying something about the
president would carry a presupposition that such a person exists but since it is
taken for granted anyway by the interlocutors, this informationmay best be seen
as being part of the inverse information of the utterance.
I want to now briefly look at a particular kind of inverse information that
Barwise and Perry did not bring to light in the context of the mother and child
example. In Figure 18.1 in the previous chapter, the mother elects to convey the
content 𝜏 to the child. After she utters an appropriate sentence and he figures
out the intended interpretation, the child is able to form a model of the Content
Selection Game. He solves it and chooses the action 𝑎 to stop crying. But he
also learns that 𝑠 is the factual situation and not 𝑠′. By digging into 𝑠 he infers
that the mother does not wish to fuss as she is busy. This is the reason why she
is conveying 𝜏 . This kind of answer could be called inverse information as it is
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generally not intended and so is not a second-order implicature. Such inverse
information is ubiquitous, in fact, because we often try to infer why an agent did
something.
This is a more complete description of how inverse information of certain
kinds might arise. Inverse information can be treated as part of the content of an
utterance even though it may not actually be communicated or conveyed to the
addressee.
19.4 Latent meaning
There is the old joke of the three psychoanalysts stepping into an elevator one
morning with the first saying “Good morning” to the other two, and the second
asking the third, “What do you think he meant?” Freud and his followers revel in
such hidden and repressedmeanings and literary and art critics (e.g. Barthes 1957;
Bordwell 1989; Eagleton 2008) have made this kind of meaning their special pre-
serve although Bordwell is “analytic” in his approach. These are meanings that
get disclosed even despite their author. For example, the mother’s not wanting
to fuss could conceivably also be a latent meaning.
Latent meanings are often derived in the context of a set of extraneous beliefs
somewhat akin to what I called associations and extended meanings earlier. In-
deed, the two categories may overlap. When critics engage with a text they may
bring a theoretical framework to bear on it and this framework would then com-
bine with the narrower contents of the text to allow such meanings to emerge.
One reason why Continentals and critics focus on these meanings is because the
more mundane referential meanings are relatively straightforward for human
beings to discern: it is no feat to ascertain that the mother is asking the child
to stop crying because the cut is not serious. Of course, theoretically, it is an
accomplishment to show how such a meaning can be derived from first princi-
ples and this has occupied researchers for millennia. But critics and Continental
philosophers are not interested in this challenge and often also employ frame-
works that eschew referential meanings altogether (Eagleton 2008). On the other
hand, semanticists have exhibited their own insularities and have failed to appre-
ciate these richer aspects of meaning. What is required is to marry the rigorous
methods of semantics with the broader scope of meaning I have been delineat-
ing. Otherwise all one gets is the excesses of Continental philosophy and the
utter silence of Anglo-American philosophy on dimensions of meaning that are
of central importance.
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19.5 Discourse meaning
I have been alluding indirectly to discourse meaning when I talked about the
meanings of texts but here is a specific example that goes beyond the meaning of
a single utterance. In Getting Even, Woody Allen says, “Can we actually ‘know’
the universe? My God, it’s hard enough finding your way around in Chinatown.”
The humor in this works partly because of the contrast between the scale of
the universe and the scale of Chinatown and partly because of the bathetic fall
from the loftiness of epistemological inquiry to merely getting around. But this
contrast and bathos are not directly present in either sentence taken by itself. It
is their juxtaposition as part of a single discourse that gives rise to such discourse
meanings.
It is possible to develop a rigorous model of discourse meaning based on Equi-
librium Linguistics by creating a sequence of Communication Games and linking
them appropriately. The challenge would be to understand the kinds of relations
(e.g. contrast, bathos, etc.) that can occur among the meanings of single utter-
ances in the discourse.These relations would form part of the discourse meaning
– so-called inter-utterance meaning – that transcends single-utterance meaning.
In addition, just as the content of a word depends on the contents of other
words in an utterance, so the content of an utterance depends on the contents of
other utterances in a discourse. Perhaps the most commonly investigated area of
discourse meaning is anaphoric reference,3 and there are many subtleties even
in this seemingly simple problem.
19.6 Emotive meaning
All the different types of meaning discussed above have a propositional form. But
there is often a non-propositional emotive content conveyed in an utterance. If
a speaker says, “Man! George W. Bush was elected again!” then either a positive
or negative emotion may be conveyed depending on the utterance situation and
especially on the identity of the speaker. McCready (2012) provides an interest-
ing game-theoretic analysis of how such meanings are communicated. However,
the particular formulation he chooses based on signaling games appears too com-
plex to be psychologically plausible. In addition, the nonmonotonic logic he uses
to determine whether the emotion is positive or negative makes no mention of
conversational goals.
3See Clark & Parikh (2007) and the references therein.
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A simpler way to see emotive meanings is via my account of modulation in
Chapter 17. For the word man in the utterance above, there would be an un-
derspecified conventional core which would be modulated by the illocutionary
Semantic Constraint consisting of Distance and possibly Relevance either to a
positive or negative content depending on the situation and especially the goals
and preferences of the interlocutors. Such an analysis would also connect the
intended emotive meaning with the other locutionary meanings of the utterance
through the prior probabilities in the partial information games of the Flow Con-
straint. This kind of connection and mutual reinforcement in equilibrium by the
contents of other words in the utterance is also missing in McCready’s paper.
The degree and tone of the emotion may also be inferred via the relevant Com-
munication Game, partly by taking the Phonetic Constraint into account.
Such meanings can be locutionary or illocutionary and may also be extracted
from an utterance without being intended. I discuss the related notion of effect
in the next chapter.
I have now described phonetic and syntactic contents which might be called lin-
guistic meanings, and earlier I described conventional meanings and referential
meanings, the latter of which include direct and indirect meanings as well as sig-
nificances, and finally I have described associations, extended meanings, inverse
information, and latent meanings. As just mentioned, there can also be emotive
meanings. All of these together may be described as comprising utterance mean-
ing. Discourse meaning goes beyond single utterance meaning. Some of these
meanings are communicated, some merely intended, either explicitly or implic-
itly, and the rest simply occur privately in the mind of each agent depending on
what other information is applied to the problem.
I may have missed some elements of utterance meaning but it should be pos-
sible to insert such items into the framework I have sketched. The key fact about
this entire range of meaning is that it is accompanied by a high degree of indeter-
minacy which implies that each component is often probabilistic and may differ
from speaker to addressee, and it may not be possible to draw sharp boundaries
between different varieties of meaning. And yet, as I have tried to argue, a fair
amount of order and rigor can be brought to the task. Also, just because there
can be so much to a single utterance does not imply that meaning is always vast
and complex. For many routine utterances it may be relatively simple.
Gricean communication is too restrictive a focus of inquiry. The flow of in-
formation where one studies what may be intended explicitly or implicitly (e.g.
Hirsch 1967; 1978; some of the essays in Iseminger 1992) is more permissive but
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even this is too conservative in the end. The field of meaning ought to cover all
the information extractable from an utterance by an agent.When such a program
is carried out, semantics begins to connect with the kinds of meaning studied in
much literary and art criticism and the hermeneutic sciences. I believe the sketch
above shows how such a link may be forged that may help bring greater rigor to
the humanities broadly conceived. It also recovers its connectionwith the history
of semantics as can be seen from van Bekkum et al. (1997).
Grice’s project of naturalizing meaning is nevertheless necessary to preserve,
as without it the entire realm of meaning would remain ungrounded. The her-
meneutic sciences miss this element in their account. It is only by combining
the two sides, intended flows of meaning and extracted meanings that are unin-
tended, that the split in the study of meaning can be healed and the discipline
made whole.
However, as I have argued in this book, Grice’s own approach to his project is
unfortunately flawed. I see Equilibrium Semantics as a more comprehensive and
demonstrably superior approach to meaning that remains grounded in commu-
nication and therefore in the Gricean project.
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20 Classifying meaning
I have now laid out more or less the entire field of meaning. Picturing this takes
a few diagrams. The first basic division is of utterance meaning into intended
meaning and extracted but unintended meaning. Intentions may be explicit or
implicit. This is shown in Figure 20.1.
utterance meaning
intended meaning extracted but unintended meaning
Figure 20.1: Classification of utterance meaning
I could have added a third branch showing syntactic and phonetic contents.
Dividing the left branch further, we get the tree in Figure 20.2.
intended meaning
communicated
meaning
locutionary
meaning
lexical/structural
disambiguation
saturation modulation
illocutionary
meaning
free
enrichment
implicature force
intended weaker flows
(e.g. suggestion)
Figure 20.2: Classification of intended meaning
I have placed modulation under locutionary meaning even though it would in
fact straddle locutionary and illocutionary meaning. Implicature includes higher-
order implicatures as well. Many if not all figures of speech fall under modulation
or implicature.
20 Classifying meaning
Thecategory of intendedweaker flows represents transfers of information that
do not require full common knowledge. These were studied in some detail in my
previous two books andmentioned in Section 7.4.There is an entire infinite lattice
of flows of informationwith communicative flows involving common knowledge
being the strongest. When something is suggested, for example, we get a flow
that is weaker than communication. Much art and literature involve suggestion
and similar weaker flows.
I have touched upon Grice’s distinction between literal meaning (or what is
said) and implicature now and then and this is just a different way to carve up
direct and indirect contents. Literal meaning includes locutionary meaning and
enrichments. The direct/indirect distinction has more to do with how these con-
tents are derived and Grice’s distinction has more to do with what contents we
lump together psychologically. There has been a great deal of discussion about
the latter division, especially by Recanati (2004), and he tries to argue that lit-
eral meanings are in some sense available to our conscious perception in a way
that locutionary or direct meanings are not because the latter have to be teased
apart from modulations and enrichments after the fact. So an alternative way to
classify intended meaning is shown in Figure 20.3.
intended
meaning
communicated
meaning
literal
meaning
lexical/structural
disambiguation
saturation modulation free
enrichment
implicature force
intended weaker flows
(e.g. suggestion)
Figure 20.3: Alternative classification of intended meaning
I have emphasized throughout that many of these categories are not separated
by strict black-and-white divisions but rather that it is often indeterminate where
a particular content is placed by an agent. Such a classification is useful nonethe-
less because it tells one what mechanisms might have produced the content or
whether it was consciously available to the agent or not.
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The category of extracted but unintended meaning can be divided as shown in
Figure 20.4.
extracted but unintended meaning
significance association and
extended meaning
inverse information latent meaning
Figure 20.4: Classification of extracted but unintended meaning
Recall that some parts of significance, especially logical significance, are in-
tended so again these classes are not watertight. The same is true of associa-
tions, extended meanings, and inverse information. Latent meanings, by defini-
tion, cannot be intended. I have tried to show in the previous chapter how the
two basic aspects of utterance meaning, intended and unintended meaning, fit
together into a natural whole. If we wish, we can draw a final diagram for dis-
course meaning shown in Figure 20.5. The category of inter-utterance meanings
that transcend individual utterancemeaningswas discussed in the previous chap-
ter.
discourse meaning
utterance meanings inter-utterance meanings
Figure 20.5: Classification of discourse meaning
As a test case, consider Stalnaker’s (2006) discussion of the following remark
of US Treasury Secretary John Snow in May 2003: “When the dollar is at a lower
level it helps exports, and I think exports are getting stronger as a result.” The an-
nouncement caused the dollar to drop precipitously in value even though only
a commonplace economic insight had been stated. What meaning issuing from
this utterance created this effect?There might be more than one plausible way to
analyze this example but it seems to me that it belongs to possibly unintended in-
verse information of the same kind as the inverse information about the mother’s
not wanting to fuss.
At the very start of the book, I said communication involves the relaying of
content and has an effect and that while the former is cognitive, the latter can
involve the whole person. I have so far not said much about this effect although
it is related to the emotive meaning of an utterance discussed earlier. Effects ac-
company most utterances though they are not part of their meaning. Happy or
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sad news may affect the addressee differently, possibly even creating palpable
bodily effects. These may be intended or unintended. Much communication is
colored in this way even if there are no actual linguistic markers of the emotion
transmitted. When understanding an utterance, it is very important to capture
the textures of such effects as well. These are nonpropositional but nevertheless
part of semantics.This is possibly where it is best to resort to concrete descriptive
techniques if such detail is required but, as I said in Section 12.2, sentiment analy-
sis in natural language processing deals with this phenomenon as a classification
problem. I have already discussed in that section howEquilibrium Linguistics can
be extended to such classification tasks so I will not say more about it here.
Finally, I repeat my definition of communication, Definition 5.3, from Sec-
tion 5.3, as we have come full circle. Recall that communication is the right notion
to reduce and not speaker meaning as Grice believed. Also keep in mind that the
proposition 𝑝 contains probabilistic contents as described in Section 15.2.
Definition 20.1. A communicates 𝑝 to B by uttering 𝜑 in 𝑢 if and only if A in-
tends (possibly partly implicitly) to convey 𝑝 to B in 𝑢, B intends (possibly partly
implicitly) to interpret A’s utterance of 𝜑 in 𝑢, and the games 𝐺A𝑢 (𝜑), 𝐺B𝑢 (𝜑),
𝐺𝑢(𝜑) induced thereby are equal and common knowledge and their solution is
𝑝.
I have now developed the full details of the global games in the definition
as well as of the larger picture of micro-semantics sketched in Chapter 3. This
should make it possible to see how the definition naturalizes meaning modulo
the category of conventional meaning which has so far been taken as externally
given. In Part V on macro-semantics, I provide an internal account of conven-
tional meaning after which the naturalization of meaning will be fully realized
assuming the framework I have described is correct.
Before I turn to that task, we take a brief detour to see what Equilibrium Lin-
guistics has to offer the problem of translation.
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My purpose here is to highlight just one contribution my framework can make
to the task of translation. Translation requires not only a grasp and command
of the source and target languages but also a deep understanding of the text to
be translated. Jurafsky & Martin (2009: Chapter 25) describe a computational
approach to the problem.
Different languages individuate the world in different ways. And different lan-
guages affect addressees of discourses in different ways. These simple facts have
a profound consequence: perfect translations do not exist.This compels us to seek
approximate translations and to view translation as a process of approximation.
Moreover, languages differ in several other ways as well, in the information they
make explicit (e.g. definiteness and number information), in their syntax, and so
on. In this section, I describe in broad outline how Equilibrium Linguistics can
bring precision to the idea of translation as approximation.
The basic idea is very simple. Let the source language be L and the target
language be L′. Consider an utterance of 𝜑 ∈ L in 𝑢. Then 𝜑′ ∈ L′ relative to
𝑢′ will be a translation of 𝜑 in 𝑢 if their meanings are sufficiently close to each
other. Suppose 𝜎 is the (locutionary and illocutionary) meaning of 𝜑 in 𝑢 and
𝜎 ′ is the (locutionary and illocutionary) meaning of 𝜑′ in 𝑢′. That is, C𝑢(𝜑) = 𝜎
and C𝑢′(𝜑′) = 𝜎 ′. (Alternatively, it is possible to let 𝜎 and 𝜎 ′ be the intended
meanings of the respective utterances that include weaker flows that are not
common knowledge.) Then 𝜎 and 𝜎 ′ must be sufficiently near each other. How
should nearness be measured?There are two possible ways, each with somewhat
different properties. One is to use the idea of distance 𝑑𝑢 from Chapter 14 and
the other is to use the idea of distance 𝛿𝑢 from Section 2.1. The former is more
practical as it takes account of the interlocutors’ goals in 𝑢1 and the latter is more
logical. I personally think 𝑑𝑢 is likely to be more useful than 𝛿𝑢 . Presumably the
goals in 𝑢′ are aligned with the goals in 𝑢 so it does not matter which situation
is used.
1This needs some interpretation as 𝜎 presumably already meets the goals of the agents as it is
both the locutionary and illocutionary content of 𝜑 in 𝑢, so what does it mean to traverse the
infon space from 𝜎 to 𝜎 ′? In this context, it would mean that 𝜎 ′ also fulfills the goals. That is,
goal fulfillment is preserved in going from 𝜎 to 𝜎 ′.
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Assume we have a translation threshold 𝜖𝑡,𝑢 . Then we can give the following
definition.
Definition 21.1. 𝜑′ in 𝑢′ is a translation of 𝜑 in 𝑢 if and only if 𝑑𝑢(𝜎, 𝜎 ′) < 𝜖𝑡,𝑢
(alternatively, 𝛿𝑢(𝜎, 𝜎 ′) < 𝜖𝑡,𝑢).
There will generally be multiple translations available and the task would then
be to identify the best one according to some criterion. One possibility is to min-
imize the distance but this may not always yield the ideal outcome.
This still leaves open how an actual translation would be derived as the def-
inition merely characterizes the set of translations. I have shown in detail how
to go from 𝜑 in 𝑢 to 𝜎 . Then reasoning of one sort or another may be used to
go from 𝜎 to 𝜎 ′. But it still remains to go from 𝜎 ′ to 𝜑′ in 𝑢′. This is the inverse
direction of generation rather than interpretation and as the generation problem
remains partially solved, so does the problem of translation. Indeed, the task is
to find a nearby 𝜎 ′ such that it is the content of some 𝜑′ ∈ L′ in 𝑢′. The last two
steps are thus interdependent and involve a back-and-forth interaction between
them.
This definition of translation is a little narrow as it omits any consideration
of the intended effects of the source and target texts. As just discussed, such ef-
fects involve classification or detailed description and the former approach can
be used to broaden the definition to include effects that are also near each other.
I believe Part IV gives a more or less complete solution to the problem of il-
locutionary communication that is, as advertised in Chapter 1, philosophically
sound, mathematically solid, reasonably computationally tractable, and empir-
ically adequate. The Setting Game, Content Selection Game, Generation Game,
and InterpretationGame that constitute an (illocutionary) CommunicationGame
are developed in detail. So are the two illocutionary Constraints: Semantic and
Flow.The universality of locutionary partial information games demonstrated in
Part III can be readily extended to illocutionary partial information games. I con-
sider meanings that lie beyond direct and indirect meaning and classify the entire
realm of meaning, both intended and unintended. I complete this conceptual ge-
ography of meaning by approaching the effects of communication as either a
classificatory or descriptive undertaking. I take a brief look at translation. Again,
as promised in Chapter 1, I connect arguments in philosophy, linguistics, psychol-
ogy, and computer science, unifying them through the framework of Equilibrium
Linguistics and relating them to the hermeneutic sciences.
In the next Part, I look at Language Games and at how conventional meanings
originate and change.
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Part V
Language Games

22 Defining and solving Language
Games
So far I have assumed that the locutionary Semantic Constraint and conventional
meanings in particular were given and available in the computation of the ref-
erential meanings of an utterance. This was the natural task of micro-semantics
and I have shown how Equilibrium Semantics provides a more or less complete
account of it and, indeed, of thewhole process of communication in the small. But
micro-semantics does not by itself explain how conventional meanings emerge
in the first place nor how these meanings change over time. Both the origin and
dynamics of conventional meaning must themselves reside in communication as
there is no other possible source. Indeed, the Semantic, Syntactic, and Phonetic
Constraints that are used in the Generation and Interpretation Games are them-
selves the products of communication. This is not to deny the initial endowment
of capacities people are born with, only to highlight the role communication
plays in activating these capacities.
I sketched a skeletal framework for macro-semantics in Section 3.2 and in this
chapter I will give it some flesh. As I said earlier, my goal is only to offer a toy
model of both origins and change that reveals the essence of these processes. I
will abstract from syntax and phonetics altogether and look only at imaginary
single-word sentences in studying the origins of conventional meaning. I will
also make other simplifying assumptions. Once this core model of a Language
Game is developed, it will be relatively easy to see how it might be extended
to accommodate more realistic scenarios. I will do the same sort of thing with
semantic change, but before I get to it, I will briefly discuss Grice (1968), Lewis
(1969), Skyrms (2010), and Tomasello (2010) on origins and compare them with
Language Games. A byproduct of this network of Communication Games is that
it shows a way to think about convention more broadly and realistically than
Lewis (1969) did.
I remind the reader that my approach is analogous to the idea of general equi-
librium in economics where one has multiple interacting markets in society. In
our situation, there are multiple interlocking conversations in society and they
22 Defining and solving Language Games
lead to what I call a meaningful equilibrium. I start with a particularly simple
Language Game and then progressively generalize it.
22.1 A simple Language Game
Recall that the locutionary Semantic Constraint has the general form 𝜔 ⟶
𝑃 ⟶𝑢 𝜎 where the first map is called the conventional map and the second the
referential map.That is, the locutionary Semantic Constraint consists of the Con-
ventional and Referential sub-Constraints. The property 𝑃 is the conventional
meaning and the infon 𝜎 is the referential meaning.1
To start with, assume there are just two properties 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 of interest in a
community of three agents A1, A2, and A3. These two properties yield the two
contents 𝜎1 and 𝜎2. That is, the referential map 𝑃1 ⟶𝑢 𝜎1 and 𝑃2 ⟶𝑢 𝜎2 is taken
as given. In these one-to-one correspondences, 𝑢 is just a parameter and takes
on different values, say, 𝑢1 and 𝑢2, for different utterance situations. For example,
𝑃1 could be the property apple and 𝑃2 the property banana and 𝜎1, 𝜎2 could be
a particular apple and banana in the environment relative to the corresponding
utterance situation in which the respective property is used by the agents.
Where do these referential maps come from? They are purely ontological and
are naturally given as part of the individuation of reality. I had discussed such
ontological transforms in Language and Equilibrium (2010: Section 2.4) and they
need not detain us here. But, just as an example, the instantiation map is as fol-
lows: 𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝑃, 𝑠) = ⟨⟨ ( 𝑥 ∣ 𝑠 ⊨ ⟨⟨𝑃; 𝑥 ⟩⟩ ) ⟩⟩ = ⟨⟨ 𝑎 ⟩⟩ where 𝑠 is the situation relative
to which a property 𝑃 is instantiated in the individual 𝑎.2 In this map there is an
infon embedded inside another infon and it is read as “the individual 𝑥 such that
𝑥 has the property 𝑃 in situation 𝑠.” The use of the variable 𝑥 indicates that the
result of this operation need not be unique. It is via instantiation that one goes
from the property apple to a particular apple in some situation. I am taking such
referential/ontological maps as given but in general such metaphysical individu-
ation of reality and the emergence of conventional meanings occur side by side
in a larger process I have called Equilibrium Metaphysics in the book just cited.
Assuming the Referential sub-Constraint, a language L is required in order
to communicate contents such as 𝜎1 and 𝜎2. This is because the properties 𝑃1
and 𝑃2 cannot be used directly as they are abstract. So an agent has to use a
property by using a word, something that can be physically produced. Assume
1I have deliberately used 𝑃 instead of the concept 𝐶 to keep things simple.
2See Section 2.1.
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L is made up of just two single-word sentences 𝜔1 and 𝜔2.3 Initially, at time 𝑡 = 0
as it were, neither word is conventionally attached to either property.There is no
conventional map such as, for example, 𝜔1 ⟶ 𝑃1 and 𝜔2 ⟶ 𝑃2 or 𝜔1 ⟶ 𝑃2
and 𝜔2 ⟶ 𝑃1. Assuming this pairing emerges in a one-to-one way, these are
the only four correspondences possible.
In this very simple scenario, there are exactly two words, two conventional
meanings, and two referential meanings. Why are both conventional and refer-
ential meanings required? Why isn’t it possible to go directly from word to ob-
ject? This was discussed in my previous book and in Section 1.2 and will be fully
addressed in Chapter 26, but the short answer is twofold: both are required to
avoid Frege’s (1892/1980) problem of informative identities such as “Hesperus is
Phosphorus” and to account for the full range of meaning, especially as encoun-
tered in the case of noun phrases involving names, descriptions, and generalized
quantifiers.
For semiosis to occur, one of the two conventional maps above must result
from the communicative exchanges in the community, either 𝜔1 ⟶ 𝑃1 and
𝜔2 ⟶ 𝑃2 or 𝜔1 ⟶ 𝑃2 and 𝜔2 ⟶ 𝑃1. Suppose A1 talks to A2 and to A3 via
two separate utterances. The notation I have used so far for a Communication
Game is Γ𝑢 . This was convenient when there were just two interlocutors A andB and just one utterance situation 𝑢 being considered. Now there are multiple
agents and multiple utterance situations so it is better to drop the parameter 𝑢,
keeping in mind that all communication always occurs inside a particular utter-
ance situation, and to add superscripts for the two agents. So the Communication
Game betweenA1 andA2 would be called Γ12 or Γ21, both being the same game,
the first symbol representing the game from A1’s point of view and the second
symbol representing the game fromA2’s point of view. Similarly, the Communi-
cation Game betweenA1 andA3 would be Γ13 = Γ31. For our purposes it does not
matter who the speaker is and who the addressee is. Both agents in both Commu-
nication Games can assume either role.This situation can be represented visually
as shown in Figure 22.1.
The figure depicts a connected graph with the vertices labeled by the three
agents and the edges labeled by the corresponding Communication Games.4
Such an object consisting of a network of agents and Communication Games
3For those puzzled by such single-word sentences, think of Wittgenstein’s (1953/1968) “Slab!”
or Quine’s (1960) “Lo! A rabbit.”
4A graph here is a set of vertices representing the agents in the community together with undi-
rected edges linking them which represent Communication Games between them. The edges
are undirected because it does not matter who the speaker is and who the addressee is. A
connected graph is one in which there is a path from any vertex to any other vertex.
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r rr A1 A2A3 Γ12 = Γ21Γ13 = Γ31
Figure 22.1: A simple Language Game Γ
between them is a Language Game. Its symbol is just Γ (or Γ(𝑛) for 𝑛 agents).
Importantly, Language Games are almost never common knowledge; only their
component Communication Games may be. This fact will figure in Chapter 23
when we discuss convention.
In general, there will be many more agents and many more Communication
Games as well as many more words, conventional meanings, and referential
meanings.When conventionalmeanings emerge through such a LanguageGame,
the community of agents will become a linguistic community. It is possible in
principle to envisage a larger graph encompassing the entire population of the
planet that comprisesmany linguistic communities with some agents beingmem-
bers of more than one such community. Such a graph may not be connected. As
populations move about, coming closer or drawing apart either spatially or cul-
turally, the links among them will change and so will their languages.
As words do not have conventional meanings initially, the Communication
Games in Figure 22.1 will have a special formwhich I now specify. Consider Γ12 =(𝑆𝐺12, 𝐶𝑆𝐺12, 𝐺𝐺12, 𝑈𝐺12), the four component games. Here the superscripts
can be ordered as 12 or 21 as both pairs of corresponding games are the same.
When considering a Communication Game as part of a wider Language Game,
it is convenient to abstract from the details of the various Setting Games and
Content Selection Games. Alternatively, we can just assume that 𝑆𝐺12 induces
the trivial 𝐶𝑆𝐺12 shown in Figure 22.2.
u r- r-
𝜌12
𝑠12 𝜎1 𝑎1 𝑣A1 , 𝑣A2
Figure 22.2: Content Selection Game 𝐶𝑆𝐺12
I have assumed that A1 is the content selector and, later, speaker but it could
easily have been A2. And I have assumed that the content he wishes to convey
is 𝜎1 rather than 𝜎2 just to keep the indices aligned. The upshot of this is thatA1
chooses to convey 𝜎1 to A2 in order to get her to do some action 𝑎1. This could
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easily have been assumed at the outset but I want to emphasize that the whole
Communication Game with all its component games is involved in the Language
Game.
Now we come to 𝐺𝐺12, the Generation Game. SinceA1 has chosen to convey
𝜎1 – that is his only option in the trivial 𝐶𝑆𝐺12 – he has also implicitly selected
𝑃1 in virtue of the Referential sub-Constraint 𝑃1 𝑢⟶𝜎1. At this stage, neither 𝜔1
nor𝜔2 are attached to either conventional meaning 𝑃1 or 𝑃2 soA1 has to consider
both words as possible carriers of the intendedmeaning. Keep inmind that if, say,
𝜔1 had been conventionally connected to 𝑃1 rather than 𝜔2, the shape of 𝐺𝐺12
would also have been trivial, essentially 𝜔1 as his choice followed by 𝜎1 as her
choice, mediated by 𝑃1 via an already existing locutionary Semantic Constraint.
But part of the difficulty the agents face at the dawn of (linguistic) semiosis is
that they have to not only choose a linguistic expression and a corresponding
referential meaning via a conventional meaning, they also have to connect the
linguistic expression with a conventional meaning in the first place.This leads to
a slightlymore complicated game of partial information as shown in Figure 22.3.5
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Figure 22.3: Partial information game 𝑔12 = 𝑔21
In this game,A1 wants to convey 𝜎1 by using 𝑃1 in the situation 𝑠1. He not only
makes a choice between 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 but also chooses 𝑃1 in 𝑠1, thereby connecting
one of the words with 𝑃1. AndA2 has to choose not only between 𝜎1 and 𝜎2 but
also between 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 because she does not know whether he is conveying 𝑃1
or 𝑃2. This compels A1 to consider an alternative situation 𝑠2 in which he has to
choose between attaching 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 to 𝑃2 andA2 has the same choices as before.
5The shape of the game tree is identical to the shapes of the Content Selection Games in Fig-
ure 11.1 in Section 11.5 and in Figure 18.1 in Section 18.2. The latter games, however, are com-
pletely different as they involve the selection of contents and responses and the former involves
the selection of utterances and meanings.
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Also, since 𝜎1 and 𝑃1 are linked and 𝜎2 and 𝑃2 are linked via the referential map,A2’s choice is really between (𝜎1, 𝑃1) and (𝜎2, 𝑃2). The payoffs have been made
symmetric to keep things simple andwe have 𝑎 > 𝑐 because (𝜎1, 𝑃1) is the correct
interpretation in 𝑠1 and (𝜎2, 𝑃2) is the correct interpretation in 𝑠2.
There is no question of anything else in 𝐺𝐺12 as there are no other linguistic
expressions available that might lead to alternative locutionary games. And there
are no other games of partial information either, because the utterance consists
of just one word, either 𝜔1 or 𝜔2. It could be said that 𝑔12 = 𝑔21 is a semantic
game and there must be a corresponding syntactic game for both words and this
is true but I will omit it for now as we are dealing just with single words. So𝐺𝐺12
contains just 𝑔12 and nothing else.6
It should be obvious that the Interpretation Game 𝑈𝐺12 also contains just 𝑔12
and nothing else. So we have completed the description of Γ12.
There are two Nash equilibria in 𝑔12, one corresponding to A1 choosing (𝜔1,
𝑃1) in 𝑠1 and (𝜔2, 𝑃2) in 𝑠2 and A2 choosing (𝜎1, 𝑃1) at the (upper) intermediate
node on the right side of the figure and (𝜎2, 𝑃2) at the (lower) intermediate node
on the left side of the figure, and the other corresponding toA1 choosing (𝜔2, 𝑃1)
in 𝑠1 and (𝜔1, 𝑃2) in 𝑠2 andA2 choosing (𝜎1, 𝑃1) at the (upper) intermediate node
on the left side of the figure and (𝜎2, 𝑃2) at the (lower) intermediate node on the
right side of the figure. In plain English, A1 can optimally attach either word
to 𝑃1 and the other word to 𝑃2 and A2 must always choose based on whether
𝑃1 is being conveyed or 𝑃2. Because the payoffs are symmetrically chosen, both
equilibria are equivalent. In other words, either 𝜔1 or 𝜔2 could attach to 𝑃1 as
one would expect in the absence of any differential costs of the two words. Note
that since 𝑠1 is actual and 𝑠2 is counterfactual, only the relevant part of either
equilibrium corresponding to 𝑠1 will be played.
This completes my discussion of Γ12 which brings us to Γ13 = (𝑆𝐺13, 𝐶𝑆𝐺13,
𝐺𝐺13, 𝑈𝐺13), the Communication Game between A1 and A3. In this game, too,
it can be said that 𝑆𝐺13 induces a trivial 𝐶𝑆𝐺13 which is similar to 𝐶𝑆𝐺12 except
that 𝜎1 is replaced by 𝜎2 and 𝑎1 by some other action 𝑎2. It is not necessary
that the two Content Selection Games differ in this way as A1 may have the
same exchange with both the other agents. But in that case the conventional
meanings corresponding to the language L consisting of the two words would
6The form of 𝐺𝐺12 is actually similar to the form of the Generation Games we saw in Figure 7.8
and Sections 7.3 and 8.4. The speaker has a choice between 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 because both can express
𝜎1 via 𝑃1 and both words lead to the same game 𝑔12. The difference occurs in the possible
different costs of 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 and therefore in the net values received by the speaker with each
choice. But I have deliberately abstracted from such complications because they obscure the
essence of Language Games.
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only be partially learned, which is an important case I will return to later. For now,
assume that the exchanges involve different contents so that the whole language
may be learned.
𝐶𝑆𝐺13 then leads to the same partial information game shown in Figure 22.3
that is also a part of 𝐺𝐺13 and 𝑈𝐺13 but this time the situation 𝑠2 is actual and
not 𝑠1 so the two partial information games are not, strictly speaking, identical.
It is called 𝑔13 or 𝑔31. Again, there are two symmetric Nash equilibria as before
but only the parts corresponding to 𝑠2 rather than 𝑠1 get played.
I had said earlier that it does not matter which agent is the speaker and which
the addressee in these two Communication Games and I have takenA1 to be the
speaker in both for now. I will soon account for the other possibilities.
If Γ12 and Γ13 and in particular 𝑔12 and 𝑔13 were played completely indepen-
dently of each other, then the same word could end up attaching to both conven-
tional meanings, 𝑃1 and 𝑃2. But the agents are at least partly rational and this
suffices for A1 who is involved in both sets of games making his choices so as
not to overload any word as that would be suboptimal and would lead to inef-
ficiencies in future exchanges. So if he chooses to connect 𝜔1 with 𝑃1, then he
simultaneously chooses to connect 𝜔2 with 𝑃2, and vice versa. In this way, he
makes the best use of the linguistic resources available to him. This is nothing
but the Consistency Condition across utterances mentioned in Section 3.2 in its
simplest form. This condition is not something externally or arbitrarily imposed
on agents, it is just a product of rationality because future ambiguity incurs an
avoidable processing cost.
Thus, the wayA1 solves 𝑔12 and 𝑔13 and, therefore, Γ12 and Γ13 is by choosing
complementary Nash equilibria in these games in keeping with the Consistency
Condition. Out of the four possibilities {(𝜔1, 𝑃1), (𝜔2, 𝑃2)}, {(𝜔1, 𝑃2), (𝜔2, 𝑃1)},{(𝜔1, 𝑃1), (𝜔1, 𝑃2)}, and {(𝜔2, 𝑃1), (𝜔2, 𝑃2)}, the last two are eliminated.This still
leaves two equilibria on the speaker’s side. On the addressees’ side, it is clear that
the first game yields (𝜎1, 𝑃1) and the second game yields (𝜎2, 𝑃2).
How does the speaker choose between the two Nash equilibria that still re-
main? It is only when 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 have identical or inversely proportional costs
and expected frequencies of use that the two equilibria will be equivalent. In all
other cases, there will be a natural bias in payoffs that will favor one equilibrium
over another.7 For the relatively rare cases when they are equivalent, there are
three ways to break the symmetry.
One purely internal way is to introduce some dynamics into the space of strate-
gies as, for example, Skyrms (2010) does. This is generally unsatisfactory for rea-
sons discussed in Section 22.3.
7It is worth referring back to footnote 4 in Section 8.1 at this stage.
325
22 Defining and solving Language Games
A second is to say that there is a short process of trial and error and feedback
through whichA2 learnsA1’s choice of equilibrium which is determined by the
flip of a fair coin. That is, the Communication Game Γ12 is repeated untilA2 gets
it right in a few steps. Certainly this must happen in some cases. For example,
if A1 is conveying something about a particular apple rather than a particular
banana but A2 thinks the opposite, then she will fail in her understanding and
therefore in her response to A1 in 𝐶𝑆𝐺12. But this failure is an opportunity to
learn the right equilibrium and therefore the intended meaning of the utterance.
The third possibility is to look historically at what must actually have hap-
pened in many situations. Gestures preceded verbal language and it is likely that
early humans both pointed at objects in their visual environment and uttered
accompanying grunts. In other words, language could build on gesture and early
attempts at verbal communication were probably overdetermined: the addressee
could infer the correct verbal response from what the speaker was pointing at.
Thus, much learning must also have happened in this one-shot way, instanta-
neously. Of course, pointing and other gestures also involve solving games but
here context and salience play some role in eliminating most possibilities. There
is also an element of naturalism as opposed to conventionalism in gestural lan-
guage, just as there is with visual language, that is absent in verbal language. So
semiosis uses quasi-naturalistic symbols to ascend to purely conventional sym-
bols.
Let us assume that A1 chooses {(𝜔1, 𝑃1), (𝜔2, 𝑃2)} rather than {(𝜔1, 𝑃2),(𝜔2, 𝑃1)}. And we already know thatA2 chooses (𝜎1, 𝑃1) in 𝑔12 andA3 chooses(𝜎2, 𝑃2) in 𝑔13. Note that the presence of the two conventional meanings in the
addressees’ choices tells one that A2 has associated 𝜔1 with 𝑃1 and A3 has asso-
ciated 𝜔2 with 𝑃2.
This implies that the entire Language Game Γ has been solved with two re-
sults. One is that the words 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 acquire the conventional meanings 𝑃1
and 𝑃2, respectively. The other is that the individual communications get across
the referential meanings 𝜎1 and 𝜎2. So there are both private and public suc-
cesses. The so-called meaningful equilibrium of Γ can be formally expressed as{[(𝜔1, 𝑃1), (𝜎1, 𝑃1)]; [(𝜔2, 𝑃2), (𝜎2, 𝑃2)]}.
Now, A1 has participated in both games and so he knows the whole mean-
ingful equilibrium. But A2 has learned only that 𝜔1 ⟶ 𝑃1 and A3 has learned
only that 𝜔2 ⟶ 𝑃2. Each of the addressees has encountered only part of the
language and thus shares in only part of the success. In the special case where
both addressees know there are only two words and conventional meanings in
the language, they could infer the other connection as a possibility but in more
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realistic situations this cannot be done. They will learn only that part of the lan-
guage that they experience. This is quite reasonable. If someone hasn’t come
across the word sesqipedalian, they may not know its conventional meaning
and be unable to use it.
Thismore or less winds up the description of Γ and how it is solved via the Con-
sistency Condition being added to the Nash criterion. It results in the Conven-
tional sub-Constraint being established and through it the locutionary Semantic
Constraint because the Referential sub-Constraint is given.
Onematter that remains is that I madeA1 the speaker in both the games.What
if he had been the addressee in, say, 𝑔13? How would A3 know which equilib-
rium to discard as she plays just that one game? She cannot choose arbitrarily
asA1 may already have made his choice in the other game 𝑔12 which could con-
flict with her choice. In such cases what happens is that A1, being a player in
both games, givesA3 feedback via repetition or gestural overdetermination that
a certain word has already been used for another conventional meaning. So it
does not matter who the speaker is and who the addressee is, in general. All
permutations are allowed.
This may strike the purist as unsatisfactory as they may want something fully
internal to the setup. But my goal is empirical adequacy and in actual fact such
original acts of semiosis are not likely to happen in a pristine way but in a some-
what messy back-and-forth, repetitive, and overdetermined way. Also, there are
likely to be a few more Communication Games with the same two words among
the three members of our tiny community before the conventional meanings are
solidly cemented. But the simple Language Game I have presented captures the
heart of the matter. And it is easy to create more complex Language Games even
with just three members because we can add multiple links between any two
members as they can talk to each other multiple times.8
Indeed, it is almost as easy to generalize the foregoing to 𝑛 agents connected
by multiple Communication Games in a new Language Game Γ together with𝑚
words, 𝑚 conventional meanings, and 𝑚 referential meanings of interest to the
community. Let 𝑆⋆𝑖𝑗 be the equilibrium strategy of agentA𝑖 in game 𝑔𝑖𝑗 (or, equiv-
alently and a little loosely, in Γ𝑖𝑗 ) which is a part of Γ. This could be a speaker
strategy or an addressee strategy and there will be as many such strategies as
there are games A𝑖 plays with the other agents in the community. A𝑗 will nat-
urally play the same game and in that case it will be called 𝑔𝑗𝑖 and the corre-
sponding equilibrium strategy will be 𝑆⋆𝑗𝑖 . IfA𝑖 is the speaker thenA𝑗 will be the
addressee and if A𝑗 is the speaker then A𝑖 will be the addressee. Keep in mind
8Such a graph with multiple possible links between any two vertices is called a multigraph.
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that both the speaker strategy and the addressee strategy in the initial situations
that are actual are ordered pairs, either (𝜔𝑙′ , 𝑃𝑙) or (𝜎𝑙 , 𝑃𝑙)with 𝑙 = 1, 2,… ,𝑚 and
𝑙′ = 1, 2,… ,𝑚.
The first index 𝑖 in the strategy 𝑆⋆𝑖𝑗 goes from 1 to 𝑛 because the Language
Game is a connected graph9 and each of the 𝑛 agents participates in at least one
game. The second index 𝑗 belongs to an index set 𝐾𝑖 ⊂ {1, 2,… , 𝑛} because the
agentA𝑖 may not talk to every other agent and also not to himself. So there will
be index sets 𝐾1, 𝐾2, …, 𝐾𝑛 for each of the 𝑛 agents. For example,A1 may talk toA4 and A7 via Communication Games Γ14 and Γ17 and to no one else in which
case 𝐾1 = {4, 7}. And so on, for each of the 𝑛 agents.
Lastly, let the intention to convey a particular content (𝜎𝑙 , 𝑃𝑙) in 𝑔𝑖𝑗 be denoted
by intention𝑖𝑗𝑙 . A meaningful equilibrium may now be defined as follows.
Definition 22.1. A Language Game Γ(𝑛) ≡ Γ involving𝑚 words,𝑚 conventional
meanings, and 𝑚 referential meanings relative to appropriate utterance situa-
tions is given. Let 𝑆⋆𝑖𝑗 be a component strategy of 𝑔𝑖𝑗 in Γ with 𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛 and
𝑗 ∈ 𝐾𝑖 where 𝐾𝑖 ⊂ {1, 2,… , 𝑛} is an index set containing indices 𝑗 corresponding
to each game Γ𝑖𝑗 in Γ. Then 𝑆⋆𝑖𝑗 is a component of a meaningful equilibrium of Γ
if and only if
1. Nash Condition: 𝑆⋆𝑖𝑗 is a component of a Nash equilibrium of 𝑔𝑖𝑗 , either the
speaker component or the addressee component depending onwhetherA𝑖
is the speaker or addressee of 𝑔𝑖𝑗 .
2. Consistency Condition: intention𝑖𝑗𝑙 ≠ intention𝑖𝑘𝑙′ if and only if 1𝑠𝑡(𝑆⋆𝑖𝑗) ≠
1𝑠𝑡(𝑆⋆𝑖𝑘) and 2𝑛𝑑(𝑆⋆𝑖𝑗) ≠ 2𝑛𝑑(𝑆⋆𝑖𝑘) for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑖 .10
The first condition just says that every meaningful strategy must be part of a
Nash equilibrium in the relevant component partial information game. The sec-
ond condition says that the same speaker strategy or the same addressee strategy
can be employed in two different component games an agent plays if and only
if the intentions in those component games are the same. This is somewhat com-
pactly expressed and I urge the reader to work out what happens when 𝑆⋆𝑖𝑗 and
𝑆⋆𝑖𝑘 are both speaker strategies or both addressee strategies or one is a speaker
9For notational reasons, it is easier to stick to a graph than a multigraph. But the definition and
theorem below carry over to multigraph Language Games without any difficulty.
10Here, 1𝑠𝑡(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑎 and 2𝑛𝑑(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑏, that is, 1𝑠𝑡 picks out the first component of an ordered
pair and 2𝑛𝑑 picks out the second component.
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strategy and the other is an addressee strategy. All four cases are covered by the
above statement of the Consistency Condition.
Since the number of words, conventional meanings, and referential meanings
are all𝑚, all Definition 22.1 says is that the set of words is mapped via a bijection
onto the set of conventional meanings in equilibrium. There are 𝑚! such permu-
tations if the payoffs are all symmetric as they were in Figure 22.3 and any one
set of meaningful equilibrium strategies can then be selected.
Since such a bijection always exists, and since Nash equilibria always exist,
a meaningful equilibrium always exists, and we can record this important fact
below.
Theorem 22.1. Ameaningful equilibrium always exists in a LanguageGame Γ(𝑛)
involving 𝑚 words, 𝑚 conventional meanings, and 𝑚 referential meanings rela-
tive to appropriate utterance situations.
Thus, the foregoing explains with respect to a relatively simple Language
Game how words acquire conventional meanings and, therefore, how semiosis
gets off the ground. If required, it may be assumed that such pairings are further
cemented by repeated use via Γ played at subsequent times.
Combined with the analyses of Parts III and IV, this completes the reduction
of meaning, how both conventional meanings and referential meanings attach to
utterances, assuming nothingmore than the partial rationality of finite agents. In
this sense, themain problem of semantics identified in Section 1.1 – how language
acquires meaning – has been solved at an abstract level. It required first solving
the problem of communication in the small – micro-semantics – assuming con-
ventional meaning was fixed, and then solving the problem of communication in
the large – macro-semantics – allowing conventional meaning to vary. This top-
down way of approaching the main problem of semantics via communication
provides a fairly tight constraint on how more detailed accounts of particular
expressions in language are constructed. As I said in Section 1.2, it brings a uni-
formity to the many subquestions of semantics.
Though themodel actually constructed is very simple, it has elements of Peirce
(1867–1913/1991), de Saussure (1916/1972; 1960), and the later Wittgenstein (1953/
1968), the first because it shows how the connections between words and conven-
tional meanings are arbitrary, the second because it shows they are simultaneous
and systemic, and the third because it shows how all meaning arises ultimately
from use or communication.
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22.2 Some generalizations
I now briefly describe some generalizations mentioned in Section 3.2.
The most obvious one is to allow lexical ambiguity by making the number of
conventional and referential meanings of interest 𝑚′ with 𝑚′ > 𝑚. Since the
number of words 𝑚 would be less than the number of conventional meanings
𝑚′, some or all of the words would have to carry more than one meaning. This
is relatively straightforward to do by simply adding more initial situations to the
games of partial information such as 𝑔12 and 𝑔13 and making the game trees a
littlemore complex. For example, if𝑚 = 2 and𝑚′ = 3 then in the simple Language
Game with 𝑛 = 3 agents we would add one initial situation to both 𝑔12 and
𝑔13, each corresponding to some third conventional meaning 𝑃3 and referential
meaning 𝜎3, and add more branches to each situation. This slightly complicates
the definition of a meaningful equilibrium and makes it a little harder to see its
simple essence so I do not pursue it here.
In actual fact, the number of possible conventional meanings, that is, proper-
ties, is infinite. So, in this case, one has to first identify a finite number of con-
ventional meanings that have the highest frequency of use and then follow the
procedure above.11 This can be done in one fell swoop by simply assuming antic-
ipated frequencies abstractly and selecting some finite number of conventional
meanings at the start, or it can be done via a dynamic Language Game played at
discrete times 𝑡 = 0, 1, 2,… . The latter is naturally more difficult to work out and
involves semantic change, something I will consider in Chapter 24.
It is also not too hard to extend the utterances to full multiple-word sentences
and allow a pre-given grammar. All it involves is adding syntactic partial infor-
mation games to the semantic ones we already have.This is notationally cumber-
some but not conceptually so, especially for relatively simple sentence structures,
and, again, the definition of a meaningful equilibrium has to be modified to in-
clude the syntactic games.
Something much more adventurous is also conceivable. It is possible not only
to generate the (locutionary) Semantic Constraint but also the Syntactic Con-
straint from nothing but rationality. That is, we can show how sentences acquire
syntax and how a language acquires a grammar. This could result in contradict-
ing Chomsky’s account of a universal grammar that is innate, something that is
being questioned anyway.
11Incidentally, this double fact, of identifying a finite number of possibilities for conventional
meanings based on frequency of use, and then identifying the equilibrium of the relevant finite
game, seems to solveWittgenstein’s skeptical paradox (of plus and quus) as discussed byKripke
(1982).
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A similar strategy can be deployed with phonetics but as I have not said much
in detail about phonetic games I just mention the possibility. The reason why all
three Constraints – Semantic, Syntactic, and Phonetic – can be handled in anal-
ogous ways is that, as I’ve said earlier, they are analogous. All involve attaching
semantic, syntactic, or phonetic values or contents to words and then allowing
such couplings to be disambiguated in identical ways via the Flow Constraint.
This indicates that really only the Flow Constraint corresponding to partial
rationality is fundamental. The other three are a consequence of communication
viewed macro-semantically. I haven’t said how the Referential sub-Constraint of
the Semantic Constraint might be derived. Suffice it to say here that it is a result
of rationality and ontology. I discuss it partly in Language and Equilibrium (2010:
Section 2.4). Thus, the partial rationality of agents engaged in communication is
responsible for all of semiosis and communication itself arises from the needs
and goals of agents.
Vagueness is harder to handle because different agents will come to attach
slightly different concepts to words as discussed in Chapter 11. This means con-
ventional meanings are not fully shared and it requires relaxing the Consistency
Condition slightly and allowing an extended locutionary Semantic Constraint to
operate. Modulation, implicature, and free enrichment are also not easy to incor-
porate. It might be reasonably conjectured that early communication with new
words is free of such complications. The referential map is more complex than I
have assumed because a conventional meaning can lead to more than one refer-
ential meaning (e.g. for words like the and every). This flexibility also needs to
be accommodated and the map derived from first principles as mentioned above.
Conflict can also be introduced into the relevant Content SelectionGames of each
Communication Game in Γ. Since conflict usually does not enter into the corre-
sponding partial information games, this does not pose insuperable problems.
Finally, just as it is possible to derive grammar from rationality in principle, it
should also be possible to pull rational ontologies out of seemingly thin air.
These last few extensions are undoubtedly more challenging. In any case, once
suchmodels have been elaborated it should be possible to apply them empirically
as suggested in Section 3.2.
22.3 Comparisons
Grice (1968) sketches an account of wordmeaning on the basis of an agent having
a procedure in his repertoire to convey a certain meaning. It has the following
drawbacks:
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1. It leaves out the element of choice that inevitably arises when deciding
which word to pair with which meaning. It focuses on a single word-object
pair and so leaves out the key to symbolic meaning that Deacon (1997)
emphasizes in the first part of his book: that symbolization is systemic and
the link between word and referent is mediated by the link between word
and word. This, incidentally, is exactly what happens in a Language Game
via the bijection referred to in Section 22.1.
2. It fails to show how individual decisions result in a group conventional
meaning. Though Grice (1989a: 127) does say that each member of the
group acts in a certain way on the condition that other members do like-
wise, he does not address how such a circular situation might get off the
ground. In a much later publication, Grice (1989b: 290–297) constructs a
kind of mythical scenario for how nonnatural meaning might emerge from
natural meaning. As I wrote in Chapter 5, because he lacked the apparatus
of game theory, he could not quite envisage how such nonnatural pairings
might arise naturally through rational choice although they may build on
quasi-natural gestural pairings.
3. A less significant missing element is the two-tier system of conventional
and referential meaning as opposed to simple word-referent connections.
This could presumably be added to Grice’s account without too much dif-
ficulty.
Lewis (1969) is able to overcome the first shortcoming above with his inven-
tion of signaling games. But, short of everyone playing one large communal game
rather than participating in a network of two-person games, he shows no mech-
anism to go from micro-semantics to macro-semantics, from individual to group.
What is missing is the idea of multiple, interlocking games in society that enable
the micro level to be linked with the macro level. This is what makes Lewis’s
notion of convention too strict as I will argue in the next chapter. And the third
flaw mentioned above is also present.
Because there are perfectly symmetrical multiple equilibria in Lewis’s signal-
ing games, Skyrms (2010) adds adaptive dynamics of a special sort (e.g. replica-
tor dynamics, reinforcement learning) to break the symmetries to realize unique
equilibria in most cases given arbitrary starting points in the space of possible
strategies. This conclusion does not appear to be so remarkable because rather
special sorts of dynamics are assumed without much argument. In a lucid paper,
Huttegger (2007)12 suggests that such dynamics may be supported by assuming
12See also the references therein.
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that agents imitate one another though this argument is made in a very general
way and is also rather vague: why would one kind of dynamics be copied rather
than another and how does the process get off the ground? It is not enough to say
that success is copied because it may be difficult for the agents to gauge what is
successful in many circumstances. Also, the method seems to allow only the sim-
plest cases to be considered where there may be two words and two meanings
or possibly 𝑚 words and 𝑚 meanings. Apart from the fact that such dynamical
movements in strategy space may take a relatively long time (e.g. a thousand it-
erations) to converge to an equilibrium implying nonequilibrium behavior for an
excessive duration, the approach is implemented at such a high level of abstrac-
tion that it is unrealistic and unclear how to get to more empirically interesting
results.
Skyrms’s model is behaviorist and makes the intentions and intelligence of
human agents superfluous. That the same framework applies to both bees and
humans is a flaw, not a virtue, because something important has been left out
and the special nature of human conventional and referential meaning is lost.
Surely humans do not need to blunder about a thousand times the way bees may
have to in order to reach an equilibrium.
He misses the role of gestures that are likely to have accompanied speech at
an early stage of evolution. As I explained, linguistic meaning follows gestural
meaning temporally, the latter being much easier to establish, and overdetermi-
nation enables one-shot pairings to occur quite often. This kind of bootstrapping
allows agents to avoid potentially questionable and extended dynamics to reach
equilibrium.
In trying to avoid assumptions like common knowledge and salience that
Lewis made, Skyrms seems to ignore the role of the situation in which commu-
nication occurs. Early signals were likely meant to identify salient objects in the
environment such as food or predators and these could have been steppingstones
to later signals where such saliencewas not available. And, as I have argued,more
complex communication often relies on aspects of the situation that are invisible
such as shared background information.
He also focuses exclusively on pure coordination. As Gintis points out in his
review of Skyrms’s book:13
As it turns out, there are very few zero-sum games in reality, and there are
equally few pure coordination games. Thus Skyrms misses most of the real
action, which lies in understanding the conditions under which signaling
13https://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-reviews/R1TCQS6NFB5M3K/
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equilibria emerge even when agents do not have identical interests. This
is most acute in human societies in which individuals routinely stand to
gain from transmitting untruthful messages. But it is equally important in
animal societies in which males gain from transmitting incorrect messages
concerning their reproductive fitness to females, who use such information
to guide their choice of mates. There is a brilliant literature on this topic,
based on contributions by Ronald Fisher, Michael Spence, Amos Zahavi, and
Alan Grafen, but this literature is not touched upon in Skyrms’s exposition.
As I said in the previous section, conflict can be introduced in Content Selec-
tion Games and partial information games if required more or less painlessly and
so Language Games can readily handle both coordination and conflict.
Lastly, Skyrms does not address the issue of the need for a network of inter-
connected games. This suggests that he operates within the same ambit as Lewis
as far as linking the micro and macro levels is concerned.
As an aside, I point out that Skyrms generalizes the notion of semantic content
by making it probabilistic but my notion is more general yet because there are
multiple distributions in a content as discussed in Sections 15.2 and 15.4. Also,
Skyrms’s content is holistic and does not allow for partial propositions (e.g. the
content of an uttered noun phrase). Lastly, it is not Austinian as it does not in-
corporate the described situation or what he calls the state. As a result it is not
fine-grained enough and succumbs to logical omniscience and to the Fregean
problem of informative identities.
Thus, my basic verdict is that signaling games in the Lewis-Skyrms tradition
are on the right track but do not go far enough toward explaining the origins of
meaning.
Tomasello’s (2010) account is more satisfying, both theoretically and empiri-
cally. He emphasizes the precedence of gestures as compared with words and
uses the term “piggybacking” to describe what I have called overdetermination.
His argument about so-called recursive Gricean “mindreading” is less convinc-
ing and I have argued in earlier chapters that it is generally not required. He
too underscores the situated and intelligent nature of communication as I have
throughout this book and in my earlier publications, but because he does not
avail of game-theoretic ideas, he misses the possibility of arguing for his conclu-
sions in greater detail and with greater rigor through the use of mathematical
models.
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What justifies calling conventional meanings conventional?
Lewis (1969: 58) says there are three basic conditions for a regularity in the
behavior of members of a population to be a convention: the regularity itself, a
system of mutual expectations, and a system of preferences. On top of this, he
demands that these three conditions be common knowledge in the population.
There are two undesirable characteristics in this account, one explicit and one
implicit, that are best brought out by an example.
First, if a population is reasonably large, no member is likely to know all of it.
That is, some people will be strangers to one another. Intuitively, we know that
conventions can and do exist in such communities but common knowledge of
any regularity will be impossible because the members do not even know of one
another’s existence in a complete way.
Second, many conventions (e.g. a handshake) are instantiated locally (e.g. be-
tween two agents). Lewis modeled convention with a single large game played
by all the members simultaneously. This represents an extreme case and Lewis’s
implicit use of a single game is a special degenerate case of a network, especially
when seen in the context of Language Games that involve a network of games.
These observations suggest that actual conventions are weaker than Lewis
thought. That is, his explicit condition of common knowledge and implicit condi-
tion of a single large game are sufficient but not necessary for a regularity to be a
convention. His notion thus needs to be generalized.We can amend his definition
as follows, keeping his original notation and terminology intact.
Definition 23.1. A regularity 𝑅 in the behavior of members of a population 𝑃
when they are agents in a recurrent network of games 𝑆 is a convention if and
only if it is true that, and members’ probability estimates of other members be-
longing to 𝑃 are sufficiently high that, in any instance of 𝑆 among members of
𝑃 ,
1. everyone conforms to 𝑅;
2. everyone expects everyone else to conform to 𝑅;
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3. everyone prefers to conform to 𝑅 on condition that the others do, since 𝑆
is a network of games and uniform conformity to 𝑅 is the preferred equi-
librium of 𝑆 among at least two equilibria.
There are two changes to Lewis’s definition: one is the weakening of the re-
quirement of global common knowledge and the other is the replacement of a
single large game by a network of games.
If we substitute a Language Game Γ for 𝑆 in the definition, we can establish
why the meaning that results from a meaningful equilibrium is conventional in
this generalized sense of convention. In this case, the regularity 𝑅 is just the
pairing of a word with a property. I record this important fact.
Theorem 23.1. The conventional meanings that result from a meaningful equi-
librium of a Language Game are in fact conventional. In other words, the name
given to this kind of meaning is appropriate.
This also implies that other conventions – like shaking hands to greet some-
one – are best analyzed via networks of interconnected games rather than as a
single large game as Lewis did. To the extent that norms exist as conventions,
this applies to norms as well.
Interestingly, then, our study of the origins of linguistic conventions has led
to a broader notion of convention in general and to a revision of Lewis’s classic
definition.
Sometimes, it appears that we get stuck in suboptimal conventions, that is, in
equilibria that are not Pareto-optimal. A notable example is the QWERTY key-
board. In such cases, it often happens that a closer look reveals that the supposed
suboptimal convention was, in fact, optimal at a given time in the past, and later,
when new technologies arose, other conventions became optimal but inacces-
sible owing to the high switching costs. In other cases, it may happen that the
incremental process of reaching an equilibrium is piecewise optimal but not glob-
ally so, resulting in an inferior convention in the end that becomes sticky. This
kind of thing is likely to prevail in many historical conventions, such as the over-
all outcome of an incremental peace process, for example.
The foregoing addresses some of Burge’s (1975) criticisms of Lewis’s notion.
First, I replace Lewis’s global common knowledge by probabilities and local (gen-
erally nonconscious) common knowledge. Second, I consider the issue of switch-
ing via a consideration of costs. Burge is also concerned about an over-zealous
reliance on rationality in situations where “inertia, superstition, and ignorance”
may prevail. This observation may be accommodated by using nonconscious par-
tial rationality and awareness (e.g. an agent may know only a fragment of the
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objective partial information game and so may not realize there are other alter-
native equilibria).
Gilbert (1981) makes some interesting points about the details of Lewis’s frame-
work but they are not relevant here as my framework is very different.
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24 Semantic change
I referred in Section 3.2 to the fact that not only do conventional meanings
emerge through communication, they also evolve over the centuries. Such se-
mantic change is part of the broader changes that occur in all aspects of language.
My goal here is to sketch the mechanism by which such changes occur and show
how it fits in with the rest of Equilibrium Semantics. As such, it merely scratches
the surface of the large field of historical linguistics and, in particular, histori-
cal semantics and historical pragmatics, an instance of which may be found in
Traugott & Dasher (2007) for example.
An important constraint on almost all language change is that it must occur
during communication. A speaker may utter a sentence to communicate some
information to an addressee. Usually, the utterance merely reinforces standard
ways of speaking (or writing). Occasionally, one or more aspects of the utterance
– either semantic, syntactic, or phonetic – are altered. For example, a single word
of the sentence uttered may involve a broadened meaning. The addressee then
has to comprehend the utterance despite the alteration. If she is successful, the
relevant change gets established between the two agents and can be repeated
between them. Such a change may then also be transmitted to other agents by
either of the two agents via similar utterances and may thereby spread through
the linguistic community and become a change in the language.
Uttering sentences thus serves at least two ends: the first, generally conscious
and intended, is to enable the flow of information1 from speaker to addressee,
and the second, generally unconscious and unintended, is to either reinforce or
change aspects of language. Because communication and language change must
occur together, the constraints on the former also help to constrain the latter.
A key constraint that makes change possible was called overdetermination in
Parikh (2010: Section 6.1.5). Overdetermination in this second sense2 is the pres-
ence of an element in an utterance that provides information about another ele-
ment in that utterance. For example, in the sentence, “The dog didn’t bark,” the
verb phrase didn’t bark constrains the noun phrase to refer to something that
1I mean to include all kinds of performative utterances of the kind Austin (1975) introduced
under this broad description.
2The first sense was discussed in Section 22.1 in the context of Language Games.
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can bark – such as a dog or, less likely, a seal – in most ordinary utterance sit-
uations. Even if the word dog had been eclipsed by some noise, the addressee
would still have understood the utterance as conveying the information that the
dog didn’t bark because in such everyday situations it is only dogs that bark.3
We can say here that the verb phrase overdetermined the meaning of the noun
phrase given the context. In general, the elements that do the overdetermining
can be semantic, syntactic, phonological, or contextual.4
The second constraint that enables change is the mechanism through which
overdetermined contents are transmitted, namely,modulation or free enrichment
or implicature.
I will propose a model of language change based on overdetermination and
modulation and on the propagation of an initial change through the community
by looking at an example of semantic broadening. Many ideas in the theory of
language change (e.g. Crowley & Bowern 2010) appear to be qualitative and large-
scale, that is, they do not examine language change in the small and then relate
it to the community-wide scale. In my view, only this kind of communicative
cum propagative process can really explain it. Large-scale evolutionary models
by themselves abstract too much from the essence of the process. A better way
is to see the evolution as a sequence of small steps, each of which is modeled in
detail.
24.1 Semantic broadening: The communicative aspect
The modern English word dog derives from the middle English word dogge
(which comes from the old English word docga). Earlier, the word referred to a
powerful breed of dogs (such as Great Danes) that originated in England. It was
later semantically broadened (and transformed morphologically). This change
must have come about through communicative interactions and I now look at
the details of the semantic transformation. I abstract from the morphological
change and so will use the word dog to refer to both its narrower and broader
meanings.
Presumably, the word was used by some particular speaker in a sentence to
communicate the broader meaning for the first time in the history of English. We
can reconstruct the kind of original situation in which the change occurred and
3Consider the sentence “His boss didn’t bark at him.” This and similar examples show that
overdetermination works only when the utterance situation is also sufficiently constraining to
rule out other alternatives.
4This notion of overdetermination is a generalization of the idea of selectional restriction.
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was communicated successfully by the following thought experiment. Middle
English existed from roughly 1150 CE to 1470 CE and the paradigm situation I
consider is relatively more modern. A more authentic example would require
delving into the relevant sociology of late medieval households.
Suppose A and B have a poodle5 and they engage in the following dialogue.B: When did you get home last night?A: Around midnight. The dog didn’t bark.
It is not necessary to know why A used dog to refer to their poodle. Maybe
it was meant affectionately. Be that as it may, in the scenario sketched, the word
was used to refer to their poodle and not to some larger dog which would have
been the then-standard use.
Consider the second sentenceA utters: “The dog didn’t bark.” (𝜔 = 𝜔1𝜔2𝜔3𝜔4)
There are two possibilities for 𝜔2 = dog.The first is the old conventional mean-
ing of 𝜔2, the property 𝑃𝜔21 of being a Great Dane, say.The second is the new con-
ventional meaning 𝑃𝜔22 the utterance somehow succeeds in establishing. Initially,
the addressee considers just the first of these.
Now, first the locutionary Semantic and Flow Constraints are activated for
𝜔2 and the other words. This leads to a problem as there is no large dog in the
resource situation accompanying the utterance. This triggers the illocutionary
Semantic Constraint which results in finding 𝑃𝜔22 and the corresponding refer-
ent by using overdetermination, and then a mixed Flow Constraint resolves any
ambiguities that remain.
How doesB decidewhether the new conventionalmeaning 𝑃𝜔22 is the property
of being a dog (in its broadened modern sense) or the property of being a poodle?
Here, it is arguable that there is a linguistic constraint that involves a preference
– in some situations – for semantic broadening (from Great Danes to any dog)
over a shift to a parallel and coordinate property (from Great Danes to poodles).
In the first case of broadening, the earlier meaning is superseded by the new
meaning; in the second case, the earlier meaning remains and the new meaning
becomes a second meaning of the word. The latter is costlier in general and so
the first option is preferred in certain situations.6
5Apparently, the poodle was imported into Great Britain from France in the 1870s but treat the
time as the 15th century.
6Consider the (semantically related) term “bitch.” It derives from the old English word “bicce”
and originated as a neutral term for a female dog, a meaning it still has. But when it was used
to refer to a human, apparently around the fifteenth century, with an intended meaning like
bad woman or virago, that meaning stuck. It was not broadened to something like a female
mammal. See the relevant entry in the Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology. My thanks to
Tom Wasow for this example.
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At this stage, we can say that in the communication between A and B a new
conventional and therefore referential meaning get conveyed via modulation.
There is no guarantee that the new conventional meaning will stick, even just
between the two interlocutors. Indeed, most new meanings are short-lived. But
any initial change has the potential to be propagated through the community
and become a lasting change.
24.2 Semantic broadening: The propagative aspect
Recently, evolutionary models that abstract from the details of the propagation
and study how suitable fractions of the population converge to a steady state
based on positive or negative reinforcements have become popular.7 In my view,
such models are too abstract, and assumptions involving reinforcements func-
tion more or less as mathematical fictions that enable the derivation of desirable
empirical results. An alternative approach that builds on the preceding model of
language change in the small is as follows.
After A has successfully communicated the new meaning to B above, the
change may last in either person’s mind or it may fade away. So we may assume
there is some probability 𝑞 of a change being communicated and lasting between
the two interlocutors given that a conversation takes place between them. If the
change lasts, then either of them can pass it on to a third party via a similar
modulation. And so on.
Start with a finite community of 𝑛 persons 1, 2, 3, …, 𝑛.8 Then let 1 have some
altered meaning for a word in mind at time 𝑡 = 0.9 The people in the community
who accept the new meaning are collectively called the change set. Thus, at 𝑡 = 0
the change set is just {1}. Assume that conversations take place with probability
𝑝 > 0 between some pairs 𝑗 and 𝑘 and with probability zero for other pairs. If
a communication is successful and the change is lasting, it cannot be reversed.
This gives us a sequence of random graphs 𝐺𝑡(𝑛, 𝑝) at each subsequent stage 𝑡 =
1, 2, 3,… where the 𝑛 vertices represent the 𝑛 members and an edge between any
two vertices represents a conversation between the two corresponding persons
and occurs independently for some pairs of vertices with probability 𝑝 > 0. I will
assume that each graph in the sequence is connected in the same way, that is,
there is a path between any two nodes where a path is a sequence of distinct
7See Yang (2009) and the references therein.
8Thus, 𝑛 does double duty: it serves as a name of a member and also indicates the total number
of members.
9The member 1 plays the same role of originator as A did in the previous section.
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nodes with edges between successive nodes having 𝑝 > 0.10 If at least one of the
vertices belongs to the change set prior to the time of communication and the
communication succeeds and the change is lasting, then the other vertex is added
to the change set. In this way, the change set keeps expanding and hopefully
converges to the entire community of 𝑛 vertices.
The basic question is: what are the conditions on 𝑛, 𝑝, and 𝑞 under which this
happens? This is not the most general formulation of the situation but it suffices
to state a simple version of the problem.
Let 𝐶 denote the entire community {1, 2, 3,… , 𝑛} and 𝐶𝑡 denote the change set
at the end of period 𝑡 . We would like to ask under what conditions lim𝑡→∞ 𝐶𝑡 =
𝐶 .
If 𝑢, 𝑣 in 𝐶 are two distinct vertices, let 𝑢 ∼ 𝑣 represent an edge between 𝑢
and 𝑣 or, in other words, a conversation between them. Then the probability of
a conversation between 𝑢 and 𝑣 is 𝑃(𝑢 ∼ 𝑣) = 𝑝 as specified by the statement of
the problem. Also, if 𝐸 is the event of a communication between 𝑢 and 𝑣 whose
effect persists, then 𝑃(𝐸 ∣ 𝑢 ∼ 𝑣) = 𝑞 again as specified.
As a result, the probability of a successful conversational event with a lasting
communication at any given instant is given by 𝑃(𝑢 ∼ 𝑣 ∩ 𝐸) = 𝑃(𝑢 ∼ 𝑣)𝑃(𝐸 ∣
𝑢 ∼ 𝑣) = 𝑝𝑞. Thus, the probability of the complementary single failure at any
instant is 𝑃([𝑢 ∼ 𝑣 ∩ 𝐸]′) = (1 − 𝑝𝑞).
Now let 𝑘 ∈ 𝐶 be an arbitrary member distinct from 1. Because the graphs are
connected, there is always a path between 1 and 𝑘. If we are able to compute the
probability of 𝑘 entering 𝐶𝑡 , then we would be able to see what happens to it in
the limit as 𝑡 → ∞. Let this probability be denoted by 𝑃(𝑘 ∈ 𝐶𝑡).
First consider a path (1, 𝑘) of length 𝑙 = 1 where the vertices 1 and 𝑘 are
adjacent. If 𝑘 fails to be in 𝐶𝑡 given a path of length 𝑙 = 1, this must have the
probability of a single failure 𝑃([𝑢 ∼ 𝑣 ∩ 𝐸]′) repeating itself for instants at
1, 2, 3,… , 𝑡 . This allows us to write:
𝑃(𝑘 /∈ 𝐶𝑡 ∣ (1, 𝑘)) = 𝑃([𝑢 ∼ 𝑣 ∩ 𝐸]′)𝑡 = (1 − 𝑝𝑞)𝑡
The probability of the complementary event, that is, the probability of success
10A connected graph is usually just one where there is a path between any two vertices. In the
case of a random graph, one has to add the requirement that 𝑝 > 0 over the edges constituting
a path. Moreover, in our case, the connections must be the same over time in the sequence
of random graphs 𝐺𝑡(𝑛, 𝑝). I have deliberately used a slightly more restrictive notion of path
as it is more convenient for our purposes. It is possible to work these random graphs into the
Language Games considered earlier as the two are related but this formulation is simpler. Keep
in mind that we know empirically that there are on average six degrees of separation between
any two people on the planet.
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over this path, is:
𝑃(𝑘 ∈ 𝐶𝑡 ∣ (1, 𝑘)) = 1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑞)𝑡
Next consider a path of length 𝑙 = 2 and let the intervening node be 𝑗. That is,
let the particular path be (1, 𝑗, 𝑘) where 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶 is different from 1 and 𝑘. The key
thing to be aware of here is that if 𝑘 is to become a member of 𝐶𝑡 , then it can
do so only after 𝑗 has first become a member of the change set. Let 𝑡0 = 0, let 𝑡1
be the time at which 𝑗 succeeds, and let 𝑡2 = 𝑡 . Then, it is possible to write the
following:
𝑃(𝑘 ∈ 𝐶𝑡 ∣ (1, 𝑗, 𝑘)) = [1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑞)𝑡1−𝑡0][1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑞)𝑡2−𝑡1]
which is nothing but the success of 𝑗 at 𝑡1 followed by the success of 𝑘 at 𝑡2.
Now suppose a particular path of arbitrary length 𝑙 is (1, 𝑗1, … , 𝑗𝑙−1, 𝑘), where
each element of the sequence is a distinct member of 𝐶 . Then for 𝑘 to become
a member of the change set, it is necessary that each 𝑗𝑚 has to have become
a member of the change set first and in the right order, starting with 𝑗1 and
ending with 𝑗𝑙−1. If we let 𝑡1, 𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑙−1 be the successive times at which the cor-
responding nodes 𝑗1, 𝑗2, … , 𝑗𝑙−1 become members of the change set, and if we let
Δ𝑡𝑚 = 𝑡𝑚 − 𝑡𝑚−1 for𝑚 = 1, 2,… , 𝑙 with 𝑡0 = 0 and 𝑡𝑙 = 𝑡 , the probability of success
over this path is given by:
(32) 𝑃(𝑘 ∈ 𝐶𝑡 ∣ (1, 𝑗1, … , 𝑗𝑙−1, 𝑘)) = 𝑙∏
𝑚=1[1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑞)Δ𝑡𝑚]
As Δ𝑡𝑚 →∞ for all𝑚 from 1 to 𝑙, the conditional probability of success tends
to 1 as long as 𝑝𝑞 > 0, that is, as long as 𝑝 > 0 and 𝑞 > 0.
If there is more than one path between 1 and 𝑘, the (unconditional) probability
of success 𝑃(𝑘 ∈ 𝐶𝑡) can only be greater. That is:
𝑃(𝑘 ∈ 𝐶𝑡 ∣ (1, 𝑗1, … , 𝑗𝑙−1, 𝑘)) ≤ 𝑃(𝑘 ∈ 𝐶𝑡) ≤ 1
which implies that:
(33) lim𝑡→∞𝑃(𝑘 ∈ 𝐶𝑡) = 1
as well by the so-called squeeze theorem from elementary calculus.
Since 𝑘 was arbitrarily chosen, this shows that:
lim𝑡→∞𝐶𝑡 = 𝐶
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as long as 𝑝 > 0 and 𝑞 > 0. The convergence is independent of 𝑛, the size of the
community.
In other words, as long as a path exists between the originator and every mem-
ber of the community and the probability of a lasting communication is positive,
all members will eventually fall into the change set. That is, an initial change
between two members becomes a change in the language. This result fits the
example I have considered as the narrow meaning of dog has completely disap-
peared.
There are many ways of relaxing the simplifications assumed earlier. Many
potential chains of change could be broken by an errant member, that is, 𝑞 is
likely to vary from pair to pair rather than be constant across the community.
Also, one could assume there are two originators of two distinct meanings for a
word and study what happens in a community whose graph forms two relatively
isolated but connected components. This may be how linguistic variation occurs,
creating distinct communities and languages over time when a sufficient number
of changes accumulate in one component of a community. Labov’s (2001) detailed
study of social factors influencing linguistic change may also suggest other ways
to expand the model.
24.3 Generalizing the model
This account of semantic broadening can be adapted to other kinds of language
change. For example, a syntactic change involving the present continuous (e.g.
“I am liking your shoes”) would initially appear odd but would, via syntactic
modulations, recover the intended meaning that I like your shoes.11
I have added a philosophical and pragmatic dimension to the problem of lan-
guage change by connecting it to a theory of communication. Does it account for
all types of language change? Probably not. Even if it does apply to, say, phonetic
change, it must operate at a less conscious level than our semantic example.
I have also tried to propose a new graph-theoretic model that builds on the
idea of change occurring step by communicative step in a community. It appears
to offer certain advantages over large-scale evolutionary models involving seg-
ments of populations by sticking more closely to the knitting, as it were.
As both these aspects can be generalized in many directions, they together
amount to an outline of a framework for the study of language change.
11Theexample is an instance of a variant of Indian English and is influenced by the corresponding
syntax of many Indian languages.
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25 Beyond language
There are broadly two ways to go beyond language. One is toward other symbol
systems such as images and gestures. The other is toward actions that also func-
tion as utterances. I have dealt with both directions in The Use of Language and
to a lesser extent in Language and Equilibrium but I briefly examine an instance
of the second in a little detail to show how Equilibrium Semantics can connect
with the wider social sciences.
Consider an example from the field of international relations which may be
thought of as applied political science and sociology not to mention economics.
Imagine a situation where there are two neighboring countries X and Y and X
begins massing troops near their common border.This is not at all an uncommon
situation and one that can be quite ambiguous.
First, there is the physical action itself which could be an offensive or defensive
move in the ongoing relations between X and Y. It could also be a response to
internal developments in X (e.g. to divert attention from them). Which of these
options is actually the case would depend on the context.
But beyond this level, there could also be a second level where the physical
action functions as an utterance and conveys a meaning to the government of
Y and possibly to other parties such as the citizens of X and Y. This meaning
could involve any of the possibly many contentious elements in the relations
between X and Y. For example, themassing of the troops could serve as a warning
or intimate an intent, depending on the concrete profile of X and Y and their
interactions. And it could be highly ambiguous and unclear.
Such a meaning is essentially illocutionary and, indeed, like an implicature
because it is calculable, cancelable, indeterminate, nondetachable, and reinforce-
able. It can be derived by the same methods involving the illocutionary Semantic
Constraint consisting of Relevance and Distance and the corresponding Flow
Constraint.
There are innumerable such examples where an action’s purpose is not re-
stricted to its immediate consequences but also includes a layer of illocutionary
meanings. And Equilibrium Semantics applies to all of them. Thus, its relevance
for anthropology, sociology, political science, economics and allied fields is not
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limited to the direct role of language and meaning in the emergence, evolution,
and transformation of social institutions but also includes the entire realm of ac-
tion itself.
Part V shows how Language Games andmeaningful equilibria may be used to ex-
plain the origins of conventional meaning from the ground up and compares my
approach with that of others. Once such models are developed in greater detail,
they could begin to yield empirical results. An unexpected bonus is a new insight
into the nature of convention broadly conceived. A communicative approach to
historical linguistics is forged, one that establishes an initial semantic change via
modulation that is then propagated step by step to the whole community via a
random graph. Lastly, language is just the first rung of a tall ladder that leads to
other symbol systems and social action and ultimately to all of civilization.
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Part VI
Conclusion

26 Communication, Frege’s puzzle, and
reference
We have now traversed the whole path of Equilibrium Semantics. Looking back,
it is possible to see many different dimensions of the problem of meaning – philo-
sophical, linguistic, psychological, computational, and even humanistic, encom-
passing many aspects of the human sciences as discussed especially in Chap-
ters 19 and 25. Throughout, I have tried to demonstrate that the idea of equilib-
rium pervades all of semiosis.
Over the course of its modern history, many have felt the intuitive appeal of a
use-based or communication-based foundation for semantics but the content of
thisWittgensteinian insight has always been obscure, evenmysterious.What can
one possibly do with use? It seems like such a structureless, anti-theoretical idea.
Indeed, even connecting use with communication appears ineffectual because
the latter looks like it has little to offer beyond Austinian and Gricean informal-
ities. And so the relative – but viciously circular and question-begging1 – safety
of a Fregean and logicist truth-based foundation has continued to beckon.
In my view, neither use-based unsystematicity nor truth-based systematicity
offer a scientific approach to semantics. The only remaining possibility is to fol-
lowGrice, whose singular attempt to understand communication in the small and
in the large was systematic but informal. I have tried to present a very thorough
critique of practically his entire oeuvre together with that of his many followers
whether they are orthodox Griceans, neo-Griceans, or post-Griceans.
Equilibrium Semantics may be seen as a mathematical alternative to Grice that
organizes the raw material of semantics quite differently. It rests on four funda-
mental ideas: reference, use, indeterminacy, and equilibrium, the first taken from
ideal language philosophy which was mainly truth-based, the second taken from
ordinary language philosophy which was mainly use-based, and the last two sup-
plied by my framework itself.2 These are developed into Communication Games
and Language Games and into four Constraints, Semantic, Syntactic, Phonetic,
1See the quote by Dummett in Section 1.2.
2I have discussed these four ideas in a general way in some detail in my previous book and so
will not do so here.
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and Flow, based on the mathematical frameworks of situation theory and game
theory. It offers in principle a unified approach to all of semantics in a way that
is philosophically sound, mathematically solid, computationally tractable, and
empirically adequate.
26.1 Four philosophical benefits
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, there are at least four advantages to considering
meaning via communication as Equilibrium Semantics does.
The first is that because it tackles the main question of semantics – how lan-
guage acquires meaning – directly, the framework’s many results impose a top-
down constraint on possible answers to its various subquestions involving par-
ticular linguistic constructions. Indeed, the subtasks of semantics devolve into
building alternative theories within the framework for the same phenomena that
can be straightforwardly compared because they share a common foundation.
In the same way, theories within the framework for different phenomena can
be synthesized and integrated owing to a common foundation. I tried to demon-
strate this latter kind of integration in Parikh (2010: Chapter 6) where I developed
accounts of descriptions, names, and generalized quantifiers that all shared the
same basic assumptions about how noun phrases work.
The only other possibility is to be bottom-up and piecemeal and hope that the
proliferation of foundational assumptions will somehow get reconciled. It should
be obvious that this is a hopeless task. In fact, many theorists end up relying
on foundational Gricean assumptions, not pausing sufficiently to ask whether
relegating certain things to “pragmatics” and to the Gricean maxims is a sound
move.3 If my critique of Grice is correct then this recourse is no longer available.
Thus, if Equilibrium Semantics is accepted as a constraint on the formation of
theories of meaning, it will be much easier to tackle the challenges more complex
constructions pose with an elaboration of uniform tools so that the many sub-
questions of semantics all cohere into an integrated solution to its overarching
problem of the relation of language to reality and knowledge. I illustrate this in
the next section by returning to Frege’s puzzle of informative identities that was
posed in Section 1.2.
As we saw, Dummett gives a further reason to pursue meaning via communi-
cation: to sidestep the interdependence of truth and meaning. Those relying on
truth and truth-conditional semantics or pragmatics, the most popular approach
today, never show how the truth conditions are derived from first principles. A
3Even Kripke (1977) is guilty of this.
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moment’s thought will reveal that it is the theorist who already understands the
example being discussedwho provides the truth conditions. But how do the inter-
locutors arrive at them?The truth conditions specify themeaning of an utterance
but this very meaning is also presupposed in identifying the truth conditions.
My approach has described use directly and derived meaning from use. Once
this is done, it is possible to use truth conditions or infon-based contents, the lat-
ter representing more fine-grained information conditions. This procedure dove-
tails with the first advantage listed above because when the content of an ut-
terance is assumed, it is assumed relative to a background framework like Equi-
librium Semantics. In such cases, one knows whereof one speaks because the
assumptions can be made good by simply deriving the content from first prin-
ciples when required. It is only then that the relevant theory can be said to be
complete.
The third philosophical benefit is to reduce meaning to communication and
then rely on Dretske’s further reductions of mental representations to physi-
cal facts. This allows us to see meaning as part of the natural world. I believe
I have developed this reduction fairly completely throughout the book. With the
truth-conditional strategy, this possibility remains murky at best. Lewis (1972:
170) writes:
I distinguish two topics: first, the description of possible languages or gram-
mars as abstract semantic systems whereby symbols are associated with
aspects of the world; and, second, the description of the psychological and
sociological facts whereby a particular one of these abstract semantic sys-
tems is the one used by a person or population. Only confusion comes of
mixing these two topics.
As I have tried to show, especially in Part V, these two topics are inextricably
linked because Language Games depend on interlocking Communication Games
and the conventional meanings of Communication Games result from their par-
ticipation in Language Games. That is, macro-semantics and micro-semantics
cannot be separated from each other. Indeed, it could not be otherwise because
language and meaning are just one large social institution that hangs together
only because its different parts and levels cohere. This is precisely what the bur-
den of this book has been, to show how the main problem of semantics, how
language acquires meaning in the small and in the large, can be solved.
Lastly, I have argued that the vagueness of language is an important natural
source of its normativity, arising as it does from “the great variation of things
in the world combined with the limitations on our concepts” as quoted from
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Murphy (2004: 21) in Chapter 11. Thus, this elusive property, too, becomes clear
in one of its aspects via understanding the communication of vague utterances.
26.2 Solving Frege’s puzzle
I will develop just the part of Equilibrium Semantics required for the solution. I
omit the four different uses of names, referential, attributive, generic, and pred-
icative, referred to earlier and analyzed in detail in Parikh (2010: Chapter 6).
Apart from the particular theory I offer, I want to emphasize that Equilibrium
Semantics is a framework and as such is compatible with other possible accounts
although it also rules out some.This is the sense in which it provides a constraint
on semantic theories.
It is often not realized that the cognitive significance of identity statements
involves two items of information. In the case of Hesperus and Phosphorus, not
only does the addressee learn that the names hesperus and phosphorus co-refer
but also that one is the heavenly body seen in the evening and the other is the
heavenly body seen in the morning and that they are the same.4 Most people
subscribe instinctively to a direct reference theory where each name is just a
label for the referent. And then neither item of information is available in the
trivial content of the utterance and its cognitive significance becomes a mystery.
Direct reference theories are also held by sophisticated contemporary theorists
who argue for quite counterintuitive consequences of their theory such as Hes-
perus’s identity with Phosphorus being a metaphysically necessary truth that is
nevertheless not epistemologically a priori as it is an empirical discovery.
I now solve Frege’s puzzle in a way that survives challenges posed by more
complex constructions and by other constraints such as Putnam’s (1975) argu-
ments about the nature of meaning.5
4It seems even Frege himself may not have realized this because his Begriffsschrift solution
attends to the first item involving names and his On Sense and Reference solution attends to
the second item involving modes of presentation. Subsequent scholarship, as far as I know, has
also attended to one or the other but never to both in a single solution.
5I do not discuss how my solution offers a way of solving Putnam’s problems about meaning
but anyone familiar with them should be able to see how. Indeed, I feel my solution is more
satisfactory than his because he includes the referent in the conventional meaning or intension
of the term, which is a bit artificial. If it is kept separate in a resource situation and both the
conventional meaning and resource situation jointly determine the referent thenwe get a more
natural solution.
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26.2.1 Preliminaries
26.2.1.1 Causal chains
Kripke (1980) and others developed the notion of a causal chain to account for
how the reference of a name occurs. The idea is that someone in a linguistic com-
munity starts using a name to refer to an entity, say a heavenly body, and then
this use spreads through the community. Korta & Perry (2011: Chapter 7) call the
structure of references a network. A causal chain can in fact be rigorously de-
fined as following a certain path within the network of Communication Games
called a Language Game.6 In general, there will be multiple causal chains for
any name and the network that results will be a subgraph of a Language Game
because not all parts of the Language Game will involve the name. One conse-
quence of such a rigorous definition is that it allows us to construct the infon⟨⟨𝑅𝑐 ; 𝑎; 𝑁 ; 𝑢 ⟩⟩ where 𝑎 is the referent and source of the chain, 𝑁 is the name
that refers in the situation 𝑢, and 𝑅𝑐 is the relation linking 𝑎 to 𝑁 in 𝑢. There will
be cases, however, where there is no real referent 𝑎 and then 𝑎 will be replaced
either by a corresponding fictional object drawn from a fictional universe or by
the contradictory infon 0.
26.2.1.2 Resource situations and modes of presentation
The idea of resource situations comes from Barwise & Perry (1983). At least one
resource situation 𝑟𝑢 is associated with every noun phrase via 𝑢. Every resource
situation associated with a name 𝑁 contains an infon like ⟨⟨𝑅𝑐 ; 𝑎; 𝑁 ; 𝑢 ⟩⟩ by
definition. That is, 𝑟𝑢(𝑁 ) is a resource situation induced by 𝑢 only if 𝑟𝑢(𝑁 ) ⊨⟨⟨𝑅𝑐 ; 𝑎; 𝑁 ; 𝑢 ⟩⟩ for some 𝑅𝑐 , 𝑎 relative to 𝑁 and 𝑢. Not all resource situations in-
volve such causal chains; some may be perceptual or may depend on an attribute.
Frege (1892/1980) conflated the distinct notions of sense and mode of presen-
tation. Sense is analogous to conventional meaning, which for names is just the
property 𝑃𝑁 = named N . The mode of presentation is what enables a speaker or
addressee to fix a reference and is analogous to a resource situation.7
6Incidentally, so can Putnam’s (1975) division of linguistic labor.
7I myself conflated these two notions in Parikh (2010: 291) and posited the hybrid notion of an
indexical property which was a property that contained a link to an external object. But such
a combination is not required as the link can be housed within a resource situation. If we wish
to avoid Kripke’s (1980: pages 68–70) noncircularity condition even for the property taken by
itself, we can reinstate the hybrid notion. See footnote 14 in Chapter 3.
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26.2.1.3 The extension function
In Section 2.1 I had defined the following function:
(34) 𝑒(𝑃, 𝑠) = {𝑎 if there is exactly one object 𝑎 having 𝑃 in 𝑠{𝑥 ∣ 𝑠 ⊨ ⟨⟨𝑃; 𝑥 ⟩⟩} otherwise
In the context of causal chains and resource situations for names, I substitute 𝑃𝑁
and 𝑟𝑢 for 𝑃 and 𝑠:
(35) 𝑒(𝑃N , 𝑟𝑢) = {𝑎, if there is exactly one object 𝑎 having 𝑃N in 𝑟𝑢{𝑥 ∣ 𝑟𝑢 ⊨ ⟨⟨𝑃N ; 𝑥 ⟩⟩}, otherwise
𝑒(𝑃N , 𝑟𝑢) will provide the content of names like hesperus and phosphorus:
𝑒(𝑃hesperus, 𝑟𝑢) = Venus and 𝑒(𝑃phosphorus, 𝑟 ′𝑢) = Venus where 𝑟𝑢 , 𝑟 ′𝑢 are the
two corresponding resource situations.8
26.2.1.4 Functions treated intensionally and extensionally
Generally, functions are treated extensionally. For example, 𝑓 (𝑥) = 𝑥 +2 is taken
to be equal to 𝑔(𝑥) = 𝑥 + 4− 2 because the “external” values both functions yield
are the same. However, they are not intensionally equal because their other prop-
erties such as the time taken to compute their outputs may differ. So functions
taken intensionally may be different objects even though extensionally they are
the same.
In the same way, we can treat the extension function above intensionally or
extensionally. Thus, 𝑒(𝑃hesperus, 𝑟𝑢) and 𝑒(𝑃phosphorus, 𝑟 ′𝑢) are different objects
intensionally because their first and second arguments differ. Specifically for our
purposes, the causal chains their second arguments contain are different. Exten-
sionally, however, they are the same and just have the value Venus.
26.2.2 Setting up the analysis
Now consider an utterance situation 𝑢 involving a conversation about astron-
omy where A says “Hesperus is Phosphorus” to B. As our interest is in solving
8I am omitting certain complications involving conditioned infons that are considered in Parikh
(2010) as the present definitions suffice for our purposes.
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Frege’s puzzle, we can abstract from many features of the Communication Game
Γ𝑢 and focus just on the locutionary Semantic Constraint. We can also ignore
the mythological meanings of “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” as they would be
eliminated by the Flow Constraint.
This may seem like a trivial step as theorists do it almost unconsciously but
the difference is that now one knows precisely what is being abstracted from so
that the missing details can be filled in if required. It is just this kind of awareness
that has led many researchers to consider utterances instead of sentences as they
realized that certain contextual aspects of utterances could not be ignored.
26.2.3 Semantic Constraint
Let the sentence uttered be 𝜑 = 𝜑1𝜑2𝜑3 where 𝜑1 = hesperus, 𝜑2 = is, and 𝜑3 =
phosphorus. Also, 𝑅= is just the relation of equality.
(36) hesperus:
Referential Use: 𝜑1 ⟶𝑃𝜑1 𝑢⟶𝑒(𝑃𝜑1 , 𝑟𝑢) = Venus = 𝜎1
(37) is:
Predicative Use: 𝜑2 ⟶𝑃𝜑2 = 𝑅= 𝑢⟶ ⟨⟨𝑅= ⟩⟩ = 𝜎29
(38) phosphorus:
Referential Use: 𝜑3 ⟶𝑃𝜑3 𝑢⟶𝑒(𝑃𝜑3 , 𝑟 ′𝑢) = Venus = 𝜎3
26.2.4 The analysis
As we have abstracted from the different possible uses of names and also from
the lexical ambiguities in 𝜑, the FlowConstraint involves trivial games and yields
the following locutionary content for the utterance:
𝜎 ℓ = ⟨⟨𝑅=; 𝑒(𝑃𝜑1 , 𝑟𝑢); 𝑒(𝑃𝜑3 , 𝑟 ′𝑢) ⟩⟩
Since we can treat the arguments of this infon both intensionally and exten-
sionally, it follows immediately that the content carries nontrivial information
because only the extensional equality holds. Indeed, both items of information
9Actually, there are two other uses of is that I discuss in Parikh (2010), the so-called auxiliary
andmembership uses.The current predicative use just picks out the equality relation. However,
it is conditioned by the requirement that it refer to a time period overlapping with the time of
utterance and also belonging to a finite time interval.
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that make up the utterance’s cognitive significance are conveyed. There is no
particular reason why the different causal chains in 𝑟𝑢 and 𝑟 ′𝑢 should involve the
same object Venus. This requires, in fact, an empirical discovery.
In an utterance of “Hesperus is Phosphorus” it is usually the intensional con-
tent that is intended as the extensional content is trivial. The elimination of the
latter would also be effected by the Flow Constraint.
If we consider the sentence “Hesperus is Hesperus” instead then its content
would be:
𝜏 ℓ = ⟨⟨𝑅=; 𝑒(𝑃hesperus, 𝑟𝑢); 𝑒(𝑃hesperus, 𝑟𝑢) ⟩⟩
where 𝜑1 = 𝜑3 = hesperus and the two resource situations are now the same.
This equality is trivial as expected and, indeed, it holds both extensionally and
intensionally.
Suppose someone says, “Woodchucks are groundhogs” in some situation 𝑢.
Now this is a case where both terms have the same conventional meaning be-
cause the property of being a woodchuck is the same as the property of being a
groundhog. That is, their senses are the same so Frege’s solution will not work.
But the resource situations will be different and contain different causal chains
terminating in the same kind of rodent, and this allows nontrivial information
to be learned from the identity.10
As I said at the start of this section, one item of information is that the first
is the heavenly body seen in the evening and the second is the heavenly body
seen in the morning and they are the same. The first part of this information is
contained in 𝑟𝑢 both via the causal chain ⟨⟨𝑅𝑐1; Venus; hesperus; 𝑢 ⟩⟩ and via
background information about when Hesperus is observed (i.e. in the evening).
This latter fact is also embedded in the relation 𝑅𝑐1 because the causal link in-
volves Hesperus in the evening. The second part of this information is contained
in 𝑟 ′𝑢 via the different causal chain ⟨⟨𝑅𝑐2; Venus; phosphorus; 𝑢 ⟩⟩ and via differ-
ent other facts such as when Phosphorus is observed (i.e. in the morning). And
the third part, the identity relation, is of course contributed by is. So one nontriv-
ial significance of “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is clearly available to the speaker
and addressee. (The same kind of difference occurs in the resource situations for
woodchucks and groundhogs. One term may have been encountered in the field
and the other in a dictionary. And so on.) The second item involving the coref-
erence of the two names is also readily available from the distinct causal chains.
So my solution is able to account for both items of cognitive significance.
10I would like to thank Ed Zalta for extended conversations about this topic over the years. See
Zalta (1983: Chapter VI) and Zalta (1988: Chapters 9–12).
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Many proposals exhibit some difference between “Hesperus is Phosphorus”
and “Hesperus is Hesperus,” either that the two names co-refer or that the two
modes of presentation result in the same object, without, however, deriving both
and so miss the former’s full cognitive significance.
Imagine something like an Agatha Christie murder mystery in which the char-
acters’ identities have been scrambled and in solving the mystery, Hercule Poirot
grandly announces, “Smith isn’t Smith but Jones is Jones.” Here, the first con-
junct isn’t contradictory but informative and the second conjunct isn’t trivial
but also informative just like “Hesperus is Phosphorus.” My approach easily han-
dles such utterances because the relevant resource situations for each occurrence
of the two names are different and contain different facts. Most other solutions,
whether Fregean or of the direct reference kind, would find them hard to account
for.
26.2.5 Wider considerations
Direct reference theorists and others who treat the contents of identity state-
ments only extensionally are led to conflate the trivial and informative contents
mentioned above, and from there, inescapably, to the startling conclusion that
they are synthetic necessary truths known a posteriori. Kripke’s (1980) discovery
that it is important to distinguish the metaphysical notion of necessity from the
epistemological notion of aprioricity and also from the linguistic notion of ana-
lyticity is certainly valid. In general, though, as Kripke shows himself, whether or
not there are contingent a priori truths or necessary a posteriori truths is an open
question and one that should have little to do with how we use our language; it
should have to do with how the world is and with how agents might learn its
many truths. For example, we may discover through computational means that
a certain large number is a prime: this is then a necessary a posteriori truth.
Perhaps our most important means of acquiring information is through lin-
guistic communication; not only that, much of the information we have could
not be had without language. But the closer scrutiny initiated by Kripke himself
should caution us against taking one of the relatively simple uses of language as
evidence for rather counterintuitive claims about what are essentially metaphys-
ical and epistemological concepts.
Possibly, mathematical identities such as 7+5 = 12 can also be seen in this dual
intensional-extensional way and then their being informative would follow. Of
course, they still remain necessary truths unlike “Hesperus is Phosphorus” and
the question of how necessary truths can be informative – like learning that a
large number is a prime – is a different one.
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26.3 Defining reference
I briefly point out an immediate consequence of the framework: it becomes easy
to define reference. For Equilibrium Semantics the notion is broader than the
standard notion because the content of any legitimate expression that is uttered
is a referent. In an utterance of “Bill ran,” both “Bill” and “ran” refer.
There are two natural notions of reference, “subjective reference” correspond-
ing to speaker meaning and “reference” to communication. The former allows
a referent not to be communicated whereas the latter involves the successful
transmission of the referent to the addressee. The expression 𝛼 below can be
subsentential or a whole sentence and 𝜎 is a partial or full infon.
Definition 26.1. A subjectively refers to 𝜎 by uttering 𝛼 in 𝑢 if and only if there
is a situation 𝑐 such that A means 𝑝 = (𝑐 ⊨ 𝜎) by uttering 𝛼 in 𝑢.
Definition 26.2. A refers to 𝜎 by uttering 𝛼 in 𝑢 if and only if there is a situation
𝑐 and an addressee B such that A communicates 𝑝 = (𝑐 ⊨ 𝜎) to B by uttering 𝛼
in 𝑢.
Here, 𝑝 = (𝑐 ⊨ 𝜎) is a partial or full proposition based on the partial or full
infon 𝜎 . When 𝜎 = ⟨⟨ 𝑎 ⟩⟩ = 𝑎 where 𝑎 is an individual, we get the familiar case of
singular reference.
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Appendix A: Situated games
The basic task of this Appendix is to derive the locutionary semantic map 𝑔𝑢 ∶L → G introduced in Part III from first principles. This derivation will provide
themathematical foundation for our informal discussion of situated games of par-
tial information. It will also enable readers to see how all the other games such
as syntactic games of partial information, illocutionary games of partial informa-
tion, locutionary and illocutionary global games, Setting Games, Content Selec-
tion Games, Generation Games, Interpretation Games, Communication Games,
and Language Games can be defined either analogously or by further construc-
tion.
Recall that the elements of situation theory have already been spelled out as
fully as required for the purposes of this book in Section 2.1. Certain basic facts
relating to agents and language were also identified in Section 2.2 and Chapter 4.
I will take this material as given here.
The key innovation in my presentation, based on Parikh (1987b; 1990; 2001;
2010), is that games are constructed from situation-theoretic objects just as num-
bers can be constructed from sets. The motivation for preferring such an embed-
ding of game theory in situation theory is discussed in Appendix A of Language
and Equilibrium and so will not be repeated here.
A.1 The background
Let the sets of infons, situations, and propositions be I , S , and PROP respec-
tively. These sets are assumed to be finite and represent the range of infons, sit-
uations, and propositions of interest relative to a small part of reality called the
environment E within the overall informational space or ontology O. There are
various operations on these entities partially described in Section 2.1 and these
should be borne in mind as well.
While any action can be communicative in the right context, I restrict my focus
to linguistic communication. The Conventional sub-Constraint C and the Refer-
ential sub-Constraint R originate in communication as discussed in Part V and
together provide the set of possible (semantic) contents of an utterance. Another
A Situated games
way of describing the task of the Appendix is to say that the Flow Constraint F
will be developed mathematically assuming C and R are given.
SinceA’s actions are utterances of sentences, they can be modeled by ordered
pairs ⟨𝜑, 𝑢⟩, where 𝜑 is a sentence in L. As the utterance situation 𝑢 is a param-
eter, it is convenient to simplify the notation by specifying utterances by their
sentences alone.B’s actions are interpretations of A’s utterances, and can be modeled as pairs⟨𝜎, 𝑐⟩, where 𝜎 is an infon and 𝑐 the situation described partially by the infon.
Once again, this can be simplified to just 𝜎 , because 𝑐 is held fixed for all the
infons that serve as interpretations relative to the utterance situation 𝑢. I have
taken infons rather than propositions as the relevant contents. Clearly, both are
transmitted in an utterance.
Initially, lexical games 𝑔𝑢(𝜑𝑖) will be constructed, where 𝜑𝑖 is a word in the
sentence 𝜑. The corresponding possible contents of 𝜑𝑖 obtained from C and R
will be denoted by 𝜎𝑦𝑖 where 𝑦 stands for zero or more primes. To avoid the
proliferation of generic indices, I choose to replace 𝑖 with just the number 1with
the understanding that the same construction would apply mutatis mutandis to
all the words in the sentence uttered. Thus, 𝜑𝑖 is replaced by 𝜑1 and 𝜎𝑦𝑖 by 𝜎𝑦1 .
It is convenient to define a function𝑚𝑢 that maps elements ofL into their pos-
sible contents 𝜎𝑦1 relative to 𝑢. 𝑚𝑢(𝜑1) = {𝜎𝑦1 ∣ 𝑦 = 0, 1, 2,…primes} is assumed
to be finite and generated via C and R. Indeed, 𝑚𝑢 is just the composition of the
conventional and referential maps suitably defined. An added advantage of using
this composed function is that the construction of 𝑔𝑢(𝜑1) can be applied beyond
language to other symbol systems and other domains like social systems if𝑚𝑢 is
reinterpreted for those other contexts. In other words, C and R and their corre-
sponding maps may be viewed as just the theory of 𝑚𝑢 for the case of language.
Further, different parts of language such as nouns and verbs require different
theories for each corresponding part of the Referential Constraint R, something
that was considered in greater detail in my previous book. A similar function𝑚′𝑢
that maps elements of L into their possible parse trees based on the Syntactic
Constraint may be assumed if we wish to consider syntax but I will just abstract
from it here.
The way the game-theoretic model works is that given an utterance situation
𝑢, the speaker A forms an intention to convey a (partial) content 𝜎1 (like Bill
Smith) as part of a full utterance and chooses a possibly ambiguous locution 𝜑1
(like “Bill”) such that 𝜎1 ∈ 𝑚𝑢(𝜑1). If 𝜎1 is the only member of 𝑚𝑢(𝜑1), a trivial
game ensues. If 𝜑1 is ambiguous then a nontrivial game results. In either case, the
number of initial situations in the game equals the number of possible contents
of 𝜑1.
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A.2 Some prior basic elements
Some basic relations, infons, situations, and functions pertaining to communica-
tion are now defined.
The first is the relation 𝑖𝑡𝑐 of intending to convey something. This is a three-
place relation with a speaker who does the intending, an infon the speaker in-
tends to convey, and an addressee to whom the content is addressed. Such in-
tentions can be either explicit or implicit. The second relation ℎ𝑢 is the relation
of having uttered something. Its first argument is a speaker and its second ar-
gument is a parameter that is anchored to an expression. However, instead of
writing ⟨⟨ℎ𝑢; A; ̇𝜑 ⟩⟩ with 𝑓 ( ̇𝜑) = 𝜑1, I will write simply ⟨⟨ℎ𝑢; A; 𝜑1 ⟩⟩ to keep
the notation uncluttered. The third relation is the relation ℎ𝑖 of an addressee’s
having interpreted an utterance as communicating something. This is a three-
place relation with arguments an addressee, an utterance, and an infon. From
these three relations, corresponding infons and situations can be constructed.
We start with a specification of the possible initial situations in a game of
partial information.
Definition A.1. 𝑠1𝑦 ⊂ 𝑢 and 𝑠1𝑦 ⊨ {⟨⟨ 𝑖𝑡𝑐,A, 𝜎𝑦1 ,B ⟩⟩}, where 𝜎𝑦1 ∈ 𝑚𝑢(𝜑1).
This says simply that the initial situation 𝑠1𝑦 is a subset of the utterance situation
𝑢 and supports an infon representing the appropriate intentionAwould have to
convey 𝜎𝑦1 to B.
I had earlier used 𝑡 to refer to various parse trees but I will be abstracting
from syntax here so I will use it instead for situations that result from an initial
situation after A has uttered something.
Definition A.2. 𝑎𝑐𝑡A ∶ S ×L→ S
𝑎𝑐𝑡A(𝑠, 𝜑1) = 𝑠 ∪ {⟨⟨ℎ𝑢,A, 𝜑1 ⟩⟩}.
𝑎𝑐𝑡B ∶ ran(𝑎𝑐𝑡A) × I → S
𝑎𝑐𝑡B(𝑡, 𝜏) = 𝑡 ∪ {⟨⟨ℎ𝑖,B, 𝜑1, 𝜏 ⟩⟩} where 𝜑1 = 2𝑛𝑑[𝑎𝑐𝑡−1A (𝑡)].
Here ran(𝑎𝑐𝑡A) is just the range of the function 𝑎𝑐𝑡A. These two functions give
general descriptions of the consequences ofA’s uttering something in a situation
and of B’s subsequently interpreting it. All that happens is that the initial situa-
tions 𝑠 get augmented first with A’s utterance and next with B’s interpretation.
It should be easy to see that if 𝑠 were taken to be one of the initial situations 𝑠1𝑦
above and if appropriate utterances and interpretations were specified, then we
would have the basic mechanism for generating the game tree via the updates
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given by 𝑎𝑐𝑡A and 𝑎𝑐𝑡B . Thus, having started with the elements of situation the-
ory and with some basic relations pertaining to communication, games of partial
information will naturally follow.
This is partly where using situation theory enables us to make the information
available to each agent at each stage explicit. Uttering 𝜑1 in 𝑠 has the consequence
that ⟨⟨ℎ𝑢,A, 𝜑1 ⟩⟩ gets added to 𝑠, a fact that is explicitly available to both agents.
Without this kind of underlying construction, this fact would remain implicit.
This kind of articulation is especially useful in contexts where artificial agents
that communicate have to be designed because such information can then be
used in making situated and strategic inferences.
We first remind ourselves of the form of games of incomplete information
which will be the approximate target of our construction.
A.3 Games of incomplete information
As I have said, traditionally, games are approached directly. Although Harsanyi
(1967) was the first person to define games of incomplete information, he did so
in normal or strategic form. What we need is their extensive form definition be-
cause that is where various aspects of the choice structure are made transparent.
This was made clear by Kuhn (1953) who was the first to define extensive form
games for games of perfect and imperfect information. Kreps & Wilson (1982)
extended Kuhn’s definition to games of incomplete information. We use their
formulation of a game of incomplete information as a tuple of sets and functions
as the approximate goal of the situation-theoretic construction. This goal is ap-
proximate because games of partial information are different in certain respects
from incomplete information games.
Kreps and Wilson Kreps & Wilson (1982) define a game of incomplete infor-
mation directly as an extended tuple ⟨𝑇 , ≺ ; 𝐴𝐶𝑇 , 𝑎𝑐𝑡 ; 𝑁 , 𝜂 ; 𝑃 ; 𝐻 ; 𝑣⟩. 𝑇 is a set
of nodes and ≺ is a partial ordering on 𝑇 that makes the pair ⟨𝑇 , ≺⟩ a tree (more
precisely, a forest). 𝐴𝐶𝑇 is a set of actions and 𝑎𝑐𝑡 is a function that maps every
noninitial node of ⟨𝑇 , ≺⟩ into some action in 𝐴𝐶𝑇 . This is intended to be the ac-
tion that leads to this node. 𝑁 is a set of agents (or players) and 𝜂 is a mapping
from the set of nonterminal nodes onto 𝑁 . 𝜂 establishes whose turn it is to act. 𝑃
is a vector of probabilities on the set of initial nodes. This much of the tuple gives
a tree with decision nodes connected by actions with an agent identified for each
decision node. 𝐻 is a partition on 𝑇 that consists of subpartitions, one for each
player. It is meant to capture the information sets of each agent, the sets of de-
cision nodes of an agent that cannot be distinguished by the agent. Accordingly,
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each agent’s subpartition is a collection of those sets of nodes that are his or her
information sets. Finally, 𝑣 is the payoff function, a mapping from the terminal
nodes into the set ℝ of real numbers.
A.4 Games of partial information
I now construct locutionary semantic partial information games as described in
Chapter 7. This is a straightforward matter of defining the elements of the tuple
above one by one.
A.4.1 Situations and choices
As was said above in Section A.1, given an utterance situation 𝑢, the speaker A
forms an intention to convey a (partial) content 𝜎1 (like Bill Smith) as part of a
full utterance and chooses a possibly ambiguous locution 𝜑1 (like “Bill”) such that
𝜎1 ∈ 𝑚𝑢(𝜑1). The first element of the tuple that has to be constructed is the tree
of possible situations and to do this we start with the initial situations identified
in Definition A.1 in Section A.2. Then we define A’s choice sets in each of these
initial situations which just contain 𝜑1. Next, we generate the intermediate situa-
tions that result from 𝜑1 based on 𝑎𝑐𝑡A from Definition A.2 and then identify B’s
choices in these situations. Finally, we define the terminal situations that follow
from B’s interpretive actions based on 𝑎𝑐𝑡B . This collection of situations forms a
tree under the subset ordering.
Definition A.3. 𝑇0 = {𝑠1𝑦 ∣ 𝜎𝑦1 ∈ 𝑚𝑢(𝜑1)}
𝐶A ∶ 𝑇0 → P(L)
𝐶A(𝑠1𝑦) = {𝜑1}
𝑇1 = {𝑎𝑐𝑡A(𝑠1𝑦 , 𝜑1) ∣ 𝑠1𝑦 ∈ 𝑇0}
𝐶B ∶ 𝑇1 → P(I)
𝐶B(𝑡) = 𝑚𝑢(𝜑1)
𝑇2 = {𝑎𝑐𝑡B(𝑡, 𝜏) ∣ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇1, 𝜏 ∈ 𝐶B(𝑡)}
𝑇 =⋃𝑖 𝑇𝑖
Each 𝐶A(𝑠) and 𝐶B(𝑡) are the same and are A’s and B’s choice sets in the rele-
vant situations.
Proposition A.1. ⟨𝑇 , ⊂⟩ is a “tree” (more accurately, forest).
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Since the more basic building blocks of situations and actions have been strung
together piece by piece, the fact that ⟨𝑇 , ⊂⟩ is a tree is something that can now
be proved rather than simply assumed.
Definition A.4. ∀𝑡, 𝑡′ ∈ 𝑇0, 𝑡 ≡A 𝑡′ iff 𝑡 = 𝑡′
∀𝑡, 𝑡′ ∈ 𝑇1, 𝑡 ≡B 𝑡′
Proposition A.2. ≡A, ≡B are equivalence relations.
These equivalence relations capture the relevant epistemic properties of the two
agents as follows.
Proposition A.3.
• For all 𝑡, 𝑡′ ∈ 𝑇1, 𝑡 ≡B 𝑡′ implies 𝐶B(𝑡) = 𝐶B(𝑡′).
• For all 𝑡, 𝑡′ ∈ 𝑇1, 𝑡 ≡B 𝑡′ implies 𝑡 /⊂ 𝑡′.
• For all 𝑡, 𝑡′ ∈ 𝑇1, 𝑡 ≡B 𝑡′ implies 𝜂(𝑡) = 𝜂(𝑡′).
The first statement says thatB has the same choices at each of various equivalent
situations. This is important because if the choices weren’t the same the agent
could use that information to distinguish between epistemically equivalent sit-
uations, a contradiction. The second statement says that of two equivalent situ-
ations one cannot precede the other. This again makes intuitive sense because
if such precedence were possible, the agent would know it, and it would make
the situations epistemically distinguishable. The last statement requires Defini-
tion A.8 made below and says simply that the same agent has to act in all equiv-
alent situations. The corresponding properties forA are even more trivially true.
The key thing to note is that all these properties can now be proved from more
basic assumptions.
A.4.2 Actions
The third element of the game tuple above, the set of actions in the game, is
nothing but the union of all the choice sets in Definition A.3. This gathering of
all the actions into a single set is just to maintain conformity with Kreps and
Wilson’s tuple, so that the game is rendered in a familiar form.
Definition A.5. 𝐴𝐶𝑇 = [⋃𝑠∈𝑇0 𝐶A(𝑠)] ∪ [⋃𝑡∈𝑇1 𝐶B(𝑡)] = {𝜑1} ∪ 𝑚𝑢(𝜑1)
The map 𝑎𝑐𝑡 assigns an appropriate set of actions in 𝐴𝐶𝑇 to each noninitial
situation in 𝑇 .
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DefinitionA.6. 𝑎𝑐𝑡 ∶ 𝑇1 ∪ 𝑇2 →𝐴𝐶𝑇
𝑎𝑐𝑡(𝑡)= 2𝑛𝑑[𝑎𝑐𝑡−1A (𝑡)] = 𝜑1 if 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇1= 2𝑛𝑑[𝑎𝑐𝑡−1B (𝑡)] = 𝜎𝑦1 if 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇2 for some appropriate 𝑦
𝑎𝑐𝑡 maps a situation into the action that brings it about. The reason for labeling
situations or nodes in the game tree with actions in this manner is because ⟨𝑇 , ⊂⟩
is a tree and this means that each noninitial situation has a single action that
generates it.
A.4.3 Agents
Definition A.7. 𝑁 = {A,B} is the set of agents.
The function 𝜂 below determines whose turn it is to act.
Definition A.8. 𝜂 ∶ 𝑇0 ∪ 𝑇1 →𝑁
𝜂(𝑡)= A if 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇0= B if 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇1
This is just a formal way of saying that A is the speaker and B the addressee.
A.4.4 Prior probabilities
The next item in the tuple is the prior probabilities. As we have seen, they are
the most complex part of the game-theoretic structure because it is through them
that each local game is connected with all the other local games, both locution-
ary and illocutionary, that materialize when a sentence is uttered. To enable the
definition below, assume that the whole sentence uttered is 𝜑 = 𝜑1𝜑2…𝜑𝑛 for
some 𝑛, as was done in Section 8.1. In addition, remember that 𝑥−1 is a variable
that stands for any of the vectors formed by taking all the combinations of the
possible semantic contents of locutions other than 𝜑1. As I am abstracting from
syntax here, we do not consider the vector of possible syntactic contents 𝑦.
Definition A.9. 𝑃 ∶ 𝑚𝑢(𝜑1) × 𝑚𝑢(𝜑2) × … × 𝑚𝑢(𝜑𝑛) × {𝑢} → [0, 1] such that
∑𝑦 𝑃(𝜎𝑦1 ∣ 𝑥−1; 𝑢) = 1 with 𝜎𝑦1 ∈ 𝑚𝑢(𝜑1) and 𝑥−1 ∈ 𝑚𝑢(𝜑2) × … ×𝑚𝑢(𝜑𝑛).
This is a key reason why games of partial information differ from games of
incomplete information. Incomplete information games have a single pre-given
probability distribution; as was first explained in Section 7.3, partial information
games have multiple probability distributions for each local game. These form
a third set of strategic choice variables along with the choice of utterance and
interpretation from each 𝐶A(𝑠) and 𝐶B(𝑡). This strategic characteristic is made
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possible by the presence of the conditioning variables 𝑥−1 because each different
instantiation of these variables creates a different probability distribution 𝑃(𝜎𝑦1 ∣
𝑥−1; 𝑢) and the agents have to choose one distribution from among many based
on whether all such choices are in global equilibrium or not, the latter just being
the equilibrium of the global game.
A.4.5 Information sets
Definition A.4 and Propositions A.2 and A.3 allow us to specify the information
sets of each agent. They are information sets precisely because they have been
shown to have the appropriate epistemic properties.
Definition A.10. ℎA ∶ 𝑇0 → P(𝑇)
ℎA(𝑡) = {𝑡′ ∈ 𝑇0 ∣ 𝑡′ ≡A 𝑡} = {𝑡}
𝐻A = {ℎA(𝑡) ∣ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇0}
ℎB ∶ 𝑇1 → P(𝑇)
ℎB(𝑡) = {𝑡′ ∈ 𝑇1 ∣ 𝑡′ ≡B 𝑡} = 𝑇1
𝐻B = {ℎB(𝑡) ∣ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇1}
𝐻 = 𝐻A ∪ 𝐻B
Again, I observe that the situation-theoretic construction makes it possible to
build information sets from the simpler objects ≡A and ≡B rather than just defin-
ing and imposing them outright. It provides an explanation of why they arise
from the more basic epistemic properties of the game.
A.4.6 Payoffs
At one level, the payoffs are the easiest elements to define as all that is needed
is two real-valued functions defined on the terminal situations in 𝑇2, with the
understanding that each function encodes the same underlying preferences up
to positive affine transformations.This would be the most general case. However,
it is desirable to constrain these functions to respect the inequalities introduced
in Section 7.3.
𝑎A > 𝑐A; 𝑎′A > 𝑐′A; 𝑎B > 𝑐B; 𝑎′B > 𝑐′B
These inequalities pertain to games where there are only two initial situations.
For games with more initial situations, note that the additional terminal situa-
tions that result all belong with instances whereB has erred in her interpretation.
All such situations are mapped into the lowest level of payoffs 𝑐A or its cognates.
These inequalities were derived from the underlying preferences agents have
for successful communication on the one hand and for minimizing effort or cost
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on the other. This is why it makes sense to constrain the payoff functions we
define to obey these inequalities.
A little manipulation of prior constructs is required to express the condition
that a terminal situation represents a correct interpretation or an incorrect one.
This is not difficult to do but I rehearse it a bit to make it more readable.
To identify terminal situations where the interpretation is correct, we require
that the situation 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇2 satisfies:
1𝑠𝑡[𝑎𝑐𝑡−1A (1𝑠𝑡[𝑎𝑐𝑡−1B (𝑡)])] = 𝑠1𝑦 ∈ 𝑇0
2𝑛𝑑[𝑎𝑐𝑡−1B (𝑡)] = 𝜎𝑦1
Both these conditions flow from Definitions A.1, A.1, and A.6. The first condition
simply traces the path back from the terminal situation 𝑡 to the initial situation
𝑠1𝑦 in 𝑇0 by Definition A.2 and the second condition requires that the interpreta-
tion leading to the terminal situation be 𝜎𝑦1 , which is the content intended in 𝑠1𝑦
by Definition A.1, thereby ensuring that the interpretation is the right one.These
two conditions jointly capture the requirements for the highest payoffs like 𝑎A
and its cognates. Similar conditions with suitable modifications are required to
identify payoffs like 𝑐A and its cognates.
Definition A.11. 𝑣A ∶ 𝑇2 →ℝ
𝑣B ∶ 𝑇2 →ℝ
such that ∀𝑡 , 𝑡′ ∈ 𝑇2
if
1𝑠𝑡[𝑎𝑐𝑡−1A (1𝑠𝑡[𝑎𝑐𝑡−1B (𝑡)])] = 𝑠1𝑦 ∈ 𝑇0,
2𝑛𝑑[𝑎𝑐𝑡−1B (𝑡)] = 𝜎𝑦1 ,
and
1𝑠𝑡[𝑎𝑐𝑡−1A (1𝑠𝑡[𝑎𝑐𝑡−1B (𝑡′)])] = 𝑠1𝑦 ∈ 𝑇0,
2𝑛𝑑[𝑎𝑐𝑡−1B (𝑡′)] ≠ 𝜎𝑦1
then
𝑣A(𝑡) > 𝑣A(𝑡′) and 𝑣B(𝑡) > 𝑣B(𝑡′)
𝑣 = (𝑣A, 𝑣B)
369
A Situated games
The terminal situations 𝑡′ are those where the interpretation is incorrect. In gen-
eral, there will be many terminal situations 𝑡′ when the number of initial situa-
tions in the game is greater than two.
Both 𝑣A and 𝑣B obey the same constraints although the actual payoff numbers
may be different for the two agents. 𝑣 collects both these functions in an ordered
pair.
A.4.7 The game tuple
All the elements required for a local game are now at hand.
Definition A.12. 𝑔𝑢(𝜑1) = ⟨𝑇 , ⊂ ; 𝐴𝐶𝑇 , 𝑎𝑐𝑡 ; 𝑁 , 𝜂 ; 𝑃 ; 𝐻 ; 𝑣⟩
The full local game is of course ⟨𝑔𝑢(𝜑1),I𝑔⟩, where I𝑔 represents common knowl-
edge betweenA and B of 𝑔𝑢(𝜑1). In general, I𝑔 represents the information struc-
ture of the strategic interaction and it may range from no shared information to
full common knowledge.1 This is part of the advantage gained by the situation-
theoretic construction because it permits a natural extension of games where
common knowledge obtains to more general strategic interactions where com-
mon knowledge may not obtain.
Earlier, in Section A.1, I chose to avoid undue generality by fixing the utterance
to be 𝜑1. It is now time to relax this constraint by letting the utterance vary freely
over L.2
Definition A.13. 𝑔𝑢(𝛼)where 𝛼 ∈ L is defined analogously by replacing 𝜑1 with
𝛼 and making all other corresponding changes in each component of the game
tuple above. 𝑔𝑢(𝑒) = 𝑔𝑒 and 𝑔𝑢(0) = 𝑔0.3 G is defined to be just the collection of
all the tuples so obtained. This gives us the map 𝑔𝑢 ∶ L→ G.4
1See Parikh (2010: Section 3.3.4) for further discussion.
2Remember that L is the free monoid generated from the vocabularyW by the special concate-
nation operation ○𝐺 together with the empty string 𝑒 and the zero element 0 as mentioned in
Section 4.1. Needless to say, 𝑚𝑢(𝑒) = {1}, 𝑚𝑢(0) = {0}, and 𝑚𝑢(𝛼) = {0} when 𝛼 ∈ L is a
grammatical but meaningless expression.
3See Section 10.1.
4I have already specified in Section A.2 that we have an anchor 𝑓 such that 𝑓 ( ̇𝜑) = 𝛼 in order
to secure that 𝛼 is uttered in 𝑢. It is necessary to make the game map a total function. We can
do this as follows:
𝑔𝑢[𝑓 ](𝛼) = { 𝑔 if 𝑓 ( ̇𝜑) = 𝛼𝑔𝛼 otherwise
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This completes the construction of the local game map 𝑔𝑢 , the primary goal of
the Appendix.
Theorem A.4. 𝑔𝑢(𝛼) where 𝛼 ∈ L is a local game of partial information.
As observed above, instead of simply defining or legislating that the tuple above
is a game, the situation-theoretic construction makes this fact a consequence de-
rived from more basic assumptions. It is possible to prove that the tuple is a local
game of partial information.
Games of partial information are in many ways similar to but slightly more
general than games of incomplete information. The particular subclass of partial
information games we are concerned with – those that apply to communication
– are in fact similar to but again slightly more general than the subclass of incom-
plete information games known in economics as signaling games.
We can now introduce syntactic contents into these games and define syntac-
tic local games by using a similar function𝑚′𝑢 that maps elements of L into their
possible parse trees based on the Syntactic Constraint.
A.5 The product of two games
Now that games of partial information have been built and their collection G
identified, it is possible to define their product ⊗. What has to be done is to start
with two tuples, one for each multiplicand, and then construct the tuple for their
product, building each component one by one from the components of the mul-
tiplicands. Along the way, it is necessary to prove that each component does in
fact have all the required properties. For example, the payoff inequalities have
to be preserved in the product when they are defined to be the sum of the corre-
sponding payoffs in the multiplicands.
Once this is done, it becomes easy to show that (G, ⊗) is a monoid and that
𝑔𝑢(𝛼1 ○𝛼2) = 𝑔𝑢(𝛼1)⊗𝑔𝑢(𝛼2), facts that are required in Section 10.1 to prove that
𝑔𝑢 ∶ L→ G is an isomorphism in order to establish the universality of games of
partial information in semantics.
I leave this construction and the proofs of the corresponding facts as an exer-
cise for the reader.
where 𝑔 is the game defined above when 𝛼 is uttered in 𝑢 and where 𝑔𝛼 is the game below:
u r- r-
𝜌𝛼 = 1
𝑠𝛼 𝑡𝛼𝛼 1 0, 0
371
A Situated games
A.6 The compact form
A compact form for the locutionary global game can now be defined as discussed
in Section 8.1. This is straightforward to do as all its components have already
been constructed.
A.7 Solution concepts
The next step would be to define the notion of a strategy for such games and
examine various solution concepts. Because all the local games generated by an
utterance are interconnected through the prior probabilities, it becomes neces-
sary to extend the standard definitions of a strategy and the corresponding equi-
libria. This involves two things: one is to provide for the strategic nature of the
prior probability distributions and the other is to build a definition of global equi-
librium based on the solution concept one starts with, presumably Pareto-Nash
equilibrium. I have shown how to do this informally in Section 8.1 and the defi-
nitions do not pose any special obstacles.
Whatever solution concepts we employ, they make possible the construction
of the second basic map of Equilibrium Semantics 𝑓𝑢 ∶ G → I , whose existence
and uniqueness were established by the universality result of Section 10.1. Once
we have bothmaps 𝑔𝑢 and 𝑓𝑢 , we have essentially derived our fundamental global
fixed point equations: Equations 6 and 7 fromTheorems 8.5 and 8.6.
This completes a mathematical rendering of the core framework of Equilib-
rium Semantics from first principles. It can be extended to all the other games
mentioned at the start of the Appendix in a natural way.
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